Midway Island Siege?

Suppose USA's ships got spotted before the Battle of Midway and got smacked by battleship fire. I think there was some convoluted plan and the submarines were suppose to spot the Americans.
...you care to go into detail about how battleships that weren't even deployed in the battle manage to hit the USN carriers?

Anyhoo, doesn't matter. The IJN doesn't have the forces to take the island. There are too many defenders, and Midway is too far from Japan to keep the fleet around long-term. It's not quite as bad an idea as an invasion of Hawaii, but up there.

If i was defedning Midway and i saw the Yamato on the horizon, hear it fire and see its shell pass over my head my white flag goes up.

Being bombarded by the Yamato is safer than being a prisoner of Imperial Japan. Probably more comfortable too. Ship bombardment never wiped out defenders. The US bombarded island after island but still had to fight bloody battles on them.
 
My problems are that if we are that incompetent to get that close to the IJN's BB's, not the Kongo's with the Kido Butai, we have a lot more problems on our hands with the leadership in the Pacific. All the ships we had at Midway were faster than the fastest IJN BB's except the Kongo's. I just cannot see them letting them get that close to any of the task forces to open fire even at night. Our Radar outranged there firing range and we would have turned and ran if we even thought a BB group was close.
As for Midway we can just let them have it and it won't change much except put more of the transports and IJN's ships on the bottom of the Pacific, Midway is a lot closer to Hawaii than to any supply bases the Japanese have. Once the Essexes start coming off the assembly line we are heading west with no problems.
 
My problems are that if we are that incompetent to get that close to the IJN's BB's, not the Kongo's with the Kido Butai, we have a lot more problems on our hands with the leadership in the Pacific. All the ships we had at Midway were faster than the fastest IJN BB's except the Kongo's. I just cannot see them letting them get that close to any of the task forces to open fire even at night. Our Radar outranged there firing range and we would have turned and ran if we even thought a BB group was close.
As for Midway we can just let them have it and it won't change much except put more of the transports and IJN's ships on the bottom of the Pacific, Midway is a lot closer to Hawaii than to any supply bases the Japanese have. Once the Essexes start coming off the assembly line we are heading west with no problems.

I don't know to be honest. Since their battleships are too slow, I have no idea how this happens. Let's say Nimitz gets (insert contagious disease here) and his replacement is very aggressive, and the radar was on the friz so you get the OP events.

So... this doesn't even change that much does it? They can't even hold Midway is what you are saying, because resupplying is a nightmare for them.

Edit: Fixed Typo
 
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I don't know to be honest. Since their battleships are too slow, I have no idea how this happens. Let's say Farragut gets (insert contagious disease here) and his replacement is very aggressive, and the radar was on the friz so you get the OP events.

So... this doesn't even change that much does it? They can't even hold Midway is what you are saying, because resupplying is a nightmare for them.
Farragut?
 

*Facepalm

I meant Nimitz

For a while there, I was concerned that them there Damn Japanese Yankees was gonna git past my line of torpedos, and run past Fort Morgan, and all I'd have protecting Sand and Eastern would be the Tennessee and them 3 'Bama gunboats. Phew!
 
I don't know to be honest. Since their battleships are too slow, I have no idea how this happens. Let's say Nimitz gets (insert contagious disease here) and his replacement is very aggressive, and the radar was on the friz so you get the OP events.

So... this doesn't even change that much does it? They can't even hold Midway is what you are saying, because resupplying is a nightmare for them.

Edit: Fixed Typo

Chester Nimitz was back in Pearl Harbor, as would his replacement. Adm Frank Jack Fletcher, the senior Admiral at Midway was a very cautious man and there is no way he is going to let his carriers get that close to battleships.
 
Ok well first off, it'd be easier to just say "The US Carriers don't come out to play, all other preparations are as OTL" or something. It requires less work then just making the American's dumb enough to sail blithly into the range of the main force.

I find it interesting that i actually never heard anyone talk about the takeability of Midway by the Japanses invasion force. I mean, the USN is gone in the area, all they have is planes. Good luck against 2 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 20 destroyers. Thats a lot of firepower coming at yah. Talking about AA too.

Good luck wading through waist high water for the better part of a mile, because the landing craft can't make it over the reef, while the rubber boats you were supposed to transfer to might as well have neon "Please shoot me" signs floating above them. The Americans, who outnumber your attack force, are ashore and heavily dug in, spraying you with rifle fire, machine guns, and the odd tank canister shell. Oh, and did I mention you have essentially no naval fire support or air support because its' beneath the IJN's dignity? And your commander's idea of a sneaky strategy is a banzai charge? The Japanese would have been lucky to make it to the beach with enough force to hold a small beachhead, much less take the island entirely.
 
I guess maybe the Japanese's best shot is bombard the island for seven days with cruiser weight guns (with the island as a target apparently beneath the dignity of the battleships) and then convince the Marines the Japanese actually outnumber them. I think a landing force WOULD get air support, if only to fend off the planes now landed at Midway. They Japanese can't loiter around tooo long after the battle since they need to return to base. Then they give the offer of surrender.

Marines probably know they got the attackers outnumbered and realize it's a bluff and call their bluff. Besides, even if it wasn't a bluff, unconditional surrender against the Japanese would lead to the same fate as the Wake Island defenders, so if there isn't a conditioned surrender, might as well go down swinging. And to be honest, I'm not buying the idea of Marines surrendering after a week's worth of bombardment without a Japanese boot on the ground (and if the Japanese tried, the US Marines would surly realize who outnumbers who). Maybe a week's worth of bombardment followed by lots and lots of landing craft, and at least 3,000 Japanese survivors landing of the island AFTER many of their comrades got sunk in the "please shoot me" rubber boats, then I can imagine them considering calling it quits.

Ok, so the planes at midway lost their home ships, but mostly safely landed (aside from over 100 shoot downs in the battle itself). Their pilots are safe, and that's hundreds of pilots that we don't need to waste time replacing. So Midway likely doesn't fall and the USA will counterattack the Japanese anyways. So... I guess even this "best case" naval battle of Midway, the Japanese didn't even do much. They inflicted no significant losses (sure 3 carriers... except against America which can replace carriers easily, it's the experienced pilots that would be the valuable assets and those are safe) and didn't take Midway.
 
Why would Yamamoto bother with a siege of Midway after the naval battle is complete? Midway itself was incidental, it was bait to lure the US carriers out from Pearl and force a decisive battle to sink them. In this scenario he's accomplished that so there's no point in hanging around...from the Japanese perspective, it's a smashing victory.
 
I thought the Battle of Midway Islands was fought for... Midway?

It was an element in a larger plan. Yamamoto's goal was the destruction of US carriers in the Pacific. He believed that the Americans were reluctant to risk their remaining carriers in a fleet action, and would need to be lured out of Pearl Harbor where they were inaccessible to the Japanese. A direct attack on Pearl Harbor, where they were stationed, would have been suicidal against the amount of land-based air that had reinforced Hawaii since Dec. 7.

So Yamamoto chose to target Midway. He (fairly reasonably) believed that if Japan captured Midway, the US Navy would feel compelled to recapture it, due to it's proximity to Hawaii. For Yamamoto, the plan was this: Neutralize Midway in a surprise attack and capture it via amphibious landing. The Japanese main force would then wait to the west of Midway while the American carriers sortied from Pearl. When the American forces were off Midway, the Japanese main force would then surprise them and force a decisive battle - which Yamamoto expected to win. In that sense, the capture of Midway was a key part of his plan, but only because he thought the US Navy would stay safely bottled up in Pearl Harbor otherwise.

In reality, what Yamamoto thought would be an initial surprise attack was no surprise at all because American cryptanalysis had broken the Japanese naval code and the US Navy was fully aware that the Japanese were targeting Midway. Knowing that the Japanese carriers would be present, the US Navy planned to force a decisive battle of their own and attack the Japanese carriers during the initial assault on Midway, long before the Japanese expected them to be in the area. The result was our real-life Battle of Midway.

In this scenario, it seems that everything goes the same with the American carriers being present at the initial attack on Midway, except they get sunk by the Japanese instead of vice versa. From Yamamoto's perspective then, things didn't go to plan tactically - the Japanese landings on Midway haven't even happened yet - but it doesn't matter because apparently the Americans came out anyways without needing to be baited by actually capturing the atoll. The remaining facilities on Midway are probably subsequently trashed by naval fire or carrier air attack, depending on how secure Yamamoto feels in hanging around, but strategically his goal of sinking the American carriers is complete and actually landing on Midway at this point is superfluous.
 
Good luck wading through waist high water for the better part of a mile, because the landing craft can't make it over the reef, while the rubber boats you were supposed to transfer to might as well have neon "Please shoot me" signs floating above them. The Americans, who outnumber your attack force, are ashore and heavily dug in, spraying you with rifle fire, machine guns, and the odd tank canister shell. Oh, and did I mention you have essentially no naval fire support or air support because its' beneath the IJN's dignity? And your commander's idea of a sneaky strategy is a banzai charge? The Japanese would have been lucky to make it to the beach with enough force to hold a small beachhead, much less take the island entirely.

Okay, i think i get it now. So even if the shore bombardment would intensify, supplies get blown to bits and the airfield is demolished and the japanese would land on Midway American style, they simply have not enough manpower to ever get off the beach? How many Americans were on Midway?

It was an element in a larger plan. Yamamoto's goal was the destruction of US carriers in the Pacific. He believed that the Americans were reluctant to risk their remaining carriers in a fleet action, and would need to be lured out of Pearl Harbor where they were inaccessible to the Japanese. A direct attack on Pearl Harbor, where they were stationed, would have been suicidal against the amount of land-based air that had reinforced Hawaii since Dec. 7.

So Yamamoto chose to target Midway. He (fairly reasonably) believed that if Japan captured Midway, the US Navy would feel compelled to recapture it, due to it's proximity to Hawaii. For Yamamoto, the plan was this: Neutralize Midway in a surprise attack and capture it via amphibious landing. The Japanese main force would then wait to the west of Midway while the American carriers sortied from Pearl. When the American forces were off Midway, the Japanese main force would then surprise them and force a decisive battle - which Yamamoto expected to win. In that sense, the capture of Midway was a key part of his plan, but only because he thought the US Navy would stay safely bottled up in Pearl Harbor otherwise.

In reality, what Yamamoto thought would be an initial surprise attack was no surprise at all because American cryptanalysis had broken the Japanese naval code and the US Navy was fully aware that the Japanese were targeting Midway. Knowing that the Japanese carriers would be present, the US Navy planned to force a decisive battle of their own and attack the Japanese carriers during the initial assault on Midway, long before the Japanese expected them to be in the area. The result was our real-life Battle of Midway.

In this scenario, it seems that everything goes the same with the American carriers being present at the initial attack on Midway, except they get sunk by the Japanese instead of vice versa. From Yamamoto's perspective then, things didn't go to plan tactically - the Japanese landings on Midway haven't even happened yet - but it doesn't matter because apparently the Americans came out anyways without needing to be baited by actually capturing the atoll. The remaining facilities on Midway are probably subsequently trashed by naval fire or carrier air attack, depending on how secure Yamamoto feels in hanging around, but strategically his goal of sinking the American carriers is complete and actually landing on Midway at this point is superfluous.

Actually it was my understanding that in the original plan by Yamamoto the mobile force(kido butai) would have "soften up" the approaching American fleet in defense of Midway, which also should have included battleships. The supporting force with the 2 Kongo class battleships would simply mop up the rest. The Main force was then to take out the main American fleet that would have been dispatched to stop the attack on Alaska. Supposedly they hoped the rest of the american battleship force would consist of that force.

It was always about the battleships.

Of course instead of the Americans scrambling their fleet to various points and actually falling for the elaborate trap the Americans were simply waiting for the Japanese at Midway. Taking out the mobile force took off the head of the very large serpent. The rest is history.
 
Okay, i think i get it now. So even if the shore bombardment would intensify, supplies get blown to bits and the airfield is demolished and the japanese would land on Midway American style, they simply have not enough manpower to ever get off the beach? How many Americans were on Midway? ....

Still can't find the thread where this was discussed in detail. In general...

A entire Marine Base Defense Battalion, most of a second, a SeaBee battalion, a Marine air group, and a couple companies from a Marine Raider battalion. A Army bomber group, a Navy air group. Miscl Navy communications and techs.

The Marines total between 3000 & maybe 3400. All trained for ground combat. The Navy and Army added several hundred more ground support personnel. The SeaBee I don't know. So maybe 4500.

The Base Def Bn were mostly 5", & 3" dual purpose guns, approx a dozen of each. Roughly 100 HMG & MMG were present.

The two battalions, SNLF & Army, totaled roughly 1200 each were the Japanese landing force. Two thirds comprised the assault groups, split between the two islands. The balance were to follow and mop up. Army and Navy support personnel to sept up a air base ect... Were another 1500+.

Two light cruisers were designated for fire support. At least one naval gunfire spotting team would have been present, possibly two.

So there would be two separate assaults, not supporting each other onto two islands. With another 800 men following when boats were available. There were Daihatsu landing craft for maybe half the assault force. The rest were to use ships boats to reach the reef. There was a plan to ground a transport on the reef. Sometime the Japanese did that when in a hurry, or desperate.
 
Here is a more complete description of the Japanese landing force. It appears I forgot one SNLF group. Total infantry is approx 2500 men and small arms.

I'll look for some maps of Midway. The text below refers to landing on the south side of the island. There the reef edge was relatively close to the shore. The other shores had between 1000 & 3000 meters of reef to cross.

The actual landing on Midway was to be accomplished by approximately 1,500 Special Naval Landing Force troops who would storm Sand Island; and by 1,000 Army troops of the Ikki Detachment, to land[16] on Eastern Island. Summarizing the enemy landing plan, Captain Toyama stated:

We were going to approach the south side (of Midway), sending out landing boats as far as the reef. We had many different kinds of landing boats but did not think that many would be able to pass over the reefs. If they got stuck the personnel were supposed to transfer to rubber landing boats. We had plenty of equipment for a three months' occupation without help, but were not sure of our boats.[17]

Assault elements in the landing would be backed up by the 11th and 12th Construction Battalions plus miscellaneous base-development detachments. "The Navy," added an operation plan to destroy the sortieing enemy fleet."[18]



[16] USSBS Interrogation Nav. No. 60, Capt. Toyama, Yasumi, IJN, 1 October 1945, p. 250; hereinafter cited as Toyama. Further details as to the plan and the Ikki Detachment are from "Japanese Land Forces No. 2," 20 October 1942, a translation by JICPOA, hereinafter cited as Ikki Report. The Ikki Detachment mentioned here is the same one which was destined to be annihilated by Marines at the Battle of the Tenaru, 21 August 1942, on Guadalcanal. This unit is sometimes referred to as the Ichiki Detachment because the Japanese characters for "ikki" and "ichiki" are identical.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.


2nd Combined Landing Force
5th Kure SNLF
5th Yokosuka SNLF
Ichiki Detachment(2/28th Regiment)
11th & 12th Construction Battalions
Survey & Weather Group

Approx 5,000 men---included 1,500 SNLF Marine rifles and 1,000 Army rifles
 
More scraps about Midways defense. from this thread: https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=11&t=211477&hilit=Midway+Island

Earlier I mention that the Japanese might launch 4 carrier worth of full deck strikes during this assualt. And I assumed that the MTB Squadron would be destroyed, However I got to thinking "Historically" the Japanese the Japanese did not "target?" or sink any MTB's in their one 4 CV 1/2 deck strike . So potentially add 8 PT boats strafin' those landing craft too, if the supporting Japanese warships are not providing close in support and fight off these PT boats.

Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 1 (MTBRon 1)
Lt. Clinton McKellar Jr., USN
Midway Island

USS PT-20
USS PT-21
USS PT-22
USS PT-24
USS PT-25
USS PT-26
USS PT-27
USS PT-28

The man responsible for planning the Japanese amphibious landing on Midway Atoll was Commander Yasumi Toyama. Toyama laboured under a number of serious disadvantages. The only maps of Midway Atoll in his possession were old and likely to be unreliable. Toyama had no aerial photographs of the atoll because the pilots of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-221 had intercepted and shot down a Japanese four-engined Kawanishi 97 "Mavis" patrol flying boat that had been approachingMidway on 10 March 1942. This Japanese flying boat had come from Wake Island and had been assigned to carry out a photographic reconnaissance of Midway to provide intelligence for the Japanese amphibious assault on Midway in June.

Toyama had no intelligence concerning the defences of Midway and the number of defenders. The Navy planners expected to face about 750 US Marines, and that would have been the pre-war strength of the Midway Detachment, Fleet Marine Force. The Army estimate was more realistic; they expected that the Marine strength would be closer to 2,000. It was anticipated that the Marines might have between 50-60 planes on the atoll.

Toyama planned a simultaneous attack on Sand and Eastern Islands from the southern side of the atoll where the two islands were close to the reef. The Japanese landing force would number about 5,000, and would be spearheaded by two elite assault units - Captain Minoru Ota's 2nd Combined Special Naval Landing Force numbering about one thousand five hundred marines, and the Army's Ichiki Detachment which numbered about two thousand men and was commanded by Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki.
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Preparations.html

If you can locate a copy of Lt.Col. Robert Heinl's Marines at Midway, June 1942, it contains a pretty good map. The basic organization was:

6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced) – c. 2,130 O&EM
Commanding Officer Col. Harold D. Shannon
Commanding Officer, Eastern Island Group Maj. William W. Benson

Seacoast Artillery Group
Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Lewis A. Hohn
Battery A (2 5-inch)
Battery B (2 5-inch)
Battery C (2 5-inch)
Sand Island 7-inch Battery, Provisional (2 7-inch; manned by Battery B)
Eastern Island 7-inch Battery, Provisional (2 7-inch; manned by Battery A)
Sand Island 3-inch Navy Battery, Provisional (2 3-inch; manned by Battery C)
Eastern Island 3-inch Navy Battery, Provisional (2 3-inch; manned by Battery A)

6th Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Group
Commanding Officer Maj. Charles T. Tingle
Battery D (4 3-inch AA)
Battery E (4 3-inch AA)
Battery F (4 3-inch AA)
Battery G (searchlight)

6th Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Commanding Officer Capt. Robert E. Hommel
Battery H (24 .50-caliber MG)
Battery I (24 .30-caliber MG)
Tank Platoon, Provisional (5 M2A4 Light Tanks)

3d Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Group
Commanding Officer Maj. Chandler W. Johnson
Battery D (4 3-inch AA)
Battery E (4 3-inch AA)
Battery F (4 3-inch AA)

3d Defense Battalion Special Weapons Group
Battery K (8 37-mm)
Battery L (18 twin 20-mm on 40-mm carriage)

Provisional Infantry Group
Detachment, 2d Raider (Each company included a weapons platoon of 2 60-mm mortars and 2 .30-caliber M1919A4 MG.)
Company C
Company D
Provisional Marine Companies (Each company included a weapons platoon armed with 2 60-mm mortars, 2 .30-caliber M191A4 MG, and 2 M1916 37-mm guns.)
22d Provisional Marine Company
23d Provisional Marine Company
 
Here is a more complete description of the Japanese landing force. It appears I forgot one SNLF group. Total infantry is approx 2500 men and small arms.

I'll look for some maps of Midway. The text below refers to landing on the south side of the island. There the reef edge was relatively close to the shore. The other shores had between 1000 & 3000 meters of reef to cross.

You don't need to work yourself hard for the maps. The torpedo boats might have trouble getting their shots in. I'm sure the IJN ships will try to smack them. Do the transports have radios? If so, they can make "corrections" everytime the gunfire misses the boats. If the transports have radio, I think it's safe to say the torpedo boats (which have torpedoes) will probably suffer the loss of most of their boats and only get one or two transports in return. Destroyers MURDER torpedo boats.

This leaves the problem that the plan was to use rubber boats. Somehow, I don't think that's going to go to well, unless the destroyer guns shoot the defenders at the same time... which means some shells are going to land on the landing forces.

I don't think the 1,500 forces would be enough to take Sand Island. The only thing going right for Captain Toyama's plan is that in TTL, the IJN made the USN opposition run away. I guess it's not impossible to win, I mean the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Battle of Balaclava should have gotten shredded before getting within 100 meters of the target by conventional calculations but they did get there before being repulsed. It's just that the odds would be in favor of the defenders in a 3 to 1 situation, and in this case the attacker are actually outnumbered.
 
... Do the transports have radios? If so, they can make "corrections" everytime the gunfire misses the boats. If the transports have radio, I think it's safe to say the torpedo boats (which have torpedoes) will probably suffer the loss of most of their boats and only get one or two transports in return. ...

Unlikely the transport crews had the training to do this with much effect. & the destroyers & other ships, including the transports could fire directly at the torpedo boats. That is of course if they see them. The Japanese plan was to approach, anchor, disembark, and start preparatory fires during the night. The landing craft would make their approach and disembark on the reef sometime around dawn. This gives the US PT boats the opportunity to attack in the dark. It would also make sense for the torpedo boat attack to occur while at least the 7: batteries & possiblly part of the 5" batteries attack the Japanese as well. If the defenders use illumination rounds to back light the ships the PT boats have a advantage until the Japanese searchlights actually pin them.

Nailing one transport with the PT boats and either a transport of one of the fire support ships with the defenders cannon, before dawn, sets the attack on a downward spiral early on.

I wonder if any USN subs would have wandered into the landing force fleet just after dawn?
 
I guess the best plan for the IJN at this stage might be bombard where the torpedo boats are the day before, since those boats are much more fragile than the 7 inch batteries (which would be fortified in concrete and likely to withstand lots of shells). There is no surprise anymore since after TTL battle of Midway, all the American airmen are on Midway. Even after TTL Midway and the suppression of torpedo boats, the attacks will meet a hail of bullets and naval costal battery fire, all while outnumbered. It doesn't look good for them.
 
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