If the Allies did not have a shortage of transport aircraft for Operation: Market-Garden, how would that have impacted the battle? In other words, there is enough lift for the British 1st Airborne and Sosabowski's Polish Brigade to be dropped in one day. Everything else reminds the same - the weather, troop placement, basic plan, etc.
More Airlift at Arnhem
- Thread starter Blackfox5
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It would still fail for me.
The problem was that the British were arrogant, they didn't that the ground Intel was correct because it was from the dutch Resistance, meaning they ignored the presence of an SS Panzer corps.
You've still got the problem of 30 corps trying to cover 100 miles in 4 days, they expected no resistance but in fact they were pushed back from the start. The problem for me wasn't the Para's ( or lack of them) but the armour element of the plan
The problem was that the British were arrogant, they didn't that the ground Intel was correct because it was from the dutch Resistance, meaning they ignored the presence of an SS Panzer corps.
You've still got the problem of 30 corps trying to cover 100 miles in 4 days, they expected no resistance but in fact they were pushed back from the start. The problem for me wasn't the Para's ( or lack of them) but the armour element of the plan
Yeah, I'm pretty sure it is still a blunder, but I was wondering if someone with more details would know how the battle would change. If all troops are available at Arnhem that first day, it would have to change something. Can the entire bridge be taken by the British that first day, and if so how does this affect the battle? With enough troops, can the British secure a good drop zone for supplies? Can the British actually get troops over the Rhine, even if they can't exploit it because of logistics issues?
I'm not unconvinced the bridgehead over the Rhine could have been had. The thing is I've never seen any serious evidence supplies for forty, or twenty, or even a dozen divisions and corps/army overhead could have been provided to exploit such a bridgehead. About the best I see happening is 21 Army Group fights its way a bit further north to reach the Zuider Zee thus isolating the western Netherlands from Germany, and having a slightly better starting position for the spring offensive.
The idea that the Allied armies could exploit a break though of the western German defenses in September, at Arnhem, Aachen, Trier, or Strausboug or anywhere else was based on a misunderstanding of the German armies recovery and the depth of the Allied supply problem.
The idea that the Allied armies could exploit a break though of the western German defenses in September, at Arnhem, Aachen, Trier, or Strausboug or anywhere else was based on a misunderstanding of the German armies recovery and the depth of the Allied supply problem.
Carl, so you think that the Allies can cross the Rhine, but aren't able to exploit the bridgehead to end the war? Instead, the Allies peter out and bog down somewhere in western Hannover and the Ruhr? So what happens afterwards?
If so, at least the Dutch Hunger Winter is avoided.
IOTL Devers 6th Army Group reached the Rhine at Strasbourg in late November 1944 and by all accounts could have crossed it, but was ordered to stop by Ike. Patton was temporarily bogged down, but getting closer. Is it possible that the Allies resume a broad front offensive in late 1944 since they have multiple bridgeheads over the Rhine? How would a British bridgehead over the Rhine affect Hitler's own decision to launch Wacht Am Rhein?
If so, at least the Dutch Hunger Winter is avoided.
IOTL Devers 6th Army Group reached the Rhine at Strasbourg in late November 1944 and by all accounts could have crossed it, but was ordered to stop by Ike. Patton was temporarily bogged down, but getting closer. Is it possible that the Allies resume a broad front offensive in late 1944 since they have multiple bridgeheads over the Rhine? How would a British bridgehead over the Rhine affect Hitler's own decision to launch Wacht Am Rhein?
Difficult to predict anything for the Grofa. A counter attack somewhere fit his mentality that autum.
Well a quick gain would be to not have Lieutenant-General Browning going in on D-Day with a whole HQ that took up 30 or more transport aircraft. Considering that the whole operation was mostly based around mid-sized units effectively fighting separately I'm not exactly sure what the overall HQ on the ground was to offer to be honest.
Personally I think that Market Garden could have been carried off with a few tweaks but like Carl not really sure if it could be fully exploited effectively. General changes that need to be made at a minimum in my opinion are
- Brereton tells Browning to wind his neck in and sit the operation out.
- Airlift commanders should have been told that there's a war on so you're just going to have to drop people closer to the bridges. Likewise any possible casualties from doing two drops on the first day will simply have to be accepted.
- Rather than arsing about with the Groesbeek Heights 82nd Airborne needs to have capturing both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge as their primary objective to be carried out as quickly as possible. This means that Guards Armoured don't have to help do the job when they arrive and waste valuable time.
- Checking the bloody communications so that they can talk to headquarters and more importantly the close air support. IIRC the CAS planes were under instructions not to attack off their own bat as the weather wasn't great and at the ranges involved it was hard to tell friendly from enemy.
- Use radio navigation like Oboe or Gee-H to get to the drop zones accurately, it's useful for everyone but IIRC the American aircrews were still a bit patchy on night operations.
- Make sure that sufficient bridging equipment is brought up from the rear before you start off since the operation might involve some water.
- Look at possible coup de main attacks on the bridges via glider borne forces, it's already somewhat of a gamble so a bit more is hardly an issue.
Well the British getting stung by the German Englandspiel operation does kind of give a reason why they might of been a bit leery about local intelligence. But yeah, it was a bit of an oversight. Funny thing, well it depends on your sense of humour I guess, was that if the operation had only been a few days later half the German forces would have left, IIRC one of the SS divisions had been slated to be moved back to Germany by train to be rebuilt.
Drop Zones
I don't think lift would have made much of a difference unless drop/landing zones were closer to the bridge. If !st Airborne and the Poles would have landed within a mile or two of the Arnhem Bridge and straddling the river near the bridge they may have been able to hold on. But then again, they may not have been able to avoid AA and lost more glidermen and equipment on the zones and lost any advantage.
Grace Alone,
Greg
I don't think lift would have made much of a difference unless drop/landing zones were closer to the bridge. If !st Airborne and the Poles would have landed within a mile or two of the Arnhem Bridge and straddling the river near the bridge they may have been able to hold on. But then again, they may not have been able to avoid AA and lost more glidermen and equipment on the zones and lost any advantage.
Grace Alone,
Greg
I have actually read some versions that say there was very little flak about on the first day and still not much on the second with the main Ruhr belts being well to the east, the re-supply drops getting slaughtered because with things dragging on after a couple of days the Germans had dragged in every piece of light flak they could lay their hands on. Have to see if I can dig them up again and run down some actual figures for the number of guns deployed in the region.
Cook
Banned
The presence of the II SS Panzer Corps (as well as Field Marshal Model’s headquarters) in the immediate vicinity of Arnhem was known to the British planners prior to the launching of Market-Garden but was discounted as not being significantly strong enough to pose a obstacle to the plan; the whereabouts of II SS Panzer was provided by Bletchley Park. II SS Panzer Corps in September 1944 was the equivalent of an understrength armoured brigade.
The reason that it is commonly believed that the British did not know about the panzer corps was because the popular histories of Market-Garden, most notably Cornelius Ryan’s A Bridge Too Far were written in or before the early 1970’s – prior to the existence of Bletchley Park being revealed to the public and consequently anything that could be traced back to Bletchley had been expunged from all records.
The Dutch resistance were known to have been infiltrated by the Abwehr; consequently any information provided by the Dutch was not accepted as credible unless it was verified from another source. Since it could not be admitted that the British had accepted the information without revealing the existence Bletchley, the official story became that the Panzers came as a surprise to them. That was back in the days when if the government wanted to keep a secret, it stayed secret.
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That's very interesting, I just assumed that bletchley was revealed in the 60's after Turing's death, I also blame a bridge too far
Cook
Banned
No mention at all of the park was made until 1975 when the first limited information about it was revealed and the existence of Colossus wasn't disclosed until 1989!
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My own impression as to the reasons Market-Garden failed, though this is colored by memories of the movie (which may or may not be accurate), is that a major factor was the inability of XXX Corps to advance quickly enough to relieve the 1st Airborne at Arnhem. This was exacebrated by the fact that they were advancing on a extremely narrow one-road axis; though, of course, having played Highway to the Reich and other such board wargames of the campaign in my misspent youth 
, I'm well aware that there was only one really good north-south road in that particular part of the Netherlands at the time that large armored forces could use. IIRC the Germans also managed to blow one of the smaller bridges that XXX Corps needed (Son? Veghel?) and that delayed the advance while bridging equipment was brought up. The real point, though, is that Market-Garden was the kind of operation that depended on too many things having to go right, so airlift isn't really as significant a factor as might be thought.
, I'm well aware that there was only one really good north-south road in that particular part of the Netherlands at the time that large armored forces could use. IIRC the Germans also managed to blow one of the smaller bridges that XXX Corps needed (Son? Veghel?) and that delayed the advance while bridging equipment was brought up. The real point, though, is that Market-Garden was the kind of operation that depended on too many things having to go right, so airlift isn't really as significant a factor as might be thought.Certainly we could change a lot of things with hindsight to make Market-Garden a success (even if a partial one). However, my question is not about hindsight changing the Allied decisions, but if the constraints of not enough airlift was removed.
Using Wikipedia (very dangerous, I know), it seems this is the distribution of forces for the actual drop.
- 1st Day – LZ S & Z, DZ X: 1st Parachute Brigade, 1st Airlanding Brigade, 1st Airlanding Light Regiment Royal Artillery, Royal Engineer and medical units and Divisional HQ
- 2nd Day – DZ Y, LZ X: 4th Parachute Brigade accompanied by extra artillery units and remaining elements of the Airlanding Brigade
- 3rd Day – DZ K, LZ L: Polish Parachute Brigade. Using the road bridge, they would reinforce the perimeter east of Arnhem, linking up with their own artillery who would be flown in by glider to LZ 'L'.
So in this scenario, all of the landings are made in the first day. Allied airborne forces are basically doubled with four brigades instead of two, and full artillery. So besides Johnny Frost of the 2nd Battalion,1st Parachute Regiment of the 1st Parachute Brigade going to Arnhem, you have Sosabowski’s Polish Brigade south of the Rhine and additional elements north. So instead of Frost’s single Battalion, there is an entire brigade, and both ends of the Arnhem bridge is taken. There is also an entire extra brigade and more to help the rest of the 1st Airborne to help secure Arnhem and take the supply drop zone. IOTL, the British failed to do this. ITTL, I think the British are able to take Arnhem including the supply drop zone. That eliminates ONE of the failures of Arnhem.
Here is a map of the first day of the landing. If you give the British two extra brigades, I think they can handle the German battalions who can arrive there, and therefore secure the perimeter around Arnhem they intended.
The problem now is that they have planned to hold out only two to three days. We know that its going to take XXX Corps about eight days to reach Driel which will effectively end the operation. Since the 1st Airborne did hold out that long in worse circumstances (men separated from each other without adequate resupply), I think we’ll have a successful Market-Garden in that Allied forces can now cross the Rhine.
To be honest, with the British holding the bridge with an entire division, and reports that Allied soldiers are taking the other bridges, I wonder how long it’ll be before the Germans order a complete withdrawal. It’ll be very apparent that Arnhem won’t be taken in time to destroy the Allied plans, and I think this will impact German decisions during the battle.
The only question is based on logistical constraints, how far can they advance. Consensus seems to be that they can only go so far, and I agree.
However, that does open up possibilities for an Allied winter offensive once Dever’s 6th Army Group reaches the upper Rhine. By late November, the Allied supply situation is different than it was in mid-September. With British having crossed in the north, and the Americans and French in the south, do the Allies launch a winter offensive that encircles and Ruhr and pushes towards Berlin?
Even if the Allies stop at the Elbe and not end the war, we are looking at a very different end of the war. Eisenhower is in a position to assist with Berlin. Patton could liberate all of Czechoslovakia, preventing local Communists from seizing control of the local police. The western Allies might capture all of Austria, and possibly enter western Hungary. In a best case scenario, a winter offensive by the Western allies causes a complete collapse in German morale on the western front, allowing the Americans and British to definitely move and occupy all of those areas while the Soviets are held up on the Danube and Vistula. Western Allies might even reach Krakow allowing the Polish government-in-exile control part of the country.
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The Light Tank Mk VIII, aka. the Harry Hopkins, was too large to be carried by Hamilcar gliders so it was effectively non transportable by air. The Mk VII Tetrarch was the largest light tank that would fit. Between the possibility of taking Tetrarchs or Humber/Coventry armoured cars under 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment or more 6-pounder and 17-pounder anti-tank guns under 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery Royal Artillery like they actually did I think I'd probably go for more guns myself.
Well I did give you thirty odd extra gliders straight off the bat, IIRC the reason Browning and his HQ came in that way was because not all of them were fully parachute trained since it hadn't been envisaged as a front line unit. Kind of says everything about their participation right there.
But getting back to your main points it does seem to be that up until they reached the Nijmegen bridge that XXX Corps was on time, earlier delays having been made up. If 82nd Airborne Division are able to take the Nijmegen bridge straight after landing whilst IIRC it was still fairly lightly defended and hold both ends that means Guards Armoured Division won't have to help them do the job when they arrive but can instead get on with reaching Arnhem which they look like having a pretty decent chance of reaching on schedule.While I agree in your analysis, I don't think the 82nd Airbone will be taking Nijmegen any earlier with the POD than they did IOTL. It's just that the 1st British Airborne are in better position while they wait for XXX Corps to arrive.
However, if the Germans decide resistance won't affect the outcome of the battle, they might attempt to withdraw forces allowing the 82nd to take the bridge earlier. I don't know if that is realistic though. With Arnhem Bridge held, the outcome of the Battle now depends on the Germans holding the Nijmegen bridge. I think the Germans will make a real attempt to hold that before giving up. If Arnhem is held, do the Germans simply decide to blow up the Nijmegen bridge instead?
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Never heard of "Grofa" used before. I had to look it up: GroFaZ from 'Größter Feldherr aller Zeiten' - Greatest War Leader of All Time.
If Hitler orders an attack, where do you think it'd be placed? Still in the Ardennes for a drive to Antwerp that cut off even more Allied troops? Or do you think it'd be directed north towards the expanded Arnhem/Hannover/Ruhr bridgehead? Given Hitler's interest in encircelment and destroy operations, it seems the Ardennes is still the most likely scenario.
BlairWitch749
Banned
the british ignored their own ground intelligence reports
the king's household cavalry recon squadron made a daring drive up hells highway right before the jump off and reported the road heavily defended
also the breakthrough sector was too narrow and the road itself was narrow; with no space for medium tanks to turn around, meaning a single AT gun could hold the corps and force the infantry to disembark and screen; over and over again
beyond that it was a bridge to nowhere, crossing wouldn't make the germans in western holland surrender, and as their supplies peter out, they will get the displeasure of the germans opening sluices and dykes north and south of the penetration creating an even worse famine problem and likely marooning the speerhead until it can be counter attacked by forces assembling for watch on rhine
as mac says in brothers in arms; a foolhardy plan
the king's household cavalry recon squadron made a daring drive up hells highway right before the jump off and reported the road heavily defended
also the breakthrough sector was too narrow and the road itself was narrow; with no space for medium tanks to turn around, meaning a single AT gun could hold the corps and force the infantry to disembark and screen; over and over again
beyond that it was a bridge to nowhere, crossing wouldn't make the germans in western holland surrender, and as their supplies peter out, they will get the displeasure of the germans opening sluices and dykes north and south of the penetration creating an even worse famine problem and likely marooning the speerhead until it can be counter attacked by forces assembling for watch on rhine
as mac says in brothers in arms; a foolhardy plan