Assuming for a moment there is no significant European war from 1914 to 1920. Just a few very brief local conflicts, in the Balkans, Asia, or the usual colonial wars. Then what will be the developments in weapons and tactics globally for those six years. I am guessing weapons development will be slower, and in different directions than OTL due to WWI.
Thoughts, or links to threads where this has been discussed before...
Ivan Bloch' theories on the impenetrability of defensive weapons would get serious study.
You would see accelerated development of track laying equipment, mobile rail bridges, personal body armour, armoured battlefield transport.
Highly doubtful, he was a banker, Jewish too, both of which were marks against him in the minds of the serious professional soldiers on all sides. No one took him seriously, its only in retrospect that people resurrected his works and marked him as a prophet, because he was right. Otherwise he'd likely remain obscure and ignored until his analysis was superseded by technology.
they forgot the lesson of the American civil war set piece battles.
Europe's patriots were unmoved. French cavalry and British infantry commanders only learned Bloch's lessons by a process of trial and error once Bloch's impossible war, World War I, had begun. The Russian and German monarchies proved equally incapable of assimilating Bloch's cautionary words concerning revolution, paying the price with summary execution and exile, respectively.
Contemporary theory treats Bloch as the Anti-(?)Clausewitz of the early 1900s. A review in 2000 in the journal War in History [4] concentrates on the interaction between Bloch's theory and the military professionals of the time. In short, it finds that they tended to dismiss Bloch, on the basis that, while his "mathematics" might be correct, his overall message ran the risk of being bad for morale.
They didn't forget, they just consider the American experience irrelevant to the European one; they did the same thing with the Russo-Japanese war and the Balkan wars. Its almost as if early 20th century Europeans were highly ethnocentric
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Gotlib_Bloch
Subs will probably end up in the same mess as IJN interwar subs.
Navies will exercise though a few things will become apparent. Having air cover will deter submarines from approaching the battlefleet, and having aircraft able to attack subs will follow.
Also having a large multi engine aircraft able to mount multiple gun batteries may be seen as the ultimate air superiority fighter. Briefly.
One o f Bloch' forgotten theories was that dense rail nets, such as Northern France, returned the power to the defensive because they could shuttle men and equipment rapidly form Front to front, and that rail destruction as a defending army withdrew reduced the attackers to a horse drawn crawl...
something that German rapid mobilising in 1914, errr, 'forgot'.
I think it was more a matter of not expecting the level of successful sabotage of the Belgian rail network by the Belgians during the invasion, which seriously disadvantaged the German advance. It would have mattered less what the French had available in terms of rail if the Germans had not had to deal with months worth of rail repairs, which forced them to rely on horse carts. Without a few strategic tunnel demolitions the Germans could have keep their rail transport pretty damn close to the front, minimizing the need to rely on horse transport. So its more arrogance on their part, plus wishful thinking that they ignored this threat as a potential derailer of their plan; if anything it wasn't forgotten, but rather purposely ignored, as it would debunk the Moltke plan for invasion of France from the conceptual standpoint, leaving Germany unable to win a two front war, which was anathma to the ideology of the time.
Actually, that counts as a win for Britain, the German fleet remains bottled up, unwilling to risk another beating to try to hurt Britain.Or to a more broad subject. We condemn the High Seas Fleet as wasteful, but only because the CP lost on land. The naval battles of dreads were a draw. UK was unable to hold the German coast. Same for Germany. North Sea was a no man's land.
Um, what? How does Russia losing mean that Britain loses India?If the Austrians do better in the East in 1914, the CP will win the war, and we will have a huge number of books condemning the wasteful RN spending for starting a pointless rivalry with Germany that leads to the loss of India.
>Just like aircraft carriers carry planes to a battle, a ship would carry small subs to a battle zone and lower them into the water with a crane the day of the battle.
Um, what? How does Russia losing mean that Britain loses India?
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It made sense at the time, given the size of smaller subs. Some large warships were already carrying torpedo boats.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kégresse_trackI agree that armored cars would be the most likely direction, probably changing to armored half track cars since this is simpler and cheaper then fully tracked vehicles and would greatly help the early armored cars with their narrow hard rubber tires go off road
>Cranes for deploying torpedo boats sounds like a temporary measure. A specialized cruiser with a well deck and ballast tanks, like the amphib. transports from the 1940s might be better.
Actually, that counts as a win for Britain, the German fleet remains bottled up, unwilling to risk another beating to try to hurt Britain.
Um, what? How does Russia losing mean that Britain loses India?
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It made sense at the time, given the size of smaller subs. Some large warships were already carrying torpedo boats.
In a way this is akin to large ships carrying aircraft for launching torpedos. The torpedo bomber being a torpedo boat with more speed, less endurance, and a better view for searching.
Cranes for deploying torpedo boats sounds like a temporary measure. A specialized cruiser with a well deck and ballast tanks, like the amphib. transports from the 1940s might be better.
To be fair, not sure how much was Napkinwaffe and how much had serious engineering into it, but it did seem to be the popular idea among admirals of how to get subs to a naval battle in open ocean, and with generous funding, it could be made to work.