Mexico reforms in the 1970s?

[Vinization]

So I've made some research on prominent Mexican politicians during the 1960-70s, the most authoritarian years of PRI's perfect dictatorship, mostly because I was inspired by @Roberto El Rey's excellent TL. I eventually stumbled upon the name of Carlos Alberto Madrazo Becerra, who was governor of Tabasco and, after that, president of PRI for less than a year, having been appointed to that position by president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the guy who presided over the Tlatelolco Massacre.

According to Wikipedia, Madrazo attempted to reform PRI by sidelining old officials in favor of younger and more dynamic members, as well as instituting open primaries for local offices, something that incurred the wrath of the hardliners and president Ordaz, forcing his resignation.

Would it be plausible for him to try to play the long game and not do any huge reforms in PRI just yet, thus allowing him to stay as president of the party? Could Ordaz, believing he's just a pretty face who won't change the status quo, make him his successor as president in 1970? Assuming that happens, how would Madrazo fare as president of Mexico? Could he start to slowly dismantle the priísta dictatorship once his power is consolidated, namely by cutting back on the rampant electoral fraud and corruption? Could he handle the post 1973 oil boom better than Luis Echeverría (the OTL president from 1970 to 1976 and another huge murderer just like his predecessor) did?

Finally could this lead to a government that handles the 1985 Mexico City earthquake at least a little better than it did IOTL?

EDIT: Could Madrazo try to have some of the nastier hardliners like Ordaz and Echeverría prosecuted, mostly as a big statement that things are going to change? Lázaro Cárdenas did exile Plutarco Elías Calles and his allies decades earlier.

 

[Aztekk]

So I've made some research on prominent Mexican politicians during the 1960-70s, the most authoritarian years of PRI's perfect dictatorship, mostly because I was inspired by @Roberto El Rey's excellent TL. I eventually stumbled upon the name of Carlos Alberto Madrazo Becerra, who was governor of Tabasco and, after that, president of PRI for less than a year, having been appointed to that position by president Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, the guy who presided over the Tlatelolco Massacre.

According to Wikipedia, Madrazo attempted to reform PRI by sidelining old officials in favor of younger and more dynamic members, as well as instituting open primaries for local offices, something that incurred the wrath of the hardliners and president Ordaz, forcing his resignation.

Would it be plausible for him to try to play the long game and not do any huge reforms in PRI just yet, thus allowing him to stay as president of the party? Could Ordaz, believing he's just a pretty face who won't change the status quo, make him his successor as president in 1970? Assuming that happens, how would Madrazo fare as president of Mexico? Could he start to slowly dismantle the priísta dictatorship once his power is consolidated, namely by cutting back on the rampant electoral fraud and corruption? Could he handle the post 1973 oil boom better than Luis Echeverría (the OTL president from 1970 to 1976 and another huge murderer just like his predecessor) did?

Finally could this lead to a government that handles the 1985 Mexico City earthquake at least a little better than it did IOTL?

EDIT: Could Madrazo try to have some of the nastier hardliners like Ordaz and Echeverría prosecuted, mostly as a big statement that things are going to change? Lázaro Cárdenas did exile Plutarco Elías Calles and his allies decades earlier.

Well, I think I can offer some help.

You see, the period between the late 60's and late 80's were very troublesome for Mexico, particularly since the postwar boom had ended and the nation was facing a series of crises. Many of these were caused by mismanagement and government repression, and discontent did exist. By the 80's, PRI's hold to power had diminished and serious political challenges had arisen. The 1988 saw a major voter fraud scandal against popular opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, signaling the end of PRI's political dominance and the beginning of Salinas's reforms towards the alternation of power in 2000.

Here's the deal with your suggestion. If he shows eagerness towards reforms too early, he would be stifled and removed from the picture. However, if he doesn't, he would be unable to properly capitalize on the early 70's oil boom. Without previous overtures for reform and progress, he would reach power at a very poor time for PRI's popularity, since the 1968 massacre was still very present in people's minds. He would need massive spending in order to win people over, similarly to what Echeverría did, leading to an economic collapse once the Arab oil market reopened. Madrazo's critics (which would be numerous by that point) would ensure that the next president would be a PRI hardliner.

Should he prosecute high-ranking PRI leaders during his tenure, there would be an immediate and unbeatable counter-response that would end his political career right on the spot. It would definitively cause great social upheaval, but nothing the CIA can't handle.

1930's Mexico was radically different than 1970's Mexico. The PRI was still in its infancy, and the policies that would guide its existence would only be born during the Cárdenas presidency. Something as overwhelming as an exile would simply never happen under the stiff, closely regulated PRI dictatorship of the later years, not with the USA keeping a close eye to make sure Mexico is nice and stable.

If you want big change, you have to remove PRI. That means removing Calles, which means removing Álvaro Obregón, which means removing Venustiano Carranza, which means removing Victoriano Huerta, which means removing Francisco I. Madero. Just get rid of the Mexican Revolution, the R in PRI is there for a reason.

If you want to ask me any questions, don't hesitate. I've lived in Mexico all my life, after all.

 

[Vinization]

Well, could the 1975 Nayarit gubernatorial election not be rigged, at least? And would it be plausible for Madrazo to become president in 1964 through the dedazo instead of Ordaz? The economic boom was still ongoing and he already had a pretty distinguished record as governor of Tabasco if Wikipedia is correct.

 

[Aztekk]

Well, could the 1975 Nayarit gubernatorial election not be rigged, at least? And would it be plausible for Madrazo to become president in 1964 through the dedazo instead of Ordaz? The economic boom was still ongoing and he already had a pretty distinguished record as governor of Tabasco if Wikipedia is correct.

Things could get messy in Nayarit - the military even had to occupy the state's capitol OTL when the fraud happened and people got upset. A PRI electoral defeat is never an option, no matter how bad things go.

Something you will notice is that PRI presidents always picked their successors from within their inner circle - that is, their Cabinet. Oftentimes these are obscure figures, not tainted by public scandals, with close ties to the previous administration even after they take office. This ensures power remains within a strict elite of PRI loyalists. This differs from the United States, where candidates are chosen due to their public appeal and ideologies.

Although Madrazo could be chosen in a country like the US, the PRI would never pick the governor of some backwater, rural state with no ties to the Mexico City elite. His loyalties to the party remained untested, remember. Why choose this random small-time guy when I can pick my very trusted, very loyal Cabinet member that is controversy-free and will keep me nice and safe after I leave office?

 

[Vinization]

Things could get messy in Nayarit - the military even had to occupy the state's capitol OTL when the fraud happened and people got upset. A PRI electoral defeat is never an option, no matter how bad things go.

Something you will notice is that PRI presidents always picked their successors from within their inner circle - that is, their Cabinet. Oftentimes these are obscure figures, not tainted by public scandals, with close ties to the previous administration even after they take office. This ensures power remains within a strict elite of PRI loyalists. This differs from the United States, where candidates are chosen due to their public appeal and ideologies.

Although Madrazo could be chosen in a country like the US, the PRI would never pick the governor of some backwater, rural state with no ties to the Mexico City elite. His loyalties to the party remained untested, remember. Why choose this random small-time guy when I can pick my very trusted, very loyal Cabinet member that is controversy-free and will keep me nice and safe after I leave office?

Yeah. both Ordaz and Echeverría were secretaries of the interior of the administrations that preceded them. Although, wasn't Tabasco a major producer of petroleum?

 

[Vinization]

I can pick my very trusted, very loyal Cabinet member that is controversy-free

Hm, would it be plausible for Ordaz to choose Madrazo as his successor assuming he stays nice and obedient like stated in the OP while Echeverría's name is tainted by Tlatelolco?

 

[Allochronian]

Could Ordaz, believing he's just a pretty face who won't change the status quo, make him his successor as president in 1970?

There's a hidden joke in that sentence...

Anyway, back to the topic, the PRI was so entrenched within Mexico that it is highly improbable that they would have allowed Madrazo to become president AND make any decent reforms. Unless you would find a way to convince the majority of PRI officials to get on your side and avoid assassination attempts, you'd have to go back to the beginning of the early 20th Century to avoid the PRI from ever forming or have its earliest leaders change their political goals.

Goodness, man. Trying to make Mexico great tends to be such an ASB thing to do...

If you want big change, you have to remove PRI. That means removing Calles,

Good!

which means removing Álvaro Obregón,

Good.

which means removing Venustiano Carranza,

There goes the 1917 Constitution...

which means removing Victoriano Huerta,

VERY Good!

which means removing Francisco I. Madero.

I'm curious as to how Mexico would have been if he was politically successful in his reforms.

If you want to ask me any questions, don't hesitate. I've lived in Mexico all my life, after all.

Cool, man.

I like your profile of Imperial Mexico!

 

[Vinization]

Is it really THAT implausible for the Mexican transition to democracy, however slow it may be, to start about a decade earlier? They started allowing local offices and mayoralties to be controlled by the opposition in the 1980s, even if electoral fraud was still rampant as shown by Chihuahua in 1986 and the 1988 presidential election.

@Roberto El Rey, what is your input?

 

[Allochronian]

Is it really THAT implausible for the Mexican transition to democracy, however slow it may be, to start about a decade earlier? They started allowing local offices and mayoralties to be controlled by the opposition in the 1980s, even if electoral fraud was still rampant as shown by Chihuahua in 1986 and the 1988 presidential election.

@Roberto El Rey, what is your input?

Sorry, I tend to be blinded by heavy pessimism when I review Mexican history.

I'd like to be proven wrong and learn about the historic close calls that could have improved the political and social life of Mexico and her people.

 

[Roberto El Rey]

@Roberto El Rey, what is your input?

First off, thank you for asking my opinion! It's a nice feeling when someone else seeks out my expertise on a subject like this. Anyway, here are my thoughts (and keep in mind that most of my research is on the '80s and '90s, so I'm a little hazy when it comes to the '70s).

A lot of people on this site regard Carlos Madrazo as a great crusader for freedom and democracy. I think he was much closer to the opposite. The impression I get from my research is that, in attempting to reform the PRI's organization structure, Madrazo's intention was not to liberalize and democratize the political system as a whole, but to reform the PRI just enough so that it could move with the times. By trying to introduce party primaries and abolish the dedazo, Madrazo was trying to convince dissatisfied voters that, rather than turning away from the PRI to look for political change, they could find that change within the PRI by holding entrenched party power brokers accountable, breaking the incumbent President's control over the selection of his successor, and allowing new blood to gain power within the party without selling out to corrupt interests. At the time, Díaz Ordaz and the party machine crushed Madrazo's reforms because they ran counter to their short-term interests, but if Madrazo had been allowed to implement his ideas, I think it's very possible the PRI's hegemony would have been prolonged, not shortened, because the opposition parties would have lost some of their appeal in the face of a slightly-liberalized ruling party.

As for Madrazo becoming President himself, I think it's within the realm of possibility. As @Aztekk says, only inner-sanctum cabinet members were ever considered for the presidency, and they typically didn't have much of a political following of their own. However, if Madrazo is somehow able to convince Díaz Ordaz that his reforms are necessary for the long-term survival of the PRI, and if he implements them to resounding effect, it's unlikely but not inconceivable that Díaz Ordaz might name him to a cabinet position, perhaps even Government Secretary. But if Madrazo is to have a shot at the presidency, the student protests of 1968 would have to go very differently, or perhaps not happen at all. In OTL, Luis Echeverría was not "tainted" by the Tlatelolco massacre—in fact, Tlatelolco was the biggest single factor which influenced Díaz Ordaz to name Luis Echeverría as his successor. As Jorge Castañeda writes, "the hard-line outcome favored the hard-line candidate", as Echeverría's strict crackdown showed that he was tough, loyal, and efficient. It didn't endear him much to the Mexican people, but it sure impressed the hardline Díaz Ordaz, whose vote was the only one that mattered.

For a hardliner like Díaz Ordaz to name a reformer like Madrazo as his successor, you can't have any significant civil disturbance in the last few years of Díaz Ordaz's sexenio. It's pretty hard to get rid of the protests entirely, since they were influenced by years of prior context and the worldwide countercultural movement, but if they don't end up devolving into violence and if Madrazo takes some sort of prominent role in placating the students, he might—might—be able to convince Díaz Ordaz to hand him the presidency. But as I mentioned above, the aim of Madrazo's reforms was most likely to strengthen the party's long-term grip on power than to weaken it, so if Madrazo were to become President, it's quite likely that a multi-party system would taken even longer to emerge than in OTL.

As for the whole democratization process being moved up a decade, it's a bit more complicated than a different guy becoming President at a certain time. My birds-eye view of this era is that the relationship between the PRI and Mexican society was governed by an unwritten, social contract: PRI governments would provide the population with various benefits, including a social safety net for blue-collar workers, land and crop insurance for farmers, and upward mobility for the white-collar middle-class, plus general economic growth, infrastructure development and civil order. In turn, the Mexican people would keep voting for the PRI in election after election and tolerate corruption and graft from PRI officeholders. By the 1990s, with the introduction of neoliberal reforms, free trade, and economic stagnation, the contract had effectively broken down, which was an important contributing factor to the end of PRI rule. To move the democratization process forward by several decades, you'd have to somehow cause the shift in PRI policy towards neoliberalism to happen earlier. As Aztekk says, this would probably require a glut of oil-fueled deficit spending followed by a crash in oil prices which leads to severe budget cuts, which is hard to effectuate without changing the way world oil prices fluctuate. You'd also need the economic stagnation which started in the 1970s to already be in full swing, which would require some major policy and investment failures on the part of the state in the 1950s and 1960s. If you're trying to have a democratic transition similar to OTL's, but have it happen ten or fifteen years earlier, I believe it would be pretty hard to accomplish without some significant changes to both Mexico and the outside world.

Now, it is somewhat more conceivable that the system could start to break down by the mid '90s or even the late '80s. It's hard to imagine a situation where the PRI doesn't have the power to steal the election of 1988 if it wants to, but if some initial reforms to the PRI structure get instituted in the 1960s, it's conceivable that the PRI of the late '80s might be willing to recognize Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas's victory if his margin is large enough. If Cárdenas is cheated in 1988 but then proceeds to build up his opposition party into a strong, grassroots force for democracy that can deliver another solid victory in 1994 (something he didn't do IOTL), an even slightly more reformist-minded PRI could well decide to admit defeat and concede the election. That's probably a more plausible way to move up Mexico's democratic transition by a few years.

 

[Vinization]

Oh, I didn't think of Madrazo as some sort of messiah, but only as someone who might've been a better president than Echeverría was - not a high bar to clear, I know, but still.

Speaking of Cuauhtémoc, it might be interesting to see him be elected president in 1982 as a priísta and handle the earthquake, since Spanish Wikipedia says he was screwed out of the Michoacán gubernatorial seat in 1974 by Echeverría. One thing is certain, there's no way he could've performed worse than Miguel de la Madrid did.