Midway Island Siege?

CalBear

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This is a hilariously piss-poor recon. So they expected a 3 to edge in numbers, no tanks, and little protection. Instead, they would be the ones outnumbered, be vulnerable in those "please shoot me" rubber boats, and face cannon fire from unexpected sources. And they missed that in a land of 1,200 acres. Heck, even missing them in a plot of land 10 times as big is pretty crappy intel.



Huh, I thought the Aleutians were a logical follow up to a capture of Midway and winning the battle of Midway (of course, here the battle of midway is won, the island is almost untakeable. For reasons I previously mentioned, I don't think it's impossible but less than a 1 in 1000 odds. Since they Americans lost 3 carriers and the Japanese zero, I guess Samoa is next? Also, Henderson Field isn't a great comparison since Midway has bunkers that can withstand 305 mm fire for the men. Presumably fuel, food, and ammo would be there too, although it might be hard to get a plane into the door.

So a siege is not going to happen (well, unless you count seven days as a "siege") and the island is safe. The airmen were also saved and Midway is within ferry range.



Why? In TTL, the Japanese achieved victory by conincidental means (I remember something about submarine pickets and coordination of surface ships and air recon that never really happened, in my OP I said that the nebulous plan worked). In other words, they didn't expect the USN to be there and only found it. In short, the Americans are reading the Japanese like an open book and the Japanese were only able to achieve this thanks to the sub picket. Also as I mentioned earlier, the loss of the flattops isn't that much of a problem if the pilots and planes are saved, and Galveston bay even mentioned a concrete plan.
Midway has often (including as the title of a couple pretty good books) been described as a "miracle" victory. While the U.S. undoubtedly had its fair share of luck, most significantly in the way that the series of entirely uncoordinated airstrikes from both the Atoll itself and from the carriers overstressed the Kido Butai's CAP, the reality is that the entire Operation MI (the overall title of the Midway and Aleutians operations) was a goat rope from the word go. The American victory was much less a miracle and much more an example of bold leadership, proper use of Intel, and a slight, but critical USN advantage in technology (the U.S. had air and sea search radar, the IJN did not, even with the somewhat amateur effort at fighter control, at least the U.S. force knew that there were strikes inbound).

Yamamoto, for all his acknowledged brilliance, allowed himself to be rushed in laying the missions out, something that compounded by his well established tendency to create overly complex plans, resulted in so many moving parts that MI was a perfect recipe for disaster. As was noted earlier in the thread there are a couple of really good, almost overly detailed, threads in post-1900 where the Battle and the possible outcomes of the Japanese landings are dissected at length. They are probably a couple years old at this point.

In the long run Japan lost the war the second the first bomb cleared its shackle on December 7th.
 
I'm trying to imagine a possible combination of US leaders in the presidency & congress who would have rolled over after PH ? Just cant find them.
 
I'm trying to imagine a possible combination of US leaders in the presidency & congress who would have rolled over after PH ? Just cant find them.

Finding American politicians willing to relegate Germany for later is much easier (and a potentially disastrous decision). Bombing Pearl Harbor really made war to the knife and to the hilt inevitable.
 
Even if in this scenario the Japanese successfully take Midway - then what? It's too small to use as a staging base to Hawaii, which they had no chance of taking anyway. They don't have enough shipping to keep it in supply, so, food and water aside, they quickly run out of avgas, ammo, spare parts etc. By 1944 it basically becomes a target range for ship gunnery practice and dive bomber pilot qualifications.
 
Even if in this scenario the Japanese successfully take Midway - then what? It's too small to use as a staging base to Hawaii, which they had no chance of taking anyway. They don't have enough shipping to keep it in supply, so, food and water aside, they quickly run out of avgas, ammo, spare parts etc. By 1944 it basically becomes a target range for ship gunnery practice and dive bomber pilot qualifications.

Basically. A Wake with a much handier location, essentially.
 
Why? In TTL, the Japanese achieved victory by conincidental means (I remember something about submarine pickets and coordination of surface ships and air recon that never really happened, in my OP I said that the nebulous plan worked). In other words, they didn't expect the USN to be there and only found it. In short, the Americans are reading the Japanese like an open book and the Japanese were only able to achieve this thanks to the sub picket. Also as I mentioned earlier, the loss of the flattops isn't that much of a problem if the pilots and planes are saved, and Galveston bay even mentioned a concrete plan.

Because these are human decisions, and you're looking at this from the omniscient perspective of someone with all the facts in 2017, and not from the perspective of the Americans in 1942. To them, they had a stacked deck and yet at the end of the day they've suffered the second-worst defeat in US naval history. They would have no idea how coincidental the Japanese plan was, all they would know is that the Japanese had a plan, and apparently it was better than theirs because it worked. Since their whole reason for being out there was the cracked intercept, it'd be only logical to wonder if it was a setup.
 

CalBear

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Even if in this scenario the Japanese successfully take Midway - then what? It's too small to use as a staging base to Hawaii, which they had no chance of taking anyway. They don't have enough shipping to keep it in supply, so, food and water aside, they quickly run out of avgas, ammo, spare parts etc. By 1944 it basically becomes a target range for ship gunnery practice and dive bomber pilot qualifications.
aka: Wake Island, except with less fuel consumption.

Ninja'd

6d676c1981a04aad8a8d589d8043336c411dd2addf89bf3b48b69bd42ca8e4aa.jpg
 
Midway has often (including as the title of a couple pretty good books) been described as a "miracle" victory. While the U.S. undoubtedly had its fair share of luck, most significantly in the way that the series of entirely uncoordinated airstrikes from both the Atoll itself and from the carriers overstressed the Kido Butai's CAP, the reality is that the entire Operation MI (the overall title of the Midway and Aleutians operations) was a goat rope from the word go. The American victory was much less a miracle and much more an example of bold leadership, proper use of Intel, and a slight, but critical USN advantage in technology (the U.S. had air and sea search radar, the IJN did not, even with the somewhat amateur effort at fighter control, at least the U.S. force knew that there were strikes inbound).

See, again, i knew all that too. Gotta remember that.

That much we can agree on

yeah i agree on that as well.
 
Lets look at the Aleutians.... for the Japanese it is a minor secondary theater. For the US is it also a secondary theater (albeit with more resources by far tossed into it). The weather is the worst anywhere were serious fighting occurred in World War II aside from possibly the far Arctic Front around Murmansk. Flight operations were typically more costly in air losses due to weather than enemy action. The Japanese had too few ground troops and amphibious craft available in June 1942 when they seized Kiska and Attu to also seize Dutch Harbor with the defenses already present. The two Japanese CVL airgroups present (about 50 aircraft) do not outnumber the USAAF aircraft present.

If the Japanese actually won Midway, to move in strength against the rest of the Aleutians would require assembling the shipping and warships and ground troops over the course of the summer of 1942 in time to make a landing at Dutch Harbor before the weather turned horrible instead of just frequently bad (precipitation, including snow, doubles in September from August, temperatures drop 10 degrees on average) and by October an amphibious campaign is out of the question due to weather.

(Note that the US invaded Kiska in August, and Attu on May 30 in OTL)

This seems like an unlikely Japanese course of action unless they planned such from the beginning instead of trying to act on a fleeting opportunity.
(snipped some)

The Japanese (at least the IJN) had some plans for future operations in the Aleutians. Shattered Sword has some mention of that, with Zuikaku and Shokaku being assigned to planned fleet organizations. No mention of what those planned operations are though. I would write more, but I can't find my book tonight.

My guess as to possible Aleutian operations is another strike on Dutch Harbor. Maybe invasion as well, after isolating Dutch Harbor. If the USN is defeated at Midway, Dutch Harbor and other Aleutian islands would look vulnerable.

I'm hoping that Anthony Tully will write a book about the Aleutians part of the Midway campaign. I would buy it in hardback.
 
Let's play a bit of scenario here. Let's suppose the skip bombing isn't trained at all, or if it is, the tactic isn't used against he defenseless cargo ships. The hellcat development is delayed, leaving the Grumman F4F the most advanced carrier plane for awhile. What do you think would play out? The Saratoga and Wasp as you mentioned would be fully operational. Galveston Bay mentioned how Midway itself could be used. An FS Operation is doomed to fail. Is it all that different that OTL?

How because that would require alot alot more PODs than stupid USN at Midway the Hellcat flew 20 days after midway how do you butterfly that away the USMC is still getting the F4U this requires the US to be purposely trying to sabotage itself.
 
How because that would require alot alot more PODs than stupid USN at Midway the Hellcat flew 20 days after midway how do you butterfly that away the USMC is still getting the F4U this requires the US to be purposely trying to sabotage itself.

Oops, I thought it flew 20 WEEKS afterwards never mind
 

CalBear

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Oops, I thought it flew 20 WEEKS afterwards never mind
It actually had the potential to be ready even earlier. The BuAer instructed Grumman to install the R-2800 before beginning production (the original F6F was designed for the R-2600) in April of 1942. That delayed the first flight for about 2.5 months (which, BTW, is close to a miracle in engineering since the R-2800 is almost 19 inches longer and about 300 pound heavier than the P&W engine).
 
Anyways, I got my original answer. Even if the Miracle of Midway is reversed, the Japanese assault would be like trying to put rocks in a blender... made worse that their recon managed to miss stuff with only 1,200 acres of land to search
 
It actually had the potential to be ready even earlier. The BuAer instructed Grumman to install the R-2800 before beginning production (the original F6F was designed for the R-2600) in April of 1942. That delayed the first flight for about 2.5 months (which, BTW, is close to a miracle in engineering since the R-2800 is almost 19 inches longer and about 300 pound heavier than the P&W engine).
The XF6F looked more like the F4F
Grumman-XF6F-1-Hellcat-Bu.-No.-02981-left-front-quarter-large.jpg

Grumman_XF6F-1_Hellcat_1942.jpg
 
Anyways, I got my original answer. Even if the Miracle of Midway is reversed, the Japanese assault would be like trying to put rocks in a blender... made worse that their recon managed to miss stuff with only 1,200 acres of land to search

If the post war examination of Japanese documents & verbal testimony is to be believed they never were able to recon the place that spring. The one attempt in early may resulted in the aircraft not returning. Shot down according to USN/MC records. The attackers apparently had no photos, had some prewar maritime charts, and just some sketches of the topography of the island.
 
The alternative I'd like to see studied would be if Yamamoto had continued operations as intended of midnight 4-5 June. that is not given the turn around order shortly after midnight. Thus on the 5th the landing force would close on Midway, & the main force & separate support force for the sunk carriers would be searching somewhere NE of Midway when dawn comes.
 
Midway has often (including as the title of a couple pretty good books) been described as a "miracle" victory. While the U.S. undoubtedly had its fair share of luck, most significantly in the way that the series of entirely uncoordinated airstrikes from both the Atoll itself and from the carriers overstressed the Kido Butai's CAP, the reality is that the entire Operation MI (the overall title of the Midway and Aleutians operations) was a goat rope from the word go. The American victory was much less a miracle and much more an example of bold leadership, proper use of Intel, and a slight, but critical USN advantage in technology (the U.S. had air and sea search radar, the IJN did not, even with the somewhat amateur effort at fighter control, at least the U.S. force knew that there were strikes inbound).
I've never thought of midway as a miracle victory. The miracle is in the margin of victory. A less lucky America could well have won losing an extra carrier and with Japan losing a carrier less.
 
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