More Battleships and No Aircraft Carriers for Germany

More Light and No Heavy Cruisers - Revised

I had forgotten that Nürnberg was intended to be an 8,000 ton version of Leipzig, rather than a repeat of the Leipzig design. This is what the Germans actually wanted to do, because the larger hull would have given better hull strength, allowed for superior protection for the turrets and magazines, permitted a heavier flak armament and an increase in speed. However, the designers spent the years 1933-35 on what would become the Hipper class and as a result Cruiser F had to be a repeat of Leipzig because no other design was available.

As the Germans weren't designing what became the Hipper class ITTL it would be possible to design the enlarged Leipzig in time to build Cruiser F (Nürnberg) to this design. Therefore the 6 light cruisers built in place of the 5 Hippers would be "Super Leipzigs" rather than what I suggested before, which was to bring the Cruiser M design forward 4 years.

The Hipper class were intended to take 36 months to build, but the 3 ships that were completed took an average of 48 months to build. The Cruiser M class were planned to take 30 months to build at the time they were ordered and I was going to have the 6 Cruiser M class laid down instead of the 5 Hippers and Graff Zeppelin built in an average of 42 months. However, the real Nürnberg was build in 24 months, albeit before the Germans began their expansion programme. Therefore the projected building times for the 6 "Super Leipzigs) that I now propose to be laid down in place of the 5 Hippers and Graff Zeppelin to have a projected building time of 24 months but because of the overloading of the shipyards to complete them in an average of 36 months.

On that basis:

Rostock (Cruiser G - Blucher IOTL) laid down 15/08/1935 and completed on 20/09/1938 instead of 20/09/1939;
Elbing (Cruiser H - Hipper IOTL) laid down 06/07/1935 and completed on 29/04/1938 instead of 29/04/1939;
Wiesbaden (Cruiser J - Prinz Eugen IOTL) laid down 23/04/1936 and completed 01/08/1939 instead of 01/08/1940;
Mainz (Cruiser K - Seydlitz IOTL) laid down 29/12/1936 and completed 01/01/1940 instead of never;
Frankfurt (Cruiser L - Lützow IOTL) laid down 02/08/1937 and completed 01/08/1940 instead of never;
Dresden (Cruiser M - built in stead of Graff Zeppelin IOTL) laid down 28/12/1936 and completed 31/12/1939 instead of never.

One of the reasons behind the change from Cruiser M to Super Leipzig is what Saphroneth said about the shortage of gun pits. Although he was referring to 15" turrets for the 2 extra Bismarcks the same presumably applied to cruiser turrets and it would be easier to build 18 triple 6" than 24 twin 6".

If the Germans can get these ships out the shipyards about a year earlier, that reduces the congestion in the shipyards and increases the capacity to complete the other ships that were under construction or planned.

The 1930 London Naval Treaty allowed the British Empire 339,000 tons of cruisers and on that basis the Anglo-German Naval Agreement gave Germany an allowance of 118,650 tons. ITTL the Emden, Koln class, Leipzig and the 7 Super Leipzigs absorb 86,000 tons, which leaves 32,000 tons. Therefore the Germans would be within their rights to build another 4 Super Leipzigs. Therefore Cruisers N, O, P and Q are ordered in the middle of 1936 (which is the same time as J and K were ordered IOTL) and when the British announce their plan to expand their fleet from 50 to 70 cruisers it gives Germany the right to order Cruisers R and S in the first half of 1937. In 1936-37 it was planned that the first sextet of Super Leipzigs would be completed between July 1937 and July 1939 with the second 6 to be laid down after G to M were launched and completed between July 1939 and the end of 1940. As already explained the first 6 were completed between April 1939 and August 1940 so the second sextet was put back to from July 1940 to the end of 1941.

IOTL the Germans had planned to rebuild theKöln class, Leipzig and Nürnberg after the faults in their design had been revealed during the Spanish Civil War, but only the Karlsure had been rebuilt before war broke out. ITTL as the Germans are planning for the strongest possible fleet by 1939 they would assign greater priority to the rebuilds, even if it meant delaying new ships and they also have the advantage that only 4 ships need to be rebuilt instead of 5.
 
More Light and No Heavy Cruisers

IOTL Cruiser F, which became the Nürnberg was ordered in March 1933, laid down in November 1933, launched in December 1934 and completed in November 1935 (24 months) was a repeat of Leipzig.

As explained in my last post Cruiser F ITTL was an enlarged and improved Leipzig and although it displaced a third more than the ship that was built IOTL it should not take a third longer (8 moths) to complete.

IOTL the next cruisers G and H (which became Blucher and Hipper) weren't ordered until October 1934 and laid down in July and August 1935.

However, the Treaty of Versailles allowed Germany to retain 8 light cruisers which were all due for replacement by the end of the 1920s. 5 new ships had been built by the time Hitler came to power so ITTL the new Nazi government had the legal right to bring the orders for Cruisers G and H forward to April 1933 as an unemployment relief measure. That is provided they did not displace more than 6,000 tons, which the 2 Super Leipzigs ordered officially did at least until the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as ratified.

Cruiser G (Rostock) would be laid down in February 1934 with a projected completion date of February 1936 and Cruiser G (Elbing) would be laid down in January 1934 with a projected completion date of January 1936.

Could that schedule be met?

I think they could be built in that time because its before the overloading of the shipyards that happened after the AGNA was signed. The 18 month head start should at least bring the completion of these ships forward 18 months. That would release capacity at the Deutsche Werek and Blohm und Voss shipyards between circa March 1938 and September 1939 that could be used to accelerate the completion of the other ships that were under construction there.
 
Mass Prodution of U-Boats

Although I'm exploring how the Germans could have built a larger and more effective surface fleet for 1939-41 my proposal for the Germans to start the mass production of M and S-boats using prefabrication in 1939 instead of 1943 made me think, "What would the results have been had the Germans done the same with submarines?"

If the sources I used are accurate the average building times (in months) were as follows:

9 Type I
8 Type IIA to D
12 Type VIIA to F
12 Type IXA to D
24 Type XB
13 Type XIV

3 Type XXI
3 Type XXIII

IOTL the Germans built 967 U-boats of Types I to XIV. Of those 114 ordered to January 1939 and the remaining 853 were built to orders placed from August 1939.

If the Germans had decided to mass produce U-boats from August 1939 the above suggests that the Germans could have built about 3,400 submarines with the same shipyard capacity as OTL.

3,400 submarines seems too high to me. I doubt that Germany can produce enough steel for 2,550 extra U-boats for start.

So how many U-boats could the Germans have built had mass production methods been introduced 4 years earlier? Points will be deducted if production in other areas has to be reduced as the point of the exercise is "More bang per buck!"
 
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Destroyers

I usually have:

-12 Type 1925 torpedo boats built in place of the F-boats because I want 12 extra destroyers available in September 1939.
-All the Z boats from Z-23 are built to the Type 1936B design and due to a change of requirements. Another 3 might actually be completed because Z-40 to 42 aren't cancelled in favour of 3 scout cruisers, which weren't completed either.
-T-1 to T-21 are built as Type 1939 T-boats, but no change to the total number of T-boats that was built.

However, I now think the Germans should have done something more radical.

Instead of the 10 F-boats, order 12 additional Type 1943 M-boats. They would also be ordered from different yards. IOTL the 10 F-boats were ordered from: Blohm und Voss, 2; Germania, 6; and Wilhemshaven Dockyard, 2 (machinery built by Blohm und Voss). Instead the orders would be spread among the yards that built the first 12 Type 1935 M-boats IOTL, (Flender-Werke Lübeck, Oderwerke Stettin and Stülcken Hamburg). This would reduce the congestion in the big warship yards and as the minesweepers had reciprocating machinery instead of turbines, it would release turbine cutting capacity for larger warships. The Germans ordered another 12 Type 1943 M-boats in 1937 in place of the 12 trawlers that they purchased and converted to VP-boats. These measures brought the total number of M-boats ordered before the outbreak of war from 36 to 60, but because the Type 1943 was easier to build than the Type 1935 all 60 had been completed before the outbreak of World War II instead of 12 IOTL.

Instead of the Type 1934 and subsequent designs of Z-boat the Germans decide to build a smaller design with conventional machinery. This is effectively the Type 1940 T-boat of OTL.

36 Type 1940 would be ordered to the end of 1936 rather than the first 22 Z-boats, first 12 Type T-boats and the 10 F-boats (44 hulls). There was also a redistribution of the orders which were concentrated on Deschimag, Germania and Schichau (Elbing) so that Blohm und Voss, Deutsche Werke and Wilhelmshaven could concentrate on their battleship and cruiser orders. All 36 destroyers had completed by September 1939 instead of 22.

The destroyers built ITTL were smaller than the Type 1934 and Type 1936 Z-boats completed while the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was in force. Their official displacement was 1,500 tons so the 36 ordered by the end of 1936 came to 54,000 tons, which slightly exceeded the 52,500 tons allowed under the agreement. Another 18 were ordered in 1937-38 instead of the 8 Z-boats and 9 T-boats which were actually ordered. This was possible because the Royal Navy announced its intention to expand from 16 to 22 destroyer flotillas. 12 boats were ordered in the summer of 1939 (instead of Z-31 to Z-42) after the AGNA had been denounced.

All other things being equal 9 boats would be ordered in the autumn instead of T-22 to T-30, with no more being ordered until 1941, which is when the next batches of Z or T-boats were ordered IOTL. This would bring the total number of Type 1940 T-boats ordered since 1934 up to 75 instead of 42 Z-boats, 30 T-boats and 10 F-boats (82 hulls).

However, according to Whitley the Germans were (until October 1939) planning to build 39 Type 39 T-boats (T-22 to T-60) in 3 yards, with T-52 scheduled for completion in April 1942. If the Germans adopted prefabrication methods for destroyers in the autumn of 1939 as they do with M, S and U-boats ITTL Germany might be able to complete more destroyers than it did IOTL.

IOTL the Germans ordered 24 Type 1940 T-boats from Dutch shipyards, but none of them were completed. This was partly due to the reluctance of the Dutch to collaborate with the Germans, but also because they built 60 Type 1940 M-boats. ITTL the mass production of M-boats in Germany means no minesweepers were ordered from Dutch yards so the workers that built the M-boats ITTL can be put to work on the destroyers.

It's a good idea in theory, but will it work in practice?

At the worst the Germans would have 32 Type 1940 T-boats with reliable machinery in commission at the outbreak of World War II rather than the 22 Z-boats and 10 F-boats with their temperamental high-pressure machinery that they actually started the war with. Then they would go on to complete at least another 56 Type 1940s instead of the 20 Z-boats and 36 T-boats that were actually completed during the war.
 
unconvinced on the mass production techniques, there were well documented (and understandable) problems with u-boat construction, only 8(?) of 134 finished? http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/uboats/typxxi/index.html

even the less complicated M-boat design built from components did not fare much better with 17 of 160 finished http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/minehunter/mboot43/index.html

And only a small proportion of the mass produced S-boats were completed too.

In the case of the submarines 118 Type XXI were completed out of 752 ordered and 61 were completed out of 432 Type XXIII ordered. The average building times were 3 months each. However, because they were a new design they took longer than normal to work up which is the main reason why so few became operational. That won't be a problem with mass producing the Type VII and Type IX.

The main reason why such a small proportion of all three types were completed was the WAllied bombing of Germany which was less intense in 1939-43.

I was expecting the main objection to be insufficient raw materials, followed by not enough fuel and not enough Germans.
 
Therefore in the short term they would convert a merchant ship to gain design and operating experience. The Germans (if they hadn't already IOTL) would also send Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe personnel for training on aircraft carriers and carrier aircraft with the Imperial Japanese Navy. Similarly personnel from the aircraft industry and Kriegsmarine warship designers would go to work in the Japanese aircraft industry and IJN warship design department to gain experience of carrier aircraft and aircraft carrier design respectively.

For Battleship H it would have been harder:
-The 3 Hipper class completed IOTL had a combined armament of eighteen twin 105mm and the 6 light cruisers built in their place ITTL required twelve twin 88mm. Therefore the six surplus mounts and their fire control equipment would provide 75% of the heavy anti-aircraft armament of Battleship H;
-But then there are the four 15" and six 5.9" turrets plus their associated fire control equipment. The twin 5.9" is in large scale production with: 24 being built for Cruisers G to M (instead of 20 twin 8" for the Hipper class); 8 being built for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; and 12 being built for Bismarck and Tripitz for a grand total of 54 turrets. Therefore I think they could squeeze in another 6 for Battleship H. If Saphroneth is correct about the lack of gun pits for the main armament then it's not possible to build the 15" turrets in time to complete her in January 1941.

For the follow on programme:
-(Based on how long it took to build Bismarck and Tirpitz), Battleship J if laid down in October 1937 would be launched in February 1940 and completed in February 1942. However, its more likely that she would have been suspended when she reached the fitting out stage to concentrate resources on completing her sister ships;

That was a really enjoyable read. So, this left me with two questions. Firstly, Battleship J could have interesting impact on the war effort, depending on if Hitler has a anti capital ship rant. If completed in 1942 or early 1943, the ship may find itself sent to Norway, where it has similar career to the tirpitz. However, if their are two 15' Battleships in norway, a larger counter force will need to kept in the North sea. Another possibilty is a Ise style convertation, which either isn't completed, or gets finished in 1944, and languishes in dock.

Secondly, a vessel similar to a escort carrier, though built from the ground up as a CVE wouldn't effect the schecules, and could have a better hanger deck, and aircraft handing factillies than a comparable CVE, is also quite curious. Weak to everything, I could see it deployed in Norway, though if it survives Norway, I can't see any real use for it, as I can't imagine it going much faster than 20 knots, presuming it has better machinery than the average mercheant ship.
 
Secondly, a vessel similar to a escort carrier, though built from the ground up as a CVE wouldn't effect the schecules, and could have a better hanger deck, and aircraft handing factillies than a comparable CVE, is also quite curious. Weak to everything, I could see it deployed in Norway, though if it survives Norway, I can't see any real use for it, as I can't imagine it going much faster than 20 knots, presuming it has better machinery than the average mercheant ship.

I thought it would be something primitive along the lines of the British Audacity or American Long Island.

I hadn't given any thought to how it would be used in a war.
 
That was a really enjoyable read. So, this left me with two questions. Firstly, Battleship J could have interesting impact on the war effort, depending on if Hitler has a anti capital ship rant. If completed in 1942 or early 1943, the ship may find itself sent to Norway, where it has similar career to the tirpitz. However, if their are two 15' Battleships in norway, a larger counter force will need to kept in the North sea. Another possibilty is a Ise style convertation, which either isn't completed, or gets finished in 1944, and languishes in dock.

Actually it's three 15" battleships in Norway because there is also Battleship H, which would be completed between Bismarck and Tirpitz. But I have a feeling that it wouldn't be ready in time to go out with Bismarck so it would go to Norway with Tirpitz early in 1942. Then in the second half of 1942 or early 1943 Battleship J joins them. The Royal Navy has to knock out all 3 of them before it can restart the Arctic convoys.
 
In the case of the submarines 118 Type XXI were completed out of 752 ordered and 61 were completed out of 432 Type XXIII ordered. The average building times were 3 months each. However, because they were a new design they took longer than normal to work up which is the main reason why so few became operational. That won't be a problem with mass producing the Type VII and Type IX.

I was expecting the main objection to be insufficient raw materials, followed by not enough fuel and not enough Germans.

"To hasten production, numerous manufacturers prefabricated hull segments for delivery to central assembly yards, where workers had to hunt for precise dimensional matches among the various segments; ultimately the mass-production process produced significant variability in the quality of individual boats."

Worth, Richard (2015-09-03). Fleets of World War II (revised edition)

thought the issues of insufficient materials, lack of fuel, and scare crews were already mentioned by you so didn't reiterate.

believe they were learning or relearning how to build u-boats and to introduce another element with (attempted) mass production techniques would not work, leaving aside how and why they would attempt this.

my promotion of the larger S-boat fleet was to sponsor diesel engine industry and torpedo development.
 
Actually it's three 15" battleships in Norway because there is also Battleship H, which would be completed between Bismarck and Tirpitz. But I have a feeling that it wouldn't be ready in time to go out with Bismarck so it would go to Norway with Tirpitz early in 1942. Then in the second half of 1942 or early 1943 Battleship J joins them. The Royal Navy has to knock out all 3 of them before it can restart the Arctic convoys.

I was working on the presumption that the Bismarck goes on her sortie.
 
I was working on the presumption that the Bismarck goes on her sortie.

It's jumping the gun, but if H goes out with Bismarck they both make it to Brest and in spite of the RAF throwing everything it has at them and the twins all four capita ships are ready for the Channel Dash.

Re the aircraft carriers. I think that rather than the 3 proposed liner conversions they convert some tankers and freighters into austere carriers during World War II along the lines of the British merchant aircraft carriers. Their job would be to provide anti-shadower fighters and ASW coverage for their convoys to Norway.

Though that is jumping the gun, because I intend to do a consolidated post explaining the differences between the Kriegsmarine ITOL and TTL in September 1939.

I also want to discuss if the Germans could make more of the 3-year head start they had in the development of radar and improve the quality of the maritime Luftwaffe.
 
Secondly, a vessel similar to a escort carrier, though built from the ground up as a CVE wouldn't effect the schecules, and could have a better hanger deck, and aircraft handing factillies than a comparable CVE, is also quite curious. Weak to everything, I could see it deployed in Norway, though if it survives Norway, I can't see any real use for it, as I can't imagine it going much faster than 20 knots, presuming it has better machinery than the average mercheant ship.

A CVE based on the Dithmarschen class fast oilers might be possible. They are about the same dimensions as the American Cimarron upon which the Sangamon and Commencent Bay classes were based and they are faster at 21 knots.
 
German Naval Aviation

According to the German Navy in World War Two by Jak P. Mallmann Showell it was planned in 1935 to create a naval air force of some 25 squadrons with a grand total of 300 aircraft. According to Alfred Price in Birth of the Luftwaffe the prepared an expansion plan in the autumn of 1938 to be completed in the autumn of 1942 that included the expansion of the naval air force to 36 squadrons with 432 aircraft. Finally according to According to Roskill in Volume I of the War at Sea, in January 1939, the Luftwaffe agreed to create a naval air force of 41 squadrons with 492 aircraft, but did not give the completion date.

Price said that the Luftwaffe squadrons had an establishment of 12 aircraft consisting of 9 operational machines and 3 aircraft in reserve. This was equivalent to the RAF's Initial Equipment (I.E.) and Immediate Reserve (I.R.) so under:

-the 1935 Plan it would have been 25 squadrons with 225 I.R. aircraft;
-the 1938 Plan it would have been 36 squadrons with 324 I.R. aircraft;
-the 1939 Plan it would have been 41 squadrons with 369 I.R. aircraft.

However, when war broke out the Luftwaffe's equivalent of RAF Coastal Command the Seeluftstritkräfte only had 20 squadrons, plus 2 ASR squadrons.

If the 1939 Plan had been completed there would have been 9 Küstenfliegergruppen, but only 15 of the squadrons (including one in LG2) and 5 gruppe stabs had been formed. They were equipped with obsolete flying boats and seaplanes built by Dornier and Heinkel whose performance was so poor that even the Anson and Skua could shoot them down.

The 1939 Plan included 2 squadrons of seaplanes to operate from the Kriegsmarine's battleships and cruisers. These actually existed in September 1939 and belonged to Bordfliegergruppe 196, but its stab wasn't formed until September 1943. In common with some of the coastal squadrons they flew the Heinkel He60 floatplane and were due to reequip with the Arado Ar196.

The final element of the 1939 Plan was a force of 12 squadrons to operate from the Kriegsmarine's aircraft carriers. Trägergruppe 186, with 2 Bf109 and one Ju87 squadrons (but no stab) existed when war broke out. Between then and the end of October 1939 it was expanded into 2 gruppen each with a stab and 3 squadrons. One was equipped with Bf109s and the other had Ju87s. However, suspension of the Graff Zeppelin in June 1940 resulted in their transfer to the mainstream of the Luftwaffe in July 1940 as III./StG 1 and III./JG 77 respectively.

Under the plan prepared in the autumn of 1938 the Luftwaffe was to have 13 Seekampfgeschwardern for operations against naval targets by the autumn of 1942. However, the forces under the General z.b.V. der Luftflotte 2 (which was first renamed 10. Flieger-Division and then X. Fliegerkorps) had only 2 Ju88 and 6 He111 squadrons, which over the next 6 months were expanded into 2 full strength geschwardern (KG26 and KG30). However, the squadrons of the future X. Fligerkorps did not have an effective air-launched torpedo and wouldn't have one until 1942. Mine warfare was one of the roles of the Seeluftstritkräfte. The Germans had developed an good magnetic mine, but because they weren't expecting war in 1939 hadn't built up an adequate stock. However, that did not stop the Luftwaffe forming dedicated mine laying command, 9. Flieger-Division, on 01/02/40. It was renamed IX. Fliegerkorps in November 1940.

According to Birth of the Luftwaffe by Alfred Price the Luftwaffe had (not including LN 100 and the transport force) 302 squadrons on 01/09/39. The 30 squadrons in the Seeluftstritkräfte and General z.b.V. der Luftflotte 2 therefore represented 10% of the Luftwaffe's total strength.

In terms of quality I want more Do17 and He111 built in place of the Do18, He59 and He60 so that the Küstenfliegergruppen can be equipped with effective aircraft. I'd also like to see the Luftwaffe obtaining high-performance torpedoes from Italy at least 3 years sooner. Rather than a purchase it could be swapped with a licence allowing the Italians to build Daimler-Benz aero engines.

Ideally I'd want the Maritime Luftwaffe to have 41 Seeluftstritkräfte squadrons and 13 Seekampfgeschwardern in September 1939, plus adequate stocks of (effective) torpedoes and mines. However, that requires the formation of 130 extra squadrons bringing the total number of Luftwaffe squadrons to 432 (an increase of 43%) which I'm sure will be told is impossible.

However, is a 10% increase in the total size of the Luftwaffe to 332 squadrons feasible? That would allow the Maritime Luftwaffe to be increased from 30 to 60 squadrons. That would allow the Seeluftstritkräfte to be brought up to its planned strength of 41 squadrons with enough left over to form 2 full-strength Seekampfgeschwardern (18 squadrons).

Then between September 1939 and March 1940 I'd want the number of Seekampfgeschwardern increased from 2 to 6 (4 torpedo-bomber and 2 mining) plus the quadrupling of Fw200C production so that there would be 4 Gruppen of them by the summer of 1940.

If no numerical increase over the real world was possible I at least want the following:

1) Equip the GR squadrons with medium bombers instead of flying boats and seaplanes;
2) An effective torpedo;
3) An adequate stock of magnetic mines.
 
According to the German Navy in World War Two by Jak P. Mallmann Showell it was planned in 1935 to create a naval air force of some 25 squadrons with a grand total of 300 aircraft. According to Alfred Price in Birth of the Luftwaffe the prepared an expansion plan in the autumn of 1938 to be completed in the autumn of 1942 that included the expansion of the naval air force to 36 squadrons with 432 aircraft. Finally according to According to Roskill in Volume I of the War at Sea, in January 1939, the Luftwaffe agreed to create a naval air force of 41 squadrons with 492 aircraft, but did not give the completion date.

Price said that the Luftwaffe squadrons had an establishment of 12 aircraft consisting of 9 operational machines and 3 aircraft in reserve. This was equivalent to the RAF's Initial Equipment (I.E.) and Immediate Reserve (I.R.) so under:

-the 1935 Plan it would have been 25 squadrons with 225 I.R. aircraft;
-the 1938 Plan it would have been 36 squadrons with 324 I.R. aircraft;
-the 1939 Plan it would have been 41 squadrons with 369 I.R. aircraft.

However, when war broke out the Luftwaffe's equivalent of RAF Coastal Command the Seeluftstritkräfte only had 20 squadrons, plus 2 ASR squadrons.

If the 1939 Plan had been completed there would have been 9 Küstenfliegergruppen, but only 15 of the squadrons (including one in LG2) and 5 gruppe stabs had been formed. They were equipped with obsolete flying boats and seaplanes built by Dornier and Heinkel whose performance was so poor that even the Anson and Skua could shoot them down.

The 1939 Plan included 2 squadrons of seaplanes to operate from the Kriegsmarine's battleships and cruisers. These actually existed in September 1939 and belonged to Bordfliegergruppe 196, but its stab wasn't formed until September 1943. In common with some of the coastal squadrons they flew the Heinkel He60 floatplane and were due to reequip with the Arado Ar196.

The final element of the 1939 Plan was a force of 12 squadrons to operate from the Kriegsmarine's aircraft carriers. Trägergruppe 186, with 2 Bf109 and one Ju87 squadrons (but no stab) existed when war broke out. Between then and the end of October 1939 it was expanded into 2 gruppen each with a stab and 3 squadrons. One was equipped with Bf109s and the other had Ju87s. However, suspension of the Graff Zeppelin in June 1940 resulted in their transfer to the mainstream of the Luftwaffe in July 1940 as III./StG 1 and III./JG 77 respectively.

Under the plan prepared in the autumn of 1938 the Luftwaffe was to have 13 Seekampfgeschwardern for operations against naval targets by the autumn of 1942. However, the forces under the General z.b.V. der Luftflotte 2 (which was first renamed 10. Flieger-Division and then X. Fliegerkorps) had only 2 Ju88 and 6 He111 squadrons, which over the next 6 months were expanded into 2 full strength geschwardern (KG26 and KG30). However, the squadrons of the future X. Fligerkorps did not have an effective air-launched torpedo and wouldn't have one until 1942. Mine warfare was one of the roles of the Seeluftstritkräfte. The Germans had developed an good magnetic mine, but because they weren't expecting war in 1939 hadn't built up an adequate stock. However, that did not stop the Luftwaffe forming dedicated mine laying command, 9. Flieger-Division, on 01/02/40. It was renamed IX. Fliegerkorps in November 1940.

According to Birth of the Luftwaffe by Alfred Price the Luftwaffe had (not including LN 100 and the transport force) 302 squadrons on 01/09/39. The 30 squadrons in the Seeluftstritkräfte and General z.b.V. der Luftflotte 2 therefore represented 10% of the Luftwaffe's total strength.

In terms of quality I want more Do17 and He111 built in place of the Do18, He59 and He60 so that the Küstenfliegergruppen can be equipped with effective aircraft. I'd also like to see the Luftwaffe obtaining high-performance torpedoes from Italy at least 3 years sooner. Rather than a purchase it could be swapped with a licence allowing the Italians to build Daimler-Benz aero engines.

Ideally I'd want the Maritime Luftwaffe to have 41 Seeluftstritkräfte squadrons and 13 Seekampfgeschwardern in September 1939, plus adequate stocks of (effective) torpedoes and mines. However, that requires the formation of 130 extra squadrons bringing the total number of Luftwaffe squadrons to 432 (an increase of 43%) which I'm sure will be told is impossible.

However, is a 10% increase in the total size of the Luftwaffe to 332 squadrons feasible? That would allow the Maritime Luftwaffe to be increased from 30 to 60 squadrons. That would allow the Seeluftstritkräfte to be brought up to its planned strength of 41 squadrons with enough left over to form 2 full-strength Seekampfgeschwardern (18 squadrons).

Then between September 1939 and March 1940 I'd want the number of Seekampfgeschwardern increased from 2 to 6 (4 torpedo-bomber and 2 mining) plus the quadrupling of Fw200C production so that there would be 4 Gruppen of them by the summer of 1940.

If no numerical increase over the real world was possible I at least want the following:

1) Equip the GR squadrons with medium bombers instead of flying boats and seaplanes;
2) An effective torpedo;
3) An adequate stock of magnetic mines.

As nobody has gainsaid this I'm going to go for the Luftwaffe with a 10% increase in flying units.

Though I did expect several replies along the lines of: the Germans could have built the extra aircraft if someone like Milch had been in charge of aircraft production instead of Udet; but they didn't have the extra aviation fuel for the 30 extra squadrons and the 10% expansion of the training organisation and other second-line flying units that might be needed to support them.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'd say they could manage that kind of increase, but that the result would be a slight efficiency decrease (because they're expanding faster in the build-up phase). So the actual increase in fighting power is less than 10% but more than 0.
 
German Naval Radar

AFAIK the Germans began the development of radar several years before the British. However, but by 1939 the British had caught up and over the course of the war would forge ahead. That is at least in the application of radar if not the quality of the sets.

Is the above statement is correct? If the statement is correct could the Germans have maintained their lead?

The British official history on the design and development of weapons includes a chapter on radar. It says that the progress made up to 1939 was remarkable and that if more money had been available. It laments that the money actually was available, but for reasons that seemed good at the time it wasn't spent.

Therefore could the Germans have made more progress with their radar programme had they put more money into it? And could this be done without damaging their other weapons programmes? AFAIK the answer is yes, because the electronics industry didn't need the same types of labour and raw materials as the heavy engineering sector so it doesn't mean less guns and butter for better radar.

Or in a rare example of inter-service cooperation could the branches of the Wehrmacht conduct a joint radar research programme to avoid duplications of effort? E.g. AFAIK the Luftwaffe developed the PPI, but the Kriegsmarine didn't use it because they didn't know about it.

ITTL I want the Germans warships of September 1939 are fitted with radar sets that were as effective as those fitted to British warships in September 1942. Meanwhile I want the torpedo-bombers and general reconnaissance aircraft fitted with a 50cm ASV radar.
 
I'd say they could manage that kind of increase, but that the result would be a slight efficiency decrease (because they're expanding faster in the build-up phase). So the actual increase in fighting power is less than 10% but more than 0.

I didn't think of that and it's not an across the board increase either. All the increase is in the maritime branch of the Luftwaffe which is doubled in size and there are big fluctuations in the increase in the number of the different types of squadron.

The number of GR squadrons is doubled so on that basis there is a theoretical reduction of 50% in efficiency. However, some of that will be offset by the improvement in the quality of its aircraft.

X. Fliegerkorps is going to be 3 or 4 times larger, i.e. from 8 squadrons to 24-30. Does that mean there will be a reduction of efficiency of 75-80%? If it does that is going reduce the effectiveness on my mass torpedo bomber attack on Scapa Flow somewhat.
 
Most interesting read. Can you elaborate a tad more on that experimental converted carrier to be built ITTL? Do they still build the Ju-87C and Bf-109T (to fly from that experimental CV?), or they plan to start building carrier based fighters and dive bombers based on say Bf-109F and Ju-87D after 1940?

Also, regarding what to build instead of the OTL CVs, how about two of those 20,000 ton battlecruisers with 6 280mm guns (P class), is there anything good in that idea?

Btw regarding torpedoes, as mentioned with another occasion, they definitely need to get their hands on japanese ones. Imagine even a 25% increase in hits compared to OTL (now imagine say 50%, at least in the early part of the war, if the german torpedoes were as bad as the US one at that time). Mind you, there's the issue of timing in getting japanese torpedoes in say 1937, is it enough time to have their tech absorbed into german industry before the war, or they need them even earlier for that.
 
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