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Many historians have questioned Admiral Yamamoto's planning for Operation MI, the proposed seizure of Midway as a means to force the weaker US Navy out for Japan's cherished hope of a decisive battle.

However, one issue doesn't appear to have gotten as much attention as it might. Specifically, the Japanese diversionary attack on the Aleutians. As I recall, a diversion is supposed to fit into certain criteria, and not being large enough to potentially damage the main attack is one of them.

For instance, historians have noted that the two medium carriers sent to the Aleutians might have made a difference at Midway whereas the US sent no carriers up north.

In OTL the US did not even realize that, in a comparative last minute decision, Yamamoto had decided to dispatch the Yamato and six other battleships plus various escorts to Midway. At least one prominent historian believes it would not have mattered as an attempt had to be made to held Midway. However...

If Yamamoto made the decision early enough for the US to find out, and the US Navy then made the natural albeit wrong conclusion that the battleships would be kept in front of the carriers as a screen, might the US Navy have rejected a stand for Midway under conditions which would risk American carriers but only Japanese battleships?

The reason I ask is that an alternative did exist. Specifically, the IJN forces in the Aleutian Islands and the Guards (Aleutian Screening) Force between Midway and the Aleutians.


The Japanese force in the Aleutians included the aircraft carriers Ryujo and Junyo, with 40 fighters and 21 each dive bombers and torpedo bombers. Also 3 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, one auxiliary cruiser, 12 destroyers, 6 subs, a minelayer, 3 minesweepers, 3 oilers, 3 transports, and 3 general cargo ships.

The Guards Force included the battleships Ise, Hyuga, Fusi, and Yamashiro with 2 light cruisers and 12 destroyers.


In OTL local forces were commanded by Admiral Robert A Theobald with 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, and 4 destroyers. An additional detachment of 9 destroyers and 6 subs were already in the area. Also a 5 Coast Guard cutters, 3 tenders(for PBYs), 1 gunboat, 3 oilers, 14 YP and something identified only as SS Comet with Patrol Wing 4 with 20 PBYs and a single B17.

Lastly, the US Army Air Corps fielded 109 fighters, 43 bombers and 3 light bombers at various bases.


In this situation Nimitz has written off Midway, he will not make a stand, but the US needs a victory badly...somewhere. Yamamoto has launched a secondary attack which includes roughly 20% of Japan's carrier-based air, 25% of Japan's destroyers and cruisers AND more than 35% of Japan's battleships. Best of all, the US Navy CAN muster sufficient force to destroy this portion of the IJN.

In addition to Theobald's forces, Nimitz has the three carriers near Hawaii and also Task Force One with 7 battleships, 8 destroyers, and the escort carrier Long Island(20 fighters) under Admiral Pye at San Francisco.



So assume that after Midway the Japanese have taken Midway with some losses, perhaps 1000 Japanese dead and a destroyer or two. However, the diversionary forces to attract US attention have done their job too well and the US has wiped out that 2 medium carriers, 4 battleships, 9 cruisers and 24 destroyers with no losses above a few destroyers and a cruiser or two?

From Yamamoto's perspective, is the gain at Midway more than countered by the American victory up north with a loss of a large percentage of the IJN? Can he find another means of forcing the US Navy to face him?
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