usertron, I didn't want to respond to you without first getting the facts straight, because, as I allude to in my earlier response, I was certain there was a major flaw in your argument for which I needed to cite some authority to rebut. I like to go with reliable sources.
So I revisited the Cuba crisis chapters in Lawrence Freedman's 'Kennedy's Wars' ; he's my go-to historian for strategic analysis of JFK. I respect the fact that at the end of this book he seemed to want to reach a conclusion that reaffirmed the CW about Kennedy being bound to avoid Johnson's mistakes in Vietnam, but he understands the historical record doesn't support that handwave, so he lays out the facts as objectively as he can. I trust his judgement on Cuba to the same extent.
First things first: So, with this refresher under my belt, I grant you your statement that SecDef McNamara exercised unusually tight control over the military, and in particular naval, deployments during October, '62, to highly controversial effect.* You're right about that.
However, your assertion about this somehow being a disgrace, about it reflecting badly on both McNamara and the Administration, that it was no different than the charges laid against that man (and the next POTUS) over the escalation in SE Asia, and your implication that the US military brass were somehow a superior alternative to this micro-management (or mismanagement?)... this is, to put it bluntly, an indefensible argument. I honestly don't know how someone who says he's an RFK admirer can make such an argument, not if he has the facts about the Missile crisis at hand.
Seriously, you're making a huge mistake in treating the Cuban quarantine as designed by McNamara, JFK et al in ExComm like any old military confrontation that was best organised exclusively by the men in uniform. This is just not true. It was explicitly designed, by mostly diplomacy-minded civilians, as an alternative strategy to what the Chiefs wanted; it was done in lieu of initiating either surgical air strikes, carpet bombing, or outright invasion. It wasn't even meant to be a traditional naval blockade, it was meant to be much weaker, more like a police action. Hence the name 'quarantine', as opposed to blockade.
And even then it wasn't Kennedy's first idea for reacting to the Crisis:
"He was prepared to authorise an air strike but... he was looking for a minimalist version. [However] there had been no clear recommendation [from ExComm] to limit the attack in this way; if anything, the weight of argument had been against [moderation], especially from the military." Emphasis mine, P. 177.
So, thankfully, he latched onto the least aggressive action. Blockade.
Both Kennedys were deeply involved in this process, and even Secretary of State Rusk was at his most dovish in advocating quarantine. ExComm wrote the 'rules of engagement', as it were; the President himself changed the demarcation line in the ocean so that Soviet bloc ships already on the high seas, headed to Cuba, would have several more hours to turn around before coming up against USN units. P.196. It was all about bringing to bare the softest-yet-most-forceful pressure that could be brought against the Russians; it was the option to try something , anything, before going to war. P.182, P.200. And ExComm was deeply influenced by the fear that going to war over the Cuban missile sites couldn't be done without America appearing to be the aggressor, ala the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. P.178.
The Chiefs, OTOH, they had no love for gradual pressure. Yes, they've been stereotyped by history and pop culture as warmongers over Cuba. Because, guess what, they were:
"They rejected all limited strikes as being 'unsound', risking a loss of surprise, and inviting retaliatory attacks on the US... No strike could proceed without taking out the air defences. They also looked to striking 'tanks and all other significant military targets.' But this assumed greater ambition: 'Objectives--eliminate threat to US and liberate Cuba'. They were also convinced that the threat from the missiles was such that they should be attacked even after they became operational. To the question posed by McNamara, 'What Soviet reaction may be anticipated?' the answer was 'Soviet reaction unknown.'" P. 177 (Later, when asked again, they blithely decared that the Soviet response to America killing Russian troops in Cuba would be 'manageable', P.180.)
Of note: At this October 16 meeting, and the next day, and in their next meeting with POTUS, the Chiefs always pushed for the maximalist amount of strategic aggression; so even when they gave up on convincing POTUS to launch a fullscale invasion, they still opposed limited, or 'surgical' air strikes. The one restrained tactical view they held was that attack should be delayed so that more intelligence should be gathered; but even this played into their belief that timing didn't matter, that a delay that lead to the missiles having enough time to become operational was of little or no significance. Yet the civilians at ExComm, and POTUS himself, went into great detail about the ramifications of an attack carried out against a nuclear arsenal that was ready for use against America. PPs 178/179/199.
"The Joint Chiefs' continued to oppose restricted strikes. In part this was because they were more [ambitious]... No merit was seen in doing less than possible... If there was a risk of failure, then the [JCS' aim] was to add to, not subtract from, the scale and intensity of the strikes... RFK later recalled 'the many times that I heard the military take positions which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know.'" P.180.
(And as for your allusion to General Shoup's noble attitude having somehow added an element of balance to this mindset, here's what Freedman has to say about the USMC commandant's behaviour at one of these Oval Office meetings:
"After Kennedy left, General Shoup congratulated LeMay on 'pulling the rug out from under him'... 'Somebody's got to keep them from doing the goddam thing piecemeal. That's our problem. Go in there and friggin' around with the missiles. You're screwed. Go in there and friggin' around with the lift. You're screwed. You're screwed, screwed, screwed. Some goddam thing, some way, that they either do the sumbitch and do it right, and quit friggin' around.'" P.186 To be sure, that's a transcript from the relevant Kennedy WH tapes; but Freedman in footnotes implies it and other comments made during that meeting are a mark against the general's supposed restraint;
"Shoup [later said] he 'fought against invasion of Cuba from the start' and warned against taking the JCS as a single entity... [But] this dissent is by no means evident from the meeting." P.449.
If I had to guess, I'd say Shoup was angry that the missile sites and associated conventional military infrastructure weren't to be carpet bombed. )
Overall this is the context for McNamara's behaviour during the Cuban Missile Crisis. From this and other reading I've done over the years I see nothing wrong with what he or any of the other 'doves' did. To allege that he made the situation worse is just not credible.
*
"If the quarantine was going to be tested, the Americans were anxious that they stop appropriate ships. McNamara observed; 'It would be an unfortunate incident if we hailed a ship that refused to stop [and] we then disable it and found it didn't have any offensive weapons on it.'... On October 23 he identified the Kimovsk as probably loaded with offensive weapons and likely to be approached... [By Wednesday] the crucial first engagement was expected at noon, and McNamara described in detail [to ExComm] the means by which a Soviet submarine could be attacked---an opening step that did not fit in with JFK's graduated response and which drew, for him, a straight line into [a new] Berlin crisis.
"The president wondered whether this had to be the first exchange, but McNamara insisted that there was no alternative because of the danger to USN ships if the submarine was left alone. So all that could be done was wait...
"[RFK's] own thought was that 'we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off.'
"Yet at 10:25 [CIA Director] McCone had already received information... that six ships in Cuban waters had ether stopped or reversed course. Kennedy's gray moment had occurred while McCone was out of the room checking the report... So as to give the Gagarin and Kimovsk time to turn, the president ordered [the Essex carrier group] not to intervene..." PPs.196/97.
After this first confrontation, "The president... decided that any ships approaching the quarantine line were to be followed and watched carefully but no action should be taken unless specifically instructed." P.197.
The above incidents related to missile- and materiel-carrying cargo vessels. But there were more on the way; petrol tankers.
On the 25th, "McNamara reported to ExComm that one tanker, the Bucharest, had been intercepted that morning and had claimed that it was carrying [fuel] to Cuba. There was a recommendation that it should be boarded, as should the next tanker coming into view, the Groznyy, which was 'carrying a deck load that might be missile field tanks.' This potential interception was already controversial after [SecDef] and the chief of naval operations, Admiral George Anderson, had clashed over the navy's plan to stop this ship using, if necessary, a shot into the rudder. McNamara wanted Anderson to understand that the objective was to send a message to Khruschev rather than humiliate him, lest Khrushchev 'react in a nuclear spasm'." Soon after, JFK started ordering which of the following ships should or shouldn't be boarded (with Groznyy in the former category, Bucharest in the latter). P.198
"On the morning of 27 October a US destroyer pulled alongside [the Groznyy]... As previous tankers had been allowed through, there was reason to for Moscow to assume this one would not be stopped. The USN, however, took a different view. It issued a warning and prepared to fire a shot. On this, the most tense day of the crisis, McNamara wanted no shots fired, and this led to another argument with Admiral Anderson, who was getting increasingly exasperated with the SecDef's micromanagement of his operation.
"As the Groznyy had been warned [beforehand], the navy's failure to stop it would undermine the credibility of the quarantine. This was one of the issues playing on McNamara's mind in ExComm that day, for he raised it several times.
"Again, in ExComm, the doves won. At Robert Kennedy's suggestion it was agreed that the Groznyy be allowed to cross the line but no further ships thereafter." PPs.198/200
I see no way an argument can be made about either McNamara, the president, or ExComm overstepping their bounds by closely supervising all these incidents. It beggars belief that the USN should have been allowed to make unilateral decisions about firing into or over Soviet vessels.
Yes, you're right,
Turgidsonians would perhaps be a better expression...