Military Aircraft that should have never been built?

Two of the main problems with the IJN were the same as the Luftwaffe: their training programs and their mania for not rotating pilots in and out of active duty. German and japanese veterans flew untill they died, regardless of time in duty; meanwhile, training was carried out by instrutors that(for the most) had little combat experience. Alied pilots were rotated back, and many went on to training units, to pass on what they had learned. This meant that new alied pilots had far better tactical training in middle/late war than Axis pilots.
The problem of shortage of pilots was not unique to the Axis. The Americans and Soviets also had that problem. The only ones out of the major powers who managed to mostly avoid it was the British and that was due to the pre war Empire training programs in Canada, South Africa, India and AusNZ.

Generals on **all** sides, as amazing as it seems to us today, severely underestimated how much material their industry could produce and how fast.
To take one example, the Lancaster was in full scale production for 2 years. In that time over 7000 examples were completed, about 70 a week/10 a day. Once the prototype was ordered into production, and the machine tools setup, they would churn them out.
 
But there were 10 US pilots for every IJN pilot.
I don't think that was true at the beginning of the war. The U.S. had a systematic way to build up the number of pilots they needed not only to staff the huge carrier fleet they were building but to give pilots a break after a reasonable period of combat and bring their experience back to newer pilots.
 
The Allies had the ability to train their people in safe areas and also bleed them in small low risk actions. The Axis not so much.
The USN from’43 especially.
Bombing some isolated Japanese island garrison may not help much win the war, but for the newbies fresh out of the various flight schools, it meant flying hours and combat time. Which cannot be replicated. Sure enemy AAA and the occasional fighters were not the best that lwould be faced. But it permitted rookies to be broken in, key tactics could be developed and checked out in real world senarios and the deadwood identified and removed.
 
My favourite quote from Komrade Stalin is, "Quantity has a quality all it's own..."

Yeah... that quote is neat, but far from reality. Winter saved the soviets in 41; after that, german mistakes and shortcomings helped the soviets suvive almost as much as anything else; lend lease rebuilt soviet industry and logistics. And then the winter of 42 and Stalingrad nailed the coffin.
 
Yeah... that quote is neat, but far from reality. Winter saved the soviets in 41; after that, german mistakes and shortcomings helped the soviets suvive almost as much as anything else; lend lease rebuilt soviet industry and logistics. And then the winter of 42 and Stalingrad nailed the coffin.

Or, in other words: Soviets were non-factor in the ww2?
 
Or, in other words: Soviets were non-factor in the ww2?

What? Wth did you read that?! I simpy, stated that general winter and german strategic dumbness had great responbability. As for non-factor, only an idiot would say that; the soviets bled the germans white. The german army died in Russia. But it was not just "blind quantity without quality" as that saying states.
 
What? Wth did you read that?! I simpy, stated that general winter and german strategic dumbness had great responbability. As for non-factor, only an idiot would say that; the soviets bled the germans white. The german army died in Russia. But it was not just "blind quantity without quality" as that saying states.

When one reads that 'winter saved Soviets in '41', what is to left to deduce from that?
 
When one reads that 'winter saved Soviets in '41', what is to left to deduce from that?

In 41 the germans came within 16km of the center of Moscow; most if the soviet army, in 41 was either destroyed or retreating. And then winter came. and the stretched, overworked and completely-unprepared-for-winter germans ground to a halt. So, yes, in 41, general winter saved them. Bought them time to start reorganize, rebuild, learn from mistakes (while making some more...) and grind down the german army through 42.
 
However the Soviets took advantage of the unprepared nature of the Germans and rode rough shod all over the them with Siberian troops who just laughed at the weather in comparison to a Siberian one. Stalin's comment was intended more for post-1941, when the Soviets relied on massed numbers to overwhelm the Germans/Finss/Rumanians/Bulgarian/Hungarians...
 
However the Soviets took advantage of the unprepared nature of the Germans and rode rough shod all over the them with Siberian troops who just laughed at the weather in comparison to a Siberian one. Stalin's comment was intended more for post-1941, when the Soviets relied on massed numbers to overwhelm the Germans/Finss/Rumanians/Bulgarian/Hungarians...

Yes, but even that was not correct. By the time that happened, not only the german allies crushed around Staliningrad were in very poor condition (number & quality of equipment), but also the quality of the Red Army had improved substtantionally, at all levels. Yes, it was 20-1, but those 20 had late model T-34s, supported by artillery and air force. The Rumanians/Bulgarian/Hungarians had mostly home-built obsolete junk, backed by very small numbers of german-built equipment. The Finns had some of the best defensive terrain of the war, but the russians learned enough to, at least, force them to an armistice. And, after early 44, the T-34/85 and IS-1 were good enough to deal with german armour, while in the air, advance fighters began to suplant the german models. It was far from being just "quantity".
 
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