Middle East Front 1942

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Deleted member 1487

For the record, I know the principles, just didn't see the preceeding 5 Pages as very Constructive.

You managed to make a constructive statement here. A Key question is if the British collapsed forward or withdrew in an orderly fashion. Wiking?

You are noting me wrong BTW. I am simply stating that the axis must get to Suez before there Can be an after Suez is taken chain of events. Now lets discuss this based on either orderly withdrawal or major defeat.
Its clear that the British would probably get away relatively intact via panic as per Mersa Matruh and fall back on the Nile. The Axis take Alexandria while OTL reinforcements (Axis paras, Italian armored division, German motorized division 164th IIRC) move out toward the Nile. So the Brits post up on the Nile, flooding parts of it per plan and perhaps deal with some unrest and perhaps guerrilla action in their rear areas from Egyptians.

A major issue going forward will be Desert Air Force and USAAF bombing of Alexandria to shut down the port. Given the size of it though it will be hard to shut it down completely given the remaining air bases and threats against Cairo's air bases. Another big issue though for the Allies is that they will have lost bases they used west of the Nile to bomb Axis supply lines and will therefore be able to generate less sorties then than they did from 1st Alamein on IOTL. Also they will likely have to drop the bombing of Tobruk and Benghazi to focus on bombing Alexandria, meaning more can be shipped in further west. With the fall of Alexandria the rolling stock of the Egyptian rail roads will be in Axis hands, meaning the rail lines from Alexandria to Libya will be available to move supplies from Tobruk to Alexandria to help make up for reduced port capacity due to Allied bombing there. Then the Allies have to worry about a potential Axis para drop over the Nile to breach the river defenses and those Axis troops perhaps linking up with Egyptian resistance. If the Brits really have to worry about their supply lines due to restive natives they aren't going to be defending the Nile that well, as they'll need to keep men in reserve just in case. I'm sure there will be collaboration west of the Nile and friendly Egyptians organized and dropped East of the Nile too.
 
Its clear that the British would probably get away relatively intact via panic as per Mersa Matruh and fall back on the Nile. The Axis take Alexandria while OTL reinforcements (Axis paras, Italian armored division, German motorized division 164th IIRC) move out toward the Nile. So the Brits post up on the Nile, flooding parts of it per plan and perhaps deal with some unrest and perhaps guerrilla action in their rear areas from Egyptians.

A major issue going forward will be Desert Air Force and USAAF bombing of Alexandria to shut down the port. Given the size of it though it will be hard to shut it down completely given the remaining air bases and threats against Cairo's air bases. Another big issue though for the Allies is that they will have lost bases they used west of the Nile to bomb Axis supply lines and will therefore be able to generate less sorties then than they did from 1st Alamein on IOTL. Also they will likely have to drop the bombing of Tobruk and Benghazi to focus on bombing Alexandria, meaning more can be shipped in further west. With the fall of Alexandria the rolling stock of the Egyptian rail roads will be in Axis hands, meaning the rail lines from Alexandria to Libya will be available to move supplies from Tobruk to Alexandria to help make up for reduced port capacity due to Allied bombing there. Then the Allies have to worry about a potential Axis para drop over the Nile to breach the river defenses and those Axis troops perhaps linking up with Egyptian resistance. If the Brits really have to worry about their supply lines due to restive natives they aren't going to be defending the Nile that well, as they'll need to keep men in reserve just in case. I'm sure there will be collaboration west of the Nile and friendly Egyptians organized and dropped East of the Nile too.

I don't think given your scenario you would see any time for organised Egyptian interference and not much for disorganised Egyptian interference (i.e stones and abuse lobbed as the British race past).

Where collaboration would have an impact is once the lines stabilize which would be Palestine in your scenario as by that stage Rommel would have outrun both his original supply infrastructure which was wobbling past Mersa Matruh and any supplies he might have picked up from the British...actually we are all assuming that somehow someone cocked up enough for Rommel to get his hands on loot for him to get to Sinai.

I doubt it would be remotely enough to tip the odds in Rommel's favour but it is lots of hard working Egyptian bodies that would become a vital Axis resource.

Though given the Axis track record even left alone they are likely to mess things up with the Egyptians.
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't think given your scenario you would see any time for organised Egyptian interference and not much for disorganised Egyptian interference (i.e stones and abuse lobbed as the British race past).

Where collaboration would have an impact is once the lines stabilize which would be Palestine in your scenario as by that stage Rommel would have outrun both his original supply infrastructure which was wobbling past Mersa Matruh and any supplies he might have picked up from the British...actually we are all assuming that somehow someone cocked up enough for Rommel to get his hands on loot for him to get to Sinai.

I doubt it would be remotely enough to tip the odds in Rommel's favour but it is lots of hard working Egyptian bodies that would become a vital Axis resource.

Though given the Axis track record even left alone they are likely to mess things up with the Egyptians.
Apparently at Tobruk Rommel captured 2000 vehicles and 1400 tons of fuel, which got him to El Alamein. Alexandria had mountains of supplies as it was the primary naval base and source of supplies to the front line to the Libyan border (as the rail lines ran though there), so there is simply no way to destroy those supplies in time if the British lose on July 1st or June 30th if we assume thing go a bit better with the weather at Alamein and the Axis bounce that line and move the 60 mils to the city in 24 hours.
 
Apparently at Tobruk Rommel captured 2000 vehicles and 1400 tons of fuel, which got him to El Alamein.

And yet he lacked enough fuel to maneuver even to take advantage of tactical gaps in the British lines. This does not suggest that a success at Alamein would lead to the fall of Alexandria. Instead the British merely fall a few dozen kilometers back and hold the Germans there.
 

Deleted member 1487

And yet he lacked enough fuel to maneuver even to take advantage of tactical gaps in the British lines. This does not suggest that a success at Alamein would lead to the fall of Alexandria. Instead the British merely fall a few dozen kilometers back and hold the Germans there.
IOTL on July 1st the weather had badly disorganized his attack and enemy firepower had entangled Axis units in a way that was difficult to get out of quickly. AFIAK it wasn't so much the lack of fuel as the combat situation. So if the desert storm doesn't catch them while forming up, they attack before the Indians arrive, which they would have if the storm didn't delay the initial attack, then they flow through the wider gaps instead of getting caught up in combat and can race on, probably capturing more British trucks and supplies on the way, just as they did at Mersa Matruh. And just as in that battle the British probably panic and retreat again despite there being a chance to win. Perhaps then just west of Alexandria the Indian brigades show up and delay the Axis exploitation, but alone they aren't going to stop them, even if retreating British forces that are pulling back try and turn and stand. Once they get passed Alamein their there is a wide open flank without a Depression to anchor on. The Axis can use the captured fuel they get to manuever around, just as they kept doing. Frankly the issue is that almost axiomatically the Axis forces in the desert were just pushing on and capturing supplies every time they attacked, before the Brits figured out they were in trouble.

http://www.comandosupremo.com/Mersa.html
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Not to inject reality into any of this, but:

And yet he lacked enough fuel to maneuver even to take advantage of tactical gaps in the British lines. This does not suggest that a success at Alamein would lead to the fall of Alexandria. Instead the British merely fall a few dozen kilometers back and hold the Germans there.

Good point.;)

Not to inject reality into any of this, but there's also the minor point that the British did not put all their available troops into action at 1st Alamein.

As it was, from July, 1942 onwards, the British committed all or some of the combat elements of the 1st South African, 2nd New Zealand, 4th Indian, 5th Indian, 8th Indian, 10th Indian, 9th Australian, and 50th Infantry, as well as elements of the 1st Armoured, 7th Armoured, and 10th Armoured; the 8th Armoured Division (arrived in Egypt July 5), 44th Infantry Division (arrived in Egypt July 24), and the 51st Infantry Division (arrived August 12), were, for the most part, in reserve at this point...

So unless the Axis are going to magically overcome all or part of 11 divisions already in the Middle East, much less the three reinforcing divisions that arrived at full strength from the UK in July and August, the whole premise is pretty much impossible...

The Axis, of course, managed to reinforce with Littorio and the German 164th Infantry Division by the time of 2nd Alamein.

Best,
 
and the Axis bounce that line and move the 60 mils to the city in 24 hours.


Sorry for the slow response as I was for bed when I first read this.

I have to ask and it is a genuine question. Do you actually understand how an army moves? Lots of people do not. They read a soldier can march twenty five miles in a day and they think well obviously an army of footsoldiers can march twenty five miles a day.

Save it cannot because that twenty five mile figure is for a full march on middling to good roads. In actual fact what happens is the road has a fixed capacity, often soldiers only march down it three abreast as you need to leave half a road free in case you have to by pass blockages. So say a single infantry division might stretch nine miles, a corps more like twenty...suddenly you realise a corps on foot might be restricted to just fifteen miles a day on two parallel roads or just five on a single track.

Now in theory a motorised column is much faster but there are problems. One is the spacing between motor vehicles has to be larger because they are faster and another is that it is very rare for any march column of motor vehicles to average more than ten miles an hour in the Second World War (it can happen that it is exceeded for brief sprints but that average will grab you on a long march). So a not atypical armoured division on the move is a sixty-seventy mile long tail back.

Ah but we are in the desert, surely more columns can deploy in line abreast and this is true but that burns a heck of a lot of petrol and leads to a lot of vehicles bogging down which either slows those columns of march or leaves a sorry trail of vehicles left behind.

All this and we have not even started to worry about the enemy.
 

Deleted member 1487

Sorry for the slow response as I was for bed when I first read this.

I have to ask and it is a genuine question. Do you actually understand how an army moves? Lots of people do not. They read a soldier can march twenty five miles in a day and they think well obviously an army of footsoldiers can march twenty five miles a day.

Save it cannot because that twenty five mile figure is for a full march on middling to good roads. In actual fact what happens is the road has a fixed capacity, often soldiers only march down it three abreast as you need to leave half a road free in case you have to by pass blockages. So say a single infantry division might stretch nine miles, a corps more like twenty...suddenly you realise a corps on foot might be restricted to just fifteen miles a day on two parallel roads or just five on a single track.

Now in theory a motorised column is much faster but there are problems. One is the spacing between motor vehicles has to be larger because they are faster and another is that it is very rare for any march column of motor vehicles to average more than ten miles an hour in the Second World War (it can happen that it is exceeded for brief sprints but that average will grab you on a long march). So a not atypical armoured division on the move is a sixty-seventy mile long tail back.

Ah but we are in the desert, surely more columns can deploy in line abreast and this is true but that burns a heck of a lot of petrol and leads to a lot of vehicles bogging down which either slows those columns of march or leaves a sorry trail of vehicles left behind.

All this and we have not even started to worry about the enemy.

Given that the Axis forces attacked at Mersa Matruh and despite a storm that cost them about half a day if not more in three days they had fought and covered over 100 miles to Alamein from Matruh. So I'm just going by their historical fighting/distance covered rate
 
Given that the Axis forces attacked at Mersa Matruh and despite a storm that cost them about half a day if not more in three days they had fought and covered over 100 miles to Alamein from Matruh. So I'm just going by their historical fighting/distance covered rate

So based on the fact that they were able to move at thirty miles a day or if you assume that sandstorm really did cost a half march the equivalent of forty miles a day you assume that Rommel is going to conjure up an extra twenty miles a day?

The problem is the only way he can do this is not fighting the British which means any Brits he by passes get to shoot up his trains for free.

There are also the fact that British were not in one line at El Alamein but had reserves and then the fact the British had fall back positions already part-prepared. Even if these are all assumed to be of rubbish standard that still burns up far more time than a half a day sandstorm.

The thirty to forty miles a day march not impossible for motorised troops. The sixty miles a day is really pushing it in perfect conditions (i.e no enemies).
 

Deleted member 1487

The thirty to forty miles a day march not impossible for motorised troops. The sixty miles a day is really pushing it in perfect conditions (i.e no enemies).
Yet the Germans did 60 miles a day in Russia in 1941 despite resistance and attacks on supply lines that badly lagged behind. The conditions were every bit as bad.
 
Yet the Germans did 60 miles a day in Russia in 1941 despite resistance and attacks on supply lines that badly lagged behind. The conditions were every bit as bad.

Not really no...

Russia is big...this is important as it allows you deploy across more roads and then concentrate again at the end of each day's march. In fact what happened in Russia was divisions and sometimes smaller units frequently laggered up without being in contact with friendlies, something they could only afford to do in spots where the Soviets were equally scattered, where they were not they were slowed down a lot.

In your scenario you are going to have to push your forces down the same highway the 8th Army is retreating down, in fact crushing their wrecked vehicles under the tracks of your imperious panzers (hoping of course nothing gets caught up in the rolling gear).

In an age of Google Maps you can take a look for yourself at the geography with relative ease.
 

hipper

Banned
IOTL on July 1st the weather had badly disorganized his attack and enemy firepower had entangled Axis units in a way that was difficult to get out of quickly. AFIAK it wasn't so much the lack of fuel as the combat situation. So if the desert storm doesn't catch them while forming up, they attack before the Indians arrive, which they would have if the storm didn't delay the initial attack, then they flow through the wider gaps instead of getting caught up in combat and can race on, probably capturing more British trucks and supplies on the way, just as they did at Mersa Matruh. And just as in that battle the British probably panic and retreat again despite there being a chance to win. Perhaps then just west of Alexandria the Indian brigades show up and delay the Axis exploitation, but alone they aren't going to stop them, even if retreating British forces that are pulling back try and turn and stand. Once they get passed Alamein their there is a wide open flank without a Depression to anchor on. The Axis can use the captured fuel they get to manuever around, just as they kept doing. Frankly the issue is that almost axiomatically the Axis forces in the desert were just pushing on and capturing supplies every time they attacked, before the Brits figured out they were in trouble.

http://www.comandosupremo.com/Mersa.html

Hmm on June 30th the 21st Panzer Division was immobilised because of lack of fuel

in the early hours of the 1st July the 15th and 21st were delayed by a sandstorm then by heavy air attacks.

the 18th infantry Brigade had occupied Deir el Shin on the evening of the 28th

so there is no way the Germans could have got there first.

there were indeed many gaps in the British line, however the Germans were denied air recconisance or the efforts of their wireless intercept service (everything was been done on the rush)

The Good source of course had fallen silent on the 29th of June and the British were aware of the compromise of Bonner Fellers codes by the 10th of June - you decide how relevant the information the germans were getting in late June was from the good source.

The final problem was of course that Auchinleck had decided to stay and fight it out at the Alamein position rather than the Matruh position.

so your POD has to be that Auchinleck does not decide to fight that position

however the many negative consequences that follow from retreating from Alamein are the best arguments for the logic of staying there.

of course the British were finally getting decent anti tank Guns into the infantry Divisions so it was getting much more Expensive to attack British infantry

Regards

Hipper
 

hipper

Banned
Its clear that the British would probably get away relatively intact via panic as per Mersa Matruh and fall back on the Nile. The Axis take Alexandria while OTL reinforcements (Axis paras, Italian armored division, German motorized division 164th IIRC) move out toward the Nile. So the Brits post up on the Nile, flooding parts of it per plan and perhaps deal with some unrest and perhaps guerrilla action in their rear areas from Egyptians.

A major issue going forward will be Desert Air Force and USAAF bombing of Alexandria to shut down the port. Given the size of it though it will be hard to shut it down completely given the remaining air bases and threats against Cairo's air bases. Another big issue though for the Allies is that they will have lost bases they used west of the Nile to bomb Axis supply lines and will therefore be able to generate less sorties then than they did from 1st Alamein on IOTL. Also they will likely have to drop the bombing of Tobruk and Benghazi to focus on bombing Alexandria, meaning more can be shipped in further west. With the fall of Alexandria the rolling stock of the Egyptian rail roads will be in Axis hands, meaning the rail lines from Alexandria to Libya will be available to move supplies from Tobruk to Alexandria to help make up for reduced port capacity due to Allied bombing there. Then the Allies have to worry about a potential Axis para drop over the Nile to breach the river defenses and those Axis troops perhaps linking up with Egyptian resistance. If the Brits really have to worry about their supply lines due to restive natives they aren't going to be defending the Nile that well, as they'll need to keep men in reserve just in case. I'm sure there will be collaboration west of the Nile and friendly Egyptians organized and dropped East of the Nile too.


They don't have to shut down the port,
they just have to sink Italian merchant shipping traveling to the port.

Historically one squadron of Swordfish did that to Tobruk

Until Haifa is captured its still very possible for British Cruisers to operate in the Western med. So Italian convoys would need battleship escorts to Alexandria.

The POD really needs to be that the Italians build a railway from Tripoli to Tobruk before the war.

However thats a very profitless use of capital expenditure. Ships are a more efficient means of transport in every scenario except war.

Cheers
 
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