Military operations if Japan doesn't surrender

The point I'm getting at is that in 1945 the Allies were making no demands of Japan that they had not of Germany, and that the Imperial Japanese armed forces had shown themselves the full equal of the Wehrmacht in barbarism. There is an extent to which demands for unconditional surrender were going to make the enemy fight harder, but there is also the extent to which the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the entire command decisions of the Wehrmacht in 1944 call into question whether or not Unconditional surrender changed very much.

Yeah. By 1945, the question Japan's leaders should be asking themselves is whether they'd rather sign a peace treaty before or after the Allies land.

At least in 1944 its possible to pursue "slim chance". 1945, Japan has no method of winning available, except Allied collapse of will happening via distinctly partisan ASBs or something.
 
Ironically and rather twistedly Soviet behavior in 1939-41 showed them to be a Literal Genie about agreements but still adhering to them.

I wouldn't say that. Stalin was a literal genie when confronted with a force considerable enough to earn his respect, like Nazi Germany. But during 1939-41 he violated non-aggression pacts with Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, the Litvinov Pact, the "mutual assistance" pacts that he himself imposed on the Baltics in 1939, and the previous Soviet recognition of the entire Vilnius region as part of Lithuania.
 
Yeah. By 1945, the question Japan's leaders should be asking themselves is whether they'd rather sign a peace treaty before or after the Allies land.

At least in 1944 its possible to pursue "slim chance". 1945, Japan has no method of winning available, except Allied collapse of will happening via distinctly partisan ASBs or something.

And as it was Japan *did* get a conditional peace, where Germany did not.

I wouldn't say that. Stalin was a literal genie when confronted with a force considerable enough to earn his respect, like Nazi Germany. But during 1939-41 he violated non-aggression pacts with Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, the Litvinov Pact, the "mutual assistance" pacts that he himself imposed on the Baltics in 1939, and the previous Soviet recognition of the entire Vilnius region as part of Lithuania.

The elephant in the room with that is that his right to do that was guaranteed by the secret protocols of the M-R Pact. For that matter Nazi Germany had also signed a non-aggression pact with some of the states it later invaded. I agree that Stalin was just as prone to ignoring his agreements when convenient, but he also kept his agreements on spheres of influence with Churchill in 1944 when he had no real reason to do that.
 
The elephant in the room with that is that his right to do that was guaranteed by the secret protocols of the M-R Pact.

Well that's not quite what a literal genie does, is it? And even Molotov-Ribbentrop was not followed to the letter, as Stalin demanded Northern Bukovina, which the Pact did not mention.

For that matter Nazi Germany had also signed a non-aggression pact with some of the states it later invaded.
But as you said, this is the sort of thing that Hitler did.

I agree that Stalin was just as prone to ignoring his agreements when convenient, but he also kept his agreements on spheres of influence with Churchill in 1944 when he had no real reason to do that.
That's very disputable. The 10% that the British were assigned in Romania and the 20% that they were assigned in Hungary and Bulgaria ended up amounting to 0%, Yugoslavia was inapplicable because Tito started off anti-British and then became anti-Soviet, and Stalin supported the Greek Communists when he thought that they had a chance. Some people think the percentages agreement was important, but in practice everything proceeded as if it had never existed. The fate of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria was decided by the presence of the Red Army, that of Yugoslavia by Tito and that of Greece by the civil war.
 
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Well that's not quite what a literal genie does, is it? And even Molotov-Ribbentrop was not followed to the letter, as Stalin demanded Northern Bukovina, which the Pact did not mention.

He sent the exact amount of Soviet economic aid required by the Pact and made no quibbles about Nazi seizure of their own sphere of influence. You are right that Bukovina was not in the Pact, and I concede that.

That's very disputable. The 10% that the British were assigned in Romania and the 20% that they were assigned in Hungary and Bulgaria ended up amounting to 0%, Yugoslavia was inapplicable because Tito started off anti-British and then became anti-Soviet, and Stalin supported the Greek Communists when he thought that they had a chance. Some people think the percentages agreement was important, in practice everything proceeded as if it had never existed.

From what I've read it was Tito who supported the Greek communists, not Stalin. And that support was one of the factors in the Titoist break with Moscow. I concede the points about Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
 
From what I've read it was Tito who supported the Greek communists, not Stalin. And that support was one of the factors in the Titoist break with Moscow.

Support came from both Moscow and the new communist governments of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania. What Tito did was refuse to discontinue aid once Stalin decided that the KKE was a lost cause and continuing the civil war hurt Soviet interests more than it aided them - it had strained British resources, which was good, but then led to the Truman Doctrine, which was bad. It's generally forgotten now that Tito was quite confrontational towards the West back then, going as far as attacking US aircraft over the Julian March. Stalin could only accept that attitude if it deferred to him, though his judgment in the matter turned up not not have been that good - Kim Il-sung demanded several times that he be allowed to atack South Korea before receiving the go-ahead.
 

loughery111

Banned
The point I'm getting at is that in 1945 the Allies were making no demands of Japan that they had not of Germany, and that the Imperial Japanese armed forces had shown themselves the full equal of the Wehrmacht in barbarism. There is an extent to which demands for unconditional surrender were going to make the enemy fight harder, but there is also the extent to which the Battle of Leyte Gulf and the entire command decisions of the Wehrmacht in 1944 call into question whether or not Unconditional surrender changed very much.

The IJA made, frankly, most of the combat elements of the Wehrmacht look like Boy Scouts. Some of the latter, many even, at least attempted to follow the rules on prisoners and civilians, sort of. They did poorly at it, as often as not, especially on the Eastern Front, but nothing short of the Holocaust itself actually outdoes what the IJA did as a matter of course in waging war and, even worse, in occupying civilian areas.
 
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