Międzymorze, or the Intermatine Commonwealth

There was a real attempt to create a confederacy or commonwealth spanning from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. The idea began as the reconstruction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the release of Poland in post-WWI.

The project was led by the Polish general and later "dictator", Józef Piłsudski. His intention, aside from strenghten Poland, was to create a strong country to prevent any other partition or invasion, either west or east-originated, of Poland or any other Eastern European country. A confederacy to stand against Germany and Russia.

The plan was to convince Hungary, Luthuania, Czechoslovaquia, Yugoslavia and the nationalist revolters in Bielorussia and Ukraine that this confederacy was good for the future of their nations.

Here's a map of the project:

Mapka_miedzymorza.png


I think that if, during the Polish-Soviet war, there was turmoil in Russia, the project might (might) have come to reality. Crazier projects did came to be real, like the Soviet Union itself. It is true that Piłsudski found problems and oppositions among most of the peoples he wanted to join this commonwealth, but in Hungary there was some approval, and in Ukraine some nationalists, instead of regarding this as a threat to their aspirations, saw the opportunity to ensure them.

Let's put some coup d'État led by a Soviet General, or more Western funds to the White tsarist supporters in Russia, and Piłsudski might have had a chance to lead this union effectively.

What do you think? What could have been the turning point? What should have happened for this Intermarine Commonwealth to become a reality?

Take care!

EDIT: Yes, there's a typo in the title, it should be "Intermarine". But it seems I can't change it...
 
The most important point would be to establish a strong, independent (yet very pro-Polish) Ukraine headed by Symon Petliura. This gets you the core Miedzymorze: Baltic to Black Sea, Poland and Ukraine allied against the Soviets. Romania was reasonably friendly with Poland at the time, but who knows what their reaction to this early Polish-Ukrainian Alliance will be.

Czechoslovakia might be persuaded to join if Hitler starts rattling sabers at them sooner, but their relations with Poland were tense enough without Poland actively recruiting them into this alliance.
 
Interesting approach.

What of Hungary? Horthy was quite ultranationalistic, it's hard to see him giving up part of his sovereign power, especially since he was most of the time friendly with Germany. Not with the Russians, nonetheless.
 
Interesting approach.

What of Hungary? Horthy was quite ultranationalistic, it's hard to see him giving up part of his sovereign power, especially since he was most of the time friendly with Germany. Not with the Russians, nonetheless.

Until the death of Engelbert Dolfuss, Austria was hostile to the Nazis, and closely allied to Mussolini, who also distrusted Hitler. So, find a way to get a war against Nazi Germany in the early 1930s with Austria, Miedzymorze, and Italy against Nazi Germany (and Hungary?) that ends with Hitler deposed, Hungary occupied by allied forces, and an alliance with Mussolini.

The unfortunate side effect of relying on Mussolini is that he too had territorial ambitions in Yugoslavia. If we want Yugoslavia in the Miedzymorze, there's going to be a war between Italy and Miedzmorze at some point. And unless Prometheism, Pilsudski's other ambition, succeeds, all these western front wars can leave Miedzmorze open to a revanchist Russia.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
In Ukraine the problem is that Pelitura's government was not popular at all. He had almost no supporters, and most Ukrainians prefered the Red Army, the White Army or the Makhnoist over the Ukrainian nationalists. The Polish annexation of East Galizia didn't make it better, since many Ukrainians believed Pelitura had allowed it to happen.
 
The problem with Intermare was that its potential members were too hostile towards each other. After the collapse of the Russian Empira and Austria-Hungary all formerly subjugated nations started building their own states. And the real problems started with borders. Most of Central-Eastern European states had borders conflict with most if not all neighbours. Poland and Czechoslovakia fought over Tesin, Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius, Poland and Ukraine over Lvov (those names represent whole regions, not just towns), Czechoslovakia was att odds with Germany (Sudetenland) and Hungary, Hungary was furious over treaty of Trianon, etc... The border areas of most of emerging states was a real jigsaw of many nations. Therefore all states whose compatriots lived there believed they had valid claims to disputed regions. New born patriotisms / nationalisms were mutually exclusive and hostile.
E.g. Vilnius: historical capital city of Lithuania. But the plurality there (if not majority) was Polish. OTOH in terrains around the town plurality was Lithuanian. And now decide - whose claims are more valid?
Naturally Polish patriots (from Lithuanian POV nationalists) wanted Vilnius Polish. And also naturally Lithuanian patriots (from Polish POV nationalists) wanted to claim it for their own.
Poland was the biggest and strongest of those competitors in the region and won most of the conflicts, gaining a dubious bonus: animosity of most of its neighbours.
So how to overcome those odds?
Personally I do not believe in Intermare as a single, even federal state. For most of the nations of Central Eastern Europe it would by another empire, this time dominated by Poles: uncacceptable for Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovakians, etc.
A kind of political-military alliance, some kind of proto-NATO might have more chances to succeed. It would have required all interested states to practice policy of tolerance towards national minorities in their borders. Small chance for that.
The only thing that might make it happen is some kind of external threat(s), common for all the members. IOTL it was communist threat, which was not enough. But...
In 1920 OTL the Soviets concentrated their efforts on the biggest adversary in the region - Poland, leaving Baltic states more or less alone. WI after Polish defeats in first half of 1920 the Soviets got cocky and invaded also Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, forcing them to join forces with Poland? Also, invasion of small and innocent countries by the Soviets may make the Soviets loose some sypathy in the West and end with stronger support of Entente for Polish-Baltic-Ukrainian coalition. Thanks to bigger military help Polish victory in Battle of Warsaw ends with even bigger Soviet defeat, augmented also by battles of Komarów and battle of Niemen River. Polish troops help Balts liberate their homelands gaining some sympathy points. Also, some changes in Polish internal policy need to be made, so the Polish government is not under control of Piłsudski's political adversaries.
Eventually victorious Polish armies and their Ukrainian allies renter the Ukraine. The treaty of Riga is signed in 1921, with even more Soviet concessions.
Thanks to Piłsudski's support there is an independent Ukraine on the western bank of Dnieper - eastern part goes to USSR. In general, Dnieper and Berezina become western border of the USSR. An independent Belarus is proclaimed, although it is dominated by Poland. Vilnius is part of Poland, but the whole region receives autonomy, with Polish, Lithuanian and Belarussian as official and equal languages. Similar situation is in Lvov.
Piłsudski is elected the president of Poland and manages to change constitution to more US style, giving him a lot of executive power, so he can force his policy through the Sejm. He starts the agrarian reform to give land to milion of landess peasants.
Anyway, Piłsudski, Petlura, and other leaders of the former alliance know that the Soviets will want revenge. Also, their countries are devastated by war, and their economy is ruined. Therefore Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia sign in Mińsk a treaty founding the Intermare Community (a kind of EU+NATO) with common market, mutual economical support and military alliance.
Here.
And now I must tell you, that this scenario is almost ASB. Too much mutual hatred, distrust, social and cultural clashes - IMHO Intermare was an interesting, but unrealistic dream.
 

archaeogeek

Banned
There's a good reason only the poles advocated for it. To most of the people involved, it was just swapping the russians and the austrians for Poland.
 
I agree with archaeogeek. Miedzymorze is basically a Polish nationalist wet dream, with absolutely no single chance to happen. Even as Romania is concerned, this country would favor bilateral alliances over a loose federation led by Pilsudski. At best, it would have been Poland, a Lithuanian puppet, a rump Bielorussian puppet, and a very rump Ukrainian puppet. Not to mention that Polish rule was not especially popular in the three aforementioned puppet states.
 
There are a few options for an approximation of this plan, but fully realizing Piłsudski's dream is an extraordinary low-probability outcome.

The easiest way to achieve a "close-enough" result might be to limit or avoid the Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict over Cieszyn, or at the very least allow for an accepted compromise resolution of the dispute. With that done as early as possible, one avoids Prague's opposition to Polish entry into the Little Entente.

Poland OTL had an alliance with Romania, also a member, and Polish membership could be an enormous asset to that alliance, possibly allowing it to maintain relevance in the inter-war era.

Ideally, such relatively friendly relations facilitates improved trade, commercial relations, and industrial co-operation. Otherwise isolated, and lured by the needs of commerce, Hungary gradually adopts a neutralist position of pragmatic co-operation with its Little-Entente neighbors that German or Italian wooing never quite manages to overcome.

The expanded Little Entente provides a better (and slightly more unified) market than OTL for French military industry and related products, and Paris can breathe a sigh of relief that good relations with Prague does not need to mean cold relations with Warsaw. The Polish concept of Międmorze merges with the conception of a Cordon Sanitare in French thinking, leading to an expansion of French diplomatic support for the Little Entente as a guarantor of European peace, and revival of the threat of an eastern front for a resurgent Germany.

The true mark of the Little Entente as an enduring European institution comes in the mid-thirties. After having re-militarized the Rhineland and annexed Austria, Berlin now turns to make demands on Czechoslovakia for the Sudetenland. French and British mediation--without the participation of Prague--requires the cession of the border territory to Germany. Czechoslovakia refuses these terms, leading to war. The Little Entente mobilizes in support while Germany largely fails to make significant progress against Czech fortifications. Polish offensives aimed at the industrial region of Silesia leads to a German defeat in the Battle of the Oder, which combined with Hungarian disinterest in ever-grander German promises, Yugoslav-Romanian skirmishes on the Austrian frontier, and continued stubborn resistance in the Sudetenland, spurs French confidence enough to call for a full mobilization and renewed diplomatic pressure on Berlin.

Knowing well that Germany was not prepared for war with both France and the Little Entente, the German military orchestrates a coup against the National Socialist government, and halting offensives into Czechoslovakia. Through the good offices of the United Kingdom, Germany asks for a cease fire, and British mediation of a peace.

Though short, the war has been especially costly for Germany, but a massive boost to the prestige and unity of the Little Entente. In the peace, Poland annexes Danzig--renamed in the Polish to Gdansk-- and gains several border districts in East Prussia, which Germany must keep demilitarized. There are minor gains for Poland in Silesia, but British mediators (and strident German opposition) do not allow for the full scale of annexations desired by Warsaw, much to Polish disappointment.

Czechoslovakia is confirmed in control of Sudetenland, and in lieu of territorial compensation is provided reparations, and assured of a demilitarized zone on the German side of the border.

Austria is again granted independence, with the provisional government looking to France and the Little Entente for guarantees. Feeling betrayed by Italy, the Austrians leave Mussolini to fume after rejecting his own opportunistic advances.

The Saar is reoccupied by France, which also gains the right to protect the region as a separate customs territory of Germany, such customs revenues accruing to France in lieu of the full scale of Versailles reparations.

The triumph of the Little Entente cements the relationship of its member-states, and greatly raises its profile elsewhere. Not long after the war, Turkey joins the alliance as an observer, as does the restored republic of Austria.

The increasing Soviet threat and humiliation of Germany also leaves the remaining states of Eastern Europe with few other potential options other than the Little Entente. While Lithuania remains aloof given unresolved disputes with Poland, Finland joins as an observer as well.

Future conflict with the Soviet Union in the Baltic War, over the independence of the Baltic States, further establishes the strength of the Little Entente, and growing economic ties (and anti-communism) eventually lead to Hungary joining the organization. Europe's bulwark against Soviet expansionism, the Little Entente became a model for European unity and co-operation that the great powers only grudgingly have come to accept.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
I agree with archaeogeek. Miedzymorze is basically a Polish nationalist wet dream, with absolutely no single chance to happen. Even as Romania is concerned, this country would favor bilateral alliances over a loose federation led by Pilsudski. At best, it would have been Poland, a Lithuanian puppet, a rump Bielorussian puppet, and a very rump Ukrainian puppet. Not to mention that Polish rule was not especially popular in the three aforementioned puppet states.
Not to mention the fact that most Poles though Pilsudski was wrong, and Poland should outright annex those places, not just set up puppets.
 
In Ukraine the problem is that Pelitura's government was not popular at all. He had almost no supporters, and most Ukrainians prefered the Red Army, the White Army or the Makhnoist over the Ukrainian nationalists. The Polish annexation of East Galizia didn't make it better, since many Ukrainians believed Pelitura had allowed it to happen.

Actually Petlyura (and Makhno) became pretty popular with the peasants (not the workers, who preferred the Bolsheviks) as a fighter against both "yids and commissars" and "landlords and officers". The peasants were unwilling draftees in the Red and White armies: the Whites were made up of former officers, cadets, and NCOs; the Reds were workers' militia organised by ex-officers. The "Black" and "Blue" forces were, though they had their leaderships of radical sailors and miscelanious lower-middle-class Ukrainian intellectuals, peasant armies.

But that was during Petlyura's brief rule of the Ukraine, before he went on the run in the west. As soon as he allied with the landlords and officers - Polish ones this time instead of Russian, but then many of the landlords in right-bank Ukraine had been Polish anyway - the peasants in Dniepr Ukraine indeed largely preferred the "yids and commissars" - as indeed did many of the Russian officers.

Could any German hypothetical regime have backed Miedzymorze at the expense of a resurgent Russia?

If Poland gets so powerful, you'd think Germany and Russia would be in bed together - and the pride of Junkertum were happy to work with the Bolsheviks IOTL. How "resurgent" is Russia without Ukraine?
 
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The project was led by the Polish general and later "dictator", Józef Piłsudski.

He wasn't a bad chap as eastern European strongmen went, but he was an unashamed putschist. I see no need for quotation marks.

I think that if, during the Polish-Soviet war, there was turmoil in Russia, the project might (might) have come to reality. Crazier projects did came to be real, like the Soviet Union itself.

:confused:

What sounds more likely:

1) In the turmoil surrounding the collapse of a large empire, a ruthless, radical, and highly organised group of men seize power and bring most of it under their rule in a civil war; those parts where strong popular nationalism receives the backing of other countries become independent.

2) In the turmoil surrounding the collapse of a large empire, one popular nationalist movement in a peripheral conquers half the bleeding place?

Let's put some coup d'État led by a Soviet General, or more Western funds to the White tsarist supporters in Russia, and Piłsudski might have had a chance to lead this union effectively.

The Whites were broken when Pilsudski marched into Ukraine, hanging on in the Crimea, and that was how he liked it: he hadn't attacked when the civil war was at its height because he preferred Soviets to Tsarists when it came to negotiating Polish independence and borders and in that respect he was almost certainly right.

See, what I'd do is change things in 1919. Had Denikin and Yudenich both been a little more successful, the Bolshevik regime might have gone under - in this case Russia might collapse into wholesale warlordism like you saw in China. Poland invade the Ukraine, drives out the Whites, and installs Petlyura because he's nearest, all with the assistance of the French.

Then throw in a pro-Polish putsch in Lithuania, and close allies in Estonia, Latvia - hell, possibly Georgia in this scenario.
 
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