Miscellaneous >1900 (Alternate) History Thread

Any thoughts on the story idea of Hitler coming to power in Austria in the 1930s and not Germany due to him joining the Austro-Hungarian Army rather than the German Army?
 
Yes they rejected him, as did the Bavarians in early 1914. In my premise he is declined in Bavaria for a second time but a wealthy German who was nearby gives him some money to take a train to Linz and on the way he eats a steady diet for a few weeks. By the time he enlists he is somewhat healthier.

And by this point A-H has lost a lot of people against Russia so their standards have lowered some.

Here is what I have written so far.

 
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I have this stupid idea bouncing around in my head, and am too lazy to do the research of width and depth to ascertain it's viability, so...

Let's say that we have Stalin - or some ISOT pretending to be Stalin - having a bit of a different calculus about Nazi Germany, to the tune of deciding to go to war with it in 1940, while they're still busy with Entente.

So, there are two overland targets - either going for Romania (And it's a bit of a distance to Germany), or for Poland (And there we have a problem of underdeveloped infrastructure and different gauges), and both wouldn't allow Soviets to get to Germany faster than Entente would.
Of course, there's a value in going for Romania anyway, to the tune of "OIL!". But pure land approach in Poland would be rather slow.

However, with Poland we have a possibility of using marine shipping, as there's a stretch of Baltic coast along with significant ports, that could be used to support soviet armies... Once Kriegsmarine is dealt with.

However, Kriegsmarine is a shadow of it's predecessor, and most of it would be engaging Entente fleets in any case - after proper preparations, Baltic fleet might be able to establish naval superiority in Baltics for some time if not indifinitely...
But then, why go for Polish ports, if you can go for German ones?

Thus, a plan that consists of Baltic fleet moving out of Leningrad to Pearl Harbor elements of Kriegsmarine present in the Baltics, to mine the Danish Straits and to escort ships full of troops to german shores, to be executed simultaneously with declaration of war, assault on Romania and engagements along the border in Poland.

Of course, you have to conceal preparations for such a move... Like, say, bungle the war with Finland even more in the eyes of the world and prolong it through the spring of 1940, while using it to build up necessary forces around Leningrad.

So, disregarding politics, would such a plan be possible to execute for the soviets, and why (not)?
 
It's target practice for the Luftwaffe since the Soviets have no way to provide air support for that force. The rest gets picked off by mines and U-Boats as do any resupply/evacuations.

I don't even think it's a viable operation if ASB gave the Soviets their 1990 Navy and accompanying aircraft/helicopters although that might be enough to convince some of the people in charge to go ahead with it.
 
Has anyone write Yellowstone eruption timeline on this forum? I am interested in reading timeline about yellowstone.
 
I have this stupid idea bouncing around in my head, and am too lazy to do the research of width and depth to ascertain it's viability, so...

Let's say that we have Stalin - or some ISOT pretending to be Stalin - having a bit of a different calculus about Nazi Germany, to the tune of deciding to go to war with it in 1940, while they're still busy with Entente.

So, there are two overland targets - either going for Romania (And it's a bit of a distance to Germany), or for Poland (And there we have a problem of underdeveloped infrastructure and different gauges), and both wouldn't allow Soviets to get to Germany faster than Entente would.
Of course, there's a value in going for Romania anyway, to the tune of "OIL!". But pure land approach in Poland would be rather slow.

However, with Poland we have a possibility of using marine shipping, as there's a stretch of Baltic coast along with significant ports, that could be used to support soviet armies... Once Kriegsmarine is dealt with.

However, Kriegsmarine is a shadow of it's predecessor, and most of it would be engaging Entente fleets in any case - after proper preparations, Baltic fleet might be able to establish naval superiority in Baltics for some time if not indifinitely...
But then, why go for Polish ports, if you can go for German ones?

Thus, a plan that consists of Baltic fleet moving out of Leningrad to Pearl Harbor elements of Kriegsmarine present in the Baltics, to mine the Danish Straits and to escort ships full of troops to german shores, to be executed simultaneously with declaration of war, assault on Romania and engagements along the border in Poland.

Of course, you have to conceal preparations for such a move... Like, say, bungle the war with Finland even more in the eyes of the world and prolong it through the spring of 1940, while using it to build up necessary forces around Leningrad.

So, disregarding politics, would such a plan be possible to execute for the soviets, and why (not)?
Well. you can't Pearl Harbour the German Navy as the Russians don't have any carriers and I doubt 1940 bombers have the ability to get to Kiel (perhaps they do if they don't want to come home?). This plan seems more like the Russo-Japanese War where the Russians are trying to play the role of the Japanese. But in the era of aircraft and submarines, not to mention mines that are better than in 1904, can a Soviet taskforce get OFF the German ports without being sunk? The easiest challenge would be Danzig (I don't suppose there would be much worth sinking at Memel or Elbing) but even this seems quite a stretch but at least achievable, with luck.

Are you planning amphibious assaults on Kolberg, Rostock etc? I'm not sure what the Russians have capable of such things, but I guess in sense you could do it by getting near and transferring to lighter craft a la Dardanelles landings. But the Luftwaffe is going to kind of notice this...
 
I have this stupid idea bouncing around in my head, and am too lazy to do the research of width and depth to ascertain it's viability, so...

Let's say that we have Stalin - or some ISOT pretending to be Stalin - having a bit of a different calculus about Nazi Germany, to the tune of deciding to go to war with it in 1940, while they're still busy with Entente.

So, there are two overland targets - either going for Romania (And it's a bit of a distance to Germany), or for Poland (And there we have a problem of underdeveloped infrastructure and different gauges), and both wouldn't allow Soviets to get to Germany faster than Entente would.
Of course, there's a value in going for Romania anyway, to the tune of "OIL!". But pure land approach in Poland would be rather slow.

However, with Poland we have a possibility of using marine shipping, as there's a stretch of Baltic coast along with significant ports, that could be used to support soviet armies... Once Kriegsmarine is dealt with.

However, Kriegsmarine is a shadow of it's predecessor, and most of it would be engaging Entente fleets in any case - after proper preparations, Baltic fleet might be able to establish naval superiority in Baltics for some time if not indifinitely...
But then, why go for Polish ports, if you can go for German ones?

Thus, a plan that consists of Baltic fleet moving out of Leningrad to Pearl Harbor elements of Kriegsmarine present in the Baltics, to mine the Danish Straits and to escort ships full of troops to german shores, to be executed simultaneously with declaration of war, assault on Romania and engagements along the border in Poland.

Of course, you have to conceal preparations for such a move... Like, say, bungle the war with Finland even more in the eyes of the world and prolong it through the spring of 1940, while using it to build up necessary forces around Leningrad.

So, disregarding politics, would such a plan be possible to execute for the soviets, and why (not)?
No.

The Pe2 does not have the range or the load capacity to operate far enough forward and the Russian Baltic fleet is not professional enough nor does it have the necessary tools to reach German naval bases that far west.



The trouble with European continentals is that they are clueless about MAHAN.

Think LIKE A SEASPOWER.



See Alard? Mine and patrol with submarines the waters south of it. The geographic feature in naval warfare is called a trade-lane CHOKEPOINT. To keep it open, the German KM has to come to the Russians and fight there. THAT is within Soviet airpower reach. And if the Russians, had they so chosen, to double-cross the Berlin Maniac while the disastrous Wally Norway campaign was in progress, could have tried that stunt. I estimate their chances of success at cutting off Swedish Iron Ore to Germany at less than 15%, but if Stalin or his ersatz wants to do something naval that "might" tip the Balance in Norway, it is his best move to start a submarine war in the Baltic while he has Talinin and the Gulf of Riga in his hands in 1940. Later the Germans will choke him off with minefields and their airpower and land armies (1941).

Source: https://quietwarriors.files.wordpress.com

There is a downside. Sweden will not be neutral anymore. That alone is why I think the whole idea of any Stalin double-cross is cloud cuckoo land as a political and military gamble. Naval Geography is one thing. Military competence is something else. Soviet Russia in 1940 is not too good as to competence. At sea in 1940, they are amateurs. They will get better but even in 1945, at sea, they are not too good at the sea-power thing.
 
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I actually have one that seems minor but could have major implications down the road: What if Quentin Roosevelt, son of Theodore Roosevel, lived through World War 1?
 
Failure of the Norwegian Campaign for Germany in WW2

Source: https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/3484.html

POD 5: Naval victories off the Norwegian coast result in more decisive action taken against the Germans at Narvik, resulting in their surrender before June 1940 along with the Allied recapture of Narvik. The same occurs with all other German controlled Norwegian ports, resulting in the German invasion of Norway failing completely by 21 May 1940.
Interesting to speculate how German failure is then seen in London - would Chamberlain still resign? If not, while Churchill would take credit for RN successes, would the heavy losses suggested impact on any future possibility of his becoming PM? Or would Halifax snatch victory?
 
Are there any TLs about postwar US culture/economy if the great suburbanization of America, through the GI bill and Interstate Act, were somehow averted or derailed?

I'd also be interested in PODs that could extend the period of streetcar suburb development, and in general see more passenger rail and land development centered around transit.
 

Driftless

Donor
Any good readable sources covering Elihu Root's attempts at reforming the US Army's command structure in the early 1900's? As I understand it, he attempted to combine aspects of then current corporate management models and the Prussian Army command structure, with the idea of bringing the US Army into the 20th Century. I know he set the ground work for the Chief of Staff, improved officer training and such, but ran into problems trying to corral the semi-autonomous fiefdoms of the Army's Bureaus. What I've found so far is pretty scant on detail
 
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Any good readable sources covering Elihu Root's attempts at reforming the US Army's command structure in the early 1900's? As I understand it, he attempted to combine aspects of then current corporate management models and the Prussian Army command structure, with the idea of bringing the US Army into the 20th Century. I know he set the ground work for the Chief of Staff, improved officer training and such, but ran into problems trying to corral the semi-autonomous fiefdoms of the Army's Bureaus. What I've found so far is pretty scant on detail
Not really. For a man as important to the American army as Mahan was to the American navy, he published very little on what he did to reform the disaster that was the American army of the Spanish American war. What he did write


is more about government reform in general and about foreign relations.

For work about Root's army reforms...

 

Driftless

Donor
Not really. For a man as important to the American army as Mahan was to the American navy, he published very little on what he did to reform the disaster that was the American army of the Spanish American war. What he did write


is more about government reform in general and about foreign relations.

For work about Root's army reforms...

Thanks! In your Goodreads link, I found a possible lead: The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Addresses and Reports. The further link in Google Books give a table of contents, which points to some useful short works by Root.
 

Driftless

Donor
^^^^ Further working your Goodreads link on Elihu Root's published works, I found this item: "Establishment of a General Staff Corps in the Army". Most of the content is Senate testimony (including much Senatorial question and comment).

There does seem to be a sense of a big missed opportunity with Root's reforms only being initiated before cabinet changes had Root replaced as Sec of War by Wm. Taft, who seems to have shifted the process into neutral for several years. Henry Stimson picked up the process as Secr. of War, but that was in 1911. There was a lot of stodgy 19th Century constabulary force thinking by the Army brass for too long in that turn-of-the-century time frame. Too much resistance to new ideas and technology and whatever advancements were made, often came after much bureaucratic weeping, wailing, and gnashing of teeth....
 
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