Miles Kestrel Naval Fighter.

They already had, which was why they bought the Gladiator which was at the time of the order being made the standard RAF fighter. All this proposal does is change the order to a higher performance aircraft that the RAF has (at that time) decided it doesn't want. Both aircraft need adapting but all in all the change shouldn't delay things by much and the FAA would be much better prepared for Norway and the Mediterranean war in 1940.

The important part of my point was, 'and having a higher priority than land based fighters.'

Crediting Fulmar alone for Axis not sinking more RN carriers is a foly, as it is forgetting how many merchant ships and other warships were sunk that were supposed to be protected by FAA. Foly is also blaming Zero and Wildcat for losses of their respective carriers.
On the other hand, all of the 3 major sea-borne powers failed to field a real peformer of a fighter in 1941-42, despite the technical possibilities available.

I am not crediting the Fulmar, I am pointing out the limitations of a high performance fighter in defence of a high value naval target. Its highly situational ( see USN CAP during the Rabaul raid in early 42) but in term of the primary mission of a CAP over carriers the Fulmar and the Air defence system it operated as part of is much more successful that either the USN or Japanese up to mid 42.

In terms of other ships lost, the main loss of warships is off Crete - no carriers present. Off Enemy coasts, either in the Dunkirk evacuations or on coastal raids vs Libya. One is covered by land based air the other, no carrier. Now that may be an argument for building CVE so you can have aircraft everywhere, but that requires wartime levels of finance and manning.

An earlier decision to have a high performance fighter would have resulted in different production requirements earlier which while maybe not changing the number or even aircraft available in 1939 might effect massive changes to the aircraft used by FAA in 1940 and 1941 and not having to rush development of the Sea Hurricane and subsequantly Seafire when it became apparent that a higher performing fighter was required for ops in a littoral environment vs land based twin / triple engined bombers and modern single engined fighters.

No, the diversion of resources to a third aircraft comes at the expense of something. The early war production run of any new dedicated carrier aircraft comes at the expense of something. The national priority in the period was Air defence of the UK, and after that protection of major bases by ground based aircraft, which is why the priority is also given to AA command over other parts of the ground forces. It is only after that is felt to be completed that production can be diverted to other needs. and with the BoB that means until late 40 at which point the Wildcats are on the way and lend lease is available avoiding the need to develop a dedicated naval fighter in a hurry. The first AtA kill of an F4F is over Scapa in December 40.

That they are not then redeployed to the Med is a command decision and a reasonable one given the difficulty in delivery to the Eastern Med and needs in the North Atlantic.

The argument seems to be that in 1938/9 the UK should prioritise defence of overseas naval assets against neutral Italian aircraft when you hope to keep Italy neutral as opposed to defending London from Luftwaffe bombers dropping chemical weapons on London from bases in Germany. Which they are capable of doing.

To which the answer is build more Spitfires. AA guns Radar Stations, deterrent bombers of your own.
 
No, the diversion of resources to a third aircraft comes at the expense of something. The early war production run of any new dedicated carrier aircraft comes at the expense of something. The national priority in the period was Air defence of the UK, and after that protection of major bases by ground based aircraft, which is why the priority is also given to AA command over other parts of the ground forces. It is only after that is felt to be completed that production can be diverted to other needs. and with the BoB that means until late 40 at which point the Wildcats are on the way and lend lease is available avoiding the need to develop a dedicated naval fighter in a hurry. The first AtA kill of an F4F is over Scapa in December 40.

That they are not then redeployed to the Med is a command decision and a reasonable one given the difficulty in delivery to the Eastern Med and needs in the North Atlantic.

The argument seems to be that in 1938/9 the UK should prioritise defence of overseas naval assets against neutral Italian aircraft when you hope to keep Italy neutral as opposed to defending London from Luftwaffe bombers dropping chemical weapons on London from bases in Germany. Which they are capable of doing.

To which the answer is build more Spitfires. AA guns Radar Stations, deterrent bombers of your own.

I would accept that as an answer if nothing was being built for the navy at all during this period - but that was not the case

Fulmar for example used the same engine and weapons as a Mk 2 spitfire but cost more in terms of money and manpower to make was being built and was in production from late 39 with the first serial production aircraft delivered on 4th of Jan 1940 and the first Squadron (806) operational in July 1940 Abourd Lusty

But had 'for example' the decision been made to build a fleet defence fighter that might have to encounter land based fighters (the decision when made to produce the Fulmar assumed it would not) and that fighter would be based on the Spitfire and this would be being made at Fairey 'instead of' the more difficult to make and more expensive Fulmar then there is no net loss in aircraft numbers per se.

I know its not perfect but then very little in this period was.
 
I am not crediting the Fulmar, I am pointing out the limitations of a high performance fighter in defence of a high value naval target. Its highly situational ( see USN CAP during the Rabaul raid in early 42) but in term of the primary mission of a CAP over carriers the Fulmar and the Air defence system it operated as part of is much more successful that either the USN or Japanese up to mid 42.

In terms of other ships lost, the main loss of warships is off Crete - no carriers present. Off Enemy coasts, either in the Dunkirk evacuations or on coastal raids vs Libya. One is covered by land based air the other, no carrier. Now that may be an argument for building CVE so you can have aircraft everywhere, but that requires wartime levels of finance and manning.

F4F was not a high-performance fighter per standards of 1942 - high performance speed was 370-400 mph, not 320-330, climb of 3000 fpm, not 2000. Then we have US hopefully behind both FAA and Japanese in use of carrier assets, both attack and fighters' aircraft. That prevented a mass attack on IJN earyl enough at Midway, giving Japanese a window of opportunity to hit Yorktown for the 2nd time. Criminaly non-functioning US torpedoes played their part, too.
As for Japanese - no radar, US reads your mail, lousy ship-borne AA, division of forces both for operations MI and AL, plus division between assets alocated for the op MI, plus division of carrier-borne assets, plus expecting from USN to follow IJN's (Yamamoto's) script. Sailing your ships right between US land- and ship-based aircraft.
BTW - you have credited 'Fulmar' defenders with not loosing a CV in post #45 here. Also, BTW, USN lost no light CVs and escort carriers before mid 1942, that you've somehow blamed to be F4Fs fault. IJN lost no escort CVs in that time, either.
 
Again IIRC when the navy approached Richard Fairey to build a naval version of the Spitfire, the Admiralty were informed that to tool up and build the Spitfire using Supermarine construction techniques as well as modifying the design for carrier usage would take longer than it would take Faireys to modify their own design and build it as the Fulmar. An incidental advantage being that the Fulmar as a dedicated naval fighter was less likely to be coveted by the RAF than an extra tranche of Spitfires. Further at the time of he request by the Admiralty for Fairey Aviation to build Spitfires Supermarine were struggling to build production aircraft themselves and were months behind schedule, as to Castle Bromwich we all know what a C@ck up that was without serious production becoming available till very late in the BoB. Building a capable naval fighter earlier would possible curtail production of something else if under taken prior to the OTL Fulmar production and hopefully for the sake of the aircrew that lost production is I the form of Fairey's own Battle.
 
F4F was not a high-performance fighter per standards of 1942 - high performance speed was 370-400 mph, not 320-330, climb of 3000 fpm, not 2000. Then we have US hopefully behind both FAA and Japanese in use of carrier assets, both attack and fighters' aircraft. That prevented a mass attack on IJN earyl enough at Midway, giving Japanese a window of opportunity to hit Yorktown for the 2nd time. Criminaly non-functioning US torpedoes played their part, too.
As for Japanese - no radar, US reads your mail, lousy ship-borne AA, division of forces both for operations MI and AL, plus division between assets alocated for the op MI, plus division of carrier-borne assets, plus expecting from USN to follow IJN's (Yamamoto's) script. Sailing your ships right between US land- and ship-based aircraft.
BTW - you have credited 'Fulmar' defenders with not loosing a CV in post #45 here. Also, BTW, USN lost no light CVs and escort carriers before mid 1942, that you've somehow blamed to be F4Fs fault. IJN lost no escort CVs in that time, either.

Not sure what point you are making. in terms of its mission, fleet defence and recon the RN has a better record than either the USN or IJN in 41/42. the proposal is to take an advanced trainer with a speed in 240mph range and turn it into a Hellcat in general service in 1942 and do better, I am sure they would take the Hellcat but better? in terms of measurable outcomes how exactly.

And the recon bit gets skipped over. This is an aircraft intended to fly BVR of the carrier on its own in the normal course of duties. The envisaged threat is surface raiders, U boats on the surface and long range patrol aircraft which is why the second crewman, radio here is morse keyed not voice. Its not designed to fight the war in the Pacific or to escort daylight raids over continental europe.

Basic issue is that the most effective fighter is the one at the end of a working GCI system and fleet air defence is a system of weapons, sensors and manoeuvre not top trumps with fighter planes, what is it 90% of all AtA losses happen to crews who not realise they are in combat yet.

The US was never attempting massed attacks in 42, this is a feature not a bug ( neither was the RN), their pre war exercises had shown the need for rapid attacks as soon as the enemy was sighted not assembling a balanced strike. Which works very well against the IJN in the period. Hiryu's window of opportunity is a) after the other three carriers are hit, b) because the Hiryu captain did not assemble a balanced strike but instead sent the Vals first and followed them with the Kates in separate strikes and the Hiryu is afloat because of poor tactical decision making by the US Strike leaders and Hornet group going the wrong way, as well as the tactical deployment of the IJN carriers.

The IJN faults you identify are shared with the USN on the tactical level, Yamamoto and the IJNs elaborate planning is a bit bespoke. But the IJN do not sail between land and sea based planes. As far as they are concerned there are no US carriers in the vicinity. That's the point, draw the carriers out from Pearl and ambush both of them.

Apart from Shoho And Ryujo. I mean you can only fail to defend whats there.
 
which is why the second crewman, radio here is morse keyed not voice. Its not designed to fight the war in the Pacific or to escort daylight raids over continental europe.

Basic issue is that the most effective fighter is the one at the end of a working GCI system and fleet air defence is a system of weapons, sensors and manoeuvre not top trumps with fighter planes, what is it 90% of all AtA losses happen to crews who not realise they are in combat yet.

The 2nd man as well as being the Wireless Telegrapher was also the there to operate the Type 72 DM homing beacon equipment all modern RN carrriers carried

1940_00_00_illustrious_b-jpg.433463


The beacon is the drum shaped object on the mast just above the funnel. The early equipment was not automatic and needed a trained man to operate.
 
Not sure what point you are making. in terms of its mission, fleet defence and recon the RN has a better record than either the USN or IJN in 41/42. the proposal is to take an advanced trainer with a speed in 240mph range and turn it into a Hellcat in general service in 1942 and do better, I am sure they would take the Hellcat but better? in terms of measurable outcomes how exactly.

And the recon bit gets skipped over. This is an aircraft intended to fly BVR of the carrier on its own in the normal course of duties. The envisaged threat is surface raiders, U boats on the surface and long range patrol aircraft which is why the second crewman, radio here is morse keyed not voice. Its not designed to fight the war in the Pacific or to escort daylight raids over continental europe.

Fulmar was not the only fighter used by FAA in 1941-42, they also used 1-man fighters like Sea Gladiator, Wildcat (mostly the sub-par versions the USN was seldom using) and Sea Hurricane. The OP is of opinion that Miles Kestrel-based fighter for the FAA would've been a good fighter, and I agree with that. The Miles Master went down from 290 mph figure of the Kestrel due to using a low-level engine and introduction of god awful radiator.
The scenario does not take anything away from the Fulmar, while we might recall that RN lost 4 war ships and 9 merchantmen during the Op Pedestal.

Fleet defence was not comprised just by FAA fighters, FAA fighter force was not comprised just with Fulmars.

Basic issue is that the most effective fighter is the one at the end of a working GCI system and fleet air defence is a system of weapons, sensors and manoeuvre not top trumps with fighter planes, what is it 90% of all AtA losses happen to crews who not realise they are in combat yet.

All good and well. Perhaps we can agree that fighter, that is a real performer, is better suited for the job.

The US was never attempting massed attacks in 42, this is a feature not a bug ( neither was the RN), their pre war exercises had shown the need for rapid attacks as soon as the enemy was sighted not assembling a balanced strike. Which works very well against the IJN in the period. Hiryu's window of opportunity is a) after the other three carriers are hit, b) because the Hiryu captain did not assemble a balanced strike but instead sent the Vals first and followed them with the Kates in separate strikes and the Hiryu is afloat because of poor tactical decision making by the US Strike leaders and Hornet group going the wrong way, as well as the tactical deployment of the IJN carriers.

The IJN faults you identify are shared with the USN on the tactical level, Yamamoto and the IJNs elaborate planning is a bit bespoke. But the IJN do not sail between land and sea based planes. As far as they are concerned there are no US carriers in the vicinity. That's the point, draw the carriers out from Pearl and ambush both of them.

Apart from Shoho And Ryujo. I mean you can only fail to defend whats there.

I was not judging the incapability of the USN to mount a massed strike, but their failings to even find the seaborne targed by the strike package, despite the same target being spotted hours ago by friendly aircraft. Failures in navigation, that saw heaps of aircraft landing in water instead back on carriers or firm ground. Failures in communication and coordination of ascorts to perform their job. Then we have the consequences of the torpedo scandal, that left the breach of the IJN defense by the B-26s without a carrier in flames or sinking, plus the inability of carrier-borne TBs to inflict any damage worth talking about.
IJN strike packages were far better in arriving at target as a meaningful force, that depspite US radar-assisted CAP was able to penetrate Yorktown's screen several times - and that is just a small fraction of what was sent days ago from Japan. As far as for the ships, there was no any support given by the Main Force, IJN attacked with aircraft Midway instead of battleships' guns, or at leat cruisers' guns so whole contingent of aircraft is there to attack a real prize - the USN fleet that was expected to show up. IJN/Yamamoto expecting USN to behave per IJN plan is example of arrogance, that goes against the 'never underestimate the enemy' rule.
 
What if the Americas were peacefully divided up between the European powers? Which countries would participate in this conference and how would the borders of the New World look?

Fulmar was not the only fighter used by FAA in 1941-42, they also used 1-man fighters like Sea Gladiator, Wildcat (mostly the sub-par versions the USN was seldom using) and Sea Hurricane. The OP is of opinion that Miles Kestrel-based fighter for the FAA would've been a good fighter, and I agree with that.

Pure speculation as its an advanced trainer with a lightweight construction ( no armour, no meaningful armament) which is then magicked up to a carrier fighter which has to carry all the rest of the weight from a carrier. The fundamental problem being that an FAA only design is for a very small production run, which mitigates against development on a reasonable timescale, and the general situation means high production runs of land based aircraft for ADGB is a necessity, as is the production of advanced trainers for fighter command. If there had been a viable fighter from a minor player like Miles it would have been both a miracle and stripped of the excess carrier related weight and used by the RAF.

I was not judging the incapability of the USN to mount a massed strike, but their failings to even find the seaborne targed by the strike package, despite the same target being spotted hours ago by friendly aircraft. Failures in navigation, that saw heaps of aircraft landing in water instead back on carriers or firm ground. Failures in communication and coordination of ascorts to perform their job. Then we have the consequences of the torpedo scandal, that left the breach of the IJN defense by the B-26s without a carrier in flames or sinking, plus the inability of carrier-borne TBs to inflict any damage worth talking about.
IJN strike packages were far better in arriving at target as a meaningful force, that depspite US radar-assisted CAP was able to penetrate Yorktown's screen several times - and that is just a small fraction of what was sent days ago from Japan. As far as for the ships, there was no any support given by the Main Force, IJN attacked with aircraft Midway instead of battleships' guns, or at leat cruisers' guns so whole contingent of aircraft is there to attack a real prize - the USN fleet that was expected to show up. IJN/Yamamoto expecting USN to behave per IJN plan is example of arrogance, that goes against the 'never underestimate the enemy' rule.

I was, the USN at this period was utterly incapable of launching a massed coordinated all arms strike. They did not train for it and did not believe it was necessary and were right. To do that requires an entirely different task force organisation than the one they used and would have led to the same problems as the IJN had. The failings at Midway are very specifically those of the undertrained Hornet Group and, shit happens in war. As to the Escort fighters, well the 6 of them actually did a good job. There were fundamental problems with the air group composition that were rectified but the first two encounters at Coral Sea and Midway happened within a very short period and there really was no practical way to change organisation and tactics ( outside a single group) any faster than they were. As indeed did the 6 Zeros escorting the Vals onto Yorktown. The Wildcats seem to have made one pass and then the Vals are in the AA zone and press home the attack ike the highly trained pilots they were.

The IJN strike Packages were more successful, but off IJN doctrine. The problem for the US is that the radar is really a warning rather than a control system, which gives warning at around 30 miles which lets you vector a CAP in the general direction. This is what the USN exercises had predicted would happen btw,

While the thinking of the IJN in its deployments requires a generous use of the word thinking, the overall purpose was to trap an destroy the US carrier force. Speeding to the rescue of the Island. Going in like a 1944 US invasion is simply not on. The prime objective being to get the US carriers into a fight not take the Island so fast they do not sortie in the first place. The assumption on the IJN part was a single strike would destroy the Midway air force and in any event the US carriers were so far away they could not intervene.
 
As fastmongrel says. The Fulmar was designed for a different role to the Sea Gladiator or the proposed Sea Spitfire. Just as the Firefly complemented the Seafire and Sea Fury.
 
Pure speculation as its an advanced trainer with a lightweight construction ( no armour, no meaningful armament) which is then magicked up to a carrier fighter which has to carry all the rest of the weight from a carrier. The fundamental problem being that an FAA only design is for a very small production run, which mitigates against development on a reasonable timescale, and the general situation means high production runs of land based aircraft for ADGB is a necessity, as is the production of advanced trainers for fighter command. If there had been a viable fighter from a minor player like Miles it would have been both a miracle and stripped of the excess carrier related weight and used by the RAF.

Nobody said that Miles would still not make Master trainer, with plenty of parts commonality, so economies of scale still apply.

I was, the USN at this period was utterly incapable of launching a massed coordinated all arms strike. They did not train for it and did not believe it was necessary and were right. To do that requires an entirely different task force organisation than the one they used and would have led to the same problems as the IJN had. The failings at Midway are very specifically those of the undertrained Hornet Group and, shit happens in war. As to the Escort fighters, well the 6 of them actually did a good job. There were fundamental problems with the air group composition that were rectified but the first two encounters at Coral Sea and Midway happened within a very short period and there really was no practical way to change organisation and tactics ( outside a single group) any faster than they were. As indeed did the 6 Zeros escorting the Vals onto Yorktown. The Wildcats seem to have made one pass and then the Vals are in the AA zone and press home the attack ike the highly trained pilots they were.

With all the factors added up, the US aviators/pilots/crewmen did a fine job in 1942, despite lack of experience, training, and failigs of some of their equipment.

The IJN strike Packages were more successful, but off IJN doctrine. The problem for the US is that the radar is really a warning rather than a control system, which gives warning at around 30 miles which lets you vector a CAP in the general direction. This is what the USN exercises had predicted would happen btw,

While the thinking of the IJN in its deployments requires a generous use of the word thinking, the overall purpose was to trap an destroy the US carrier force. Speeding to the rescue of the Island. Going in like a 1944 US invasion is simply not on. The prime objective being to get the US carriers into a fight not take the Island so fast they do not sortie in the first place. The assumption on the IJN part was a single strike would destroy the Midway air force and in any event the US carriers were so far away they could not intervene.

I did not proposed outright invasion of Midway, but attack with ship's big guns a few days to a) damage or destroy aircraft, fuel dumps, AAA, artillery, and b) to provoke USN to sail, as Japanese expected, from Hawaii. As far as Japanese asumption go - again, they expected US forces to act per IJN's script.
 
Nobody said that Miles would still not make Master trainer, with plenty of parts commonality, so economies of scale still apply.

Well no. you are looking at different undercarriage armament, weatherproofing to naval use, canopy, probably instrumentation armour self sealing fuel tanks. One advantage of the Master as a trainer is it uses surplus Kestrel engines so an expansion of current engine production early and that's without production interruption on either, Miles has a moving track so switching between models not that simple.

I did not proposed outright invasion of Midway, but attack with ship's big guns a few days to a) damage or destroy aircraft, fuel dumps, AAA, artillery, and b) to provoke USN to sail, as Japanese expected, from Hawaii. As far as Japanese asumption go - again, they expected US forces to act per IJN's script.

Again no, the IJN heavy units cannot keep on station for an extended period of time, and if they are detected the US does not have to respond with its carriers, and does not have to respond at Midway at all. Moving heavy units close to Midway risks their detection and attack by land based air and submarines and any damage to the BBs means the weapon the IJN regards as decisive being put at risk. And firing the guns reduces barrel life considerably. degrading a US outpost adds nothing to Japanese defensive capabilities. Yes they could have thought themselves into that way, except the Carrier force for the IJN has something they could risk losing, the BB force not. This is completely different to the US or RN later in the war being willing to go inshore with obsolete ( as far as they were concerned) BB to provide gunfire support

The bigger picture is that the US carrier raids were degrading and blinding the defensive perimeter at least as fast as it could be built. The IJN knows what the US is building and knows it is coming. The Japanese defence plan requires that the USN is degraded by the outer bases before the decisive battle. Blinding those bases means they cannot do this, risking the small number of BB the IJN has available means they cannot win the decisive battle.

And yes the whole thing depends on the US following the Japanese script to work.
 
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