Threefold question-
Is there any way that Mussolini could politically survive military defeats in Sicily and Africa, consequently aborting Italian surrender initiatives? Is there any way a post-Mussolini government would stay in the war?
If there is no Italian surrender initiative (which felt like a gift dropped in their lap at the time), what would they feel like doing with the year after August 1943, as they had not, in OTL, decided their next move before or during the Sicily campaign.
Finally a question about OTL, what was the cost/benefit to Germany of taking over north Italy and the Italian occupied portions of France, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania?
An initial tally of the costs:
Maintaining occupation troops over a broader area
Partisan attacks & attendant losses
Maintaining forces to oppose Allied offensive & potential Allied offensives
Losses of troops to Allied operations.
Diversion of command attention.
Exposure of southern territories to allied bombing.
An initial tally of benefits:
Unified Axis command with Italians out of picture
Ability to extract labor and material resources without a political or diplomatic restraint
Good defensive terrain
Diversion of allied attention from the west and north, for awhile at least