More Emphasis on Artillery after World War II?

Delta Force

Banned
Artillery seems to have significantly declined in prominence since World War II in favor of support from aircraft and missiles. However, aircraft and missiles take at least a few minutes to reach the site of a battle and can do little more than observation after deploying their payload (although air strikes are on par with a salvo from a heavy cruiser or battleship), and historically aerial bombs tended to be less accurate than artillery fire (although this has changed with the widespread adoption of guidance systems for aerial bombs but not for artillery).

There are obviously range and payload limitations for artillery, but what if it were emphasized more after World War II, especially as a means of providing forces with organic fire support and in support of ground forces during urban operations?
 
I hate to disappoint, so as a former artilleryman I'll sling my $0.02 in.

Artillery has some important strengths as fire support. As you say it is quick to respond, accurate, and not hampered by weather. It's relatively cheap as well - a 100mm mortar battery costs much less than a fighter-bomber, even after we allow for some fire-control computers etc. Artillerymen need different qualities and skills to infantry or armour, but it is certainly not impossible to teach these things. And the value of having this organic fire support is well-known - take a look at Soviet TO&Es, and note how many mortar and artillery batteries are present in a motor rifle division.

It does however add a not-inconsiderable logistical burden to a force, and it isn't terribly effective in urban fighting (it tends to produce more rubble than casualties). Geometry and topology has an effect on what targets can be struck and with what effect, especially for rockets. At higher levels, there's also an issue of flexibility. The same A-4 Skyhawk that is dropping bombs in the Sinai right now can be hitting the Golan Heights this afternoon, so it's easy to see how this might seem attractive. The Soviets were great believers in artillery, partly as a result of their experience in WW2. But if you want to change Western attitudes to it, you would probably have to do something with their expectations of air superiority. If SAMs and light AA were perceived as being more effective this might be enough on its own - perhaps air strikes during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War get massacred by a SAM trap, or American strikes in Vietnam get shredded by ZSU-23/4s.

Edit: Shot, over!
 
The latest and fanciest artillery shells enjoy terminal guidance that relies on GPS.

As for limited range ..... HAH!
Back during the 1960s Canadian-born engineer Gerald Bull was shooting small satellites into orbit. When I toured his test-range
(early 1960s in Southern Quebec) he bragged that his guns could hit Moscow!
 
I think the best way to achieve this is to have the technology to enable artillery shells to be almost insanely accurate almost like how missiles are just after WWII or even in the last stages of WWII; something like computer chips within them can do the trick, though it would have to be like after the 70's for this to happen.
 
The latest and fanciest artillery shells enjoy terminal guidance that relies on GPS.

As for limited range ..... HAH!
Back during the 1960s Canadian-born engineer Gerald Bull was shooting small satellites into orbit. When I toured his test-range
(early 1960s in Southern Quebec) he bragged that his guns could hit Moscow!

Sure, but Bull's guns were something of a special case. They were also not exactly battlefield weapons. While artillery may have a role as a space-launch system, I doubt they will be the same guns that are providing fire support for the targets - err, infantry. However, you're quite right that smart munitions are changing what artillery is capable of. When you combine that precision with ramjet-powered rounds, the distinction between an artillery salvo and a missile strike starts to blur quite a bit.
 
One, Bull never placed a projectile in orbit. Yes his saboted rounds fired from modified 16x50 naval rifles on Barbados did reach pretty spetacular ranges he was well short of orbit. Cosider the shell is going to have to leave the gun at higher than orbital speed simply due to the friction of slamming through the atmosphere
 
Artillery was still queen of the battlefield in Vietnam, Falklands and PGW 91, when there were concentrations of enemy to shell. Artillery has only lost favour in the GWOT because aircraft can cover much more area to snipe at handfuls of rifle toting guerrillas (to pump up AQ and ISIS), if these organisations ever get enough power to concentrate into battalions or above and conduct anything more that a nuisance attack then the guns will be wheeled out again.
 
Artillery was still queen of the battlefield in Vietnam, Falklands and PGW 91, when there were concentrations of enemy to shell. Artillery has only lost favour in the GWOT because aircraft can cover much more area to snipe at handfuls of rifle toting guerrillas (to pump up AQ and ISIS), if these organisations ever get enough power to concentrate into battalions or above and conduct anything more that a nuisance attack then the guns will be wheeled out again.

I'm not in a position to comment on the role of artillery in Vietnam or PGW 91. I am in a position to comment on the value of artillery in the Falklands.

The vast majority of useful fire support that came in was from the grey war canoes nearby, which were dedicated to supporting a particular mission. For example, when 42 Cdo took Mt Harriet, the Marines could call in supporting fire from the Navy, but because of the nature of the operation, there was no preliminary bombardment. There wasn't a huge need for supporting gunfire, and the advance could be summarised as: "Marines move towards the next strong point. They sit behind a rock, have a quick grumble about life in general, and decide how to take out the strong point, be it by throwing a 66 at it, or - if close enough - lobbing a couple of grenades, or calling up the grey war canoe. There's a bang, followed by Marines approaching while the rubble is coming down, a brief duffy, and then move on to the next strong point, persuading any individuals not wearing berets that they were not welcome."

Logistically, supplying artillery in the Falklands was a nightmare. They never had enough shells, and the whole shoot-and-scoot business was a bit problematic given the nature of the terrain, which meant that scooting happened at the speed of an arthritic snail, and it's not the smartest idea to stay in one place if the other side have more guns and shells than you do. Furthermore, in most places in the Falklands, the terrain just sort of swallows an artillery shell, and people nearby get showered in mud, but with limited effect. It's only really effective on the mountains, where artillery shells create lots of lovely rock chips rather than sinking six feet into a peat bog.

I can't speak for Vietnam or PGW 91. I wasn't there. I can speak for the Falklands. Artillery, queen of the battlefield? Only if you define being queen as sitting around, not doing a huge amount, but soaking up huge resources while doing so, occasionally drinking a G&T while the poor sods at the sharp end do all the work. So I guess you have a point.

In the other direction, the Argentine artillery was of limited effectiveness. They certainly shelled positions they'd recently lost, fairly accurately. In particular, they shelled Mount Harriet soon after it was taken, with the net effect of wounding a single Marine Lt who was caught out in the open while making sure his troop were properly under cover. On the plus side, I ended up marrying the nurse who was looking after me after I was cas-evaced out, so I guess I finished ahead of the game.

The Falklands was about the boots with the berets and the pointy bang-sticks. Everything else was just special effect.

Mind you, there are those who might accuse me of being biased on the topic.
 
Last edited:
I think the best way to achieve this is to have the technology to enable artillery shells to be almost insanely accurate almost like how missiles are just after WWII or even in the last stages of WWII; something like computer chips within them can do the trick, though it would have to be like after the 70's for this to happen.

We already do. The Copperhead was a 155 round developed in the 1980s and is laser guided. There are GPS guided rounds similar in function to the JDAM for both artillery and mortars. The US Army has pushed digitisation of the field artillery team down to the individual gun and FO team that links them seamlessly to the FDC. Modern FA is still amazingly deadly.


/also a former artilleryman
 
Naval artillery was uniquely useful in the Falklands and a major reason why Britain got away with fighting with only 30 105mm howitzers. However the commanders allocated some 85% of helicopter sorties to hauling guns and ammo to support the final attacks, with guns often firing 600 rounds in a day, giving a good indication of how important the commanders on the spot thought the artillery was.

In any case the point still stands, air support and direct fire from AFVs etc played a very minor role compared to the guns both on land and on ships.
 

Delta Force

Banned
We already do. The Copperhead was a 155 round developed in the 1980s and is laser guided. There are GPS guided rounds similar in function to the JDAM for both artillery and mortars. The US Army has pushed digitisation of the field artillery team down to the individual gun and FO team that links them seamlessly to the FDC. Modern FA is still amazingly deadly.


/also a former artilleryman

Wasn't Copperhead procurement quite limited due to its high cost?
 
Naval artillery was uniquely useful in the Falklands and a major reason why Britain got away with fighting with only 30 105mm howitzers. However the commanders allocated some 85% of helicopter sorties to hauling guns and ammo to support the final attacks, with guns often firing 600 rounds in a day, giving a good indication of how important the commanders on the spot thought the artillery was.

In any case the point still stands, air support and direct fire from AFVs etc played a very minor role compared to the guns both on land and on ships.

As one of the commanders on the spot, albeit at a fairly low level (No 2 Troop, K Company, 42 Cdo) involved in both Mount Kent and Mount Harriet, I think I’m in a good position to comment on the effectiveness or otherwise of shells and other long-distance fireworks in the patch of peat bog that I saw.

It’s certainly true that air delivered ground support (from the British POV) was essentially non-existent. Whether it would have been effective is something we’ll never know for sure; the Harriers were rather busy with other matters. So I totally agree that artillery (land, sea) was more important than planes dropping things that go bang on the innocent soldiers below.

The helicopter lift capacity was derisory, and much of it was given over to the artillery (and never mind actually taking supplies to No 2 Troop, K Company, 42 Cdo when we were sitting on Mount Kent, having taken the “unoccupied” feature, and were awaiting a counter-attack with more Marines than rounds between us, and a grand total of three grenades. But did we get resupply? No, just a message to say our gun support was being withdrawn during daylight hours).

I can be very specific on the assault on Mount Harriet. The assault was quiet, meaning no preliminary barrage. This was quite useful, as Longdon and Twin Sisters were both noisy assaults, which meant that the Argentine forces were looking at the bangs and flashes to the north, while we approached from the south. During the assault, my Troop called on naval gunfire for maybe a half dozen positions (I can’t be certain of the precise number; I wasn’t taking notes). Given that we were on the far right of the advance, we were bumping up against the majority of the supporting positions (being located in the “secured” part of the Argentine position). We probably accounted for around 25% of the calls for gunfire support.

What would have been different if that support wasn’t available? We’d have used more 66s, which would have been a bit quicker, but would have exposed us to a slightly greater risk. Gunfire support was particularly useful during the mid-phase of the battle. Speed was important at the start, to make inroads while they were still unsure what was going on, so we used 66s. This had the added benefit that we no longer needed to carry the things. In the end-phase, we needed to be much more controlled about application of bangs, because of intermingling, and the consequent need to avoid blue-on-blue, so we tended to use whatever we had left. A rock proved surprisingly effective at getting Argentine troops to vacate a mortar position. They seemed to assume we had lobbed in a grenade. It was dark, they were nervous.

I guess my main objection is the attitude by some that seems to place near deification on artillery support (queen of the battlefield). In the very specific and unusual circumstances of the Falklands, the heavy lifting was done by the guys with the pointy sticks. The artillery soaked up the logistical support that could have been better used making sure the guys with the green berets got their nutty, sports pages, and ammunition. But I freely admit other views are possible.

How effective was the artillery (wherever it came from)? When it was directed fire called in by people on the spot, very. When there was no such direction, not so much.

Which I guess is a long-winded way (hey, professionally, I get paid by the word, so of course I’m long-winded) of saying you’re correct, with a caveat.
 
Wasn't Copperhead procurement quite limited due to its high cost?

It was from what I understand but it was still widespread enough that we trained as FOs to do laser marked call for fires. Excalibur and the 120mm rounds were used in Afghanistan after they were introduced but usage there has rolled down as artillery use in general declined.

The firing bases we've established around Mosul probably have had a chance to use them.
 
There is no universal solution. My sole experience of being at the batting end of artillery rather than the bowling end on hard ground convinced me it can deny ground, isolate ground and make a brown trouser salesman very happy. On the other hand David on soft peat and my father on the receiving end of French 75s in soft Syrian sand shows that ground bursts are of limited value as is air bursts on prepared positions. At the end of the day the Mk1 boot and the pointy stick have to arrive to take and keep ground.

BTW, and entirely OT, if I had gone south for the winter I had planned to take a huge pot of vaseline with me (don't snigger children and make comments on the traditions of the Grey Funnel Line) as protection against trench foot as advised by my grandfather from WW1.
 
There is no universal solution. My sole experience of being at the batting end of artillery rather than the bowling end on hard ground convinced me it can deny ground, isolate ground and make a brown trouser salesman very happy. On the other hand David on soft peat and my father on the receiving end of French 75s in soft Syrian sand shows that ground bursts are of limited value as is air bursts on prepared positions. At the end of the day the Mk1 boot and the pointy stick have to arrive to take and keep ground.

BTW, and entirely OT, if I had gone south for the winter I had planned to take a huge pot of vaseline with me (don't snigger children and make comments on the traditions of the Grey Funnel Line) as protection against trench foot as advised by my grandfather from WW1.

Along with incredibly useful condoms. They keep muck out of rifle barrels.
 
deification on artillery support

I don't rate it as the most important fire support option because it was all things to all men in the Falklands, rather by a process of elimination discount helicopter gunships (a couple of Scouts fired some SS11s), fixed wing CAS (126 GR3 sorties) AFV direct fire support (2 Scorpions/4 Scimitars) as the major sources of fire support. This leaves the 4.5" guns of the ships and the 5 batteries of 105mm howitzers as the major source of fire support, being the only sources left, rather than being all conquering.

But my original point was that compared to todays GWOT, where helicopters and aircraft deliver single guided missiles/bombs, the Falklands used artillery in the old fashioned way; concentrating batteries/regiments/ships and firing thousands of rounds in a single battle.
 
Top