While absolutes are difficult to lay down, it is certainly true that while the Great Depression gave the rise of the Nazi Party its main momentum, it is also true that the harshness of the Versailles treaty created a long-term mass feeling of radical nationalist resentment against the Entente Powers and disloyalty the Weimar republic that greately helped the Nazi party in its rise to power. Remove it, and it is quite possible, and indeed likely, that neither Nazism nor Communism gain enough following to threaten the constitutional order in the 1930s.
This is even more surely true if a milder Versailles Treaty does not include just less punitive territorial clausles (albeit they are a necessary component) but also less huge reparations and/or more feasible payment terms. This may easily butterfly hyperinflation away or greately diminish its severity. Without hyperinflation, which also greately compromised the (already lukewarm) loyalty of the right-wing middle-class to the Weimar Republic, it is almost sure that neither Nazists nor Communists can pose a serious threat to the Republic.
Without these two components (harsh Versailles and hyperinflation), the combined effect of the other factors (political instability, weak democratic political parties, 1929 depression) could either cause Weimar Germany to take a France-like trajectory, where the democratic order teeters on the brink but survives (interwar France did have pretty much the same political problems as Weimar Germany) or an Italy-like trajectory, where you may have a change to a vanilla conservative-authoritarian neo-Wilhelmine or conservative-nationalist quasi-fascist regime.
However, even in this latter, less favorable outcome, such a regime would not be nowhere as radically racist-genocidal or brutally-expansionist as Nazism. Rather, it would focus on suppressing radical left-wing movements and on opportunistic, raltively moderate irredentism-expansionism. In other words, since a milder Versialles treaty more or less assumes that Germany sees most of its most legitimate irrendentist grievances (Austria, Sudetenland, Danzig, a minimal Polish Corridor) satisfied in the peace settlement, such a egime could *at the very most* pick a limited war with Poland in order to achieve its maximum, more questionable, irredentist program (ie the 1914 borders). In all likelihood this does not escalate to a general European war.
Therefore, such a PoD most likely butterflies Nazism away and as such WWII as we know it. OTOH, it is very wrong to assume that lack of Nazism would completely butterfly *a* WWII away. Even if the PoD makes Weimar Germany survive, or turns it into a relatively sane right-wing regime, you still have to take into account the actions of militarist Japan and Soviet Russia. Only if the PoD ALSO somehow butterflies away the rise of the militarist Japanese regime (quite possible) AND removes a Stalinist or Trotzkist Soviet Union from the map, AND prevent a Nazi-like Russian regime to take over, THEN WWII may be avoided. Otherwise, the typical outcome of a PoD makes Germany stay sane, is to put Stalin in Hitler's shoes.
