More European oil fields discovered before WW2

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Because they couldn't occupy at all, and they know it especially with sticking to the plan from OTL (4 phases)

I dont understand.

They did have bombers capable of reaching everything when bases in Kuban (He111, Ju88) and did IOTL bomb some of the oil targets inside their reach doing major damage (Grozny/Tiblisi), so could put it out of commission if they tried by September before defenses were organized.


Because IOTL they were able to to great effect against the targets they chose and Baku wasn't defended from aerial attack effectively until some time in September. By then the damage would be done.

You missed the point. Yes they did the damage, but "why settle for bombing when you know that this can be defended against and worked around eventually?" Damage can be repaired. Germany has learned that from bombing britain...


Given the damage inflicted and the assumption IOTL by the German command that the Soviets had suffered a mortal blow and the move against Stalingrad/Maykop would be the knockout blow (the further rush south was out of desperate need of oil rather than a knock out attempt), at the time that seemed like all that was needed to win. As we know with hindsight Stalingrad and Maykop already were badly overstretching German forces and anything beyond that, impossible due to time tables of the OTL pre-split plan, was logistical beyond their capabilities.

So do the germans now think bombing stalingrad and the caucasus will win the war in the east? I dont understand. If they are more cautious, then there needs be a reason. If there is a reason, then the assumption that one needs to be more cautious cannot logically follow to the conclusion that settling to bombing will bring victory. Maybe my english is not good enough to present it, but it seems like a contradiction to me.
 

Deleted member 1487

I dont understand.
Basically the 4 phase plan had them stop at Maykop and try and go further in 1943. So the plan itself was to stop short and not capture most of the oil anyway until Hitler changed it in 1942 during the campaign.

You missed the point. Yes they did the damage, but "why settle for bombing when you know that this can be defended against and worked around eventually?" Damage can be repaired. Germany has learned that from bombing britain...
Because IOTL the damage couldn't be repaired in wartime and was mostly done after the war ended. The Germans expected their bomb damage to stick, which it mostly did (along with the panicked Soviet demolition of their oil production).


So do the germans now think bombing stalingrad and the caucasus will win the war in the east? I dont understand. If they are more cautious, then there needs be a reason. If there is a reason, then the assumption that one needs to be more cautious cannot logically follow to the conclusion that settling to bombing will bring victory. Maybe my english is not good enough to present it, but it seems like a contradiction to me.
As far as I can tell they did think taking Stalingrad and interrupting the flow of the Volga while eventually capturing the oil in 1943 (based on pre-campaign plans) would end the war in the East. They thought the Soviets were done and their offensive would be the final nail in the coffin. Of course they thought wrong, just as they did in 1941. Like choking someone out in Judo they thought that sitting on the Volga and taking out oil resources would finish off the Soviets, so sitting on the Volga and bombing the oil was thought to be enough to end the war in the East and free up the army to turn west. Of course it became increasingly obvious that that was a faulty assumption by the end of the year.
 
Basically the 4 phase plan had them stop at Maykop and try and go further in 1943. So the plan itself was to stop short and not capture most of the oil anyway until Hitler changed it in 1942 during the campaign.

Oh i see. But i was talking about taking Stalingrad vs bombing it. Also phase 4 was not detailed at all in contrast to the other 3 phases.

Because IOTL the damage couldn't be repaired in wartime and was mostly done after the war ended. The Germans expected their bomb damage to stick, which it mostly did (along with the panicked Soviet demolition of their oil production).

How could they expect that?



As far as I can tell they did think taking Stalingrad and interrupting the flow of the Volga while eventually capturing the oil in 1943 (based on pre-campaign plans) would end the war in the East. They thought the Soviets were done and their offensive would be the final nail in the coffin. Of course they thought wrong, just as they did in 1941. Like choking someone out in Judo they thought that sitting on the Volga and taking out oil resources would finish off the Soviets, so sitting on the Volga and bombing the oil was thought to be enough to end the war in the East and free up the army to turn west. Of course it became increasingly obvious that that was a faulty assumption by the end of the year.

And here it is where i see the contradiction again: If the germans iotl were biased in their intelligence (read crappy) abut the soviets and overextendend themselves, then if they are more cautious iatl, moving up to the don only, that would indicate their intelligence about soviet capabilities and reserves would be more accurate and paint a picture where the soviets would NOT surrender just because a couple german bombers bomb stalingrad, volga shipping and caucasian oilfields. Clearly some production in stalingrad would *not* be bombed, some shipping using the volga would *not* be stopped, some oil-production would *not* be destroyed, if no german crosses the don, no panicked soviet demolition of oil production occurs either. So the overall effect would be even less, not more than iotl, if the wehrmacht just dug in on the don.

IOTL the volga shipping was stopped, production in stalingrad nonexistant, oilproduction damaged by luftwaffe and soviets, yet that didnt bring victory. How, if the reich has better intel and is more cautious, can they expect to win in ATL by doing less than OTL?
And if they dont have better intel, why are they more cautious exactly?
 

Deleted member 1487

How could they expect that?
Like the British they overestimated their ability to inflict damage. However judging by the damage they did inflict IOTL via bombing Soviet oil, they might have done a lot of irreparable damage (at least during wartime).



And here it is where i see the contradiction again: If the germans iotl were biased in their intelligence (read crappy) abut the soviets and overextendend themselves, then if they are more cautious iatl, moving up to the don only, that would indicate their intelligence about soviet capabilities and reserves would be more accurate and paint a picture where the soviets would NOT surrender just because a couple german bombers bomb stalingrad, volga shipping and caucasian oilfields. Clearly some production in stalingrad would *not* be bombed, some shipping using the volga would *not* be stopped, some oil-production would *not* be destroyed, if no german crosses the don, no panicked soviet demolition of oil production occurs either. So the overall effect would be even less, not more than iotl, if the wehrmacht just dug in on the don.

IOTL the volga shipping was stopped, production in stalingrad nonexistant, oilproduction damaged by luftwaffe and soviets, yet that didnt bring victory. How, if the reich has better intel and is more cautious, can they expect to win in ATL by doing less than OTL?
And if they dont have better intel, why are they more cautious exactly?
Fair point, but it wouldn't be the Soviet resistance holding them back per se, rather the logistic strain of putting significant forces into the Caucasus, whch was a major problem IOTL; they disregarded the logistics problems IOTL by forcing it against the plan because of the desperate need for oil, which won't happen here; instead they will try and focus on interdicting the Volga in 1942 and capturing a sustainable territorial base in the North Caucasus before winter, so that they could sustain and advance south in 1943, as per the plan. The forces staying on the Volga would be there to guard the flanks and keep the pressure on until the Soviet economy withered due to the interdiction and bombing of oil.
 
No way the Germans could put Baku out of commission. The place is piss easy to repair. Pretty much grabbing some Gulag labor and having them dig down 40 feet would enable some degree of production. Not to mention trying to hold the Don river bend is wholly inadequate to secure the left flank of a drive into the Caucasus. To demonstrate why, I drew a map...

o0AOBXN.png


instead they will try and focus on interdicting the Volga in 1942 and capturing a sustainable territorial base in the North Caucasus before winter, so that they could sustain and advance south in 1943, as per the plan.
The former was done IOTL and resulted in nothing, as the Soviets simply built a new rail line further east. The latter is impossible to achieve: the Germans were unable to consolidate any of their gains south of the Don at any point IOTL. The correlation of forces will swing in favor of the Soviets by winter like IOTL, which means the Germans are going to lose all of their territorial gains (along with a ton of lives) over the winter.

The forces staying on the Volga would be there to guard the flanks
What forces on the Volga? You had them stop at the Don bend, remember?

until the Soviet economy withered due to the interdiction and bombing of oil.
So in other words when something that is never going to happen happens. You really do belong in OKH.
 
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ITTL oil production is at least sufficient for Axis?

what effects on the German-Soviet Commercial Agreements?

my thinking is that USSR is NEVER going to be placed in critical position of oil shortage however Axis might have traded for enough grain and other foodstuffs that their invasion (and capture of further supplies) could have a critical effect.
 

Deleted member 1487

No way the Germans could put Baku out of commission. The place is piss easy to repair. Pretty much grabbing some Gulag labor and having them dig down 40 feet would enable some degree of production. Not to mention trying to hold the Don river bend is wholly inadequate to secure the left flank of a drive into the Caucasus. To demonstrate why, I drew a map...



The former was done IOTL and resulted in nothing, as the Soviets simply built a new rail line further east. The latter is impossible to achieve: the Germans were unable to consolidate any of their gains south of the Don at any point IOTL. The correlation of forces will swing in favor of the Soviets by winter like IOTL, which means the Germans are going to lose all of their territorial gains (along with a ton of lives) over the winter.

What forces on the Volga? You had them stop at the Don bend, remember?

So in other words when something that is never going to happen happens. You really do belong in OKH.

I misspoke and meant the Volga, not the Don. I wasn't advocating how I'd do it, rather what the OKH plan was IOTL before Hitler altered it. Yes theoretically Baku could be put back into production if the right drilling equipment and pumps could be built and put back into place, but as you yourself have claimed in other threads Soviet oil production in the Caucasus took years to recover after the war, so there is a lot more to it than simply digging a hole; there it needs to be drilled, sealed, and pressurized as to not let out the gases and required a lot of special equipment and Western help to help them get it into modern production.
 
No way the Germans could put Baku out of commission. The place is piss easy to repair.

Problem with Baku was the areas around there were saturated down to bedrock with crude oil due to leaks from pipelines and casings, plus they were even storing crude in open air pits, and even dammed off valleys.

Open lakes of Oil.

Oh, and that's still going on is some areas of Russia, today.

pic05-melt.jpg



A good enough raid with incendiaries, it would be very difficult to extinguish
 

Deleted member 1487

The Allies certainly thought so:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Pike
The French diplomat René Massigli, in a report to Paris, noted that American oil engineers observed "as a result of the manner in which the oil fields have been exploited, the earth is so saturated with oil that fire could spread immediately to the entire neighboring region; it would be months before it could be extinguished and years before work could be resumed again."[1]
https://books.google.com/books?id=39Q6uCjQEWQC&pg=PA108&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=39Q6uCjQEWQC&pg=PA146#v=onepage&q&f=false
 
is an invasion of USSR less likely with more Axis oil resources?

(based on the fact their trade deals with Soviets probably are not as large and they probably have more ability to continue payments)
 

Deleted member 1487

is an invasion of USSR less likely with more Axis oil resources?

(based on the fact their trade deals with Soviets probably are not as large and they probably have more ability to continue payments)
Probably not, because Germany needed all the other resources besides oil.
 
is an invasion of USSR less likely with more Axis oil resources?

(based on the fact their trade deals with Soviets probably are not as large and they probably have more ability to continue payments)

Probably not, because Germany needed all the other resources besides oil.

of course they had to trade with Soviets to circumvent the Allied blockade, just think they would be in MARGINAL better position with deals that exclude oil (they have their own) and ITTL they would have enough coal to send in partial payment.
 

Deleted member 1487

of course they had to trade with Soviets to circumvent the Allied blockade, just think they would be in MARGINAL better position with deals that exclude oil (they have their own) and ITTL they would have enough coal to send in partial payment.
The USSR didn't need coal. Germany could trade that to Italy or Romania instead. They would probably benefit from continuing to trade for OTL levels of oil from the USSR before the invasion due to oil needs not being met ITTL until 1943 when that year's synthetic production expansion was complete. Perhaps though they can invest the savings on not needing to expand it as much into earlier high octane fuels for their aircraft.
 
I misspoke and meant the Volga, not the Don.

Not possible except in the immediate Stalingrad vicinity. The Germans do not have the assets to support an advance across the Kalmyk steppes which would be required to secure the lower Volga.

Yes theoretically Baku could be put back into production if the right drilling equipment and pumps could be built and put back into place,
Which would be a matter of shipping them in via train or across the Caspian Sea.

but as you yourself have claimed in other threads Soviet oil production in the Caucasus took years to recover after the war,
Actually, to ensure some degree of production digging a hole is pretty much 90% of what you need to do. To get production to the levels the Soviets did pre- and post-war, you need to do a lot more then that. And in any case, even if the Germans did somehow destroy 100% of Soviet oil production in the Caucasus it still would not be enough to stop the Soviet war industry given that the Volga-Ural fields came online in the same period.

Problem with Baku was the areas around there were saturated down to bedrock with crude oil due to leaks from pipelines and casings, plus they were even storing crude in open air pits, and even dammed off valleys.

Which does not mean the Germans would be able to burn down the whole thing. Maybe large parts of it, sure. But the Soviets would repair the damage with varying degrees of rapidity and ensure that some degree of production continues. Especially once the Soviet winter offensive drives the Germans out of the Caucasus.

A good enough raid with incendiaries, it would be very difficult to extinguish
If it were that flammable, the entirety of Baku would have burned down in the 30's. Industrial accidents are a thing.


The WAllies also thought that a few good raids would knock Ploesti and any number of targets out. If strategic bombing had been that easy, the German war industry would have collapsed in 1942. Both the attackers and defenders always overestimated the potential disruptions strategic bombing could cause, with the only difference being the attackers overestimations tended to be greater.

Any contemporary assessment of a strategic bombing raid from the attack planners of how much damage an attack would do is not worth the paper they are written on. They were, almost without exception, wildly optimistic. And they mean even less if they're for a raid that wasn't even conducted.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Not possible except in the immediate Stalingrad vicinity. The Germans do not have the assets to support an advance across the Kalmyk steppes which would be required to secure the lower Volga.
Fine, agreed.


Which would be a matter of shipping them in via train or across the Caspian Sea.
If they could make any themselves or source it via LL. Why didn't they get replacements IOTL via LL given the major destruction IOTL? Also why did it take until the 1950s to get production back to pre-war levels?

If it were that flammable, the entirety of Baku would have burned down in the 30's. Industrial accidents are a thing.
Industrial accidents and widespread thermite incendiary drops are very different things. Industrial accidents can be controlled, but widespread thermite bombs starting dispersed fires are another animal entirely.


The WAllies also thought that a few good raids would knock Ploesti and any number of targets out. If strategic bombing had been that easy, the German war industry would have collapsed in 1942. Both the attackers and defenders always overestimated the potential disruptions strategic bombing could cause, with the only difference being the attackers overestimations tended to be greater.

Any pre-raid contemporary assessment of a strategic bombing raid from the attack planners of how much damage an attack would do is not worth the paper they are written on. They were, almost without exception, wildly optimistic. And they mean even less if they're for a raid that wasn't even conducted.
Ploesti and Baku are vastly different situations. Ploesti was defended by one of the best air defense systems in the world and it targeted the refineries, not the fields. Due to the defenses AND the excess refining capacity even with 50% of the refineries knocked out by Allied bombing IOTL they were able to continue pretty much at capacity of what they were pumping out of the earth and delivering to the Axis because the amounts being pumped out were declining.

When Germany attacked Gronzy and Tiblisi refineries they had far greater success knocking them out for the duration than the Allies had at Ploesti, partially because the USSR had shifted production to war materials and IIRC had sourced their equipment from the West pre-war and for some reason did not get replacements via LL.
 
If they could make any themselves or source it via LL. Why didn't they get replacements IOTL via LL given the major destruction IOTL? Also why did it take until the 1950s to get production back to pre-war levels?

Probably because most of the effort was going into getting the new oil fields in the Volga-Ural and the accompanying refining capacity online. The success of these fields probably meant that the restoration of the Caucasus oil fell down the priority list. Overall Soviet fuel (note: not oil) production increased in this time period, after all.

Which likely means the Soviets wouldn't case that much even if the Germans somehow succeeded in successfully torching Baku as the Volga-Ural fields made it somewhat superfluous.

Ploesti and Baku are vastly different situations.

Except for the part where the WAllies vastly overestimated both what they could and did do.

When Germany attacked Gronzy and Tiblisi refineries they had far greater success knocking them out for the duration than the Allies had at Ploesti,

The damage from the bombing actually seems to have been rather minor (during the whole war, a grand total of a single bomb actually landed in Baku). Pretty much the only place noticeably affected by actual fighting was Maikop, which was deliberately and systematically blown up by the Soviets. The main reason for the fall in production in the Caucasus according to this article* was actually the overproduction in 1941-42... the Soviets had basically driven their own machinery past the breaking point.

*I should throw out the caveat that I'm unsure how much stock to put in that article. It's tone is decidedly... odd and some of the other information is at odds with some other stuff.
 
Suppose oil was discovered off the coast of Norway. Would they be able to exploit it with the technology available at the time? And who would get to it first? Would Norway claim the oil, or would it be in international waters. Britain may a preemptive strike to get the oil before the Germans do.
If Britain invades Norway first, that might put a damper on lend-lease.
 

Deleted member 1487

The damage from the bombing actually seems to have been rather minor (during the whole war, a grand total of a single bomb actually landed in Baku). Pretty much the only place noticeably affected by actual fighting was Maikop, which was deliberately and systematically blown up by the Soviets. The main reason for the fall in production in the Caucasus according to this article* was actually the overproduction in 1941-42... the Soviets had basically driven their own machinery past the breaking point.

*I should throw out the caveat that I'm unsure how much stock to put in that article. It's tone is decidedly... odd and some of the other information is at odds with some other stuff.
Um, how does the fact that a single bomb landed in Baku have anything to do with the bombing of Grozny?

http://www.joelhayward.org/luftwaffevssovietoil.htm
On 10 October, Richthofen hurled almost every operational bomber his air fleet possessed against the Grozny refineries.[50] Bomber units, like those of the other aircraft types, was now in poor shape. Richthofen had started Operation Blau with an impressive force of 480 bombers, of which 323 (a reasonable 67 per cent) were serviceable.[51] Now he had only 232 bombers, of which a mere 129 (55 per cent) were serviceable. They could still deliver reasonable blows to single targets, however. The damage they and dive-bombers inflicted on Grozny reminded Richthofen of attacks on Sevastopol during June 1942; huge flames leapt from shattered fuel tanks and burst pipes, and dense clouds of smoke rose high into the air.[52] He was delighted, joyfully noting in his diary the following evening that smoke clouds were still 5,500 meters high. He repeated the attacks two nights later[53], with equally pleasing results.

Richthofen's air attacks on Grozny did considerable material damage, but placed no strain whatsoever on the Soviet economy and war effort. After all, the combined output of both Maikop and Grozny only amounted to around ten per cent of the Soviet Union's total output. Maikop's capture and Grozny's wrecking doubtless annoyed the Soviet leadership, but, with Baku's immense output left untouched, these were certainly not going to plunge the Soviet military and civilian economies into a period of hardship.
In fact, the threat of a German advance to Baku had already done far more damage; before the Germans even entered the Caucasus that threat had caused the evacuation of much machinery and the closure of many wells.[59] The German entry into the Caucasus then placed great strains on Soviet logistical capabilities, having made necessary huge detours. Oil had to travel across the Caspian Sea to Krasnovdsk and up through Turkmenia to Orenburg in order to arrive back in the nation's interior. A lack of vessels, trains and storage facilities exacerbated these problems. Thus, the loss of Maikop and Grozny paled into insignificance compared to these difficulties. Only Baku's loss or heavy damage could have crippled the Soviet Union, and Hitler had blown his opportunity in August.

Although he inflicted pleasing damage on a few refineries and oilfields, particularly at Grozny, he proved woefully incapable of crippling Soviet oil production.
 

Deleted member 1487

Suppose oil was discovered off the coast of Norway. Would they be able to exploit it with the technology available at the time? And who would get to it first? Would Norway claim the oil, or would it be in international waters. Britain may a preemptive strike to get the oil before the Germans do.
If Britain invades Norway first, that might put a damper on lend-lease.
No, that technology didn't exist until the 60s/70s and wasn't really economical to recover until the 1970s/80s. Before then even shale oil was more viable, especially in the 1930s/40s and apparently Germany put in large efforts to exploit Estonian shale oil, but just as it was getting online in 1944 it was overrun by the Soviets and demolished by retreating German forces who evacuated Estonian specialists to work in Germany.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_shale_in_Estonia#Developments_in_German-occupied_Estonia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Desert_(German_fuel_project)
 
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