Midway Island Siege?

If the U.S. is really smart, they'll give Midway to Japan. It's a bunch closer to Hawai'i than Japan or the Yellow Sea, so the Sub Force can get there a lot faster & in larger numbers & sink the large numbers of transports Japan'll need to keep it supplied. (

And with the USN subs firing so many torpedoes at the Japanese transports, maybe the problems with the MK14 torpedoes will be discovered much earlier. BuOrd KMA!
 
Nagumo does not have to sink the carriers, only disable them after which the IJN surface forces could close the distance and dispatch them, as per Hornet at Santa Cruz.

Uh Hornet was an abandoned bombed out hulk that had absorbed what 5 torpedoes and hundreds of rounds of naval gunfire when it was finally sunk by a couple of Long Lances it was an exception it was certainly not a rule
 
the problems with the MK14 torpedoes will be discovered much earlier
Getting them discovered wasn't really the issue. Getting them fixed was.:mad: Tho firing more torpedoes might effectively shoot the Sub Force out of torpedoes.:eek: (Newport Torpedo Station was producing about 3.5/d...:eek: With 3 shifts on.:rolleyes:) Which, just maybe, brings a private contractor able to build more faster on board...though judging by the Westinghouse experience with the electric torpedo, that might not solve much ahead of the OTL schedule anyhow...:mad:
 
And with the USN subs firing so many torpedoes at the Japanese transports, maybe the problems with the MK14 torpedoes will be discovered much earlier. BuOrd KMA!

Midway or not a USN submarine's best hunting ground was near Japan where traffic was plentiful. Near to an outlying base they might go 6 weeks without a sighting.
 
Uh Hornet was an abandoned bombed out hulk that had absorbed what 5 torpedoes and hundreds of rounds of naval gunfire when it was finally sunk by a couple of Long Lances it was an exception it was certainly not a rule

US carriers in 1942 tended to be vulnerable to losing propulsion after being hit by torpedoes. Nimitz had left Pye's battleships clear of the fighting, giving the IJN a massive surface superiority. Both Hornet and Yorktown after torpedo hits needed to be towed clear of their battles, but tows tended to be 4kt affairs while a Japanese surface task forces were moving at 30kt, meaning that from 200nm range warships could close and make contact on a cripple in about 9 hours. If the US carriers were intact, such as TF-16 was during Midway, then IJN warships could be deterred from closing in. If the US carriers were defeated, such as at Santa Cruz, then IJN warships could not be deterred and the crippled carrier could not get away, and was doomed.
 
Midway or not a USN submarine's best hunting ground was near Japan where traffic was plentiful. Near to an outlying base they might go 6 weeks without a sighting.
Fair point. The nearness of Midway & the increased number of patrols that can be mounted as a result may be a more notional benefit than a real one. OTOH, it might enable better use of S-boats.
 
Best naval bases for the US submarines were Truk and Rabaul. If Midway diverted resources, so much the better for Yamamoto because a sub off Midway is not torpedoing a fleet carrier.

Midway was pretty isolated and probably a bad idea for the Japanese by 1942. But that doesn't mean that just any old argument can be trotted out. Like the B-24's bombing Midway idea. Anyone here flown a battle damaged B-24 1,200 miles across open water through freezing weather and storms? I haven't, but it doesn't sound like much fun. Sounds more like certain death if you ditch.
 
Best naval bases for the US submarines were Truk and Rabaul. If Midway diverted resources, so much the better for Yamamoto because a sub off Midway is not torpedoing a fleet carrier.
Be honest, there's not much chance of it anyhow. And putting subs on watch off Truk & Rabaul meant they weren't on the firing line sinking merchants & actually doing some good.
 
Best naval bases for the US submarines were Truk and Rabaul. If Midway diverted resources, so much the better for Yamamoto because a sub off Midway is not torpedoing a fleet carrier.

Midway was pretty isolated and probably a bad idea for the Japanese by 1942. But that doesn't mean that just any old argument can be trotted out. Like the B-24's bombing Midway idea. Anyone here flown a battle damaged B-24 1,200 miles across open water through freezing weather and storms? I haven't, but it doesn't sound like much fun. Sounds more like certain death if you ditch.

Airfield built at French Frigate Shoal (3100 foot runway)... while not long enough for routine operations by a B24, it is long enough for an emergency landing, plus of course you can ditch in one of the better harbors which is roughly halfway between Midway and Pearl Harbor. Emergency airfields can also be constructed at Kaui and Nihau (western most Hawaiian islands)
http://www.airfields-freeman.com/HI/Airfields_W_Pacific.htm#frenchfrigate

So there are options
 
Ditching options such as small base facilities at FFS would improve survivability for the crews, but survivability is, like in the Aleutians, also subject to the bad weather conditions of the region for much of the year, and compounded by the long over sea flight profile. Probably a safer operation during summer months than winter months.

To better secure Midway the IJN can be expected to 'hop' down the small islands between Midway and Kauai with small destroyer borne invasion groups, while the Americans will be moving the other way. The situation might be a bit fluid until Nimitz cuts to the chase and invades Midway with a full Marine division to be done with it. But if he does that, then no Watchtower.

Not sure what the cruising speed of a B-24 was, but if 130mph were talking an 18 hour flight, so crew exhaustion and maintenance would be a factor. Bomb loads would be absurdly low because of all the fuel carried. Overall, targeting Midway would reduce operational tempo of each aircraft in comparison to use against a closer target, reduce the bomb load per mission significantly, and increase overall attrition. So, altogether, let's say half the bombs and half the expected operational life of the plane. .5x.5 = .25. Bombing Midway from Kauai would take a B-24 and give it maybe 1/4 as effective a combat career as the same plane used elsewhere for a closer target in better weather; the more planes the USAAF uses bombing Midway, the better for Japan.
 
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Not sure what the cruising speed of a B-24 was, but if 130mph were talking an 18 hour flight, so crew exhaustion and maintenance would be a factor. Bomb loads would be absurdly low because of all the fuel carried.

Green gives the range with a full bomb load of 5,000 lbs, at 25,000 feet as 1,700 miles with a 7.3 hour mission time. For the J model. Thats 232 mph. Max sustained speed for the J model is 278mph at 28,000 feet. landing speed was normally 105mph.

For the B17 G model Green places the max sustained at 263mph @ 25,000 feet. Mission range with a 4000lb bomb load was 1850 miles in 8.7 hours. 212 mph.

Flipping through Gambles 'Fortress Rabaul' I see the mission profile for the B17, B25, & B26 was a 950 nautical mile hop from the Townsend area airfields to refuel at the Port Morseby airfield group, then a final leg of just over 500 nm to attack Rabaul. At least half the B17 stopped at the Port Morseby airfields before returning to home base @ Townsend. So a total of close to 3,000 nm round trip. I'm unsure where the heavy bomber missions that supported the Gilberts operations were launched from. If from Guadalcanal, a fairly close point in latter 1943 then the roundtrip would be somewhere beyond 2200 nm.

If the Japanese are trying to operate a submarine refueling station there, as the USN did later in the war, & showing up regularly with cargo ships and escorts then a air mission could be worthwhile. While the B17 could not hit a moving ship they were fairly good at damaging or sinking docked and anchored ships @ Rabaul in 1942-43. A monthly or bi monthly raid on Midway plus harrassment from lurking submarines, even with bad torpedos, is liable to cause the Japanese to give the place up after late 1942.
 
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Green gives the range with a full bomb load of 5,000 lbs, at 25,000 feet as 1,700 miles with a 7.3 hour mission time. For the J model. Thats 232 mph. Max sustained speed for the J model is 278mph at 28,000 feet. landing speed was normally 105mph.

For the B17 G model Green places the max sustained at 263mph @ 25,000 feet. Mission range with a 4000lb bomb load was 1850 miles in 8.7 hours. 212 mph.

Round trip to Midway from Kauai is about 2,400 miles, so unless the plan is to land about 600 miles short of the runway, then the bomb load has to lighten up.

https://www.thisdayinaviation.com/tag/wright-cyclone-r-1820-97/

With a normal fuel load of 2,520 gallons (9,540 liters) the B-17F had a maximum range of 2,880 miles (4,635 kilometers). Carrying a 6,000 pound (2,722 kilogram) bomb load, the range was 1,300 miles (2,092 kilometers).

2520 (US) gallons is 15,687 lbs for 2880 miles. That 5.5 pounds of fuel per mile. A 6,000lbs bomb load drops the fuel carried to 9876lbs, which at 5.5 lbs per mile is good for 1,800 miles. To get 2400 miles would be a 2,676lbs bomb load, which is basically turning a heavy bomber into a medium bomber.

If the Japanese are trying to operate a submarine refueling station there, as the USN did later in the war, & showing up regularly with cargo ships and escorts then a air mission could be worthwhile. While the B17 could not hit a moving ship they were fairly good at damaging or sinking docked and anchored ships @ Rabaul in 1942-43. A monthly or bi monthly raid on Midway plus harrassment from lurking submarines, even with bad torpedos, is liable to cause the Japanese to give the place up after late 1942.

G4M Bettys with 1,800lbs bomb loads couldn't kick the US off Guadalcanal, so why would B-17's with 3,000lbs bomb loads succeed at Midway?

I wouldn't think Nimitz is going to let them keep the island so a submarine refuelling base in 1943 is probably beside the point. But, if the 1st USMC division is storming Midway in August, it didn't take Guadalcanal in August.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
G4M Bettys with 1,800lbs bomb loads couldn't kick the US off Guadalcanal, so why would B-17's with 3,000lbs bomb loads succeed at Midway?
Guadalcanal is a lot bigger, so there's more opportunity for dispersal.

2520 (US) gallons is 15,687 lbs for 2880 miles. That 5.5 pounds of fuel per mile. A 6,000lbs bomb load drops the fuel carried to 9876lbs, which at 5.5 lbs per mile is good for 1,800 miles. To get 2400 miles would be a 2,676lbs bomb load, which is basically turning a heavy bomber into a medium bomber.
I was wondering about radius v range, and looked here:
http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/B-17/B-17G_Standard_Aircraft_Characteristics.pdf

Basic 1 has a military load of 10,000 lbs and a radius of 873 nautical miles. (i.e. 1,004 miles there, drop bombs, 1,004 miles back). This has allowances for evasive action etc, and is with 2570 gal of fuel.
At 0 bomb load the radius is ~1330 nautical miles, same assumptions (via chart).
Interpolating, for a radius of 1,200 miles (1043 nm) that comes out at 6280 lbs. Assume 6000 lbs and some extra fuel (6,000 lbs of bombs, combat radius 1147 nm or 1319 miles) and there you go.

I know it's the G not the F, but it suggests that 6000 lbs is in the ballpark for a radius of 1,200 statute miles.
 
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G4M Bettys with 1,800lbs bomb loads couldn't kick the US off Guadalcanal, so why would B-17's with 3,000lbs bomb loads succeed at Midway?

No one expects the bombers alone to kick anyone off Midway. The Japanese attacks on Henderson Field did weaken the US enclave, destroying fuel, aircraft, & killing men. The US 5th AF created serious headaches for the Japanese at Rabaul. In that case they choose to reinforce with more AAA & fighter squadrons, & piling in more cargo ships and material to replace the losses. Would the Jpanese really want to see yet another cargo ship out of action supplying Midway or the need to send yet more replacement material to supply this questionable outpost. US bombers destroying material and damaging the occasional freight ship helps make the island untenable.

...I wouldn't think Nimitz is going to let them keep the island so a submarine refuelling base in 1943 is probably beside the point. But, if the 1st USMC division is storming Midway in August, it didn't take Guadalcanal in August.

Why would the 1st Marine Div storm the island in August. It was in the South Pacific. if you want a Marine Division the 2d could be diverted to Hawaii to prepare for this. Or prepare either of the US Army divisions on Oahu for the task.
 
This isn't surprising, there were several nested flaws and fixing each one just revealed the next!
Not really. The real issue was BuOrd bureacracy refusing to believe reports from the field & refusing to act on them.:mad: Not to mention active sabotage by alleged "investigators".:mad:
 
Not really. The real issue was BuOrd bureacracy refusing to believe reports from the field & refusing to act on them.:mad: Not to mention active sabotage by alleged "investigators".:mad:

It makes me wonder if you could somehow write a POD where the entire top echelon gets killed in a gas leak or something along those lines in early 1939. Or better yet, by a malfunctioning Mk. 14 torpedo.
 
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