I have been reading Matthew Parker’s “Monte Cassino”, today and I came across the section devoted to the first battle of Monte Cassino. It describes the "right hook" attack towards Monte Cassino by the French Expeditionary Corps, under General Alphonse Juin and speculates on whether supporting this attack would have ended the battle and caused the withdrawal of forces around Monte Cassino. I have searched the forums and I can’t find a thread discussing this “what if” before.
General Juin had an excellent understanding of the difficult terrain and the problems it caused the mainly mechanized allied forces, with his corps in contrast using few tanks and lots of mules. The conditions led him to believe that a breakthrough over the mountains to the north of Monte Cassino, bypassing the most the most heavily defended sectors of the Gustav line around the town would have the best chance of success.
The German commander von Senger was painfully aware that there were no rearward defensive positions between the Gustav line and the Atina basin and feared the entire Cassino position could be outflanked. The Germans had recently deployed the 5th Mountain Division to the area from the Eastern front, and even this hardened unit found the harsh terrain and climate of the Abuzzi Mountains shocking and extremely hazardous. Von Senger also commented on the FEC, “Moroccan and Algerian troops under the command of General Juin. These were native mountain people, led by superbly trained French staff officers, and equipped with modern American weapons.”
By mid January 1944, the French drive had faltered due to exhaustion and well-used artillery and local counter attacks by the German units. So to quote from pages 82 and 83 of the book,
“Juin, although pleased by the combat performance of his men and the great impression it had made on his allies, later gave vent to his frustration: `With an extra division, perhaps it could have been possible on the evening of January 15th to penetrate more deeply towards Atina, a strategic point on which we could develop a wide flanking movement above Caira and Cassino before descending again into the Liri valley. But behind my two joined-up divisions, who were somewhat exhausted, there was nothing left. The original plan developed by the Anglo-Saxon high command failed through the lack of a notion of an army “manoeuvre” logically and clearly defined."
It is the great “What if” of the Cassino story: had reserves been available and there been willingness to back Juin’s plan, much of the bloodbath to come might have been avoided."
So as Juin describes what if, there was sufficient reinforcements to support the French attack and to achieve and exploit a breakthrough? How would the absence of this historically gruelling battle change the campaign in Italy and the wider war?
General Juin had an excellent understanding of the difficult terrain and the problems it caused the mainly mechanized allied forces, with his corps in contrast using few tanks and lots of mules. The conditions led him to believe that a breakthrough over the mountains to the north of Monte Cassino, bypassing the most the most heavily defended sectors of the Gustav line around the town would have the best chance of success.
The German commander von Senger was painfully aware that there were no rearward defensive positions between the Gustav line and the Atina basin and feared the entire Cassino position could be outflanked. The Germans had recently deployed the 5th Mountain Division to the area from the Eastern front, and even this hardened unit found the harsh terrain and climate of the Abuzzi Mountains shocking and extremely hazardous. Von Senger also commented on the FEC, “Moroccan and Algerian troops under the command of General Juin. These were native mountain people, led by superbly trained French staff officers, and equipped with modern American weapons.”
By mid January 1944, the French drive had faltered due to exhaustion and well-used artillery and local counter attacks by the German units. So to quote from pages 82 and 83 of the book,
“Juin, although pleased by the combat performance of his men and the great impression it had made on his allies, later gave vent to his frustration: `With an extra division, perhaps it could have been possible on the evening of January 15th to penetrate more deeply towards Atina, a strategic point on which we could develop a wide flanking movement above Caira and Cassino before descending again into the Liri valley. But behind my two joined-up divisions, who were somewhat exhausted, there was nothing left. The original plan developed by the Anglo-Saxon high command failed through the lack of a notion of an army “manoeuvre” logically and clearly defined."
It is the great “What if” of the Cassino story: had reserves been available and there been willingness to back Juin’s plan, much of the bloodbath to come might have been avoided."
So as Juin describes what if, there was sufficient reinforcements to support the French attack and to achieve and exploit a breakthrough? How would the absence of this historically gruelling battle change the campaign in Italy and the wider war?