Mediterranean Option...via Turkey

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Deleted member 1487

On my other Mediterranean Option thread a point was raised about alternatives to North Africa as the Mediterranean Option and the subject of Turkey was raised. What if instead of going for a North African campaign the Axis, in lieu of Barbarossa, opts instead to put a blocking force to help the Italians hold their lines in Libya, but not attack, instead then focus on Turkey? First it would be pressure to join the Axis as Greece is being conquered in May, but if they refuse, which may or may not happen, then the Axis invades Turkey to open a Middle East campaign. The invasion would happen either in lieu of Crete due to the need to use paratroopers to seize the Dardanelles in case of Turkish resistance or if Turkey opts to join the Axis instead of facing invasion they would then launch Crete while moving through Turkey into Syria.

So what would happen in either case? If the Axis moves through Turkey, which joins the Axis to avoid invasion, to get to Syria and support the Iraqis while invading Crete, or if Turkey resists and in lieu of Crete the Axis invades Turkey to get to Syria and open a Middle East Front?

How does the USSR react? Would there be potential for the Soviets to join the Axis if there is no Barbarossa and a Middle East campaign or would Stalin be freaked out by a Turkish campaign and try to take advantage of the situation by attacking Germany? How do the British react to the invasion of Turkey and how does Turkey do? Istanbul is pretty vulnerable to attack and seizing the Dardanelles isn't really that hard, but invading the mountainous hinterland of Turkey given the infrastructure is going to be tough, as it proved in the 1920s when the Greeks invaded.

Could the Axis troops gets to Syria before the Brits or would they bog down in Turkey? Would a delayed Crete campaign until June or July change the outcome there?
 
Trying to go through Turkey would really only cause more problems for the Axis, one of Turkey's main exports to Germany was Chromite which was needed to produce Stainless Steel, while the lack of this export could be taken under control and mined directly, that "transition" tends to produce problems.

Turkey couldn't have lasted long against an invasion. They had a peace time army of 174,000 men which didn't start seeing increase until the start of 1940, at that time they mustered ~230,000 men but almost all of the equipment was pre-WW1 with rifles like the Lee Enfield, Lebel, Masuiers etc. being used. They had fortifications along the Dardanelles and along the outer regions of the country to the East. The airforce was 370 planes of all type with only about half of them being modern, their navy consisted of 26 ships total.

The infrastructural would be pretty horrible for the Germans though. Where exactly would they try to re-supply them from? The ports along the Southern end of Turkey would (likely) not be usable due to the British naval and aerial presence from Cyprus and Egypt. The Soviets would NOT allow German ships into the Black Sea and I think the small Turkish navy could even prevent a good portion of supply ships to be sunk if the Soviets did allow German ships through. Do you think they could/would send as much offensive ships to the Black Sea as they did in OTL? Romania used their navy primary during the Black Sea offensives and it was "on par" with the Turkish navy.
Other then that then all supplies would need to be brought in from land and you can just imagine the troubles that it would cause...

Stalin would be 1000% crazy over this and while I'm not so sure about what his reaction would be. I could see him easily attacking Germany if they don't pull out. Could Stalin be okay with this? Possibly but having Germany along two of his three fronts in Europe (technically all three if you count Finland) then the man that desires a buffer region could get a bit ansy.

If you look at it on a cost to benefit analysis then it's simply not worthwhile. Also Germany wasn't having problems with oil at this stage of the war (1940-1941), shortages only became a pressing issue from 1942 onwards and not critical until 1943 or even 1944. Once the invasion of Russia had been launched Germany didn't have the chance or the forces spare to invade anyone else

Finally, Turkey had been an ally of Germany in World War I, and Germany had some hopes of winning her over, e.g. through a successful campaign in Russia, as she had with Hungary, Bulgaria, etc.
 
Good point about Turkey being allied with Germany during WW1. German exchange officers knew that Turkish soldiers are stubborn in the defence when well-led and well-supplied. Those German exchange officers had trained Turkish officers like Kamal Attaturk.
So Germany's only hope was an alliance with Turkey.

Secondly, Crete proved worse than a waste of time for Germany. Crete was only valuable as a stepping-stone towards the Suez Canal.

The next question is how far German armies could advance from the Anatolian Plateau towards the oilfields of Syria and Iraq?????
 

Martynn

Banned
Going through Turkey might be quite beneficial.

1. Thr British will have to concentrate a lot of forces in the ME from fear that the Germans might try something - so no NA campaign.

2. A Caucasus Barbarossa in July 1941 would be a much better option than OTL Barbarossa. The Germans just need to get to Baku - once they got it they can lean back and watch the Soviet economy deteriorate. They would have to occupy and hold a fraction of the OTL territory.

3. less casualties for them - a Caucasus Barbarossa would include some 50 divisions - the other 100 would be stationed in Poland in order to prevent Stalin to reinforce the Caucasus region.
 

Deleted member 1487

What are the chances to strong arm Turkey into the Axis or launch a pro-German coup via pro-German officers in the Turkish army? It later developed a reputation for couping the civilian government.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Invading the Anatolian Peninsula from the northwest

On my other Mediterranean Option thread a point was raised about alternatives to North Africa as the Mediterranean Option and the subject of Turkey was raised. What if instead of going for a North African campaign the Axis, in lieu of Barbarossa, opts instead to put a blocking force to help the Italians hold their lines in Libya, but not attack, instead then focus on Turkey? First it would be pressure to join the Axis as Greece is being conquered in May, but if they refuse, which may or may not happen, then the Axis invades Turkey to open a Middle East campaign. The invasion would happen either in lieu of Crete due to the need to use paratroopers to seize the Dardanelles in case of Turkish resistance or if Turkey opts to join the Axis instead of facing invasion they would then launch Crete while moving through Turkey into Syria.

So what would happen in either case? If the Axis moves through Turkey, which joins the Axis to avoid invasion, to get to Syria and support the Iraqis while invading Crete, or if Turkey resists and in lieu of Crete the Axis invades Turkey to get to Syria and open a Middle East Front?

How does the USSR react? Would there be potential for the Soviets to join the Axis if there is no Barbarossa and a Middle East campaign or would Stalin be freaked out by a Turkish campaign and try to take advantage of the situation by attacking Germany? How do the British react to the invasion of Turkey and how does Turkey do? Istanbul is pretty vulnerable to attack and seizing the Dardanelles isn't really that hard, but invading the mountainous hinterland of Turkey given the infrastructure is going to be tough, as it proved in the 1920s when the Greeks invaded.

Could the Axis troops gets to Syria before the Brits or would they bog down in Turkey? Would a delayed Crete campaign until June or July change the outcome there?

Invading the Anatolian Peninsula from the northwest is roughly equivalent to invading Italy from the south; you can do it, but the question is why.

Anatolia is pretty much nothing but mountains and valleys, valleys and mountains, with the odd semi-arid plateau to break up the topography.



Plus, the railroad and road network as of 1940 or thereabouts is not exactly thick ... kind of thin, actually:

turkey_map_1941.jpg


Best,
 
Plus, the railroad and road network as of 1940 or thereabouts is not exactly thick ... kind of thin, actually:

& in uneven repair. Some sections had been modernized, other parts were effectively abandoned. The Turks did not have many incentives to keep up the route south to Bagdahd & the British mandate. The routes from the ports to the interior and east to the Soviet/Persian borders were more important.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Good points.

& in uneven repair. Some sections had been modernized, other parts were effectively abandoned. The Turks did not have many incentives to keep up the route south to Bagdahd & the British mandate. The routes from the ports to the interior and east to the Soviet/Persian borders were more important.

Good points.

The Pontic and Taurus mountains aren't exactly small, either; the Pontics run right down to the Sea of Marmara.

Add in the rivers, lakes, plateaus, and the Anatolian Plateau is a defenders' dream.

Plus - Batman.;)

Best,
 
The Germans were planning ten foot gauge railroads. If they had that big a train how big a ship could they carry? Maybe they could carry ships in parts and reassemble them in Romania.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
They sent MTBs down the Danube; still didn't accomplish

The Germans were planning ten foot gauge railroads. If they had that big a train how big a ship could they carry? Maybe they could carry ships in parts and reassemble them in Romania.

They sent MTBs down the Danube; still didn't accomplish much.

In terms of prolonging the war, about the "best" the Germans could have done in 1941 was:

a) not invade the USSR, and instead maintain the economic relationship;
b) not declare war on the United States;
b) in the Med, after the 1941 Balkans campaign, gear up for what would have been a very bloody assault on Malta in 1942, and not mount any overland invasion of Egypt from Libya the same year;
c) Build up the defenses of Libya and work the neutrals - Vichy France, Spain, Turkey - for continued economic integration with the rest of Axis Europe.
d) Focus on improving Germany's economy, and those of the minor Axis powers.

That's about it.

They were able to defeat France, and stalemate the British; that, and Soviet and American neutrality, was about all that Nazi Germany could have ever hoped for...

Best,
 

Deleted member 1487

b) in the Med, after the 1941 Balkans campaign, gear up for what would have been a very bloody assault on Malta in 1942, and not mount any overland invasion of Egypt from Libya the same year;

Not really necessary; IOTL they were on the verge of starving it out in Summer 1941 before moving X Fliegerkorps partly first to Africa in March and then the rest of it to Greece in May. Though Malta was able to reinforce a bit in April the British were not willing to send major supply runs to Malta until the Luftwaffe left. Had the Luftwaffe air corps stayed in Sicily in fully strength, then Malta would have likely be starved out in late summer 1941. Without Barbarossa they could use another air corps or parts of one to support Rommel in Libya, while using yet another for Greece/Crete and then using Crete as an offensive bomber base against Tobruk/Egypt/the Eastern Mediterranean.

This book gets into that issue:
http://www.amazon.com/Malta-Last-Gr...F8&qid=1462041812&sr=8-3&keywords=siege+malta
 
Not really necessary; IOTL they were on the verge of starving it out in Summer 1941 before moving X Fliegerkorps partly first to Africa in March and then the rest of it to Greece in May. Though Malta was able to reinforce a bit in April the British were not willing to send major supply runs to Malta until the Luftwaffe left. Had the Luftwaffe air corps stayed in Sicily in fully strength, then Malta would have likely be starved out in late summer 1941. Without Barbarossa they could use another air corps or parts of one to support Rommel in Libya, while using yet another for Greece/Crete and then using Crete as an offensive bomber base against Tobruk/Egypt/the Eastern Mediterranean.

posed the question in original thread, IF Axis decided to move into Syria and apply same pressure to Cyprus as they were doing to Malta, to what effect?

(my assumption it would speed up evacuation of Malta)
 

Deleted member 1487

posed the question in original thread, IF Axis decided to move into Syria and apply same pressure to Cyprus as they were doing to Malta, to what effect?

(my assumption it would speed up evacuation of Malta)

Cyprus was a lot farther than Malta was unless they seize Turkish territory right nearby. It would be a lot harder to do the same with the MUCH larger Cyprus.
 
Cyprus was a lot farther than Malta was unless they seize Turkish territory right nearby. It would be a lot harder to do the same with the MUCH larger Cyprus.

o.k. , follow that, but how much capacity did British have in 1941 to run convoys in opposite directions?

if they started to consider Malta marginal to ongoing operations?
 

Deleted member 1487

o.k. , follow that, but how much capacity did British have in 1941 to run convoys in opposite directions?

if they started to consider Malta marginal to ongoing operations?

What do you mean? Cyprus was being supplied via the Suez. They also ran a number of convoys from Gibraltar through the central Mediterranean gauntlet, though that would likely end if Malta was lost. Malta was necessary, but if the LW stayed put indication is that they would have likely though it too costly to maintain it and let nature take its course; then they would have stopped the Mediterranean West East convoys. Interdiction of Axis supplies to Libya would have pretty much stopped. At that point Rommel can take Toburk and hold the Egyptian-Libyan border and there is dispute about whether he could go on the offensive into Egypt like he did in 1942; I think with Tobruk supplies and no Malta interdiction he would have been able to invade and had a better chance of make it to Alexandria than in 1942, especially without US tanks or the USSAF heavy bomber interdiction of Benghazi of 1942.

IMHO the real question is what pressure could be brought to bear on Turkey to enter the Axis and the war without Barbarossa, Malta falling, the Axis on Turkey's European border in a threatening pose, Crete falling, and Egypt being invaded. The Soviets potentially could enter the Axis too without Barbarossa and that leaves the Turks in a very bad position to try and resist Axis entry.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
If they can force Malta's surrender in 1941, that's

Not really necessary; IOTL they were on the verge of starving it out in Summer 1941 before moving X Fliegerkorps partly first to Africa in March and then the rest of it to Greece in May. Though Malta was able to reinforce a bit in April the British were not willing to send major supply runs to Malta until the Luftwaffe left. Had the Luftwaffe air corps stayed in Sicily in fully strength, then Malta would have likely be starved out in late summer 1941. Without Barbarossa they could use another air corps or parts of one to support Rommel in Libya, while using yet another for Greece/Crete and then using Crete as an offensive bomber base against Tobruk/Egypt/the Eastern Mediterranean.

This book gets into that issue:
http://www.amazon.com/Malta-Last-Gr...F8&qid=1462041812&sr=8-3&keywords=siege+malta

If they can force Malta's surrender in 1941, that's a benefit to the Axis (although it is also a benefit to the British, in many ways; not least in freeing up resources for Egypt and the eastern Med) but trying to mount anything major in the eastern Med - into Egypt or Cyprus - is still pretty much a fool's errand, absent Turkish entry into the Axis (for Cyprus), and Turkish entry into the Axis remains extremely unlikely.

And an Axis invasion of Turkey remains an equivalent to the Allied invasion of Italy.

Best,
 
IMHO the real question is what pressure could be brought to bear on Turkey to enter the Axis and the war without Barbarossa, Malta falling, the Axis on Turkey's European border in a threatening pose, Crete falling, and Egypt being invaded. The Soviets potentially could enter the Axis too without Barbarossa and that leaves the Turks in a very bad position to try and resist Axis entry.

If they can force Malta's surrender in 1941, that's a benefit to the Axis (although it is also a benefit to the British, in many ways; not least in freeing up resources for Egypt and the eastern Med) but trying to mount anything major in the eastern Med - into Egypt or Cyprus - is still pretty much a fool's errand, absent Turkish entry into the Axis (for Cyprus), and Turkish entry into the Axis remains extremely unlikely.

re-reading on chrome trading prior and during WWII and a few thing were notable to this thread.

the British made great efforts to tie up total production but because it had been included with a lot of other food production, etc. in bartering with Germans it was difficult (and there were a lot of "leaks" til very late in war.)

even after reaching agreements it proved difficult (obviously) to conclude trading through Med, they used ports of Mersin and Alexandretta NE of Cyprus.

Italy in Axis and in Dodecanese was big problem for Turkey.

my scenario is same as initially, better to fortify Axis position in Syria and in ideal situation assume military positions in Dodecanese (they occupied areas between Bulgaria and Turkey after all.)

if not exactly or technically a blockade of Turkey, they would be in near total control of Turkish imports/exports.
 

Deleted member 1487

I get that Turkey was extremely vulnerable to the Axis, so their entry by economic pressure was doable IMHO, but fortifying Syria without Turkey in the Axis is impossible. The reason that the operation failed IOTL was the lack of ability to supply Syria due to Cyprus and British control of the Eastern Mediterranean that close to Cyprus. IOTL the Turks even shot down a Luftwaffe transport carrying German troops headed to Syria for violating their airspace, the only option to actually being able to reach Syria due to range issues.
 

Ian_W

Banned
I get that if you completely ignore logistics Turkey was extremely vulnerable to the Axis, so their entry by economic pressure was doable IMHO, because it's not like the UK has a transport fleet or anything can be moved through a neutral Russia but fortifying Syria without Turkey in the Axis is impossible. The reason that the operation failed IOTL was the lack of ability to supply Syria due to Cyprus and British control of the Eastern Mediterranean that close to Cyprus. IOTL the Turks even shot down a Luftwaffe transport carrying German troops headed to Syria for violating their airspace, the only option to actually being able to reach Syria due to range issues.

Edited for accuracy.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Thing is, the British had air and sea control in

re-reading on chrome trading prior and during WWII and a few thing were notable to this thread.

the British made great efforts to tie up total production but because it had been included with a lot of other food production, etc. in bartering with Germans it was difficult (and there were a lot of "leaks" til very late in war.)

even after reaching agreements it proved difficult (obviously) to conclude trading through Med, they used ports of Mersin and Alexandretta NE of Cyprus.

Italy in Axis and in Dodecanese was big problem for Turkey.

my scenario is same as initially, better to fortify Axis position in Syria and in ideal situation assume military positions in Dodecanese (they occupied areas between Bulgaria and Turkey after all.)

if not exactly or technically a blockade of Turkey, they would be in near total control of Turkish imports/exports.

Thing is, the British had air and sea control in the eastern Med because of their positions in Cyprus, Palestine, and Egypt; including southern Turkey, the Vichy French in Lebanon and Syria were at the bottom of a sack.

Best,
 
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