Mediterranean Option

[Deleted member 1487]

I just did a search and didn't find anything recent that addressed this topic so here goes:
Admiral Raeder presented Hitler with a Mediterranean option for 1941 in lieu of Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich..._II#Sea_Lion_and_the_.22Mediterranean_plan.22

The invasion of Britain was postponed indefinitely in September 1940 due to the Luftwaffe′s failure to obtain air superiority during the Battle of Britain, and the significantly greater power of the Royal Navy over the German naval forces. On 21 July 1940, Raeder first learned that Hitler was contemplating invading the Soviet Union.[61] At the time, Raeder had no objections to the proposed invasion other than to complain that it was likely to strengthen the budgets of the Army and Air Force at the expense of the Navy.[62] The idea of a "peripheral strategy" for defeating Britain was first suggested in a memo to Raeder by Admiral Gerhard Wagner on 29 August 1940 when it was stated that Germany could not defeat Britain in the air nor sea, and instead just seek victory in the Mediterranean as a weak spot of the British Empire.[63] In September 1940, Raeder first presented his "Mediterranean plan" to Hitler.[64] Raeder favoured a strategic focus on the Mediterranean theatre, including a strong German presence in North Africa, plus an invasion of Malta and the Middle East by German, Italian, Spanish and, if necessary, Vichy French forces.[55] Raeder believed that capturing Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal would be a great blow to Britain.[55] Afterwards, Axis forces would use the Canary Islands, the Azores and the Cape Verde islands to launch naval and air attacks that would destroy British commerce and knock Britain out of the war.[55] On 6 September 1940 and again on 26 September, Raeder met with Hitler to advise the acceptance of his "Mediterranean plan".[65] According to Raeder:

"The British have always considered the Mediterranean the pivot of their world empire ... Germany, however, must wage war against Great Britain with all the means at her disposal and without delay before the United States is able to intervene effectively.

Gibraltar must be taken. The Canary Islands must be secured by the Air Force.

The Suez Canal must be taken.

An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power. The Russian problem will then appear in a different light ... It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary".[65]
​

On 30 May 1941 Raeder told Hitler that a major offensive against Egypt to take the Suez Canal gave Germany a chance to strike a blow that "would be more deadly to the British Empire than the capture of London!".[65] On several occasions, he suggested that Hitler send the vaunted tank commander Erwin Rommel to Egypt. Hitler agreed with Raeder's idea of sending German forces to North Africa at their meeting of 26 September 1940, but noted that he would need Italian permission to do so, and as it was not until Benito Mussolini requested German help in early 1941 that the necessary Italian permission was obtained.[65] Murray and Millet wrote that Raeder's "Mediterranean strategy" had "... more to do with inter-service rivalry than with any strategic conception".[60]
When Raeder first raised the "Mediterranean plan" on 6 September 1940, Hitler mentioned that he was also considering an attack on the Soviet Union, to which Raeder did not object, and only at the second meeting of 26 September 1940 did Raeder first argue for giving primacy to the "Mediterranean plan" over an invasion of Soviet Russia.[66] Raeder's change of mind about what operation to give primacy to was mostly due to signs of increased American support for Britain such as the "destroyers-for-bases" deal of 2 September 1940, the Anglo-Free French attack on Dakar and the defection of several French colonies in Africa from Vichy to the Gaullists.[67] Raeder argued that it was quite possible that the United States might intervene in the near future, which led him to argue that Britain must be defeated in the winter of 1940/41 before America could enter the war, while the signs that Vichy was losing its control over the French colonial empire meant the Allied cause was growing stronger in resource-rich Africa.[66] Raeder argued that it was now time to sign a peace treaty that would make Vichy France into a full ally, claiming that Vichy French forces could take the important British naval base at Freetown and that, by ceasing to treat France as a conquered country, Germany would be allowed to gain all of the resources of the French empire and fleet.[68]

What if this option were taken, what would it actually look like in practice? I doubt Hitler would opt for the necessary concessions to France, so that part is out, while Spain would still say no. The navy would get all the labor and resources it could use for Uboats, while the Luftwaffe got similar treatment. The army gets its budget cut. That then leaves the historical Mediterranean fronts, but now with all the resources they could handle. The siege of Malta never stops in Spring 1941, Crete is turned into an offensive base from May 1941 on, Rommel or whomever replaces him gets as much as can be shipped to him to launch his offensives, but what then? I'm sure some pressure could be brought to bear on the French to allow for use of their shipping and ports in Tunisia to bring in extra supplies and equipment via land to Tripoli and then more trucks be made available to haul it forward, but it seems like the Mediterranean option is very limited unless the French can be brought in as belligerents on the side of the Axis.

What sort of chances does it have of succeeding?

 

[Magnum]

I think it depends a lot on if and when he reaches an agreement with Benny. If its as early as September, then a lot of things suddenly become possible*. If its in '41 as OTL, the major change I can see is an air assault on Malta before the whole Balkan campaign even started.

* - I tried to get at one time what I thought was a best case scenario for the Axis in this theater, and got this:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=306868


In the grand scheme of things though, whatever happens in the Mediterranean is irrelevant. Britain can not be invaded nor scared into peace this late into the game, the US is on its way to intervening and the Soviet Union is only getting stronger and stronger. Doesn't mean a discussion of how far the Axis can advance can't be fun though.

 

[Catspoke]

Its tricky to get Spain involved. If Hitler doesn't mind antagonizing Vichy, then he can offer huge amount of Vichy territory along with Russian grain and oil then maybe its possible.

Without Spain, it gets trickier to beat Britain, even if Egypt is taken its a long way to Persian gulf oil.

This only makes sense if:

A) you have a better Luftwaffe that can really hit British sea trade with mining or direct attack and maybe a better u-boat offensive going on with fixed torpedo issues, then its just another way to stretch Britain.

OR

B) you are trying to just solidify German position in Europe without further war (Hitler dies, Goering takes over sort of stuff, no Barbarossa). Make a final peace with Belgium, France, anyone else that is willing and keep some pressure on Britain so she eventually negotiates.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I think it depends a lot on if and when he reaches an agreement with Benny. If its as early as September, then a lot of things suddenly become possible*. If its in '41 as OTL, the major change I can see is an air assault on Malta before the whole Balkan campaign even started.

* - I tried to get at one time what I thought was a best case scenario for the Axis in this theater, and got this:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=306868


In the grand scheme of things though, whatever happens in the Mediterranean is irrelevant. Britain can not be invaded nor scared into peace this late into the game, the US is on its way to intervening and the Soviet Union is only getting stronger and stronger. Doesn't mean a discussion of how far the Axis can advance can't be fun though.

Given what I was able to tell from the situation politically between Benny and Hitler and their competition in the Balkans (Musso was not happy about Hitler's inroads in Romania, which touched off his Greek move) before the defeat in December 1940 the Germans are not going to get the greenlight to help in the Mediterranean. Practically that means no Germans can really show up in Africa before late January 1941 and December 1940 is the earliest the first Luftwaffe units can get to Sicily.

Why do you think there would be an air assault on Malta so quickly? As far as I can tell the Germans were keen to save their paras for Greece and Italy didn't have enough of their own to use outside of capturing Greek islands. I don't think its practical with a 1941 entry into the Mediterranean to do Malta before Crete. Much more likely is that they are going to do what they did IOTL, an aerial blockade, but now without Barbarossa they will have plenty of extra air power to not let up in April 1941 and keep the pressure on for as long as it took to bomb it into submission.

I think a big question here is what happens with Crete once its taken. There really won't be butterflies that impact the outcome, but now instead of moving the VIII Fliegerkorps out immediately after the victory to go to Poland for Barbarossa, it will stay in place and go on the offensive against the East Mediterranean/Egypt.

At this point I don't think we could say that Britain was going to stay in. They didn't need to be invaded to knock them out of the war, I think the loss of Malta and the Suez, plus then the bottling up and destruction of the Mediterranean fleet could topple Churchill's government and potentially open the British to exiting the war. Churchill would get the blame for the failed Greek strategy and resulting consequences. The US, if it felt that Britain might exit the war, would probably wrap up aid to ensure it would end up going to Germany in a peace deal. LL didn't really overtake British purchasing as the dominant means of supply until late 1941, so it could never get to where it would be the sole means of supply as per OTL in 1942. And the loss of Churchill as PM would probably impact the relationship with the US significantly.

Could Britain really stick out the war politically if their Mediterranean position really became unstuck and the Axis managed to capture Egypt and stoke Arab revolts?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Its tricky to get Spain involved. If Hitler doesn't mind antagonizing Vichy, then he can offer huge amount of Vichy territory along with Russian grain and oil then maybe its possible.

Based on the Kershaw bio of Hitler and Hitler's Luftwaffe adjunct's memoir Hitler was far too concerned with maintaining the armistice with France to do so and really didn't want to give Spain a damn thing other than Gibraltar. He was not at all happy with Franco and the Spaniards after their 9 hour conference that led to nothing but arguments. I got the impression that Spain could not be leveraged and Hitler would not pull a bait and switch on them. Crossing the border and daring the Spanish to resist might be something he'd pull though.

Without Spain, it gets trickier to beat Britain, even if Egypt is taken its a long way to Persian gulf oil.

This only makes sense if:

A) you have a better Luftwaffe that can really hit British sea trade with mining or direct attack and maybe a better u-boat offensive going on with fixed torpedo issues, then its just another way to stretch Britain.

OR

B) you are trying to just solidify German position in Europe without further war (Hitler dies, Goering takes over sort of stuff, no Barbarossa). Make a final peace with Belgium, France, anyone else that is willing and keep some pressure on Britain so she eventually negotiates.

By 1941 the torpedo issue had been resolved; without Barbarossa the navy and Luftwaffe get a lot more German labor and raw materials, while the army gets cuts. So compared to OTL both services would be stronger. I guess the question is whether Hitler does do a more diplomatic thing and make the concessions to France and USSR to get them allied, or he just splits the difference and attacks where he could without any deals. And maybe invades Spain to get to Gibraltar (by that I mean crossing the border, but not attacking the Spaniards. Dare them to resist as the Germans move on Gibraltar).

 

[Archibald]

The main issue is that Hitler fanatically wanted to destroy the Soviet Union and communism altogether. Changing the mind of Adolf won't be easy.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The main issue is that Hitler fanatically wanted to destroy the Soviet Union and communism altogether. Changing the mind of Adolf won't be easy.

Reading about the decision in 1940-41 for Barbarossa, Hitler wasn't actually that committed until things started falling apart with Franco and realizing the French weren't going to be an option without major concessions. So perhaps it would be something like irrefutable intelligence indicating the Soviets to strong to take out in one campaign season and Barbarossa would only bog down and create the nightmare 2 front scenario. So Hitler opts to avoid that disaster and doubles down on defeating the Brits in the Mediterranean.

 

[Don Quijote]

Spain is no use unless the RN has been seriously weakened. The British were willing to prop up the Spanish state to a large enough extent to prevent it going short of essential supplies, but only if Spain stayed neutral. If they joined the Axis, all British aid is gone, and there is a tough blockade instead. Even if they don't themselves attack Gibraltar, but only allow German troops to pass through Spain to do so, the British will not let them get away with it.

On Malta, the best thing for the Italians would be to grab it in June 1940 with whatever forces they can put together, as British defences were extremely weak. The Malta at War Museum provides this information:

Normally the island was but lightly garrisoned. There were a number of defence posts on the northern beaches, and there were the immensely strong fortifications of Valletta Harbour. When war broke out on 3rd September, 1939, the garrison consisted of the 2nd Bn. The Devonshire Regiment, 2nd Bn. The Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 1st Bn. The Dorsetshire Regiment, 2nd Bn. The Royal Irish Fusiliers, 7th A.A. Regiment R.A. (renamed, in 1940, 7th H.A.A. Regt.) and one battalion of the local territorials, the 1st Bn. The King’s Own Malta Regiment. There were three airfields; Luqa, the largest but not quite ready for use, situated about a mile from the base of the Grand Harbour; Halfar, the Fleet Air Arm aerodrome, in the south of the island with its anchorage in Marsaxlokk Bay, small but in running order; and Takali, near the centre of the island, equipped with a reception building and used by small passenger aircraft.

By the end of September 1939 voluntary recruiting had produced enough men to form two more battalions of the King’s Own Malta Regiment. The Maltese Auxiliary Corps had been formed and its personnel had joined various regular units. In November 1939 the status of the army in Malta was raised to that of a Division, and a draft of officers and other ranks from the reserve arrived from England. In May 1940 the 8th Bn. the Manchester Regiment arrived.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Spain is no use unless the RN has been seriously weakened. The British were willing to prop up the Spanish state to a large enough extent to prevent it going short of essential supplies, but only if Spain stayed neutral. If they joined the Axis, all British aid is gone, and there is a tough blockade instead. Even if they don't themselves attack Gibraltar, but only allow German troops to pass through Spain to do so, the British will not let them get away with it.

On Malta, the best thing for the Italians would be to grab it in June 1940 with whatever forces they can put together, as British defences were extremely weak. The Malta at War Museum provides this information:

Given the POD the 1940 capture of Malta isn't an option. Your point on Spain is exactly why Spain didn't join the war and Hitler wasn't willing to go into deeper debt with Stalin for the necessary grain that Spain needed.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Reading about the decision in 1940-41 for Barbarossa, Hitler wasn't actually that committed until things started falling apart with Franco and realizing the French weren't going to be an option without major concessions. So perhaps it would be something like irrefutable intelligence indicating the Soviets to strong to take out in one campaign season and Barbarossa would only bog down and create the nightmare 2 front scenario. So Hitler opts to avoid that disaster and doubles down on defeating the Brits in the Mediterranean.

From what I've read in several books the invasion of the USSR was (in Hitler's mind) the easiest way of knocking Britain out of the war by depriving them of their only viable ally. Hitler was always going to invade Russia but the Luftwaffe's inability to knock Britain out of the war accelerated Hitler's plans. The Med option was never going to force Britain to surrender as far as Hitler was concerned.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

From what I've read in several books the invasion of the USSR was (in Hitler's mind) the easiest way of knocking Britain out of the war by depriving them of their only viable ally. Hitler was always going to invade Russia but the Luftwaffe's inability to knock Britain out of the war accelerated Hitler's plans. The Med option was never going to force Britain to surrender as far as Hitler was concerned.

I got the OTL reasoning for it, for the sake of argument let's say that intelligence convinces Hitler that Barbarossa cannot succeed and would only bog him down in a two front war. So the Mediterranean option is the only potential option forward for 1941.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I got the OTL reasoning for it, for the sake of argument let's say that intelligence convinces Hitler that Barbarossa cannot succeed and would only bog him down in a two front war. So the Mediterranean option is the only potential option forward for 1941.

How would it knock Britain out of the war? (Serious question)

 

[Don Quijote]

Given the POD the 1940 capture of Malta isn't an option. Your point on Spain is exactly why Spain didn't join the war and Hitler wasn't willing to go into deeper debt with Stalin for the necessary grain that Spain needed.

So the POD has to be on or after 31st May 1941? I'd seen a few other posts with late 1940 PODs.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

How would it knock Britain out of the war? (Serious question)

Politically by toppling the Churchill government; the situation resulting from a Greek defeat and the Axis going hard to knock out Malta and capture Egypt, assuming it happens, plus then threatening the Middle East and wiping out the RN Mediterranean fleet would likely cause the British a major problem and potentially deter US support due to the weakness of Britain and perception that they may be leaving the war soon, which could then end up being a self fulfilling prophecy (the US didn't really realize until 1942 how broke Britain was and thought they were trying to get free stuff via LL while hording money). Losing Churchill as PM would probably put a damper on Anglo-US relations, as the special relationship really does seem to have been a Churchill-FDR one.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

So the POD has to be on or after 31st May 1941? I'd seen a few other posts with late 1940 PODs.

Or in late 1940.

 

[Don Quijote]

Politically by toppling the Churchill government; the situation resulting from a Greek defeat and the Axis going hard to knock out Malta and capture Egypt, assuming it happens, plus then threatening the Middle East and wiping out the RN Mediterranean fleet would likely cause the British a major problem and potentially deter US support due to the weakness of Britain and perception that they may be leaving the war soon, which could then end up being a self fulfilling prophecy (the US didn't really realize until 1942 how broke Britain was and thought they were trying to get free stuff via LL while hording money). Losing Churchill as PM would probably put a damper on Anglo-US relations, as the special relationship really does seem to have been a Churchill-FDR one.

Or in late 1940.

OK, so post-BofB. But that's a lot of assuming. How does the Mediterranean Fleet suddenly get destroyed? It may get forced out of the Mediterranean and have to be renamed, but it's not going to suffer such heavy casualties that it can be classed as wiped out. And I don't want to get involved in yet another 'can Rommel win in North Africa' argument, but let's just say it won't be easy, and there's a bit more detail needed about Germany's plans before they're marching into the Middle East.

 

[King Augeas]

It's a pretty good summary of why the Med Option is a bad idea. Even if you break the logistical and political constraints to capture Suez, then Germany is left sitting there just hoping for not only the Churchill government to call it a day, but also for it to be replaced by one amenable to a fundamental change in British war strategy and therefore willing to wreck the strengthening UK-US relations. It also requires Hitler to be able to offer a peace deal that the British would accept.

I don't know who would lead that government and this also all needs to happen before Japan screams and leaps in December 1941, because US entry into the war, even as just a co-belligerent against Japan, is a British grand strategic triumph of the first magnitude and, IMO, eliminates the prospect of a separate peace.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

OK, so post-BofB. But that's a lot of assuming. How does the Mediterranean Fleet suddenly get destroyed? It may get forced out of the Mediterranean and have to be renamed, but it's not going to suffer such heavy casualties that it can be classed as wiped out. And I don't want to get involved in yet another 'can Rommel win in North Africa' argument, but let's just say it won't be easy, and there's a bit more detail needed about Germany's plans before they're marching into the Middle East.

Given that IOTL during Crete it was very roughly handled it was already in a bad way and if in 1941 the Suez could be reached, its escape route is closed; IOTL in 1942 as Rommel was moving to Alexandria the fleet was preparing to bug out to Cyprus rather than flee into the Red Sea, so its likely it gets trapped if they do that in a 1941 situation where Egypt falls. Then its bottled up and can be wiped out by air power, mines, submarines, perhaps even a major naval action. If it tries to flee West then it would have to do so without air cover and through two bomb alleys, Crete and around Sicily. The Gibraltar force, which wasn't part of the Mediterranean fleet AFAIK would not be impacted by that.

Sure, Rommel won't have it easy to try and take Egypt, especially in 1941. He will be aided though by more support than IOTL and Crete turning into a bomber base earlier than IOTL and Malta not being allowed to recover like it did between May 1941-January 1942.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

It's a pretty good summary of why the Med Option is a bad idea. Even if you break the logistical and political constraints to capture Suez, then Germany is left sitting there just hoping for not only the Churchill government to call it a day, but also for it to be replaced by one amenable to a fundamental change in British war strategy and therefore willing to wreck the strengthening UK-US relations. It also requires Hitler to be able to offer a peace deal that the British would accept.

I don't know who would lead that government and this also all needs to happen before Japan screams and leaps in December 1941, because US entry into the war, even as just a co-belligerent against Japan, is a British grand strategic triumph of the first magnitude and, IMO, eliminates the prospect of a separate peace.

There is the issue of Japan not getting into an expanded war if Barbarossa doesn't happen. Japan was strongly influenced by that, because Barbarossa neutralized the USSR as a potential threat and because Germany appeared to be the US's major focus. Without that strategic change the Japanese might well think its too risky.

 

[TFSmith121]

The biggest single issue for an Axis Mediterranean strategy

I just did a search and didn't find anything recent that addressed this topic so here goes:
Admiral Raeder presented Hitler with a Mediterranean option for 1941 in lieu of Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich..._II#Sea_Lion_and_the_.22Mediterranean_plan.22


What if this option were taken, what would it actually look like in practice? I doubt Hitler would opt for the necessary concessions to France, so that part is out, while Spain would still say no. The navy would get all the labor and resources it could use for Uboats, while the Luftwaffe got similar treatment. The army gets its budget cut. That then leaves the historical Mediterranean fronts, but now with all the resources they could handle. The siege of Malta never stops in Spring 1941, Crete is turned into an offensive base from May 1941 on, Rommel or whomever replaces him gets as much as can be shipped to him to launch his offensives, but what then? I'm sure some pressure could be brought to bear on the French to allow for use of their shipping and ports in Tunisia to bring in extra supplies and equipment via land to Tripoli and then more trucks be made available to haul it forward, but it seems like the Mediterranean option is very limited unless the French can be brought in as belligerents on the side of the Axis.

What sort of chances does it have of succeeding?

Slim to none.

The biggest single issue for an Axis Mediterranean strategy is it depends on Italy for shipping, both naval and merchantile. Given almost a third of the Italian merchant marine was outside the Med when Italy entered the war in 1940 (and thus either seized, sunk, or interned) the Axis begins a maritime war without the merchant shipping necessary to sustain offensives across the Mediterranean littoral, from Iberia to North Africa and (depending on the point of departure) the Balkans.

The British, alone, couldn't really get at the Axis on the northern littoral of the Med, but the converse is true as well; the Axis, relying on Italian shipping and naval forces, couldn't get at the British on the southeastern littoral of the Med, either.

Then there's the question of the Italian Navy; as brilliant as some of its operations were, and the undoubted tenacity of its personnel in terms of fighting it out against a superior enemy, the reality is the RN was superior to the RM, in almost every measure - technology, training, command, etc.

Air power is another issue: although both the LW and the RA had some successes against the RAF et al in the Med, they never really reached the point of sustained air superiority, much less supremacy, and in fact the RAF managed the opposite in the southeastern Med/northeastern Africa (i.e. Egypt) and the Levant pretty handily.

Ground forces: the takeaway from the historical MTO is that the British, when fighting (essentially) on their own ground (Egypt, for example) could (and at Alamein, did) combine the multiple defensive lines (Western Desert, Alamein-Quattara, Nile and Nile Delta, Suez, Sinai, etc.) with their undoubted ability for defensive stands to frustrate any realistically-sized Axis force that could manage to logistically sustain the advance.

Logistics: Again, this is not something that can be developed overnight in an austere theater, and Libya and western Egypt were nothing if not austere; the basic problems of an Axis advance with anything more than what the PAA actually got to Alamein with (historically) are legion, and have been explored in great detail by various scholars, including Martin Van Crevald. It is, after all, the freaking Sahara Desert (more or less); when potable water has to be shipped in, along with POL, food, ammunition, spares, etc, sort of limited in comparison to Europe in terms of the exploitation.

The best Mediterranean strategy for the Axis in 1940-41 would have been for the Germans to simply reinforce the Italians in Cyrenaica and invite the British to attack, while preparing for an assault on Malta in the autumn of 1941. Staying out of the Balkans would have been smart, as well, of course.

Having the Italians get all their merchant shipping home before they declared war would have been really smart; the fact they didn't sort of makes the point the Italian high command wasn't exactly all they could have been.

Best,