Megaproject: Lake Kennedy

And Im not talking about "the number of bolts on the third maintenance cover from the left."


Oddball,

Yes, you are.

Amerigo has explained to you more than once that he is using the actual plans the US Army Corp of Engineers drew up for this project. If those plans don't include every jot and tittle you're used to dealing with in your job maintaining different dams built by a different organization in different terrain in a different part of the world, then too bad.

I've also explained to you that the "details" I commented on were not details regarding the dam's physical construction.

I have a sneaky suspicion that if someone made a ATL with rather detailed information regarding a nuclear power plant project, you would chip in also.

If they arose, I'd correct the usual fallacies the general public has on the subject. Other than that, I'd let the author work. It's a difference of degree and not kind.

Well I shall not ruin your experience anymore, Iv made my points an will refrain from further comments.

That's good to know.

I'll repeat my explanation that this timeline - like all timelines - has more to do with the effects created by the project concerned and less to do with checking the "blueprints for punctuation". Gross conceptual errors regarding the engineering and technologies involved are one thing, quibbling over the numbers of nuts and bolts is something else entirely.


Bill
 
Electrical Engineer here, but specializing in radio frequency and spectrum management, so hydropower isn't my area of expertise. Even my power electronics background is limited to college courses and some limited on-the-job work with an internship with the railroad.

While I can't attest to the details of the dam, the political background and fallout is what's fascinating to me here. And details like the "hanging dock" show a lot of attention to the little things that make this TL stand out for me.
 
Amerigo: I am fascinated. Great stuff, all of it. I'm not clear, though, is there a specific PoD or just a series of trends in the direction you want?

Oddball,

Yes, you are.

Amerigo has explained to you more than once that he is using the actual plans the US Army Corp of Engineers drew up for this project. If those plans don't include every jot and tittle you're used to dealing with in your job maintaining different dams built by a different organization in different terrain in a different part of the world, then too bad.

I've also explained to you that the "details" I commented on were not details regarding the dam's physical construction.

Sorry but it really seems that he is not.

His comments were made on alternatives to using diversion tunnels, which (as far as I understand from the reading) would stop shipping along the river. Either you can ship down the river while it's being built, or you can't. It's all very well and good to talk about the effects of the dam being built, but Amerigo has chosen the more detailed route of showing the effects of the process of the dam being built. At the level of detail he is using, where industrial conflicts, town economies, and native issues are recurring concerns, a discussion of whether or not you can trade down the main artery of interior Alaska is a perfectly valid one.

Amerigo himself has clearly worked the timeline out to incorporate this and moved on with things, hence the bit about transshipment. The timeline is probably the better for it, and wasn't held up. Meanwhile, it's benefited from the knowledge of an expert in exactly this field.

Let's not take constructive criticism, which is after all a major reason many people post here, and treat it like something to be swatted down.
 
Sorry for the delay, folks. Went on vacation for a week so wasn't available to post new snips. Fortunately, I did get a chance to drive up to the dam, since it's relatively close. The highway was pretty open since we haven't had much snow so far this winter.

It's got a pretty cool visitors' center, and since it's winter, there weren't too many other folks there. A lot of the buildings in Eureka have been taken out, but you can still see some of the ATCO trailers and stuff that were there. We didn't get a chance to explore too much since it was pretty cold.

You don't get to drive on the dam itself because of security. I guess you used to be able to before 9/11, but not so much now. The visitors' center is at the south end of the dam, and there's a parking garage so you can walk out over the top of the dam if you want to -- we didn't, since it was so cold and the ridge on the south side of the river is plenty high enough to give you a great look over the front of the dam.

The visitors' center isn't too striking; it looks just like an office building. There's a few statues of construction workers outside, and then you walk in and pay $15 for the tour. They show you a movie, then the cool part is that there's an elevator that takes you below ground so you can walk through the dam and see all the inner workings without having to deal with the cold weather. It's kind of strange at first to see that the walls are damp in a lot of the rocky areas drilled through the hills on either side, but they said that's just because of seepage, not because the dam is leaking.

We got to see some of the penstocks, and the southern generator room, which is the smaller of the two. I'm sorry the quality of the photos isn't so good; I used my iPhone, and it doesn't work as well in dark conditions.

rampart4.jpg


rampart1.jpg


rampart2.jpg


rampart3.jpg
 
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Amerigo, that's an incredible opportunity. My family visited Hoover Dam back when I was younger, and I was just awed by the scale of the thing--something about the hugeness of it that was only made clear by looking at it big as life and walking around on it and taking the tour; did you find something similarly awe-inspiring about Rampart?

Also, there seems to be a slight hiccup with your posted images, you might want to check your links.

(;))
 
Thanks for letting me know that the images weren't working. They seem to be showing up now. It really was a pretty cool experience. I've been to both Hoover and Rampart now, and Hoover's really more impressive looking. It's taller, it's a lot nicer aesthetically, it's in a nicer setting, and it gets a lot more visitors.

But as they tell you during the Hoover Dam tour, it wasn't designed with electricity production first in mind. Rampart was, and I guess that's why it's a bit more utilitarian.
 
And now back to the history.


The winter of 1976-1977 also brought the finishing of the southern section of foundation for the dam. The concrete was about even with the former riverbed, creating an unbroken section of concrete from the underlying bedrock to the surface. Throughout 1977, the concrete structure of the southern section of the dam rose higher. The steel superstructure and reinforcing kept pace, always moving slightly ahead of the concrete pouring. By the beginning of winter, crews had reached what ultimately would be the powerhouse level of the dam. Work on the powerhouse itself awaited the next year, however.

Progress on Rampart Dam was overshadowed by the completion of the trans-Alaska pipeline on May 31, 1977. It had taken less than four years from the signing of the pipeline authorization act by Nixon to have the entire system up and running. Rampart Dam, by comparison, had been planned as early as 1959 — 18 years before — and ground had been broken in 1974, just six months later than the pipeline. There was some grumbling about the “slow” pace of work on the dam, but in reality, it was slightly ahead of the Corps of Engineers’ construction schedule. Traffic on the Elliott Highway slowed slightly due to the completion of the pipeline, but many more trucks used the highway extension to supply the growing oil drilling operations at Prudhoe Bay, which still required much heavy machinery to operate. Not until the oil bust of the early 1980s did this traffic start to disappear.

In 1978, work began on the southern powerhouse. Rampart’s powerhouse level is located about 200 feet above sea level — 20 feet above the river’s original surface. Because the southern section of the powerhouse — controlling the five southern drainage channels — would be put into operation first, special considerations had to be made. Powerhouse work proved difficult, as electrical concerns were introduced to the project for the first time. Preparations also had to be made for the installation of the enormous turbines, which would be brought up the Yukon River on barges, as no truck large enough to carry their enormous weight had ever been built. Their arrival was several years in the future, however. During 1978, work focused on building the water channels that would provide a steady flow of Yukon River water downstream while the northern section of the dam was built.

On the political front, the Democrats were removed from their entrenched position in the governor’s office, as “Red” Boucher was defeated by Republican Jay Hammond, who took office in a state with three Democratic Congressmen.

By the middle of 1979, work on the southern portion of the dam — which had reached the 250-foot elevation mark — was judged sufficient enough to break the southern cofferdam and begin work on the northern section of the dam. This was a particularly nerve-wracking experience for dam workers, as their work now faced its first big test. Would the concrete structure hold up to the Yukon River’s flow? How would it withstand the winter ice? Would unexpected problems crop up? On August 9, 1979, the southern cofferdam was flooded and water began to lap around the dam. It held. Work on the northern cofferdam was delayed until September in order to ensure the maximum number of king salmon was able to pass the dam site. The dam already had been accused of causing a drop in the number of salmon during the previous five years, and it was hoped that delaying a full blockage of the river would prevent any further salmon losses. During the summer, the dam’s enormous fish ladder — it remains the largest in the world — was completed but its use was delayed until the next year.
 
On September 1, the first posts were hammered into the Yukon’s riverbed for the northern cofferdam. Thanks to the experience gained by work on the southern cofferdam, work progressed quickly. In addition, work was aided by the fact that the northern cofferdam was anchored to the southern section of the dam and thus required fewer anchors. On September 26, fewer than four weeks after work started on the cofferdam, the final watertight panel was laid in place in the eastern wall of the cofferdam. Though additional work still was required, the entire flow of the Yukon River now had to go through Rampart Dam. Before the river froze for the winter, the cofferdam was complete and drained. Throughout the winter, the hydraulic excavation techniques pioneered during the work on the southern portion of the dam were converted for use in the northern construction site with somewhat more success. The northern work site was larger, the bugs had been worked out of the system, and more workers were on the site.

Several thousand miles away, however, Rampart Dam again faced a threat to its future. In San Francisco, the Alaska Conservation Foundation, Natural Resources Defense Council, and several other environmental organizations filed suit in the United States District Court for Alaska. Their aim was to halt development of Rampart on the grounds that the dam would cause irreversible harm to the ecology of the region and that due diligence in researching the environmental effects of the dam had not been performed by the Department of the Interior. This research was required by the National Environmental Policy Act, which was passed by Congress in 1977, one of the first fruits of the more liberal Carter administration. Under NEPA, all federally funded projects and projects on federal land are required to draw up an environmental impact statement before work can proceed. The environmental organizations argued that NEPA required the federal government to create an environmental impact statement even though work on the project began before NEPA became law.

During the next nineteen years, the case percolated through the U.S. judicial system. Attempts at obtaining an injunction against continued construction were unsuccessful, and as court arguments continued, so did work on the dam. In 1983, Judge James Martin Fitzgerald of the Alaska District ruled against the lawsuit, saying that the Department of the Interior had used the best information available at the time. The conservation groups appealed the case, and in 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Fitzgerald to review the case again. In 1990, Fitzgerald upheld his decision. Another appeal resulted in another trial four years later. This time, the appeals court turned down the conservationists’ case in its court. Not discouraged, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1999, fully five years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court decided to hear the case. In the decision Alaska Conservation Foundation v. United States, the court found that the Corps of Engineers used all available information and moved ahead on those grounds, not out of any willful neglect of the facts. Furthermore, attempting to apply ex post facto law violates Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly states that the federal government and state governments are specifically prohibited from passing ex post facto legislation. It based the decision on that section and on Bouie v. City of Columbia, which had a similar result in regard to ex post facto laws in 1964. Alaska Conservation Foundation v. United States has since been cited in Rogers v. Tennessee and Stogner v. California, cases in which ex post facto registration of sex offenders were ruled unconstitutional.
 
The lawsuit had little effect on the construction ongoing in central Alaska, despite its high-profile course. Although workers kept an eye on the proceedings, which lasted well after the completion of the dam, they were not directly affected. Work halted in January 1980 due to weather conditions, but it was the shortest winter construction halt during the project, as by mid-February, the hydraulic excavators were back at work. The streams of near-boiling water flashed into steam and collected as ice on every available surface, causing not only health problems but also physical danger to the dam site. So much ice built up on the cofferdam that during spring breakup, the corrugated walls of the cofferdam came close to failing due to the weight of both the ice they carried and the impacts of the ice borne by the river rushing downstream. It was a tense time for not only the men working on the cofferdam. Breakup brought tons of ice downstream, where it impacted on the dam and soon began to pile up. House-sized chunks of ice were jumbled against each other, on top of each other, and beneath each other, all grinding in a waterborne cacophony so loud that dam workers learned to keep their ear protectors on even when they returned to the construction village south of the dam site.

The ice turned into more than an inconvenience on May 12, 1980, when ice piled up to a height estimated to be nearly twice as tall as the northern cofferdam. The piled ice shifted, and a chunk the size of a tractor-trailer plunged to the ground inside the cofferdam, killing three workers: Tim Arnold, Evon Noble, and Rexford Isaac. Their deaths weren’t the first fatal accidents at the site — two workers had been killed in separate incidents in the freight yard — but they were by far the most spectacular to that point. Work virtually ground to a halt as engineers tried to grapple with a solution to the ice problem. In future years, it wouldn’t be nearly as bad, due to the protection provided by the concrete structure of the dam, but for now it was a critical weakness in the project. As bad as the three men’s deaths were, it would have been far worse had the ice cracked the cofferdam. The resulting inundation would have obliterated all the work done to that point, potentially dealing a deathblow to the project. In the end, no clean solution was developed. As an interim fix, workers used hydraulic excavators to chop up the piles of ice looming over the cofferdam, and cranes were diverted from construction work to lift the biggest chunks over the dam site and into the downstream portion of the river. This slowed construction to almost a halt, but it prevented further fatal accidents. In subsequent years, the hydraulic excavators were no longer needed for site clearing and could be devoted to keeping the dam ice-free. After the reservoir had filled to a certain extent, ice buildup at the dam was no longer a major concern due to a lack of current at the dam. Today, breakup typically is a calm event on Lake Kennedy and follows a similar pattern to breakup on ponds and lakes across North America. Where rivers flow into the lake and both downstream and upstream of the lake, it still retains much of its ferocity, however. In spring 2009, the town of Eagle was virtually destroyed by an ice dam that forced chunks of ice and flood water over the riverbank and into the town.
 
Fascinating! Keep 'er coming!

Alaska Conservation Foundation v. United States has since been cited in Rogers v. Tennessee and Stogner v. California, cases in which ex post facto registration of sex offenders were ruled unconstitutional.

Now THAT'S a fascinating butterfly! :eek:

+10 for attention to detail!
 
The accident that killed Arnold, Noble, and Isaac wasn’t the last fatal incident during construction of Rampart Dam. If you include accidents involving trucks bound for Rampart and accidents in the freight yards and Rampart Village, a total of 33 people were killed during its construction. At the site itself, only 11 people were killed. There were hundreds of injuries ranging from smashed fingers to amputated limbs and frostbite. These injuries stemmed from the extreme conditions present at the site and the simple size of the project — more than 20,000 people worked on the dam when construction reached its height in 1983 — and although the absolute number of accidents was high, in terms of the percentage of people who worked on the project, it was very small. Weather was a constant threat, mainly from the extreme cold during six months of the year. The cold did provide some opportunities, however. No fewer than 17 studies of frostbite and cold-related injuries were performed by students and medical teams during the project, and several pioneering advances were made in cold-injury treatment.

After the disasters and near-disasters of the spring, summer 1980 on the construction site went smoothly. The first dam turbines arrived via barge and were unloaded on the riverbank after it was decided to put off their installation until winter, when the river’s flow is reduced to a near trickle. Their location on the riverbank later proved to be a problem, as their enormous weight caused them to sink into the sand and mud of the bank. Several excavators were required to dig around the turbines before cranes working in tandem yanked them free. The first concrete was poured that summer in the northern cofferdam as work began on building the foundation of the northern portion of the dam. Problems encountered during construction of the southern dam were avoided with the northern section, and the initial pouring went smoothly. The biggest difficulties came from the need to ensure a smooth, unbroken, and strong connection to the southern section’s concrete, which had been curing for several years by that point. So much attention was devoted to this effort that it later was estimated that the join between the two dam sections actually is the strongest section of concrete in the dam’s structure.

The restoration of normal river flow after breakup also brought the first stage of the filling of the reservoir. The five channels in the southern dam section were deliberately limited to permit the minimum amount of water needed to ensure navigation on the Lower Yukon. Even before the ice was cleared away, this ensured the water level behind the dam began to steadily rise. This was as planned, and both the southern dam and the northern cofferdam held up under the increasing weight of water. Both had withstood the weight of the spring ice, and the water exerted much less pressure. Summer 1980 also brought the first real test of the new fish ladder, which carried almost 250,000 king salmon upriver in addition to hundreds of thousands of smaller chum salmon and other fish. A fish-proof mesh built in the river about a half-mile from the dam diverted the fish into the opening for the fish ladder, which carried them around a spiraling course until crowning at an elevation of 635 feet — the same height as the opening of the spillway and five feet below the planned surface of Lake Kennedy. Since the reservoir had not been filled yet, this presented a problem. Engineers and construction workers constructed a makeshift fish slide and ladder to prevent a deadly plunge to the river below, and a series of pumps kept water flowing down both the fish ladder and the slide. When the fish returned downriver, they used the makeshift ladder to climb back over the height of the dam. Today, the reservoir’s height carries fish directly to and from the ladder. Fish-proof mesh below and above the dam direct fish to the ladder, which has been used by millions of fish since 1980.
 
I'm off to the library tomorrow to take another look at those plans and hopefully answer the question about the diversion strategy that was raised earlier. If there's anything else you all want me to look at, drop a note in the next 12 hours.
 
There were several problems with the process. Many fish were unable to use the ladder, causing a minor die-off as they exhausted themselves trying to swim through the downriver mesh. In addition, the makeshift ladder built to allow fish to travel downstream until the reservoir was filled did not work perfectly and had to be rebuilt every spring after being destroyed by winter ice. The biggest complaint of Native fishermen came from the massive number of salmon harvested by workers at the dam site. Many simply couldn’t resist the easy pickings of fish swimming through the confines of the fish ladder, particularly not when all they had to do was reach in and pull out a fish. So crowded was the ladder at the height of each of the four main fish “pulses” going upstream that at times it seemed as if the entire fish ladder was packed with salmon struggling upward. So many fish were taken that angry fishermen forced a bill through the Alaska Legislature banning fishing within 2,000 yards of a dam. Though this didn’t completely end “grab-n-go” fishing by dam workers, it at least ensured it wasn’t done on such a massive scale.

The 1980 election brought a Republican shift in Alaska politics, mirroring the national trend. The state voted for Ronald Reagan — the first time since statehood that Alaska went for a Republican — and Republican Frank Murkowski was elected to Senate, joining Democrat Wendell P. Kay, whose Senate tenure had begun with the 1968 election.

After fall saw construction in the northern cofferdam enter high gear, the first turbines began to be installed in the southern portion of the dam. This was a tricky task, because even with much of the river locked in ice, there was a limited but steady flow of water beneath more than a foot of ice. Before the first turbine was dropped into place by cranes working in tandem, the penstock — passage through the dam — for that turbine had to be closed off by steel gate dropped into position. Each penstock features one of the solid steel gates, which allow flow through the dam to be limited or closed off entirely so maintenance can be done on the turbine. Installation of the first turbine brought its share of problems, mainly due to the enormous weight of the turbine and its accompanying generator, which was mounted directly above the turbine.

The most intractable problem was the buildup of ice in the penstock, which had been predicted to be dry by planners. Instead, small leakages from the penstock gate caused ice to repeatedly build up in the concrete tunnel. This problem and other issues with wiring the generator to the network of wiring in the dam posed other difficulties. By April 1981, however, that first turbine and generator pair were in place. The penstock gate was opened on April 3, 1981, and the turbine began spinning freely in the limited flow from the still-frozen river. Two weeks later, Generator No. 1 was connected to that first turbine, and the dam began generating electricity for the first time. An elaborate ceremony took place on the 15th, as Alaska governor Jay Hammond and Interior Secretary James G. Watt flipped a ceremonial switch that lit a light bulb near the generator.
 
Two weeks later, Generator No. 1 was connected to that first turbine, and the dam began generating electricity for the first time. An elaborate ceremony took place on the 15th, as Alaska governor Jay Hammond and Interior Secretary James G. Watt flipped a ceremonial switch that lit a light bulb near the generator.

Only a one-Watt lighting ceremony?

This is a great TL. Not enough megaprojects show up in AH, and I doubt they ever get this level of treatment
 
Looks as though Oddball was right about the last plan. Looks as if the idea for the twin cofferdams was taken from a 1963 study, rather than the final 1971 one. I'll be sure to revise after I finish posting what I have here.

For those who are interested, here's a few scans I collected while at the library. Be sure to click on the images for a full version. They're uploaded at Wikimedia Commons for ease of use.








 
Installation of the second turbine and generator went more smoothly, as completion of a traveling crane at the powerhouse meant the ungainly tandem-crane system was no longer needed to place the turbine and generator. In addition, warming weather meant ice buildup in the penstock was not as big a problem. The traveling crane erected in the first part of 1981 was similar in design to the gantry cranes used in many ports around the world. Consisting of four legs attached at the top by a twin-arm rotating lifting arm and control cab, it straddled the powerhouse and moved on parallel rails: one on either side of the powerhouse. From 1981 until 2004, when it was removed, it was one of the largest mobile cranes in the world, capable of lifting 800 tons — more than enough to handle both the 120-ton turbines and the almost-as-heavy generators. In addition to moving the turbines and generators into place, its rotating arm allowed it to lift enormous quantities of construction material from barges or loading areas into the northern cofferdam. In several instances when work needed to be done on the face of a portion of the dam already built, it lifted a platform holding two fully loaded cement mixers.

Away from the dam itself, work was completed on the electrical connections from the dam east, to Fairbanks, and west, to Manley Hot Springs. The enormous electrical substations and transformers needed to convert the electricity generated by the dam for long-distance travel also were installed in summer 1981. A smaller electrical distribution system was activated on June 28, and the dam began supplying electricity from its two working generators to the construction effort. Eureka, the construction town, was the first non-dam location to be supplied with electricity from the dam, but national notice didn’t arrive until October, when the first dam electricity reached Fairbanks.

By that time, the third turbine and generator had been installed, even with most of the construction effort focused on completing the dam’s footings in the northern cofferdam, which was far larger than the southern one had been. Though the arrival of fall brought cold weather and the freezeup of the Yukon, the dam project construction manager saw an opportunity for large-scale publicity. He had workers make a special effort to install and connect several big transformers to the dam’s power grid and the connection leading to Fairbanks. When the electricity reached the city on Oct. 27, it quieted the persistent conspiracy theory that the dam wasn’t intended to generate electricity at all, that it was just a jobs program for Alaska. In Washington, the dam’s first electricity delivery quieted those who viewed its cost, now boosted by inflation to $3.4 billion, almost double what had been anticipated in 1968.

Overnight, the cost of electricity in Fairbanks plummeted from 7.7 cents per kilowatt/hour to 0.3 cents per kilowatt/hour. The side effects also were significant. Golden Valley Electric Company, which supplies Fairbanks and the surrounding area with electricity, stopped buying electricity from the city’s coal-fired power plant and its own diesel generators and started buying it from the dam. The lessened demand for diesel caused diesel fuel prices to drop slightly in Interior Alaska, and the city-owned coal-fired power plant was shut down. It was sold to a developer in 1984, who demolished it and began to build a large hotel just as the oil price crash began.

Through the winter of 1981 and all of 1982, work proceeded on the northern portion of the dam and installation of the generators and turbines in the southern powerhouse. The fourth and fifth generators and turbines were installed by spring 1982, and the powerhouse building was closed up shortly thereafter. Until that point, the roof had been left unbuilt to allow access for installing the turbines and generators.
 
That winter also saw the disappearance of one ever-present side effect of the construction effort: ice fog. In sub-zero conditions with low humidity and no wind, any water vapor released into the air — whether through human respiration, automobile engines, or water left open into the air — will begin to evaporate. But because of the extremely low temperatures, the air’s moisture-carrying capacity is almost zero. Instead of becoming humidity, the evaporating air forms suspended ice crystals. In confined areas, such as valleys, or when there is a lack of wind, several days of appropriate conditions will create deep layers of suspended ice crystals — ice fog.

The confined walls of Rampart Gorge and the overwhelming number of idling vehicles meant ice fog was an ever-present fact of life in the gorge during the early phases of construction. Ice fog also was extremely common in Fairbanks starting in the 1950s, as that city — which occupies the Tanana Valley — experienced growth from military construction, the pipeline, and the dam.

After electricity from the dam replaced diesel generators at the construction site and a coal-fired power plant in Fairbanks, both locations saw the virtual elimination of ice fog. At the dam site, only extended periods of -40 weather would cause the fog to return, and it would disappear as soon as temperatures moderated. In Fairbanks, not even extreme temperatures caused ice fog. Cheap electricity rendered wood stoves and oil-fired boilers — the most common form of heat in the area — obsolete, and the shutdown of the town’s coal-fired power plant removed a source of emissions and a source of heat that caused the Chena River in the middle of town to remain unfrozen.

In addition to the work that continued on the dam through 1982, work also continued on the electrical grid that today carries Rampart electricity to most corners of Alaska. After the completion of the trans-Alaska Pipeline, the state of Alaska began to receive massive amounts of money from the taxes levied on the pipeline and the oil shipped through it. Huge government spending plans passed the Alaska Legislature, covering everything from affordable housing for seniors, construction of permanent villages for Alaska Natives, port improvements, airline subsidies, even an ill-fated venture to establish central Alaska as a barley-growing region to rival America’s Great Plains. The state’s budget for 1980 included $100 million for an electrical intertie between the electric grid centered on Fairbanks and the one centered on Anchorage, in the south-central portion of the state.

Though it looks scarcely impressive today, its construction was an undertaking that compares with that of the trans-Alaska Pipeline. To reach Anchorage from Fairbanks, the intertie had to cross two mountain ranges, including the tallest in North America — the Alaska Range. It also had to cross areas vulnerable to wildfires, the Denali Fault — site of some of the biggest recorded American earthquakes — several rivers, and more than 400 miles of open ground.

When the two electrical grids were connected in August 1983 and Rampart electricity reached Anchorage for the first time, it caused an ironic problem. Because electricity from Rampart was so much cheaper than that created by burning natural gas from the Cook Inlet — the body of water that connects Anchorage to the Gulf of Alaska — it made natural gas-produced electricity unprofitable. But because only five turbines and generators had been installed in the dam to that point, there was not enough electricity available to meet the entire demand of the new, massively expanded electrical grid.
 
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