More Gettysburg What Ifs

[Dreadpool]

The following occurred to me:

1) What if General Lee had allowed General Longstreet to take his corps out on the right of the ANV in order to try and flank the Army of the Potomac?

2) What if General Dan Sickles had not violated his orders by marching III Corps a mile out in front of Cemetery Ridge? For one thing, Sickles would not have lost his leg and almost certainly wouldn't have been awarded the MOH.

 

[Arnold d.c]

1) What if General Lee had allowed General Longstreet to take his corps out on the right of the ANV in order to try and flank the Army of the Potomac?

What Longstreet was proposing wasn't a flank attack like Chancellorsville but rather a strategic relocation of the Army of Northern Virginia about 10-15 miles south of Gettysburg to find good high ground for a second Fredericksburg. It was supposedly a sweep of many miles, necessitating a change of base for the Army of Northern Virginia. The plan made good sense in abstract, but was utterly impractical to execute.
Firstly, Lee does not even have a direct road south from Gettysburg, the southernmost road (Emmitsburg and Taneytown) were in Union hands. The best road available in Lee’s situation is the Fairfield road, which leads the AoNV southwest and is in plain sight of Buford’s cavalry division. In addition, Meade has the southernmost road, increasing the chances of Meade beating Lee to the south. Secondly, the cavalry brigades with Stuart have yet to return. Although Stuart left a few cavalry brigades with Lee, these cavalry brigades were used to cover the flank and rear of Lee’s army and Jenkins’ brigade (the cavalry brigade brought to Gettysburg) was inexperienced in conducting reconnaissance. Lee needs Stuart back to screen and scout for the offensive movement. Thirdly, it’s the dreaded L word, logistics. Lee would need to adress his supply lines and reroute his supplies. Planning for such a matter would take an entire day, let alone actually executing the task. OTL it took 24 hours for the first wagon to get out of Gettysburg after Pickett’s charge on July 3rd.

Supposing that Lee ignored all of these issues and attempted it, Meade would realize that something is up. Meade is already advantaged by the fact that he has already posted cavalry brigades to watch his left flank for any Confederate movement. By the time any Confederate offensive kicks off, Meade has already concentrated his army and is prepared for any moves by Lee. The result of Longstreet’s proposal depends on what happens next, but I think it’s safe to say that it won’t be much better to Lee’s decision to attack on July 2nd.

Or are you perhaps referring to Hood's proposal (move around the southern edges of the Round Tops and strike Cemetery Ridge)?

2) What if General Dan Sickles had not violated his orders by marching III Corps a mile out in front of Cemetery Ridge? For one thing, Sickles would not have lost his leg and almost certainly wouldn't have been awarded the MOH.

Well, Day 2 would not have been such a costly day for the Union. While Sickles had a right to feel uneasy about the high ground (Peach Orchard) in front of him, most artillery officers saw the Peach Orchard did not see it the same way. They saw it as contested ground, that could be controlled by the Union artillery arrayed all along the Cemetery Ridge line. By remaining at Cemetery Ridge, Sickles' III Corps would have been within reach of the V Corps. IOTL
Sickles' 10,000 men were too far for the V Corps to intervene until 30-45 minutes had passed.

The III Corps would have been positioned along the southern extremity of Cemetery Ridge to the foot of Little Round Top. ITTL the III Corps is not stretched to the point that they have not immediate reserves. Longstreet's actions must also be considered. Due to abysmal reconnaissance work, Longstreet's attack was aiming at a mythical Union flank. The original concept for the Confederate attack had Longstreet's men deploying across the Emmitsburg Road, facing northeast, towards what the Rebel leadership thought was an exposed Union flank resting about halfway between Cemetery Hill and Little Round Top - in effect the Confederates thought that the Union line ended with the Federal Second Corps. Had Longstreet reached the Peach Orchard unmolested and deployed as intended, his line would have had to advance not towards the Union Third Corps line but instead parallel to it, from south to north. Would Longstreet have tried to find the flank at the cost of precious daylight? Would Longstreet still strike, come hell or high water?

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

The more I read about Gettysburg, the more I've realized that the Army of Northern Virginia had gotten itself into a Jutland situation.

That is they had raided Pennsylvania (successfully) and then the Army of the Potomac had positioned itself between the Army of Northern Virginia and home. The best strategic outcome for the Army of Northern Virginia, as with the German High Seas Fleet at Jutland, at that point was to get home without too many losses. In this strategic situation, there was a lot of scope for the Union/ British to do better and destroy a good part of the Confederates/ Germans. There wasn't that much scope for a better Confederate/ German outcome if the tactical stuff had gone differently.

In both circumstances, for the raiders to get home some sort of battle was unavoidable because of the operational positions of the armies/ fleets.

Now I am exaggerating how similar these situations were because tactically at Jutland, the Germans inflicted more losses on the British then they themselves took adn still returned to base as a fighting force. The Army of Northern Virginia took more losses than the Army of Northern Potomac so Gettysburg wasn't even a tactical Confederate victory. But if Lee had dis-engaged on the second day of the battle and gotten away, the Jutland analogy would have fit perfectly well. Lee's mistake was to stay around and keep fighting for a few more days. I don't find anything to criticize with how either Meade or Jellicoe handled their battles, while the British had problems at Jutland tactically, it was due entirely to various issues with their battlecruiser arm.