McClellan in Grey - AKA The Lion of New Orleans

[Nytram01]

I am not sure if Taylor being in place, and being able to do that, is realistic. That is, I don't know if it would work out in the circumstances in question - Taylor only got a brigade around the time the assignments would be made, or later (as well as being in Virginia, but the point is that he's not on the list of men being thought of).

Taylor was sent out ot Louisiana in July 1862 in OTL, partly due to his arthirtis, so I see no reason why the same couldn't happen here. I saw him more as a Jackson or Longstreet as being the more effect one of the main two subordinates - the other being Lovell - and rising to prominance due to McClellan's pre-occupation with squabbles with politicians. The New Orleans Garrison was never going to be that big in my scenario so Taylor commanding a big brigade of between 4-5,000 would be perfectly reasonable.

 

[Snake Featherston]

You've read what I said and assumed I meant it to mean Grant will attack frontally when faced with entrenchments. I never said that and its wrong of you to assume that's what I meant.

My point was that Grant was a more aggressive general than Sherman and one that was not afraid to engage the whole of his army in battle when the opportunity presented itself for him to do so. Furthermore Grant's main objective was always the complete destruction and neutralization of his enemies army where as Sherman's main objective was always the capture and neutralization of areas of enemy territory that contributed to their war effort. As such there is a fundamental differance in the way the two conducted operations and with Grant there was always a chance for bloodshed on a massive scale.

Furthermore even if Grant sends a greater portion of his force through Snake Creek Gap there is no guarentee that this will win the campaign then and there. Within hours of the AotT coming through the gap in OTL Hood's entire Corps had been sent to oppose it from Dalton and Polk was soon to be moving from Rome to Resaca and this would have been enough force to contest control of Resaca at least long enough for Hardee's Corps to come south from Dalton and the AoT to be pulled back. And even if the AotC gets sent through instead of the AotT it doesn't mean that will be the end of it. It's not as if the only way to get away from Dalton was to go through Resaca - fastest way sure but not the only way.

Also the Federal movements in the Atlanta Campaign were dictated by how far they could supply themselves from the railroad which wasn't very far. The one time Sherman tried to break away from his logistics base he didn't get very far because Johnston had anticipated his movement and opposed him. Grant was not a better general of maneuvers or logistics than Sherman so its unlikely that he would do better than Sherman in this regards.

No, this:

However on the Lee vs Johnston appraoch thing, there is a lot to be said about the effect of their opponent. A lot of the criticism Johnston recieves for not fighting for Georgia would not exist had he faced Grant instead of Sherman. Georgia would have run red with blood had Grant commanded the Union effort there since Grant did not shy away from major confrontations like Sherman - Sherman recognized he wasn't that adept tactically so didn't really try to fight battles if he could help it - and Grant certainly respected Johnston as a military man enough to take him seriously. Anyway, that's for another time.

Is false on its face. Grant's Vicksburg campaign and his ability to hoodwink Lee and move 110,000 men to Petersburg pretty much shows that in virtually everything Grant was a much better general than Sherman was. In Georgia Grant would be freer to fight the kind of rapid maneuver campaign he wanted in the Overland Campaign, and that's bad news for Joe Johnston. He got away from Sherman repeatedly because Sherman misjudged the key moments of battles. Grant was not that kind of general.

Wrong. Braxton Bragg of 1864/1865 was a petty, bitter, vendetta machine driven on only by his desire to destroy the careers and reputations of the men who turned on him in 1863 and lost whatever military skills he once had.

My vision of McClellan in Grey is more like Bragg of 1861/1862 as he's a good trainer, organizer and disciplinarian and has not yet lost all his effectiveness as a military man due to petty squabbles and politics. But even that's not totally accurate either.

My vision of McClellan is the Joe Johnston of 1864, Napoleonic plans and Lilliputtian executions. Also being Brave Sir Robin more often than not.

And how exactly is that different to what I said? I said Johnston bluffed and used quaker guns to make his position look very strong so as to fool his enemy and you've said Johnston used propaganda to fool his enemy into thinking his position was very strong.

That Davis - who as Confederate President and Commander-in-Chief was in a position to know that the Confederates couldn't possibly have the strenght in weapons or manpower to hold such a wide and exposed line - chose to believe Johnston's deception is his own fault and no fault of Johnston's.

That Johnston did not communicate anything of the truth to Davis then or later is entirely Johnston's fault. Davis has a good deal of responsibility for the schism between the two, but Johnston's no innocent. Nor is Joe Johnston the Civil War Alfred von Manstein people think of him as.

When did Beauregard show "some of the best tactical skills of any Confederate General" at 1st Manasas? Was it when he spent the entire morning on Lookout Hill gazing towards Centreville waiting for the chance to launch his own ridiculously complicated battle plan? Was it when he ignored all signs of the actual battle happening on the left flank? Was it running up and down Henry House Hill as a cheerleader?

It certainly wasn't Beauregard who brought the Confederate HQ's to Portici - that was Johnston - and it certainly wasn't Beauregard who found reinforcement and deployed them to the front - that was Johnston - and it certainly wasn't Beauregard who found the Federal flank, led Edmund Kirby Smith's brigade to it personally and sent Jubal Early's brigade in support - that, again, was Johnston.

I phrased that badly. I meant that at First Bull Run, Beauregard was not a very good tactician, but at Shiloh it was *him*, not the *other* Johnston who did what a general's supposed to do, so he was the one who won the victory of the first day and has the responsibility for the defeat of the second. He won the 1863 Battle of Charleston, and in 1864 at Petersburg he made the finest defensive battle of any CS general, and saved the CSA for another near-year.

But its not because that's not the point. I wasn't talking about 1863 Johnston who's been wounded, sat impotant in Richmond for the better part of a year and justified his mistakes. I clearly said, in the bit the above quoted passage is a response to, that I was talking about the 1862 Johnston.

There is no telling how Johnston would have developed had not fallen wounded at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. His detractors would have you believe he had some kind of psychological defect that meant he was always going to fail - Mary Chestnut's Wade Hampton story is often quoted for this - but in 1861 and in 1862 Johnston showed decisiveness at a strategic level and preparedness to attack given even a fleeting opportunty.

You've a point, that he never developed a full combat experience. I'll grant that. It to me is why both Johnstons are alternate history generals, not real generals. At least with Beauregard you have more instances than the gap between the Battle of Fair Oaks and the Battle of Jackson to judge him on.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Most likely it was, indeed, a case of misunderstanding between them, and certainly it would not be the last.

But as he was human, and a human with many flaws, he did rationalize his mistakes rather than address them and this was more than likely due to his impotance caused by injury. Joe Johnston was a workaholic who was never happy when he had nothing to do and that discontent no doubt added to his mindset when it came to rationalizing his mistakes.

Davis does have a good degree of the blame for the feud between Johnston and he. It was the CS version of Lincoln and McClellan if Lincoln had been McClellan-like himself. Either way for the CSA it was one of the worst things that happened to it, as it amplified Davis's personality cult traits.

Well neither Hood, Johnston, Davis or anyone else were really completely truthful in their recollections where the Atlanta Campaign went so I'm sure Hood claimed he did things he didn't really do as well. I probably should have said that in reply to Snake Featherstone in the first place.

Sure, everyone had instances of truthiness in the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman minimized the degree to which he depended on George Thomas, Johnston made good use of alternate history to rationalize his real record of retreats, Hood blamed his own army for failing in headlong attacks against an army group that made good use of defensive firepower and outnumbered his own force.

And I've already said that Johnston was at fault for failing to force the issue. I've said it in this thread and the one about Bragg resiging from the AoT in 1863. But I feel inclined to point out that Johnston gave Hood four opportunities to lead a major attack againt the Federals but only once did Hood actually follow through and if Hood was actually doing his job rather than expending most of his energy backstabbing his commander there would have been no need to force him to follow through on offensives.

The point, however, was that Snake Featherstone made the accusation that Johnston only attempted a decisive battle at Kennessaw Mountain however that doesn't stand up to examination where Cassville is concerned becuase it was certainly an attempt to fight a decisive battle. Also Resaca was the biggest battle fought during Johnston's tenure in command of the AoT and, while inconclusive, was another attempt at fighting a decisive battle.

Regardless of the failure to a fight a decisive battle at either Resaca or Cassville Johnston certainly tried, maybe not as hard as he could have but he still tried, so claiming he didn't is spurious.

Johnston's strategy, what he had of it, depended on Sherman to make a mistake wielding his army group. Sherman was no tactician of great renown, but he was not a blithering idiot, either. If your strategy yields the initiative to the enemy, you've yourself to blame if the enemy does nothing but advance. It must be noted that for all Hood's failures in the first battles around Atlanta he *did* halt Sherman's advance for an entire month of siege warfare. Hood was a bad general, but he had greater success in stopping Sherman than Joe Johnston did, as within two weeks against Johnston Sherman had gained a full third of Georgia.

 

[Nytram01]

No, this:

However on the Lee vs Johnston appraoch thing, there is a lot to be said about the effect of their opponent. A lot of the criticism Johnston recieves for not fighting for Georgia would not exist had he faced Grant instead of Sherman. Georgia would have run red with blood had Grant commanded the Union effort there since Grant did not shy away from major confrontations like Sherman - Sherman recognized he wasn't that adept tactically so didn't really try to fight battles if he could help it - and Grant certainly respected Johnston as a military man enough to take him seriously.

Is false on its face. Grant's Vicksburg campaign and his ability to hoodwink Lee and move 110,000 men to Petersburg pretty much shows that in virtually everything Grant was a much better general than Sherman was. In Georgia Grant would be freer to fight the kind of rapid maneuver campaign he wanted in the Overland Campaign, and that's bad news for Joe Johnston. He got away from Sherman repeatedly because Sherman misjudged the key moments of battles. Grant was not that kind of general.

And where did I say Grant wasn't a better general than Sherman? Where did I say Grant wasn't capable of performing high quality maneuvers? Or wasn't going to capitolize on things Sherman didn't?

I fail to see where you have taken offense at what I've said. I've said Grant was a good battlefield commander who was prepared to throw the full weight of his army into battle when he thought he needed to - something Sherman didn't - and to oppose me you've said basically the same thing.

Your looking for something that isn't there. I haven't criticised Grant, I haven't said Grant isn't capable of crushing Johnston. All I've said is that if Grant had been in charge in Georgia there would be a lot more bloodshed during that campaign and that nobody would accuse Johnston of not fighting for Georgia because Grant - if he felt there was ample chance of destroying the AoT - would force battle even if Johnston wanted to avoid it.

My vision of McClellan is the Joe Johnston of 1864, Napoleonic plans and Lilliputtian executions. Also being Brave Sir Robin more often than not.

Fine, if that's your opinion then your entitled to it and you dont have to bother paying attention to this scenario.

Its not as if I've made a scenario where McClellan becomes the all conquering Ceaser is it? All I've done is put him in a situation where he can improve the defenses of New Orleans and hold onto the city a little longer than the Confederate managed to do in OTL. He'll still lose it and still be considered a failure overall by general history, he just gets off to a good start.

That Johnston did not communicate anything of the truth to Davis then or later is entirely Johnston's fault. Davis has a good deal of responsibility for the schism between the two, but Johnston's no innocent. Nor is Joe Johnston the Civil War Alfred von Manstein people think of him as.

Who's Alfred von Manstein? I assume you meant Erich von Manstein and if you did nobody here is trying to say he was an Erich von Manstein. All I've said about Johnston was that good officer who could have done better and that Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was the event that decided his evolution as a General. Just cause you dont like him and I do doesn't mean I'm trying to say he was the greatest general in history.

And what do you mean about communicating the truth later. Surely later Davis must have realized Johnston was only bluffing. Why would Johnston need to explain it after he'd pulled back and his bluff had been exposed?

Could Johnston havd communicated better? Of course he could but so too could Davis have tried harder to assertain the truth. He certainly didn't go out of his way to meet Johnston or visit the front after 1st Manassas or ask him to provide details of his command or position. So they both could have done better.

I phrased that badly. I meant that at First Bull Run, Beauregard was not a very good tactician, but at Shiloh it was *him*, not the *other* Johnston who did what a general's supposed to do, so he was the one who won the victory of the first day and has the responsibility for the defeat of the second. He won the 1863 Battle of Charleston, and in 1864 at Petersburg he made the finest defensive battle of any CS general, and saved the CSA for another near-year.

I agree that Beauregard showed a great tactical aptitude later in the war but it was a fleeting moment. Strategically he lived in cloud-cuckoo land and was incapable of understanding what was reasonably possible for his forces to accomplish. So he had some plus points but like Bragg and Johnston and so many others his failings as a person and as an officer meant that the few skills he did have weren't used to their fullest.

You've a point, that he never developed a full combat experience. I'll grant that. It to me is why both Johnstons are alternate history generals, not real generals. At least with Beauregard you have more instances than the gap between the Battle of Fair Oaks and the Battle of Jackson to judge him on.

I'll agree to that.

 

[Elfwine]

There was a faint implication that it would be more like "Grant the Butcher charges Johnston",though probably more through bad assumptions on the part of the reader.

Who's Alfred von Manstein? I assume you meant Erich von Manstein and if you did nobody here is trying to say he was an Erich von Manstein. All I've said about Johnston was that good officer who could have done better and that Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was the event that decided his evolution as a General. Just cause you dont like him and I do doesn't mean I'm trying to say he was the greatest general in history.

And what do you mean about communicating the truth later. Surely later Davis must have realized Johnston was only bluffing. Why would Johnston need to explain it after he'd pulled back and his bluff had been exposed?

I think the problem here - and this is my understanding of the mess - is that Davis felt that Johnston could have done more and didn't. And Johnston's failure to communicate properly meant that instead of coming off as leaving an untenable position after having outfoxed the enemy, he came off as leaving a defensible position and Johnston never presented something to make Davis see otherwise.

Assuming for discussion's sake Davis is thinking rationally but narrow-mindedly. And that Johnston is showing a lack of insight into what Davis thinks rather than a lack of ability or willingness to fight.

The accuracy of the latter is unresolvable, but its safe to say that the man who launched Seven Pines/Fair Oakes at least had nontheoretical situations where he would go on the offense.

Could Johnston havd communicated better? Of course he could but so too could Davis have tried harder to assertain the truth. He certainly didn't go out of his way to meet Johnston or visit the front after 1st Manassas or ask him to provide details of his command or position. So they both could have done better.

Johnston, as part of doing his job, is obligated to keep Davis informed of his needs. Davis, as president, is not obligated to inspect each and every individual military formation. I'm not saying Davis is free from blame here - the two seem to be peculiarly suited for conflict in situations like this due to their stubborn defense of their position and their views without either ever trying to see what the other guy is seeing. That inevitably makes sorting out who did the wrong difficult because the will to cooperate is conspicuous by its absence.

But in this particular case, the responsibility really is with the army commander to make sure the president is fully informed. Davis shouldn't have to do anything extraordinary to ascertain the truth besides read Johnston's reports to him and compare them to the reports of the other relevant people (Northrup, for instance) to see how things are working - or not working as the case might be.

That's not to say Johnston should be doing anything extraordinary either - just giving full and complete reports on a timely basis.

 

[Snake Featherston]

And where did I say Grant wasn't a better general than Sherman? Where did I say Grant wasn't capable of performing high quality maneuvers? Or wasn't going to capitolize on things Sherman didn't?

I fail to see where you have taken offense at what I've said. I've said Grant was a good battlefield commander who was prepared to throw the full weight of his army into battle when he thought he needed to - something Sherman didn't - and to oppose me you've said basically the same thing.

Your looking for something that isn't there. I haven't criticised Grant, I haven't said Grant isn't capable of crushing Johnston. All I've said is that if Grant had been in charge in Georgia there would be a lot more bloodshed during that campaign and that nobody would accuse Johnston of not fighting for Georgia because Grant - if he felt there was ample chance of destroying the AoT - would force battle even if Johnston wanted to avoid it.

The claim that Georgia was foreordained to run red with blood if Grant were in charge. If it were so, he would have endorsed Thomas's judgement more and if the Army of Tennessee survived Resaca the Atlanta Campaign would be over before September by far. Georgia would not have run red with blood, and Grant's reliance on headlong assaults and casualties despite his seeking big battles were lower than some generals rated far higher than his.

Fine, if that's your opinion then your entitled to it and you dont have to bother paying attention to this scenario.

Its not as if I've made a scenario where McClellan becomes the all conquering Ceaser is it? All I've done is put him in a situation where he can improve the defenses of New Orleans and hold onto the city a little longer than the Confederate managed to do in OTL. He'll still lose it and still be considered a failure overall by general history, he just gets off to a good start.

So, McClellan the poor land general is going to negate the results of a primarily naval victory how? He can improve the defenses all he'd like, it was Admiral Farragut, not General Butler who won the Battle of New Orleans.

Who's Alfred von Manstein? I assume you meant Erich von Manstein and if you did nobody here is trying to say he was an Erich von Manstein. All I've said about Johnston was that good officer who could have done better and that Seven Pines/Fair Oaks was the event that decided his evolution as a General. Just cause you dont like him and I do doesn't mean I'm trying to say he was the greatest general in history.

And what do you mean about communicating the truth later. Surely later Davis must have realized Johnston was only bluffing. Why would Johnston need to explain it after he'd pulled back and his bluff had been exposed?

Surely he could have informed Davis of how much he was in fact bluffing before the retreat, such that Davis would not feel Johnston was concealing anything from him. Lee and Hood and other generals wrote plenty of letters to Davis. Johnston failed to do this, and in this he did not exactly help his case.

Could Johnston havd communicated better? Of course he could but so too could Davis have tried harder to assertain the truth. He certainly didn't go out of his way to meet Johnston or visit the front after 1st Manassas or ask him to provide details of his command or position. So they both could have done better.

Actually he did, it was how he got drawn into the Civil War version of the Unmentionable Sea Mammal.

I agree that Beauregard showed a great tactical aptitude later in the war but it was a fleeting moment. Strategically he lived in cloud-cuckoo land and was incapable of understanding what was reasonably possible for his forces to accomplish. So he had some plus points but like Bragg and Johnston and so many others his failings as a person and as an officer meant that the few skills he did have weren't used to their fullest.

I'll agree to that.

No more so, surely, than Lee, whose ideas for victory in an invasion of the North were vague and poorly-defined, while his ideas to prolong the war in 1865 show Lee never learned. As a strategist, Lee was among the war's worst generals, certainly by comparison to Beauregard. Johnston was Lee's superior as a strategist, to be sure. But if Johnston were to qualify, so must Beauregard.

 

[usertron2020]

Remember the same civilians who fired McClellan, Buell and Rosecrans also agitated for the removal of Meade and Thomas.

Name them. Major Generals at the level of McClellan, Buell, and Rosecrans were fired on the orders of ONE civilian, the Commander-In-Chief, Abraham Lincoln. And whether or not to retain Meade at the start of the Overland Campaign, or to fire Thomas just prior to Nashville, was specifically left to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant. Lincoln left the decision to Grant specifically because HE did not wish to fire either the Hero of Gettysburg or the Rock of Chickamauga. But neither would he deny his favored General-In-Chief the right to make personnel changes as he saw fit.

If you are making the argument of "agitating" to remove the above officers, well. Civilian newspaper publishers could be blamed for that. Or Cabinet Officers. Or Congressional leaders.

 

[usertron2020]

No more so, surely, than Lee, whose ideas for victory in an invasion of the North were vague and poorly-defined, while his ideas to prolong the war in 1865 show Lee never learned.(1) As a strategist, Lee was among the war's worst generals,(2) certainly by comparison to Beauregard. Johnston was Lee's superior as a strategist, to be sure. But if Johnston were to qualify, so must Beauregard.(3)

(1) I think it was you who said Lee's whole 1865 campaign was nothing more than Lee's complete inability to recognize (or tell Davis) that it was over.

(2) He never was a strategist. He ran operations to defend Virginia, not the Confederacy. When he went on the offensive, it was in the expectation that his opponents would make all the errors he needed for victory. Admittedly, he wasn't far wrong. A McClellan-bungled Antietam battle only made possible by finding enemy plans. Chancellorsville only setting up Gettysburg. Then the pursuit from Gettysburg bungled by caution and Halleck's incompetence with command.

(3) Johnston held Davis in the deepest of contempt. My impression is Beauregard actively despised Davis on a level more extreme than any other army commander for his civilian leader, including even perhaps McClellan for Lincoln! This forum has educated me in that Beauregard was not as good a general as I thought he was at the start, but he had a strong learning curve that lasted him through the war.

 

[67th Tigers]

Name them.

Start with http://www.amazon.com/Over-Lincolns-Shoulder-Modern-Studies/dp/0700614265/ref=pd_cp_b_1

 

[67th Tigers]

The first butterfly is that unlike McClellan, Halleck won't be forcing Scott out of the position. Scott will probably eventually step down due to health, but keeping him in keeps a man with better strategic vision in overall command.

How Scott was removed is a far more complex story, but the reasons why a large chunk of Washington got rid of him were simple; he did not want to fight the Confederacy. His "strategic vision" was to impose a blockade and let nature take its course. The Mississippi operations etc. were pure McClellan.

 

[Snake Featherston]

(1) I think it was you who said Lee's whole 1865 campaign was nothing more than Lee's complete inability to recognize (or tell Davis) that it was over.

Yes, it was that. That only amplifies the absurdity of Lee's "strategy" in the attempted breakout.

(2) He never was a strategist. He ran operations to defend Virginia, not the Confederacy. When he went on the offensive, it was in the expectation that his opponents would make all the errors he needed for victory. Admittedly, he wasn't far wrong. A McClellan-bungled Antietam battle only made possible by finding enemy plans. Chancellorsville only setting up Gettysburg. Then the pursuit from Gettysburg bungled by caution and Halleck's incompetence with command.

And even with the mistakes McClellan's subordinates broke Lee's army twice and Meade simply let Lee's headlong attacks chew up his army's offensive power without having to lift a finger, so to speak.

(3) Johnston held Davis in the deepest of contempt. My impression is Beauregard actively despised Davis on a level more extreme than any other army commander for his civilian leader, including even perhaps McClellan for Lincoln! This forum has educated me in that Beauregard was not as good a general as I thought he was at the start, but he had a strong learning curve that lasted him through the war.

Well, his actions at Second Petersburg certainly make him Lee's superior as a tactician, at least IMHO.

How Scott was removed is a far more complex story, but the reasons why a large chunk of Washington got rid of him were simple; he did not want to fight the Confederacy. His "strategic vision" was to impose a blockade and let nature take its course. The Mississippi operations etc. were pure McClellan.

Er, no. His strategic vision was a blockade, 60,000 Union troops to attack through the Mississippi Valley, then to let nature take its course. McClellan's idea was to parade a pretty army and demand 3 million troops to fight 60,000. Any victories attributed to McClellan should be attributed to Fitz-John Porter as much as Halleck's should be to Grant.

 

[usertron2020]

Start with http://www.amazon.com/Over-Lincolns-Shoulder-Modern-Studies/dp/0700614265/ref=pd_cp_b_1

*sigh* Once again...

Once again, listing an entire book without any mention of the pertinent data within to support your statements. The Council on the Conduct of the War (CCW) was a congressional advisory committee with delusions of executive power, which by the time of Gettysburg Lincoln had learned to ignore completely. They fell into the same category as the other potential trouble-makers I listed, yes? Newspaper publishers? Cabinet Officers? CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS.

Members of Congress could bitch and moan about individual officers, but ultimately, the orders for firings of such magnitude can come only from the President, Abraham Lincoln.

I asked you to NAME these "civilians" who you report fired McClellan, Buell, and Rosecrans.

Next time, if you are going to provide a link, do so to one that provides INFORMATION, DATA, FACTS, not yet another AMAZON.COM website. You don't have stock in Amazon, do you?

 

[usertron2020]

Er, no. His strategic vision was a blockade, 60,000 Union troops to attack through the Mississippi Valley, then to let nature take its course. McClellan's idea was to parade a pretty army and demand 3 million troops to fight 60,000. Any victories attributed to McClellan should be attributed to Fitz-John Porter as much as Halleck's should be to Grant.

At least history has corrected itself where Grant is concerned. But since it took twenty-five years to clear Porter's name following Second Bull Run, I don't see that Porter will ever be rehabilitated. At least in terms of his name ever being retrieved to the public's memory.

As to the nature of McClellan's military intelligence...

 

[Snake Featherston]

At least history has corrected itself where Grant is concerned. But since it took twenty-five years to clear Porter's name following Second Bull Run, I don't see that Porter will ever be rehabilitated. At least in terms of his name ever being retrieved to the public's memory.

As to the nature of McClellan's military intelligence...

An unfortunate truth.

 

[Fiver]

How Scott was removed is a far more complex story, but the reasons why a large chunk of Washington got rid of him were simple; he did not want to fight the Confederacy.

That was what is opponent's accused him of. Actually, they didn't like the fact he said it would take several years to defeat the CSA, they wanted a quick, simple victory. Both he and they were wrong in their hope that the war would be relatively bloodless.

His "strategic vision" was to impose a blockade and let nature take its course. The Mississippi operations etc. were pure McClellan.

That is blatantly false. The Anaconda Plan specifically included a drive down the Mississippi to split the CSA in two. McClellan's strategy as put forth in his April 27, 1861 letter to Scott involved a direct drive on Richmond. McClellan felt the Mississippi should be ignored in favor of operations on the Tennessee.

 

[67th Tigers]

*sigh* Once again...

Read. The . Book.

Don't opine on subjects you haven't even read the basics of.

 

[usertron2020]

Read. The . Book.

Don't opine on subjects you haven't even read the basics of.

Your. History. Shows. That. When. You. Put. Forth. An. Entire. Book. Without. Specific. Passages. Quoted. The. Book. Ultimately. Shows. It. Does. Not. Say. What. You. SAY. It. Says.

In fact, it often is saying the complete contrary. And I reiterate: Do you have stock in Amazon?

Following your advice in these matters would eventually result in the expenditure of funds in the three to four digit range (in the long run) for nothing. Why don't you use specifics to show YOU have read all these books? Because past performance (except for Harsh's works, which DO say what you want them to say) has shown you haven't. At least I must assume you haven't. I don't want to accuse you of something that would be much worse.

By the way, I have a better source than yours. It's called the Constitution of the United States of America. The President is the man invested with the authority as Commander-In-Chief of the United States Armed Forces. Not any congressional committees. They may advise. They may advise and consent to appointments. They have NO powers regarding removal of existent commissioned officers.

Is it possible you are confusing the relationship of a republican versus a parliamentary system of government regarding the command of its military?

 

[Elfwine]

For what its worth on Porter, he's mostly forgotten because no one remembers him.

For those not familiar with Berraisms: The point is that most people don't even know he was ever on trial, let alone that he did anything worthy of being remembered. I don't think we have to worry about him not being rehabilitated as much as no one caring enough to condemn him anymore. Even if the history books do print Fitz-John Porter as the victor, only geeks know who he was, and its not as if you can associate him with something the way Grant is that sad guy with a cigar.

And I'm not sure McClellan ever asked for three million men. This is an area where exaggeration diminishes the amount that what he actually said is more than bad enough.

 

[usertron2020]

For what its worth on Porter, he's mostly forgotten because no one remembers him.

For those not familiar with Berraisms: The point is that most people don't even know he was ever on trial, let alone that he did anything worthy of being remembered. I don't think we have to worry about him not being rehabilitated as much as no one caring enough to condemn him anymore. Even if the history books do print Fitz-John Porter as the victor, only historians and history buffs know who he was, and its not as if you can associate him with something the way Grant is, that sad guy with a cigar.

And I'm not sure McClellan ever asked for three million men. This is an area where exaggeration diminishes the amount that what he actually said is more than bad enough.

True, in that Porter's career was so short, and occurred at a time when the news for the Union in Virginia was so poor, that people would prefer to forget him, however unfair that is.

It is reported that Lincoln said to McClellan in exasperation that if he gave McClellan an army of a million men he would swear the enemy had two million and ask for three. I'm not aware of any specific proof that this story is anything but apocryphal, but it fits to a tee McClellan's style so well that the story will stay with him forever.

In fact, the only story that has any hard evidence is the idea that McClellan believed he faced an enemy of 200,000. And let's not go there, mister. That's been gone over to death. Not you, Elfwine, he knows who he is.

 

[Elfwine]

True, in that Porter's career was so short, and occurred at a time when the news for the Union in Virginia was so poor, that people would prefer to forget him, however unfair that is.

Yep. Shame, because the man obviously had real mettle - even if we make fun of how badly Lee and his division commanders handled the Seven Days, or Jackson did, someone less resolute than Porter would have been in trouble.

It is reported that Lincoln said to McClellan in exasperation that if he gave McClellan an army of a million men he would swear the enemy had two million and ask for three. I'm not aware of any specific proof that this story is anything but apocryphal, but it fits to a tee McClellan's style so well that the story will stay with him forever.

Ah yes, that story. I wouldn't say Lincoln did everything right towards McClellan or Union eastern strategy, but when someone as hard to irritate as Lincoln thinks you're being a pain in the ass on purpose, you're obviously pushing it.

The snub story is not nearly as obnoxious as the fact McClellan ranges from talking tough to whining with no room in between for performing.

I cannot overstate this - in gray, he'd be ten times worse, and ten times more despised by his president.

In fact, the only story that has any hard evidence is the idea that McClellan believed he faced an enemy of 200,000. And let's not go there, mister. That's been gone over to death. Not you, Elfwine, he knows who he is.

That figure and his plan involving 273,000 men will stick in my head forever as examples of how the ACW could have been lost.