Mobilization speed in late 1930s

An often repeated calculation in the lead-up to WWI was the fact that while France and Germany could complete their planned mobilizations (as in- getting every reservist slated to participate in their war various plans into his unti and to the frontiers) in two weeks, Russia could only complete said mobilization in six weeks.

To be sure, Russia ended up taking up offensive operations much sooner than Germany predicted (or it's own generals wanted, and with rather detrimental results Vs Germany) and found it's plans for supplying the troops it eventually mobilized sadly lacking. But the point is that the perception of the decision makers were that Russia's opponents had a short window of opportunity to defeat France before turning Eastwards and rebuffing

The dynamics of particular WWII made this less relevant- I have no Idea how long it took Germany to mobilize all the forces that participated in the conquest of Poland (Polish forces seem to have failed to complete mobilization before being overrun), and by the time the phony war ended all the major combatants were already mobilized.

Does anybody have any details regarding mobilization speeds OTL?

Absent WWI and the totalitarian regimes it spawned, and assuming all major polities survive in more or less the same alliance configuration (Russia-France Vs Germany-Austria with Italy and GB ambigiuous) what kind of gap is likely between the period Russia would require to mobilize for offensive operations in the Russian battle plans and German perceptions?

obviously, all other things being equal, the Schlieffen plan is scrap by the 1930s and probably much earlier. But still, what are the likely numbers?
 
Part of "Russias" or the Red Armies mobilization was the size in men. Double the others in most years. Then there was distance and the thinner railway system.
 
Part of "Russias" or the Red Armies mobilization was the size in men. Double the others in most years. Then there was distance and the thinner railway system.

Right, the need to move more men recruited from a much less densely populated and much larger area, over less railways (and more badly managed and constructed railways) per square mile, worse roads and with less in the way of modern communications.

But those gaps were narrowing in the early 20th century- railway density was increasing, road quality was improving, and population density and urbanization was growing.
Russian bottlenecks in getting men to the front were widening. By the 1930s motorized transport means that getting men to the railheads will also become much easier.

While the bottle itself (manpower reserves and production capacity) was also not increasing relative to the CP, to the same extent many writers claim, the speed of mobilization, and the ability to supply men who were mobilized over the vast distances of Russia were. My question is- to what extent? I never really ran across Red Army mobilization plans for the 1930s so I don't even have any yardstick to compare this by.
 
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