[Middle East AH] - Prospects for Hashemite Arabia?

I'm a major Hashemite fanboy (grew up in Jordan, so no shock there), and the question of what would have happened if they hadn't been screwed over so mercilessly by the British and French governments (along with so many others) has always been a thought in my mind. With that in mind, I wanted to take a stab at this, and provide something of a possible timeline of sorts. Not to put it up for discussion, but to sort of look past it and discuss the potential of a post-WW1 united Arabia, and a far different Middle East.

Here's the timeline:

  • Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud's raid on Riyadh in 1901 is a complete failure, and he is captured and killed with his relatives and followers who accompanied him in the raid.
  • In the wake of this failure, Al Saud gradually loses it's influence and ability in the Arab Peninsula, as many of it's former allies are brought down in skirmishes by Al Rashid or are bought off by the Ottomans.
  • As a result the two primary powers in the Ottoman-ruled Peninsula are the mercentile Al-Rashid and the religious Al-Hashem, better known today as the Hashemites.
  • Arab nationalism in the Ottoman empire is slow to proliferate, initially starting with a demand for increased presence within the empire's offices, including Arabic as a second language and special rights for Arab citizenry. Attempts by Arab politicians for increased influence in the counter-coup of 1909 and the Congress of Paris in 1913 are failures, causing a significant radicalization towards independence for these would-be nationalist.
  • By and large however, the majority of the Arab peoples are divided by religious or tribal ties, though multiple groups are beginning to form in Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus and Jerusalem.
  • During the early years of World War 1, the British attempt to entice the Sharif Hussein bin Ali of the Hejaz to revolt against the Ottomans, hoping to create an Arab fifth column. Sharif Hussein agrees, in exchange for funding, support and training, and for the promise of a kingdom consisting of all Ottoman Arabs.
  • Negotiations on this are mixed, due to British, French, Jewish and Kurdish interests,and are continued on after the war. The Sykes-Picot agreement is not signed here, nor is the Balfour declaration.
  • Due to the lack of Al-Saud, the funds and weapons sent to them in WW1 (and never used against the Ottomans) are sent to Sharif Hussein.
  • Hashemite successes during the war are mixed, but provide a solid basis for a post-war Arabia. Hussein's son Faisal is able to sway many of the Ottoman Arab regiments to desert from the 4th and 6th Ottoman Armies, using his ties with members of the Al-Fatat and Al-Had societies. These men become the nucleus of the Sharifian Army, fighting alongside the Egyptian Expeditionary Force commanded by General Allenby. As well, many Bedouin irregulars are used for asymmetrical warfare, stymieing Ottoman abilities for much of the war.
  • During the war, Al-Rashid is defeated by Al-Hashem, though becoming a prominent part of post-war politics in Arabia.
  • The war ends in an Etente victory, with the Arabs on the winning side. With all in a victorious if weary mood, the Arab, British, French, Jewish and Kurdish get to negotiations.
  • The major sticking points on the Hashemite side are the losses of Alexandrietta, Lebanon, Mosul and Palestine to various divisions of governance, coupled with the French divide up the region into mandates. Acting as relatively neutral arbiters (and finding themselves at odds in a way with their old rivals-turned-friends the French), the British goverment enacts an agreement that pleases very few, but is considered acceptable.
    • The Jewish peoples are granted the right to statehood, being given the coastal lands of the Jerusalem Governate. Meanwhile, the inland territory is given to Sharif Hussein's envisioned Greater Arabia, while Jerusalem itself is held under British Mandate as a free city. Land in the Jewish defined regions is eligible to be bought out by the Jewish Commission for settlers, and by Hashemite agreement grants citizenship and migration rights to any thus disenfranchised Arab residents.​​
    • The French are given the whole of OTL Lebanon as a French Mandate, a decision with Hussein protests bitterly but accepts by his sons pressuring.​​
    • The Kurds meanwhile are given their own state, with lands containing Kurdish populations included from what in OTL would be Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. The Persians in particular are furious over this matter, but are unable to effect much change. The area of Mosul is given over to this new Kurdish state, with the exclusive oil rights given over to the British.​​
    • Finally, as relating to the Hashemites:
      • Though bordered in by Egypt, the Gulf emirates, Iran, Kurdistan, Lebanon and Turkey, the Hashemites assume control of the modern day Middle East.​​
      • Damascus is named the new capital of this Arab state, though Baghdad quickly becomes the second city.​​
      • Portioning out responsibilities to his sons, his eldest son Ali is named Emir of Hejaz under him, given the responsibilities of the Peninsula. His second son Abdullah is named Emir of Nejd, his third son Faisal as Emir of Baghdad, and his fourth son Zeid as Emir of Aleppo.​​
      • In order to curb the greater French desires for lands, Sharif Hussein agrees to several trade agreements that place both the British and French as most favoured nations over any other trading partner, and agrees to British drilling rights in relation to oil in Iraq (but not anywhere else). ​​
      • Sharif Hussein also agrees to respect the independence of the Gulf emirates, as well as the nascent kingdom of Yemen, whose royal family also claims relation to the Prophet (PBUH).​​
      • Initially self-titled as King of the Arabs (but more professionally described as King of Arabia), Sharif Hussein claims in 1924 the defunct Caliphate title after the abdication of the last Ottoman caliph, recieving support from Mehmed IV (the final Ottoman sultan and penultimate caliph). His declaration is ill-received outside of Arabia, particularly amongst the Egyptian and Gulf Arabs.​​
      ​​
With all this in mind as a vaguely reasonable/logical timeline, let's discuss this Hashemite Arabia post-1925.

We're talking about a very large, very primitive, very decentralized, natively-run and relatively independent country. It's sitting on a lot of liquid and mineral wealth, has revanchist claims to certain territories (Lebanon, Gulf, Jerusalem), claims religious authority (Caliphate) and is being run by a relatively moderate royal family. It has "favored nation" trading ties with the British and the French, and something of a political rivalry with the Egyptian state in regards to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. It's in the midst of the swinging twenties, it's entering the Great Depression with a heavily agrarian/rural population exposed to the modern world market system, and it's not quite got a blood-feud with Israel from the get-go.

So what do you guys think? How would this version of the middle east go? More conflict? Less? What's the implications of a free Kurdistan from the get-go? Less acrimony to the would-be colonials? Islam's effects from the downsizing and sidestepping of Wahabi Islam, and the money that would go into exporting that brand of idealogy internationally?
 

raharris1973

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#1 very interesting concept, and one not often explored.

#2 How does a Hashemite Arabia do when compared to Saudi Arabia?

Being more worldly and less committed reactionaries, the Hashemites probably build up more institutions and have a more tolerant approach towards religion. While many people are less upset than OTL, the committment of the regimes supporters to Hashemite Arabia is less fervent than the OTL Saudis and Wahhabi clergy.

The monarchy is probably overthrown by the army in the 1950s when that sort of socialist, secular nationalist sort of thing became more fashionable.

Hashemite longevity in Jordan might be related to its unique circumstances as an economic backwater and buffer state. Having them try to rule anything larger, like Arabia, might be too much to handle, as Iraq was too much for them to handle.
 
You're assuming the people in the Levant and Iraq want to be ruled by the Hashemites in the first place. But local powers were actually pretty against them too during WWI to the point where Turkish rulers were also seen as an alternative. There was a gulf between the urban elites that dominated Syria, Palestine and Iraq, and the rural elites in Arabia proper.

And the Sharifians had a very hard time recruiting among Ottoman Arab divisions that were fairly loyal to Constantinople.

Sharifian action was more motivated by the fact that the Ottomans intended to depose the Hashemites and build a railway from Damascus downwards. And the promise of the Caliphate ( a role which was completely misunderstood by the Kitchenerites that proposed it in the first place.) all Kitchener intended to do was give Hussein the title of Caliph to try and build a spiritual control of Islam for Britain against a confrontation against the Russians who would control the Ottoman sultan. This was further an issue because India and Egypt had two different strategies in the Middle East. For the former they wanted to annex Iraq directly and support Ibn Saud, while the latter were pro-Hashemite but wanted to essentially create a Viceroyalty of Egypt with these lands being protectorates of Cairo. Real independence was never in the cards.
 
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The monarchy is probably overthrown by the army in the 1950s when that sort of socialist, secular nationalist sort of thing became more fashionable.

That sort of secular/socialist/nationalist trend emerged after the failure of the royal families to retake Palestine, and in part due to the strength of pan-nationalism. If you've got the majority of these Arabs in the area under the Hashemites, then much of the pan-nationalist work is done. It's possible that pan-nationalist sentiment might push towards acquiring the territories given away, but the timing would have to be either during WW2 (a time which I considered an attempt on Lebanon) or post-WW2 as the colonial efforts broke down.

In the former, I considered it a fait accompli that the Hashemites would go for Lebanon if France went Vichy, considering that would be the safer route while under such heavy British influence. It is equally possible that the Hashemites might get entreated by the Nazis, in which case we'd get a version of what happened in Iraq in OTL.

It's also worth considering that with an earlier Israel, the Nazis might effect a version of the Madagascar Plan through the Balkans and Turkey to Israel rather than bother with the intricacies of mass genocide. And considering the impact the Holocaust had on curbing anti-Semitism, that has it's own butterflies...

Regarding the existence of Kurdistan, I envisioned the Turks smashing down the Greeks, but being forced to accept the existence of Kurdistan on their border owing to British and French pressure as well as significant Kurdish resistance. I considered the possibility of a short war before ceasefires went off, but as I'm focusing on Hashemite Arabia first and the region as a whole second...

Hashemite longevity in Jordan might be related to its unique circumstances as an economic backwater and buffer state. Having them try to rule anything larger, like Arabia, might be too much to handle, as Iraq was too much for them to handle.
Oh, I don't disagree, but it's fun speculating.

You're assuming the people in the Levant and Iraq want to be ruled by the Hashemites in the first place.

Yes, I have set up a timeline where the Hashemites are extraordinarily blessed with what they have, even if the foundation is incredibly shaky.

But as I would argue, the Hashemites have one of the better claims to begin build a pan-Arab state in the Middle East, owing to their heritage and the wealth of ties they cultivated by being custodians of the Holy Cities. You are however free to theorize about a post-independence situation, and how things might proceed. Which is what I was hoping to examine.

But local powers were actually pretty against them too during WWI to the point where Turkish rulers were also seen as an alternative. There was a gulf between the urban elites that dominated Syria, Palestine and Iraq, and the rural elites in Arabia proper.
The tribes went for whoever bribed them best, and more often than not they went back and forth. The removal of a Saudi presence favours the Hashemites significantly, and strengthens their position vis-a-vis the tribes and the British and French. However the rural & urban elites might feel about being under Hashemite rule post-independence is something I would be interested in exploring, as mentioned above.

And the Sharifians had a very hard time recruiting among Ottoman Arab divisions that were fairly loyal to Constantinople.
Which was in part due to the removal of the Arab officer corps by the Young Turks, yes. As part of the timeline, I supposed the Sharifians had more success. You might choose to take that as a lack of action by the Young Turks, or simply a less loyal Arab contingent in the army.

Sharifian action was more motivated by the fact that the Ottomans intended to depose the Hashemites and build a railway from Damascus downwards. And the promise of the Caliphate ( a role which was completely misunderstood by the Kitchenerites that proposed it in the first place.) all Kitchener intended to do was give Hussein the title of Caliph to try and build a spiritual control of Islam for Britain against a confrontation against the Russians who would control the Ottoman sultan.
Yes, Sharif Hussein was set to be replaced by one of his cousins because he was suspected of fomenting a rebellion and being difficult prior to his actual rebellion.

This was further an issue because India and Egypt had two different strategies in the Middle East. For the former they wanted to annex Iraq directly and support Ibn Saud, while the latter were pro-Hashemite but wanted to essentially create a Viceroyalty of Egypt with these lands being protectorates of Cairo. Real independence was never in the cards.
As I said in OP, the Saudis are out of the picture, negating the Indian desire to support him. I also stated that the British gained significant trade concessions, fulfilling in part the desire of the India office, though you could also take it as the Egyptian office winning more, though as I've said above, no one was really satisfied with the deal.

And yes a Vice-Royalty would have been swell, but they've effectively gained a separate pseudo-protectorate here, with an actual Caliph to work alongside as opposed to the Ottoman one. They haven't quite lost out as you seem to indicate.
 
Interesting TL, Points for exploring an area of history not commonly covered. All I can say is that if the Hashemites control the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia they are probably going to have to walk a tightrope internationally, because as mid-east oil becomes more essential, the Erupeans and later the Americans will really take an interest in the region. I wonder how a Hashemite ruled Saudi Arabia would have dealt with increased European interested (and possibly intervention?) to secure Saudi oil.
 

My problem isn't so much an independent Arab state in the Levant existing, but rather handwaving the great power interplay and clusterf*ck in the region during and after WWI.

Palestine (including Jordan) was constantly being looked into for first a French,then a joint, then an American and finally British mandate which supported Zionist aspirations (especially Lloyd George). If the Hashemites are powerful in Damascus, then Churchill doesn't strip away Transjordan from Zionist settlers which means a bigger possible Israel in the future. Secondly, you're negating the British interfighting that dominated the creation of an Arab policy. The British didn't want a huge pseudo-protectorate because they were worried about the (more or less overestimated) sway of pan-Islamic ideas, specifically with regards to Egypt and India. And seeing as they contributed the biggest proportion of forces against the Ottoman Turks, I doubt how you're going to change their mind into one protecting Arab independence.

The British into the campaign were seriously looking only into two proposals; splitting the region, and taking it all for herself. Only Mark Sykes ever envisioned any real independence for the Arabs; everyone else was against it.

The Hashemites themselves also offered certain conditions and concessions. Iraq was out of the question, Palestine (including Jordan) was to be surrendered, as was Lebanon and Coastal Syria, with French influence in Syria, and British influence south.

By the end that morphed into a French offer to Faisal where he would have exclusively French advisers, and in this scenario he controlled basically modern day Syria. Faisal, not Hussain (whom was not at all popular amongst the Syrians or Palestinians) while Abdullah had his own ambitions.

I do take issue with your belief that the Arabs would follow whomever bribed them the most. That is untrue. They were against British or French rule, for one. :p

But the whole foundation on the Hashemite claim was that it was based on the will of the people (see Iraq), and frankly, they had a very weak foundation there, basically installed to maintain order (especially with Abdullah, which ended up working against the British in Transjordan since Abdullah actually neglected the situation there). And they were installed in order to mend relations with the French and the Arabs at the same time. If Faisal accepts French terms and becomes King of Syria, then the British certainly aren't turning over Iraq to him nor his brother. Indeed, they might be more inclined to support the Saudis or a Turkish family in Iraq, keeping the Hejaz in Hashemite hands if they can manage it.

Plus oil is already becoming a big issue, and Britain is keen on securing Mosul whether under Iraq, or Turkey (which offered equal concessions as Iraq was willing to give).

It's a really complicated situation that isn't straightforward at all....certainly not to the point where most of Arabia plus the Levant and Mesopotamia is included in one kingdom.

One interesting possibility was a fear that Kemalist and Arab forces might work together (there were overtures IIRC OTL) so there's an avenue for independent states in the region beforehand, but again, ensuring one Hashemite Caliph over all that territory seems to be wishful thinking based on everything going on at the same time.

I recommend the Peace to End All Peace by David Fromkin...it was a great in depth look at just how much politicking was going down behind the scenes during the First World War's Middle Eastern Theatre.

EDIT: working through the hypothesis that Saud is dead, the Government of India would likely support the Al-Rashidis as an alternative. Britain OTL paid subsidies to both the House of Hashim and the House of Saud. Here I reckon it would be to the House of Hashim and the House of Rashid.

EDIT II: Forgot to mention throughout the war Hussain wavered on supporting the Ottomans, staying neutral, and committing fully to Britain.
 
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