McClellan in Grey - AKA The Lion of New Orleans

[Snake Featherston]

Valuable discussion on the merits of McClellan as a commander aside, I think this discussion is missing a rather large part of the ramifications of the initial point of divergence. Namely, that if Lil' Mac heads south, then there will undoubtedly be a different commander in the North who will undoubtedly follow a different strategy than McClellan and in so doing drastically alter the course of the war.

Given that the runner up for McClellan in replacing Winfield Scott as the Commanding General of the Northern Armies was Halleck (Scott's preferred choice IIRC) and that Rosecrans would in all likelihood receive the same credit Mac did in West Virginia (Mac's absence doesn't change the overall result of that campaign IMO). Perhaps in TTL we see Halleck become General in Chief and Rosecrans become head of the AotP?

What kind of strategy would these two follow? Given Halleck's performance in the west, I'd imagine he'd try to assemble a gargantuan AotP before going overland via the shortest route towards Richmond (no Peninsula campaign).

Thoughts? Comments?

Halleck, unlike McClellan, really *would* be a good organizer, but he would also understand that he outnumbers the Confederate force far more than it does him. He'd fight a campaign focused on Richmond as a strategic point, but would build a force too huge for any Confederate general to roll over. As the Corinth campaign showed, against a force equal in number to the ANV at the time, Halleck could capture cities quite efficiently.

 

[Elfwine]

Where McClellan's brilliantly-built army wins most of its battles but all those victories are perpetually seen as defeats.

Yeah. I suppose I can see that McClellan felt it was necessary to shift his base, at least for argument's sake. But when two thirds of Lee's army flailing ineffectively at Porter's corps was treated the same as him doing a double somersault, defeatism is the only explanation that makes sense.

Once again, the fact all the stress and worry and burden he undoubtedly did have (and legitimately so, as well as his own issues) would be worse in gray makes Nytram's scenario end poorly for the CSA. Johnston at least seems to have waited until he was outflanked to retreat.

Lee had only one line of retreat, and an offensive all along the line would have overtaxed his resources to render retreat in any significant sense impossible.

Yeah. Unfortunately, what went into the fight went in with little direction, and the result saw constantly blunted assaults despite the fact that the men making them probably could have won, had the next blow be on the flank of said Confederates rather than for instance Harvey Hill being able to patch up things after Hood and Jackson shot their bolt.

Not at all. As at least Bragg knew he won Chickamauga.

That's another issue, though.

But didn't Bragg think he had lost at first? Admittedly he did get the point that he had won, but wasn't that his first impression?

 

[Nytram01]

Bollocks. What Joe Hooker did before the Chancellorsville Campaign and George Thomas's creating an army out of a mixture of what nobody else wanted in a few weeks before the Battle of Nashville argue that this is very much *not* the case.

As Elfwine said to you, there is a difference between building an army from scratch or close to it and rebuilding one. But anyway, if you look a few posts further down you'll see I did say that McClellan's organizational skills can be overstated and perhaps I did that however McClellan's skills in organization were not insubstancial and the Union did not have a man of similiar skills in command in the east for a long time in OTL.

Thomas didn't exactly build an army from "a mixture of what nobody else wanted". He had the Army of the Cumberland at Nashville which was a long established army in the war and had been organized under him since late 1863 and what he did was he joined John Schofield's Army of the Ohio - another army that had been in exsitance for years and under Schofield's control for the better part of a year - to it as a corps and added A.J. Smith's Corps to the Army. These forces were hardly unwanted by the Federal High Command and adding them together didn't require a great deal of organizational skill. And Nashville was a major supply depot for the Union so he hardly had second rate material to work with

If anything the US Army starts moving earlier and with 120,000 soldiers against Joe "I can't fight, I might have to work for a living" Johnston that's only going to be good for the Union.

However, as I explianed to Elfwine earlier in the thread, none of the potential Army commanders for the Union in the east at that time appear to have the capability to defeat Johnston. Banks and Fremont are no where near competant at army command and Rosecrans is so unaware of his own worth and lacks so much confidence, especially early in the war, that even a minor Confederate victory will unnerve him and could force him to stop or even drive him to retreat.

And your comment about Johnston as a retreater is not valid for 1861 or 1862 as both times he withdrew he was following the plans of the Confederate high command, the Confederate Strategy in Virginia at the time - that it changed under Lee is irrelevant.

Chances are, as I said earlier, that Johnston will withdraw to the Rappahannock line and the Federals and Confederate will face each other across that line during the winter of 1861/1862 and beyond that the Federals could only be more successful than OTL if them manage to push on to Richmond before late May or early June because at that point the Confederate will gain the ability to contend Virignia on a more even footing.

 

[Nytram01]

Halleck, unlike McClellan, really *would* be a good organizer, but he would also understand that he outnumbers the Confederate force far more than it does him. He'd fight a campaign focused on Richmond as a strategic point, but would build a force too huge for any Confederate general to roll over. As the Corinth campaign showed, against a force equal in number to the ANV at the time, Halleck could capture cities quite efficiently.

I'm sorry but Halleck had major flaws that would hurt the Union. He played Generals off against each other, obessesed himself about getting one over his rivals, rarely visited the front but commanded from his ivory tower to the rear and was a bitter and hateful man and further he was unable to control strong minded subordinate and unable to motivate them to battle. Those who served with him had no love for him, no confidence in him and no respect for him.

In OTL he was general in chief from 1862 to 1864 and he failed completely to achieve any real strategic success against the Confederates. In fact the federal force that was constantly successful on both strategic and tactical level during this time were those under the command of Grant and that's more down to Grant than it is Halleck.

Corinth is hardly a moment to show Halleck's skills in capturing cities as it was Beauregard that allowed him to do so in the first place. Halleck's advance on the city was slow and ponderous, giving his enemy ample time to see him coming and make plans against him, but Beauregard didn't even attempt to contest control of the city, Beauregard fooled Halleck into thinking he was going to attack but pulled back instead. Despite outnumbering Beauregard by almost double the Confederates number and having some of the most capable and ruthless Federals officers under him Halleck failed completely to take advantge of this and allowed Beauregard all the time in the world to withdraw unharried.

He would have been an extremely able and competant quartermaster or chief of staff but he was a failure as a field commander and a failure as General-in-Chief and him being in position as the main eastern army commander or the General-in-Chief earlier would not make the Union any more effective or effiecient than OTL.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Yeah. I suppose I can see that McClellan felt it was necessary to shift his base, at least for argument's sake. But when two thirds of Lee's army flailing ineffectively at Porter's corps was treated the same as him doing a double somersault, defeatism is the only explanation that makes sense.

Pretty much, yes.

Once again, the fact all the stress and worry and burden he undoubtedly did have (and legitimately so, as well as his own issues) would be worse in gray makes Nytram's scenario end poorly for the CSA. Johnston at least seems to have waited until he was outflanked to retreat.

True. But then Joe Johnston had *some* skill as far as actual field fighting, though most of it was used in retreating. McClellan misused Fitz-John Porter.

Yeah. Unfortunately, what went into the fight went in with little direction, and the result saw constantly blunted assaults despite the fact that the men making them probably could have won, had the next blow be on the flank of said Confederates rather than for instance Harvey Hill being able to patch up things after Hood and Jackson shot their bolt.

That's another issue, though.

Which if put in a Confederate context screws the CSA over badly.

But didn't Bragg think he had lost at first? Admittedly he did get the point that he had won, but wasn't that his first impression?

Yes, he did. That was partially because like a lot of generals Bragg had plans and stuck to them. He was not appreciate of the contingency of the battlefield.

As Elfwine said to you, there is a difference between building an army from scratch or close to it and rebuilding one. But anyway, if you look a few posts further down you'll see I did say that McClellan's organizational skills can be overstated and perhaps I did that however McClellan's skills in organization were not insubstancial and the Union did not have a man of similiar skills in command in the east for a long time in OTL.

And yet the first victory against the Army of Northern Virginia recognized as such was from the smallest Army of the Potomac in any of the major battles.

Thomas didn't exactly build an army from "a mixture of what nobody else wanted". He had the Army of the Cumberland at Nashville which was a long established army in the war and had been organized under him since late 1863 and what he did was he joined John Schofield's Army of the Ohio - another army that had been in exsitance for years and under Schofield's control for the better part of a year - to it as a corps and added A.J. Smith's Corps to the Army. These forces were hardly unwanted by the Federal High Command and adding them together didn't require a great deal of organizational skill. And Nashville was a major supply depot for the Union so he hardly had second rate material to work with

A lot of the best and most veteran soldiers of the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, however, had been detached to march through Georgia. Which made a certain amount of sense but not the kind that made Thomas's job easier.

However, as I explianed to Elfwine earlier in the thread, none of the potential Army commanders for the Union in the east at that time appear to have the capability to defeat Johnston. Banks and Fremont are no where near competant at army command and Rosecrans is so unaware of his own worth and lacks so much confidence, especially early in the war, that even a minor Confederate victory will unnerve him and could force him to stop or even drive him to retreat.

This is the same Banks who also nearly rolled up Jackson's entire line at Cedar Mountain despite Jackson outnumbering him, no? Halleck didn't have confidence and yet took Corinth the city with an army the size of the Army of the Potomac.

And your comment about Johnston as a retreater is not valid for 1861 or 1862 as both times he withdrew he was following the plans of the Confederate high command, the Confederate Strategy in Virginia at the time - that it changed under Lee is irrelevant.

In some senses it is valid, given that Johnston had made a lot of hay out of the strength of defenses riddled with Quaker Guns.....

Chances are, as I said earlier, that Johnston will withdraw to the Rappahannock line and the Federals and Confederate will face each other across that line during the winter of 1861/1862 and beyond that the Federals could only be more successful than OTL if them manage to push on to Richmond before late May or early June because at that point the Confederate will gain the ability to contend Virignia on a more even footing.

Perhaps. Joe Johnston's record as a field commander shows him to be too little prone to Refuge in Audacity to pull off what Robert E. Lee did.

I'm sorry but Halleck had major flaws that would hurt the Union. He played Generals off against each other, obessesed himself about getting one over his rivals, rarely visited the front but commanded from his ivory tower to the rear and was a bitter and hateful man and further he was unable to control strong minded subordinate and unable to motivate them to battle. Those who served with him had no love for him, no confidence in him and no respect for him.

I never said Halleck was perfect. I simply noted he used an army of 100,000 people to actually do something, not simply sitting on his duff and whining. If anything, Halleck in the East would have Fitz-John Porter rise as Grant did.

In OTL he was general in chief from 1862 to 1864 and he failed completely to achieve any real strategic success against the Confederates. In fact the federal force that was constantly successful on both strategic and tactical level during this time were those under the command of Grant and that's more down to Grant than it is Halleck.

Well, he achieved the strategic success of capturing Corinth, but not Beauregard's army. You're right about Grant doing so, but then Fitz-John Porter, like Grant, had skills as a field commander and was just as likely to rise in spite of Halleck.

Corinth is hardly a moment to show Halleck's skills in capturing cities as it was Beauregard that allowed him to do so in the first place. Halleck's advance on the city was slow and ponderous, giving his enemy ample time to see him coming and make plans against him, but Beauregard didn't even attempt to contest control of the city, Beauregard fooled Halleck into thinking he was going to attack but pulled back instead. Despite outnumbering Beauregard by almost double the Confederates number and having some of the most capable and ruthless Federals officers under him Halleck failed completely to take advantge of this and allowed Beauregard all the time in the world to withdraw unharried.

Where McClellan would have remained at Pittsburg Landing for seven months, demanding an army half a million strong, moved, won several battles, then retreated claiming he'd had his ass handed to him.

He would have been an extremely able and competant quartermaster or chief of staff but he was a failure as a field commander and a failure as General-in-Chief and him being in position as the main eastern army commander or the General-in-Chief earlier would not make the Union any more effective or effiecient than OTL.

He would have at least have done more with Fitz-John Porter, and would probably have recognized the first Seven Days' battle as a victory, not a defeat.

 

[Nytram01]

And yet the first victory against the Army of Northern Virginia recognized as such was from the smallest Army of the Potomac in any of the major battles.

So. What do that have to do with McClellan's skills as an organizer verses, say, Pope or Burnside of McDowell or Banks or Fremont? I never said McClellan was a successful battlefield commander nor army commander but he was a successful trainer and organizer and the Federals didn't get someone with even half his level of competance in that area in command of the main eastern army until Hooker in 1863.

A lot of the best and most veteran soldiers of the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, however, had been detached to march through Georgia. Which made a certain amount of sense but not the kind that made Thomas's job easier.

While the quality of soldier he had at his disposal may not have been the cream of the crop - well, except A.J. Smith's Corps - the command structure of both the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio was still intact and since the AotO was just a glorified Corps at the time anyway simply adding that to the AotC's command chain was simple.

I give Thomas no end of praise for recognizing his forces limitations and playing within those limitations but he hardly had to face such adverse conditions in organizing his force at Nashville as, say, Joe Johnston did for Bentonville. He may not have had the best of everything but he certainly didn't have a shortage of anything either.

This is the same Banks who also nearly rolled up Jackson's entire line at Cedar Mountain despite Jackson outnumbering him, no? Halleck didn't have confidence and yet took Corinth the city with an army the size of the Army of the Potomac.

Well nearly butters no parsnips. Bank's wasn't a bad general but he wasn't a good one either. He wasn't a Grant or a Sherman or a Thomas or a Sheridan (ruthless more than good) and he wouldn't be able to catch Johnston, let alone defeat him.

In some senses it is valid, given that Johnston had made a lot of hay out of the strength of defenses riddled with Quaker Guns.....

Not sure I understand this totally. Are you saying Johnston used quaker guns or was scared off by quaker guns?

Perhaps. Joe Johnston's record as a field commander shows him to be too little prone to Refuge in Audacity to pull off what Robert E. Lee did.

Who said he had to pull off what Lee did. Lee's agressive campaigning was not the only valid one for the defense of Virginia and Johnston not only didn't need to do something similiar in his time in command in Virignia but the Confederacy lacked the resources needed for him to do something similiar. All he needed to do was to delay the Federals advance until late May/early June when the Confederate resources increase then he could look to take the offensive. Considering that he did take the offensive against the Federals in Virginia at Seven Pines OTL and attempted to do so a few days before hand with a plan no less audacious than Lee's only for G.W. Smith to fail him should show that he was prepared to at least attempt to go onto the offensive - whether he'd be successful or not is another matter.

Johnston was a prudent and careful commander who was more likely to set up a defensive position to repulse the enemy than he was to split his force and attack but he was prepared to attack if the circumstances gave him the option - that he subordinates let him down and he didn't exersize command as he should have doesn't invalidate this.

Point is, however, that Lee's way was not the only way and just cause someone else may not have done things the same way doesn't mean they would fail.

I never said Halleck was perfect. I simply noted he used an army of 100,000 people to actually do something, not simply sitting on his duff and whining. If anything, Halleck in the East would have Fitz-John Porter rise as Grant did.

Well, he achieved the strategic success of capturing Corinth, but not Beauregard's army. You're right about Grant doing so, but then Fitz-John Porter, like Grant, had skills as a field commander and was just as likely to rise in spite of Halleck.

I dont know enough about Porter to comment on how good he was or how high he would rise.

Where McClellan would have remained at Pittsburg Landing for seven months, demanding an army half a million strong, moved, won several battles, then retreated claiming he'd had his ass handed to him.

Perhaps but even so Halleck capture of Corinth was not a moment of great military accomplishment. The fall of Corinth lies more on Beauregard's shoulders than it does Halleck's

 

[Snake Featherston]

So. What do that have to do with McClellan's skills as an organizer verses, say, Pope or Burnside of McDowell or Banks or Fremont? I never said McClellan was a successful battlefield commander nor army commander but he was a successful trainer and organizer and the Federals didn't get someone with even half his level of competance in that area in command of the main eastern army until Hooker in 1863.

This is true in one sense, but then let's look at the most victorious US Armies, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland. They needed to cover larger areas, had less efficient weaponry and discipline than the Eastern army, and were in Mississippi while McClellan was screwing up his best chance to end the war for good.

While the quality of soldier he had at his disposal may not have been the cream of the crop - well, except A.J. Smith's Corps - the command structure of both the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio was still intact and since the AotO was just a glorified Corps at the time anyway simply adding that to the AotC's command chain was simple.

I give Thomas no end of praise for recognizing his forces limitations and playing within those limitations but he hardly had to face such adverse conditions in organizing his force at Nashville as, say, Joe Johnston did for Bentonville. He may not have had the best of everything but he certainly didn't have a shortage of anything either.

The victories of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee argue that huge well-disciplined armies were not a necessity for victory. Grant's army was much smaller, by professional military standards more than a little undisciplined, yet it was this army that captured Fort Donelson, captured Vicksburg in one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, and won the Battles of Bald Hill, Ezra Church, and Jonesboro. McClellan did great things, but if discipline were everything, Bragg's army would have been the most powerful one in the war.

Well nearly butters no parsnips. Bank's wasn't a bad general but he wasn't a good one either. He wasn't a Grant or a Sherman or a Thomas or a Sheridan (ruthless more than good) and he wouldn't be able to catch Johnston, let alone defeat him.

Not sure I understand this totally. Are you saying Johnston used quaker guns or was scared off by quaker guns?

He used Quaker Guns while claiming the Centreville positions were invincible. Discovery of said guns was the first rock rolling downhill in the Davis-Johnston relationship.

Who said he had to pull off what Lee did. Lee's agressive campaigning was not the only valid one for the defense of Virginia and Johnston not only didn't need to do something similiar in his time in command in Virignia but the Confederacy lacked the resources needed for him to do something similiar. All he needed to do was to delay the Federals advance until late May/early June when the Confederate resources increase then he could look to take the offensive. Considering that he did take the offensive against the Federals in Virginia at Seven Pines OTL and attempted to do so a few days before hand with a plan no less audacious than Lee's only for G.W. Smith to fail him should show that he was prepared to at least attempt to go onto the offensive - whether he'd be successful or not is another matter.

With McClellan at the gates of Richmond, the CSA *did* have to attack him and drive him back. The Federals would have still been halted in the Valley Campaign and something like the Army of Virginia formed. Now, Joe Johnston would not have been stupid enough to fight an Antietam but there would have been the same requirements faced by Lee's army.

Johnston was a prudent and careful commander who was more likely to set up a defensive position to repulse the enemy than he was to split his force and attack but he was prepared to attack if the circumstances gave him the option - that he subordinates let him down and he didn't exersize command as he should have doesn't invalidate this.

That's not what his Atlanta Campaign record shows.

Point is, however, that Lee's way was not the only way and just cause someone else may not have done things the same way doesn't mean they would fail.

Lee's way cleared Virginia of the Army of the Potomac and smashed Pope's army, as well as sufficing to win Chancellorsville.

I dont know enough about Porter to comment on how good he was or how high he would rise.

He won all the Seven Days' battles save Gaine's Mill while McClellan was off dining with French aristocrats.

Perhaps but even so Halleck capture of Corinth was not a moment of great military accomplishment. The fall of Corinth lies more on Beauregard's shoulders than it does Halleck's

One could make an equal argument that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville was more on Hooker than on Lee.

 

[Nytram01]

This is true in one sense, but then let's look at the most victorious US Armies, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland. They needed to cover larger areas, had less efficient weaponry and discipline than the Eastern army, and were in Mississippi while McClellan was screwing up his best chance to end the war for good.

The victories of the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Tennessee argue that huge well-disciplined armies were not a necessity for victory. Grant's army was much smaller, by professional military standards more than a little undisciplined, yet it was this army that captured Fort Donelson, captured Vicksburg in one of the most brilliant campaigns of the war, and won the Battles of Bald Hill, Ezra Church, and Jonesboro. McClellan did great things, but if discipline were everything, Bragg's army would have been the most powerful one in the war.

That's all well and good but that only shows how successful Grant was as a battlefield commander and a campaigning general and how disorganized the Confederates were following their expulsion from middle-Tennessee and defeat at Shiloh. A well trained and organized Army is never a bad thing but victories can be won without it.

He used Quaker Guns while claiming the Centreville positions were invincible. Discovery of said guns was the first rock rolling downhill in the Davis-Johnston relationship.

I dont remeber reading anywhere that Johnston considered the Centreville position invincible. In fact, I distinctly remeber reading that Johnston opposed the setting up of a meat packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap because he was only going to stay at Centreville/Mannassas until Davis made up his mind about getting reinforcements for an invasion of the North and as such to set up anything near there would unnecessarilly put it in an exposed position.

Actually the fact that Johnston had to disperse his manpower across the whole front to maintain his position at Centreville doesn't strike me as the kind of thing he would like to do, and certainly nothing that would make him think of a position as invincible so if he claimed it as such it was more than likely a bluff for the Federals.

With McClellan at the gates of Richmond, the CSA *did* have to attack him and drive him back. The Federals would have still been halted in the Valley Campaign and something like the Army of Virginia formed. Now, Joe Johnston would not have been stupid enough to fight an Antietam but there would have been the same requirements faced by Lee's army.

I have to point this out, and I think I've done it before on this website and maybe even to you, Johnston withdrawing to Richmond during the Peninsula Campaign was always what the Confederates had planned to do. Johnston, Davis, Lee, Randoplh, G.W. Smith and Longstreet had all agreed in April that the decisive battles of the campaign would happen around Richmond. Trying to say Johnston had to attack there as if its some kind of criticism ignores the fact that the Confederates had always planned to attack there.

That's not what his Atlanta Campaign record shows.

At Resaca half of Johnston Army launched onto the offensive and he was prepared to add more men to it when Sherman turned his flank and got below the Oostanaula. At Cassville, New Hope Church, Brush Mountain and, if you think it was his intention to do so, Peachtree Creek he planned to attack only for Hood to let him down in the first three and being removed before the final one. That Johnston himself didn't force the issue is a failure of his but the intention to attack is there and Bentonville later proved that Johnston was capable of conducting an offensive operation.

Lee's way cleared Virginia of the Army of the Potomac and smashed Pope's army, as well as sufficing to win Chancellorsville.

But even so his was not the only valid method that could have been employed to defend Virginia and just because his worked doesn't invalidate others.

One could make an equal argument that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville was more on Hooker than on Lee.

You could make that argument I suppose except for the fact that Hooker wasn't looking to withdraw where as the only though crossing Beauregard's mind was how to pull out of Corinth unharmed. Corinth was certianly no federal equivilent of Chancellorsville.

 

[Snake Featherston]

That's all well and good but that only shows how successful Grant was as a battlefield commander and a campaigning general and how disorganized the Confederates were following their expulsion from middle-Tennessee and defeat at Shiloh. A well trained and organized Army is never a bad thing but victories can be won without it.

The point I'm getting at is that McClellan's army was one he used for parades and not for fighting, Grant fought and thus won. Same thing with Thomas. McClellan the Confederate would be another Joe Johnston with nothing even to show for his record except endless retreating.

I dont remeber reading anywhere that Johnston considered the Centreville position invincible. In fact, I distinctly remeber reading that Johnston opposed the setting up of a meat packing plant at Thoroughfare Gap because he was only going to stay at Centreville/Mannassas until Davis made up his mind about getting reinforcements for an invasion of the North and as such to set up anything near there would unnecessarilly put it in an exposed position.

That's not how I've read it.

Actually the fact that Johnston had to disperse his manpower across the whole front to maintain his position at Centreville doesn't strike me as the kind of thing he would like to do, and certainly nothing that would make him think of a position as invincible so if he claimed it as such it was more than likely a bluff for the Federals.

I have to point this out, and I think I've done it before on this website and maybe even to you, Johnston withdrawing to Richmond during the Peninsula Campaign was always what the Confederates had planned to do. Johnston, Davis, Lee, Randoplh, G.W. Smith and Longstreet had all agreed in April that the decisive battles of the campaign would happen around Richmond. Trying to say Johnston had to attack there as if its some kind of criticism ignores the fact that the Confederates had always planned to attack there.

And to look at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, it was as poorly-led as any of the Seven Days' but at the end of it the US lines were still quite solid.

At Resaca half of Johnston Army launched onto the offensive and he was prepared to add more men to it when Sherman turned his flank and got below the Oostanaula. At Cassville, New Hope Church, Brush Mountain and, if you think it was his intention to do so, Peachtree Creek he planned to attack only for Hood to let him down in the first three and being removed before the final one. That Johnston himself didn't force the issue is a failure of his but the intention to attack is there and Bentonville later proved that Johnston was capable of conducting an offensive operation.

According to Autumn of Glory Joe Johnston took credits for fortifications built by Hood and made a lot of mistakes, while at no point did he ever try to seek a decisive battle save at Kennesaw Mountain. Crucially, his strategy depended on screw-ups by Sherman, and if your strategy leaves that to the enemy, that's not a good idea.

But even so his was not the only valid method that could have been employed to defend Virginia and just because his worked doesn't invalidate others.

Those other methods tend to ignore certain fundamental problems.

You could make that argument I suppose except for the fact that Hooker wasn't looking to withdraw where as the only though crossing Beauregard's mind was how to pull out of Corinth unharmed. Corinth was certianly no federal equivilent of Chancellorsville.

The Army of the Potomac generals weren't looking to withdraw. Fighting Joe had a council of war to decide whether to stay and fight, most of his generals *did* want to stay but he simply withdrew anyway.

 

[Nytram01]

The point I'm getting at is that McClellan's army was one he used for parades and not for fighting, Grant fought and thus won. Same thing with Thomas. McClellan the Confederate would be another Joe Johnston with nothing even to show for his record except endless retreating.

Perhaps McClellan did only use his army as a parade ground play thing but his training and organization of it made it possible for others to use it as a fighting force. Of course he was not alone in being able to train and organize an army well but it was never my point to say that he was unique in this. My point was only that McClellan could train and organize an army and this could be beneficial to the Confederacy.

Partly the reason I moved Richard Taylor out to New Orleans in 1862 in the original scenario was so that he - an aggressive, offensively minded general - could take command of the defense of New Orleans while McClellan devoted himself to his pety squabbles with politicians thus using a well trained and organized force in battle.

That's not how I've read it.

And where had you read it. I've read in both Craig Symonds biography and "a Different Valor" and Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond by Steven H. Newton that Johnston did not think of Centreville as invincible, that he thought of it as an exposed position that forced him to disperse his own strength to keep hold of and that he was only prepared to stay there if there was the possibility of troops arriving to let him go onto the offensive. I have also read that the Confederates lacked the heavy guns to properly defend the position and had to resort to quaker guns and deception to try to keep the Federals from advancing.

And to look at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, it was as poorly-led as any of the Seven Days' but at the end of it the US lines were still quite solid.

And it was Johnston's first offensive battle. Every general made mistakes in their first offensive but Joe Johnston didn't get the opportunity of McClellan, Lee, Grant or other army commanders got to try again immediately after assessing what went wrong because he fell wounded on the first days battle. Had Johnston not sat impotant in Richmond for the rest of the year dwelling on the battle and justifying his mistakes rather than addressing them he may have developed into a much different commander.

However Seven Pines/Fair Oaks certainly showed that Johnston - at least the 1862 version - was prepared to launch an offensive even in less than perfect circumstances. So it doesn't fit into the Jeff Davis/Mary Chestnut idea of Johnston the perpetual retreater who never attempted to fight a battle and was always looking for a better opportunity.

According to Autumn of Glory Joe Johnston took credits for fortifications built by Hood and made a lot of mistakes, while at no point did he ever try to seek a decisive battle save at Kennesaw Mountain. Crucially, his strategy depended on screw-ups by Sherman, and if your strategy leaves that to the enemy, that's not a good idea.

Well, considering Hood was not in Georgia before Johnston, that Hood was injured at Chickamauga and arrived with the Army of Tennessee a couple of months after Johnston and never left that army for even a day before being smashed at Nashville I fail to see how he could have built fortifications without at least Johnston's knowledge or consent.

Furthermore the affair at Cassville was definate attempt to seek decisive battle that was blown by Hood.

 

[Elfwine]

And where had you read it. I've read in both Craig Symonds biography and "a Different Valor" and Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond by Steven H. Newton that Johnston did not think of Centreville as invincible, that he thought of it as an exposed position that forced him to disperse his own strength to keep hold of and that he was only prepared to stay there if there was the possibility of troops arriving to let him go onto the offensive. I have also read that the Confederates lacked the heavy guns to properly defend the position and had to resort to quaker guns and deception to try to keep the Federals from advancing.

Speaking as the non-Johnston fan: I would assume - I haven't read any biographies of him, so this is piecing together based on what I've read of him in general and applying my powers of reason - that Johnston presented this as if it was secure and Davis got the impression Johnston thought it was more secure than Johnston actually treated it as. Johnston was never an optimist. Davis was.

And it was Johnston's first offensive battle. Every general made mistakes in their first offensive but Joe Johnston didn't get the opportunity of McClellan, Lee, Grant or other army commanders got to try again immediately after assessing what went wrong because he fell wounded on the first days battle. Had Johnston not sat impotant in Richmond for the rest of the year dwelling on the battle and justifying his mistakes rather than addressing them he may have developed into a much different commander.

He could have addressed them instead of engaging in a very human (but very flawed) attempt to rationalize them away.

However Seven Pines/Fair Oaks certainly showed that Johnston - at least the 1862 version - was prepared to launch an offensive even in less than perfect circumstances. So it doesn't fit into the Jeff Davis/Mary Chestnut idea of Johnston the perpetual retreater who never attempted to fight a battle and was always looking for a better opportunity.

Yeah, now if only we had any other examples. One exception, maybe two (Bentonville) in something over two years (all totaled).

Well, considering Hood was not in Georgia before Johnston, that Hood was injured at Chickamauga and arrived with the Army of Tennessee a couple of months after Johnston and never left that army for even a day before being smashed at Nashville I fail to see how he could have built fortifications without at least Johnston's knowledge or consent.

He had them built when he was in command of the army.

Furthermore the affair at Cassville was definate attempt to seek decisive battle that was blown by Hood.

And when Hood said "nu uh" Johnston said "okay we're retreating scrap everything".

Johnston's response to Hood not being cooperative was not that of a general looking for a fight, it was a general using a subordinate's decision to back out of one.

 

[Nytram01]

Speaking as the non-Johnston fan: I would assume - I haven't read any biographies of him, so this is piecing together based on what I've read of him in general and applying my powers of reason - that Johnston presented this as if it was secure and Davis got the impression Johnston thought it was more secure than Johnston actually treated it as. Johnston was never an optimist. Davis was.

Most likely it was, indeed, a case of misunderstanding between them, and certainly it would not be the last.

He could have addressed them instead of engaging in a very human (but very flawed) attempt to rationalize them away.

But as he was human, and a human with many flaws, he did rationalize his mistakes rather than address them and this was more than likely due to his impotance caused by injury. Joe Johnston was a workaholic who was never happy when he had nothing to do and that discontent no doubt added to his mindset when it came to rationalizing his mistakes.

Yeah, now if only we had any other examples. One exception, maybe two (Bentonville) in something over two years (all totaled).

He had them built when he was in command of the army.

Well neither Hood, Johnston, Davis or anyone else were really completely truthful in their recollections where the Atlanta Campaign went so I'm sure Hood claimed he did things he didn't really do as well. I probably should have said that in reply to Snake Featherstone in the first place.

And when Hood said "nu uh" Johnston said "okay we're retreating scrap everything".

Johnston's response to Hood not being cooperative was not that of a general looking for a fight, it was a general using a subordinate's decision to back out of one.

And I've already said that Johnston was at fault for failing to force the issue. I've said it in this thread and the one about Bragg resiging from the AoT in 1863. But I feel inclined to point out that Johnston gave Hood four opportunities to lead a major attack againt the Federals but only once did Hood actually follow through and if Hood was actually doing his job rather than expending most of his energy backstabbing his commander there would have been no need to force him to follow through on offensives.

The point, however, was that Snake Featherstone made the accusation that Johnston only attempted a decisive battle at Kennessaw Mountain however that doesn't stand up to examination where Cassville is concerned becuase it was certainly an attempt to fight a decisive battle. Also Resaca was the biggest battle fought during Johnston's tenure in command of the AoT and, while inconclusive, was another attempt at fighting a decisive battle.

Regardless of the failure to a fight a decisive battle at either Resaca or Cassville Johnston certainly tried, maybe not as hard as he could have but he still tried, so claiming he didn't is spurious.

 

[Elfwine]

But as he was human, and a human with many flaws, he did rationalize his mistakes rather than address them and this was more than likely due to his impotance caused by injury. Joe Johnston was a workaholic who was never happy when he had nothing to do and that discontent no doubt added to his mindset when it came to rationalizing his mistakes.

Perhaps. But I'm not sure if he'd been busy he'd have done much better.

Hard to say. Sufficient to say, we'd have the chance to find out if he'd do anything differently in response to "Okay, so that didn't work." in those circumstances - OTL we don't even have any solid basis for speculation thanks to all the rationalization (not just Johnston's).

Well neither Hood, Johnston, Davis or anyone else were really completely truthful in their recollections where the Atlanta Campaign went so I'm sure Hood claimed he did things he didn't really do as well. I probably should have said that in reply to Snake Featherstone in the first place.

Oh aye. But the fortifications do seem to have gone up late, which means Hood.

Sufficient to say, there's a mean spirited part of me that thinks they should have each been forced to listen to Johnston's (or his choice of Davis's or Hood's in Joe's case) writings for all eternity.

And I've already said that Johnston was at fault for failing to force the issue. I've said it in this thread and the one about Bragg resiging from the AoT in 1863. But I feel inclined to point out that Johnston gave Hood four opportunities to lead a major attack againt the Federals but only once did Hood actually follow through and if Hood was actually doing his job rather than expending most of his energy backstabbing his commander there would have been no need to force him to follow through on offensives.

The point, however, was that Snake Featherstone made the accusation that Johnston only attempted a decisive battle at Kennessaw Mountain however that doesn't stand up to examination where Cassville is concerned becuase it was certainly an attempt to fight a decisive battle. Also Resaca was the biggest battle fought during Johnston's tenure in command of the AoT and, while inconclusive, was another attempt at fighting a decisive battle.

The problem is that it was such a half hearted attempt that it does more to emphasize how unwilling Johnston was. Hood complained and the result is Johnston not merely putting off the attack or replanning the attack but retreating from Cassville. I don't know enough on Joe's role in regards to Resaca to compare it.

Regardless of the failure to a fight a decisive battle at either Resaca or Cassville Johnston certainly tried, maybe not as hard as he could have but he still tried, so claiming he didn't is spurious.

By that logic, McClellan "tried" to destroy Lee's army at Antietam.

Its one thing to say Johnston could have been more aggressive in the sense Lee actively looked for opportunities every step of the way sort of thing. But Johnston didn't even commit to overcoming obstacles when he did get past the theoretical stage into issuing orders for an assault.

It was - exaggerating for effect - the equivalent of trying to take up jogging and deciding to quit when you get a pebble in your shoe.

The thing that makes this relevant, I think, is that McClellan would be more like the guy who would talk about jogging but always be complaining of sunburn, because someone was deliberately seeking to hide the sunscreen.

 

[Nytram01]

The problem is that it was such a half hearted attempt that it does more to emphasize how unwilling Johnston was. Hood complained and the result is Johnston not merely putting off the attack or replanning the attack but retreating from Cassville. I don't know enough on Joe's role in regards to Resaca to compare it.

By that logic, McClellan "tried" to destroy Lee's army at Antietam.

Its one thing to say Johnston could have been more aggressive in the sense Lee actively looked for opportunities every step of the way sort of thing. But Johnston didn't even commit to overcoming obstacles when he did get past the theoretical stage into issuing orders for an assault.

It was - exaggerating for effect - the equivalent of trying to take up jogging and deciding to quit when you get a pebble in your shoe.

Its a fault that Johnston seems to have developed somewhere between 1st Manassas and Seven Pines that he delegate responsibilty for battles to subordinates and does not keep a close eye on the events unfolding. At Manassas he was forced by circumstances to take direct control over things but after that he gives a lot of freedom to his subordinates. By Bentonville he seems to have reverted back to a more 1st Manassas kind of command style.

More experiance in actual combat during a period where the Union didn't have not only numerical and material advantage but also commanders who could use those advantages to the fullest might have made him revert to a more hands on commander earlier.

That said, Johnston was not a man who planned and prepared well. He was capable of dealing with things in the moment but his habit of letting subordinates handle the particulars of a battle meant that this ability isn't really used to its fullest.

As I said before, Johnston was the kind of man who invested all of his confidence unshakably in men he trusted but most of those men didn't deserve that trust and proved that they didn't. Which shows that somewhere in his make up Johnston wasn't good at judging the character of other people.

However on the Lee vs Johnston appraoch thing, there is a lot to be said about the effect of their opponent. A lot of the criticism Johnston recieves for not fighting for Georgia would not exist had he faced Grant instead of Sherman. Georgia would have run red with blood had Grant commanded the Union effort there since Grant did not shy away from major confrontations like Sherman - Sherman recognized he wasn't that adept tactically so didn't really try to fight battles if he could help it - and Grant certainly respected Johnston as a military man enough to take him seriously. Anyway, that's for another time.

The thing that makes this relevant, I think, is that McClellan would be more like the guy who would talk about jogging but always be complaining of sunburn, because someone was deliberately seeking to hide the sunscreen.

To repeat myself:

Partly the reason I moved Richard Taylor out to New Orleans in 1862 in the original scenario was so that he - an aggressive, offensively minded general - could take command of the defense of New Orleans while McClellan devoted himself to his petty squabbles with politicians thus using a well trained and organized force in battle.

Thus while McClellan distracts himself with quarrels and squabbles a proven fighting general would be in place to handle the defense of the city. I was compensating for McClellan ultimate failure and fall from grace due to personality to give the Confederates the best chance I could to hold onto New Orleans for longer.

You'll note that at no time have I tried to ignore McClellan's personailty defects nor professional failing in the construction of the scenario however, if I continued the scenario, I would likely ignore some of Johnston's failing or try to develop him so they are lessened since I am a Joe Johnston partisan and inclined to think the best of him even though I will occaisonally say a word against him.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Perhaps McClellan did only use his army as a parade ground play thing but his training and organization of it made it possible for others to use it as a fighting force. Of course he was not alone in being able to train and organize an army well but it was never my point to say that he was unique in this. My point was only that McClellan could train and organize an army and this could be beneficial to the Confederacy.

Partly the reason I moved Richard Taylor out to New Orleans in 1862 in the original scenario was so that he - an aggressive, offensively minded general - could take command of the defense of New Orleans while McClellan devoted himself to his pety squabbles with politicians thus using a well trained and organized force in battle.

So he's Braxton Bragg in 1864-5 in 1861? Only good things for the Union from that.

And where had you read it. I've read in both Craig Symonds biography and "a Different Valor" and Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond by Steven H. Newton that Johnston did not think of Centreville as invincible, that he thought of it as an exposed position that forced him to disperse his own strength to keep hold of and that he was only prepared to stay there if there was the possibility of troops arriving to let him go onto the offensive. I have also read that the Confederates lacked the heavy guns to properly defend the position and had to resort to quaker guns and deception to try to keep the Federals from advancing.

What I read is that Johnston used propaganda to claim his fortress was absolutely strong, and McClellan believing that encouraged others to see it thus. Then it turned out Johnston hoodwinked McClellan at which point Jeff Davis's trust of Johnston took a steep nosedive.

And it was Johnston's first offensive battle. Every general made mistakes in their first offensive but Joe Johnston didn't get the opportunity of McClellan, Lee, Grant or other army commanders got to try again immediately after assessing what went wrong because he fell wounded on the first days battle. Had Johnston not sat impotant in Richmond for the rest of the year dwelling on the battle and justifying his mistakes rather than addressing them he may have developed into a much different commander.

All mistakes, but not all mistakes are equal. Lee's failures were from over-complicated plans, Grant's from underestimating Confederate resilience. Lee in West Virginia was unceremoniously booted by Rosecrans, while McClellan was well a ways away from fighting, while Grant at Belmont at least had his soldiers actually *fighting*. Beauregard admittedly did not perform well at First Bull Run, but showed some of the best tactical skills of any Confederate general.

However Seven Pines/Fair Oaks certainly showed that Johnston - at least the 1862 version - was prepared to launch an offensive even in less than perfect circumstances. So it doesn't fit into the Jeff Davis/Mary Chestnut idea of Johnston the perpetual retreater who never attempted to fight a battle and was always looking for a better opportunity.

Johnston's performance in the Vicksburg Campaign, however, is the fly in the ointment here.

Well, considering Hood was not in Georgia before Johnston, that Hood was injured at Chickamauga and arrived with the Army of Tennessee a couple of months after Johnston and never left that army for even a day before being smashed at Nashville I fail to see how he could have built fortifications without at least Johnston's knowledge or consent.

Furthermore the affair at Cassville was definate attempt to seek decisive battle that was blown by Hood.

He did this when he had command of the Army of Tennessee, during the Siege of Atlanta. The fortifications were quite impressive and certainly better used than Johnston's along the Chattahoochee. As far as Cassville, it seems to me that if Joe Johnston really intended to fight, he would simply have overriden Hood's objections. That would have hardly been unprecedented on either side.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Its a fault that Johnston seems to have developed somewhere between 1st Manassas and Seven Pines that he delegate responsibilty for battles to subordinates and does not keep a close eye on the events unfolding. At Manassas he was forced by circumstances to take direct control over things but after that he gives a lot of freedom to his subordinates. By Bentonville he seems to have reverted back to a more 1st Manassas kind of command style.

More experiance in actual combat during a period where the Union didn't have not only numerical and material advantage but also commanders who could use those advantages to the fullest might have made him revert to a more hands on commander earlier.

That said, Johnston was not a man who planned and prepared well. He was capable of dealing with things in the moment but his habit of letting subordinates handle the particulars of a battle meant that this ability isn't really used to its fullest.

As I said before, Johnston was the kind of man who invested all of his confidence unshakably in men he trusted but most of those men didn't deserve that trust and proved that they didn't. Which shows that somewhere in his make up Johnston wasn't good at judging the character of other people.

However on the Lee vs Johnston appraoch thing, there is a lot to be said about the effect of their opponent. A lot of the criticism Johnston recieves for not fighting for Georgia would not exist had he faced Grant instead of Sherman. Georgia would have run red with blood had Grant commanded the Union effort there since Grant did not shy away from major confrontations like Sherman - Sherman recognized he wasn't that adept tactically so didn't really try to fight battles if he could help it - and Grant certainly respected Johnston as a military man enough to take him seriously. Anyway, that's for another time.

Erm, Grant's records in the Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga campaigns argue that he was no headlong charger of the Lee style. Grant used maneuver on the grand scale and was quite good at so doing. Grant would have ended the Atlanta campaign at Resaca. Grant also had unlike Sherman the ability to sense the key points of a battle, and would have been intelligent enough to trust his subordinate with the most powerful army and best-developed intelligence system more than favoring his old army. Sherman was the third-best US commander, and he was a maneuverer, not a fighter. In this sense he was perfect for fighting the Confederacy's best retreater.

 

[Elfwine]

Its a fault that Johnston seems to have developed somewhere between 1st Manassas and Seven Pines that he delegate responsibilty for battles to subordinates and does not keep a close eye on the events unfolding. At Manassas he was forced by circumstances to take direct control over things but after that he gives a lot of freedom to his subordinates. By Bentonville he seems to have reverted back to a more 1st Manassas kind of command style.

Would be interesting to see why.

More experiance in actual combat during a period where the Union didn't have not only numerical and material advantage but also commanders who could use those advantages to the fullest might have made him revert to a more hands on commander earlier.

Perhaps.

That said, Johnston was not a man who planned and prepared well. He was capable of dealing with things in the moment but his habit of letting subordinates handle the particulars of a battle meant that this ability isn't really used to its fullest.

As I said before, Johnston was the kind of man who invested all of his confidence unshakably in men he trusted but most of those men didn't deserve that trust and proved that they didn't. Which shows that somewhere in his make up Johnston wasn't good at judging the character of other people.

Bad combination of traits here. Bad in a tragic sort of way.

However on the Lee vs Johnston appraoch thing, there is a lot to be said about the effect of their opponent. A lot of the criticism Johnston recieves for not fighting for Georgia would not exist had he faced Grant instead of Sherman. Georgia would have run red with blood had Grant commanded the Union effort there since Grant did not shy away from major confrontations like Sherman - Sherman recognized he wasn't that adept tactically so didn't really try to fight battles if he could help it - and Grant certainly respected Johnston as a military man enough to take him seriously. Anyway, that's for another time.

In the spirit of courtesy and respectfulness, I will agree to leave it here, much as I want to respond. Sufficient to say, McClellan would be more likely to retreat back to Atlanta rather than hold Dalton to begin with.

To repeat myself:

Partly the reason I moved Richard Taylor out to New Orleans in 1862 in the original scenario was so that he - an aggressive, offensively minded general - could take command of the defense of New Orleans while McClellan devoted himself to his petty squabbles with politicians thus using a well trained and organized force in battle.

Thus while McClellan distracts himself with quarrels and squabbles a proven fighting general would be in place to handle the defense of the city. I was compensating for McClellan ultimate failure and fall from grace due to personality to give the Confederates the best chance I could to hold onto New Orleans for longer.

I am not sure if Taylor being in place, and being able to do that, is realistic. That is, I don't know if it would work out in the circumstances in question - Taylor only got a brigade around the time the assignments would be made, or later (as well as being in Virginia, but the point is that he's not on the list of men being thought of).

 

[Fiver]

Given that the runner up for McClellan in replacing Winfield Scott as the Commanding General of the Northern Armies was Halleck (Scott's preferred choice IIRC) and that Rosecrans would in all likelihood receive the same credit Mac did in West Virginia (Mac's absence doesn't change the overall result of that campaign IMO). Perhaps in TTL we see Halleck become General in Chief and Rosecrans become head of the AotP?

The first butterfly is that unlike McClellan, Halleck won't be forcing Scott out of the position. Scott will probably eventually step down due to health, but keeping him in keeps a man with better strategic vision in overall command.

 

[Nytram01]

Erm, Grant's records in the Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga campaigns argue that he was no headlong charger of the Lee style. Grant used maneuver on the grand scale and was quite good at so doing. Grant would have ended the Atlanta campaign at Resaca. Grant also had unlike Sherman the ability to sense the key points of a battle, and would have been intelligent enough to trust his subordinate with the most powerful army and best-developed intelligence system more than favoring his old army. Sherman was the third-best US commander, and he was a maneuverer, not a fighter. In this sense he was perfect for fighting the Confederacy's best retreater.

You've read what I said and assumed I meant it to mean Grant will attack frontally when faced with entrenchments. I never said that and its wrong of you to assume that's what I meant.

My point was that Grant was a more aggressive general than Sherman and one that was not afraid to engage the whole of his army in battle when the opportunity presented itself for him to do so. Furthermore Grant's main objective was always the complete destruction and neutralization of his enemies army where as Sherman's main objective was always the capture and neutralization of areas of enemy territory that contributed to their war effort. As such there is a fundamental differance in the way the two conducted operations and with Grant there was always a chance for bloodshed on a massive scale.

Furthermore even if Grant sends a greater portion of his force through Snake Creek Gap there is no guarentee that this will win the campaign then and there. Within hours of the AotT coming through the gap in OTL Hood's entire Corps had been sent to oppose it from Dalton and Polk was soon to be moving from Rome to Resaca and this would have been enough force to contest control of Resaca at least long enough for Hardee's Corps to come south from Dalton and the AoT to be pulled back. And even if the AotC gets sent through instead of the AotT it doesn't mean that will be the end of it. It's not as if the only way to get away from Dalton was to go through Resaca - fastest way sure but not the only way.

Also the Federal movements in the Atlanta Campaign were dictated by how far they could supply themselves from the railroad which wasn't very far. The one time Sherman tried to break away from his logistics base he didn't get very far because Johnston had anticipated his movement and opposed him. Grant was not a better general of maneuvers or logistics than Sherman so its unlikely that he would do better than Sherman in this regards.

 

[Nytram01]

So he's Braxton Bragg in 1864-5 in 1861? Only good things for the Union from that.

Wrong. Braxton Bragg of 1864/1865 was a petty, bitter, vendetta machine driven on only by his desire to destroy the careers and reputations of the men who turned on him in 1863 and lost whatever military skills he once had.

My vision of McClellan in Grey is more like Bragg of 1861/1862 as he's a good trainer, organizer and disciplinarian and has not yet lost all his effectiveness as a military man due to petty squabbles and politics. But even that's not totally accurate either.

What I read is that Johnston used propaganda to claim his fortress was absolutely strong, and McClellan believing that encouraged others to see it thus. Then it turned out Johnston hoodwinked McClellan at which point Jeff Davis's trust of Johnston took a steep nosedive.

And how exactly is that different to what I said? I said Johnston bluffed and used quaker guns to make his position look very strong so as to fool his enemy and you've said Johnston used propaganda to fool his enemy into thinking his position was very strong.

That Davis - who as Confederate President and Commander-in-Chief was in a position to know that the Confederates couldn't possibly have the strenght in weapons or manpower to hold such a wide and exposed line - chose to believe Johnston's deception is his own fault and no fault of Johnston's.

All mistakes, but not all mistakes are equal. Lee's failures were from over-complicated plans, Grant's from underestimating Confederate resilience. Lee in West Virginia was unceremoniously booted by Rosecrans, while McClellan was well a ways away from fighting, while Grant at Belmont at least had his soldiers actually *fighting*. Beauregard admittedly did not perform well at First Bull Run, but showed some of the best tactical skills of any Confederate general.

When did Beauregard show "some of the best tactical skills of any Confederate General" at 1st Manasas? Was it when he spent the entire morning on Lookout Hill gazing towards Centreville waiting for the chance to launch his own ridiculously complicated battle plan? Was it when he ignored all signs of the actual battle happening on the left flank? Was it running up and down Henry House Hill as a cheerleader?

It certainly wasn't Beauregard who brought the Confederate HQ's to Portici - that was Johnston - and it certainly wasn't Beauregard who found reinforcement and deployed them to the front - that was Johnston - and it certainly wasn't Beauregard who found the Federal flank, led Edmund Kirby Smith's brigade to it personally and sent Jubal Early's brigade in support - that, again, was Johnston.

Johnston's performance in the Vicksburg Campaign, however, is the fly in the ointment here.

But its not because that's not the point. I wasn't talking about 1863 Johnston who's been wounded, sat impotant in Richmond for the better part of a year and justified his mistakes. I clearly said, in the bit the above quoted passage is a response to, that I was talking about the 1862 Johnston.

There is no telling how Johnston would have developed had not fallen wounded at Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. His detractors would have you believe he had some kind of psychological defect that meant he was always going to fail - Mary Chestnut's Wade Hampton story is often quoted for this - but in 1861 and in 1862 Johnston showed decisiveness at a strategic level and preparedness to attack given even a fleeting opportunty.