Methods for Soviet Atomic Attack on the US Mainland

Nebogipfel

Monthly Donor
Did the Soviets know about the locations the key nuclear production facilities and where the US nukes were stored ? These would be also potential targets.
 
Did the Soviets know about the locations the key nuclear production facilities and where the US nukes were stored ? These would be also potential targets.

The nuclear production facilities were public knowledge. I'm not sure if the storage sites were public domain, but the Soviets almost certainly knew their location through their spy network. But they don't have enough bombs to hit them even if they could deliver them - NRDC estimates the Soviet stockpile in 1949 at one (1).
 
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Most posts agree SAC strikes would require reconnaissance first taking weeks if not a full month. In that time would the Air Force/SAC be doing what we now term counter-air and air dominance operations to pave the way for eventual nuclear strikes? This means knocking down any fighters that appear, wiping out airfields, pipelines, rail lines, and generally doing damage to air defenses.

That's what I was assuming. Spend a few weeks demolishing their air defenses to make sure the route is absolutely clear for the atomic drops in "Atomic Blitz" idea LeMay had.
 
The Soviets' first weapon was an exact clone of the Fat Man design (no thanks to Klaus Fuchs and the others involved in the Rosenberg Spy Ring). And it certainly could be air-dropped by the Tu-4.

It would take a few weeks: remember that other than some Luftwaffe target folders, and those who'd been to Russia in the '30s who'd help build some factories for the Russians, reliable intelligence on Soviet industrial centers was lacking. Especially for those facilities built in 1942-43 east of the Urals. RB-36 missions would have to be flown to gather the photos needed for mission planning, and then the actual strikes flown. It's not just bombing a city, it's actually knowing the locations of industrial complexes that's important in this time frame: LeMay knew that the Nagasaki bomb had missed its intended target by three miles, and some of the targeted industry had survived. His planners needed reliable imagery for their strike planning, and in the early days of a war, needed recon missions flown over the USSR before the bombing campaign could begin in earnest.

I would think, based on what I have read about Curtis, the initial strike would nukes and also be used to gather intelligence as much as the fuel would allow.
 
LeMay was told in 1950 that if war began with the USSR, he'd have to do a lot of recon first, before he could mount a serious strategic campaign, with either nukes or iron bombs. So many of the target locations were unknown at the time. Some weren't revealed until the overflights-whether U-2, RB-36, RB-47, RAF, etc. And some weren't known until the first recon sats were flown in the early '60s.
 
LeMay was told in 1950 that if war began with the USSR, he'd have to do a lot of recon first, before he could mount a serious strategic campaign, with either nukes or iron bombs. So many of the target locations were unknown at the time. Some weren't revealed until the overflights-whether U-2, RB-36, RB-47, RAF, etc. And some weren't known until the first recon sats were flown in the early '60s.

I have a book on air warfare and the chapter Early Cold War Aerial Spying says that the earliest SAC target lists were based on old Luftwaffe target lists and aerial photographs taken by JU-86P during WWII. I wonder if LeMay & company would have considered those good enough to launch initial bomb raids with?
 
For some strikes, that might do it, especially if the targets are in European Russia and the Ukraine. But for Central Asia and the Soviet Far East? Not very likely. That calls for RB-29 and RB-36 missions to find the targets before mounting strikes. FEAF during the Korean War was told very explicitly that if war broke out with the USSR, they'd have to fly the recon first, then attack.
 
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