Monte Cassino and the Right Hook

I have been reading Matthew Parker’s “Monte Cassino”, today and I came across the section devoted to the first battle of Monte Cassino. It describes the "right hook" attack towards Monte Cassino by the French Expeditionary Corps, under General Alphonse Juin and speculates on whether supporting this attack would have ended the battle and caused the withdrawal of forces around Monte Cassino. I have searched the forums and I can’t find a thread discussing this “what if” before.

General Juin had an excellent understanding of the difficult terrain and the problems it caused the mainly mechanized allied forces, with his corps in contrast using few tanks and lots of mules. The conditions led him to believe that a breakthrough over the mountains to the north of Monte Cassino, bypassing the most the most heavily defended sectors of the Gustav line around the town would have the best chance of success.

The German commander von Senger was painfully aware that there were no rearward defensive positions between the Gustav line and the Atina basin and feared the entire Cassino position could be outflanked. The Germans had recently deployed the 5th Mountain Division to the area from the Eastern front, and even this hardened unit found the harsh terrain and climate of the Abuzzi Mountains shocking and extremely hazardous. Von Senger also commented on the FEC, “Moroccan and Algerian troops under the command of General Juin. These were native mountain people, led by superbly trained French staff officers, and equipped with modern American weapons.”

By mid January 1944, the French drive had faltered due to exhaustion and well-used artillery and local counter attacks by the German units. So to quote from pages 82 and 83 of the book,

“Juin, although pleased by the combat performance of his men and the great impression it had made on his allies, later gave vent to his frustration: `With an extra division, perhaps it could have been possible on the evening of January 15th to penetrate more deeply towards Atina, a strategic point on which we could develop a wide flanking movement above Caira and Cassino before descending again into the Liri valley. But behind my two joined-up divisions, who were somewhat exhausted, there was nothing left. The original plan developed by the Anglo-Saxon high command failed through the lack of a notion of an army “manoeuvre” logically and clearly defined."

It is the great “What if” of the Cassino story: had reserves been available and there been willingness to back Juin’s plan, much of the bloodbath to come might have been avoided."


So as Juin describes what if, there was sufficient reinforcements to support the French attack and to achieve and exploit a breakthrough? How would the absence of this historically gruelling battle change the campaign in Italy and the wider war?
 
You're right, I don't believe this has been discussed before.

There were several failures to take advantage of possibilities in the Italian campaign. Apparently this was one of them

The earlier the Allies can get up Italy, the better, and getting stuck at Monte Cassino was one of the worst blocks.

I suspect it might not, actually, have made that big a difference, what with the imminence of Overlord, etc., but there would have been some political results. The Western Allies being more effective might help with the post-war situation?
 
the entire campaign it Italy was run terribly. an invasion up the peninsula faces a series of steep mountain valleys and easily defended river lines.

the allies had such air and naval superiority after the fall of siciliy and the germans had so few troops in the theater they could have landed anywhere they wanted. conservative by the book ike and mark clark went to the gulf of salerno where the only german armor in the whole country was.

they should have landed all the way north at pola or genoa or venice to cut off every german soldier in the country.

fMark Clark wasn't a good general so the Gustav line needed to be a blood bath. even if he supports the breakthrough in the mountains it changes nothing because the roads and highways there are easily flooded, not in great numbers, and vulnerable to scorched earth tactics. the germans when cassino did fall just zipped on back to the caeser line. the terrain in italy always favors the defender
 
the allies had such air and naval superiority after the fall of siciliy and the germans had so few troops in the theater they could have landed anywhere they wanted. conservative by the book ike and mark clark went to the gulf of salerno where the only german armor in the whole country was.

THey also needed to ben range for the airforce to help them.
 
I have been reading Matthew Parker’s “Monte Cassino”, today and I came across the section devoted to the first battle of Monte Cassino. It describes the "right hook" attack towards Monte Cassino by the French Expeditionary Corps, under General Alphonse Juin and speculates on whether supporting this attack would have ended the battle and caused the withdrawal of forces around Monte Cassino. I have searched the forums and I can’t find a thread discussing this “what if” before.
Probably coincidentally, but I mentioned it briefly in a post about a week ago in which I mentioned Matthew Parker's book:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=2778777&postcount=4

Only way to keep Cassino intact (and one of the largest religious libraries in the world IIRC) is if the Allies manage earlier to threaten to encircle Cassino, forcing the Germans thus to vacate the area before any bombardment can take place.
Probably the most important part about Juin's forces and the biggest advantage he had, was that his forces had a very light logistical tail.

Parker vividly describes how a large % of the (combat)troops were functioning as porters.
 
THey also needed to ben range for the airforce to help them.

there were large constallations of airfields around genoa that could have been captured

its worth it to sacrifice some air cover during the landing not to have to fight any german armor. a landing near genoa would make a quick lodgement, capture the necessary airfields and force all germans in the southern part of the country 4 or 5 divisions worth, surrender
 
Or, if you wish the allies to be a bit more pedantic, have them hop to Sardinia/Corsica after Sicily. That puts the west coast of Italy, and the south of France, under Allied air cover for the next stage. It will telegraph somewhat, but will open up so much of the western med as a potential target that Italy becomes almost undefendable.
 
Pure Coincidence, I ensure you FlyingDutchman. As I said in the initial post, I posted this TL after reading it in the book…

Would Juins success enhance the image of the Free French? A force up until Italy at least considered poorly trained by some Allied Generals.
 
Or, if you wish the allies to be a bit more pedantic, have them hop to Sardinia/Corsica after Sicily. That puts the west coast of Italy, and the south of France, under Allied air cover for the next stage. It will telegraph somewhat, but will open up so much of the western med as a potential target that Italy becomes almost undefendable.

The Invasion of Sicilly, gave the Allies more airfields, and additional cover for Med. convoys. It acted as a means of taking Italy out of the War and thereby spreading German forces around the area to cover the formely Italian areas.
The US though were opposed to an Med. entanglements and distractions from the business - as they saw it of fighting the Germans in North-western Europe. Otherwise a more planned timetable - rather than the what do we do now (once we've finished in Sicilly).
If this had been the case - and the reality was as the Germans new - the Allies would only invade within aircover - there should have been an appreciation that the west side of Italy was geographically the worst. Not for nothing is Italy likened to a leg - it is the back that is the softer!
Hence, IMHO a smaller scale Sicilly invassion - to 'fix' the enemy, followed by a right hook into the heel of the mainland - secure Tarranto. This force divides, one part crosses to the west-coast to trap German & Italian armies in the Straits and Sicilly; while the other part assisted by a follow up landing at Brindissi goes north up the East coast of Italy.
No Salerno - but yes add Sardinia - this gives the Axis no end of problems, where the threat will be next.
 
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