Maybe just have him serve as Quartermaster General and he could hopefully excel and be recognized for his organizational skill in that capacity?
I don't like to be defending the man, but the devised strategy in the hands of an aggressive commander might have worked. McClellan could devise somewhat clever strategy but he wasn't really capable of carrying them through.
Agreed, but as I pointed out, McClellan simply did not possess the requisite initiative and capacity for aggression for such a strategy to have a chance at success. What this indicates is either that he woefully misestimated his own capabilities (failing to acknowledge that he did not have the military personality for such a strategy), or simply was a lousy strategist who made a plan to divide his force in the face of a superior foe, and then just... sit there.
McClellan was a cautious general, but the nature of that cautiousness is sufficiently haphazard that it's hard to assess. It seems to have manifested itself predominately as caution on a tactical, rather than strategic level. In fact, a lot of his strategy was extraordinarily risky - e.g. the Peninsular Campaign. E.g., leaving Porter's Corps out to be potentially destroyed in detail. At the same time, in the Antietam campaign, he sat on his hands for a few precious days rather than act immediately. It's essentially the opposite of e.g. Phillip Kearny's "I can make men follow me to hell" style of generalship. It's been suggested that he was too concerned for the wellbeing of his men to order them to death.
Is there a way to have George McClellan remembered as a great general?
Agreed, but as I pointed out, McClellan simply did not possess the requisite initiative and capacity for aggression for such a strategy to have a chance at success. What this indicates is either that he woefully misestimated his own capabilities (failing to acknowledge that he did not have the military personality for such a strategy), or simply was a lousy strategist who made a plan to divide his force in the face of a superior foe, and then just... sit there.
McClellan was a cautious general, but the nature of that cautiousness is sufficiently haphazard that it's hard to assess. It seems to have manifested itself predominately as caution on a tactical, rather than strategic level. In fact, a lot of his strategy was extraordinarily risky - e.g. the Peninsular Campaign. E.g., leaving Porter's Corps out to be potentially destroyed in detail. At the same time, in the Antietam campaign, he sat on his hands for a few precious days rather than act immediately. It's essentially the opposite of e.g. Phillip Kearny's "I can make men follow me to hell" style of generalship. It's been suggested that he was too concerned for the well being of his men to order them to death.
If he's elected in 1864 and (near certainly) manages to reunite the Union during his term; people will probably be willing to excuse his 1861-1862 failings.
That is assuming that the south still wants to reunite with the union in a confederate victory. Given that they were hoping for a MCClellan victory so they could make peace on their own terms, which included secessions, it may be a bit doubtful.