Naval artillery was uniquely useful in the Falklands and a major reason why Britain got away with fighting with only 30 105mm howitzers. However the commanders allocated some 85% of helicopter sorties to hauling guns and ammo to support the final attacks, with guns often firing 600 rounds in a day, giving a good indication of how important the commanders on the spot thought the artillery was.
In any case the point still stands, air support and direct fire from AFVs etc played a very minor role compared to the guns both on land and on ships.
As one of the commanders on the spot, albeit at a fairly low level (No 2 Troop, K Company, 42 Cdo) involved in both Mount Kent and Mount Harriet, I think I’m in a good position to comment on the effectiveness or otherwise of shells and other long-distance fireworks in the patch of peat bog that I saw.
It’s certainly true that air delivered ground support (from the British POV) was essentially non-existent. Whether it would have been effective is something we’ll never know for sure; the Harriers were rather busy with other matters. So I totally agree that artillery (land, sea) was more important than planes dropping things that go bang on the innocent soldiers below.
The helicopter lift capacity was derisory, and much of it was given over to the artillery (and never mind actually taking supplies to No 2 Troop, K Company, 42 Cdo when we were sitting on Mount Kent, having taken the “unoccupied” feature, and were awaiting a counter-attack with more Marines than rounds between us, and a grand total of three grenades. But did we get resupply? No, just a message to say our gun support was being withdrawn during daylight hours).
I can be very specific on the assault on Mount Harriet. The assault was quiet, meaning no preliminary barrage. This was quite useful, as Longdon and Twin Sisters were both noisy assaults, which meant that the Argentine forces were looking at the bangs and flashes to the north, while we approached from the south. During the assault, my Troop called on naval gunfire for maybe a half dozen positions (I can’t be certain of the precise number; I wasn’t taking notes). Given that we were on the far right of the advance, we were bumping up against the majority of the supporting positions (being located in the “secured” part of the Argentine position). We probably accounted for around 25% of the calls for gunfire support.
What would have been different if that support wasn’t available? We’d have used more 66s, which would have been a bit quicker, but would have exposed us to a slightly greater risk. Gunfire support was particularly useful during the mid-phase of the battle. Speed was important at the start, to make inroads while they were still unsure what was going on, so we used 66s. This had the added benefit that we no longer needed to carry the things. In the end-phase, we needed to be much more controlled about application of bangs, because of intermingling, and the consequent need to avoid blue-on-blue, so we tended to use whatever we had left. A rock proved surprisingly effective at getting Argentine troops to vacate a mortar position. They seemed to assume we had lobbed in a grenade. It was dark, they were nervous.
I guess my main objection is the attitude by some that seems to place near deification on artillery support (queen of the battlefield). In the very specific and unusual circumstances of the Falklands, the heavy lifting was done by the guys with the pointy sticks. The artillery soaked up the logistical support that could have been better used making sure the guys with the green berets got their nutty, sports pages, and ammunition. But I freely admit other views are possible.
How effective was the artillery (wherever it came from)? When it was directed fire called in by people on the spot, very. When there was no such direction, not so much.
Which I guess is a long-winded way (hey, professionally, I get paid by the word, so of course I’m long-winded) of saying you’re correct, with a caveat.