McClellan Considered Great General?

TFSmith121

Banned
Montgomery Meigs was QM and did an excellent job

Maybe just have him serve as Quartermaster General and he could hopefully excel and be recognized for his organizational skill in that capacity?

Montgomery Meigs was QM and did an excellent job; there's no reason to replace him.

McClellan, likewise, would be a poor choice for adjutant general (personnel); his conservatism would be detrimental to the recruitment and mobilization of the USCTs, beginning in 1863.

He had no special knowledge or ability in the realms of the ordnance, paymaster, or any other of the staff departments; his railroad management experience could have been helpful, but the US already had Scott and Haupt.

He managed a corps-level command reasonably well during the 1861 West Virginia campaign, all things considered; an equivalent would probably have been the best place for him in 1862, or - at the most - a departmental/army-level command; the general-in-chief's position was beyond his capabilities, or his interests, frankly.

Best,
 
I don't like to be defending the man, but the devised strategy in the hands of an aggressive commander might have worked. McClellan could devise somewhat clever strategy but he wasn't really capable of carrying them through.

Agreed, but as I pointed out, McClellan simply did not possess the requisite initiative and capacity for aggression for such a strategy to have a chance at success. What this indicates is either that he woefully misestimated his own capabilities (failing to acknowledge that he did not have the military personality for such a strategy), or simply was a lousy strategist who made a plan to divide his force in the face of a superior foe, and then just... sit there.

McClellan was a cautious general, but the nature of that cautiousness is sufficiently haphazard that it's hard to assess. It seems to have manifested itself predominately as caution on a tactical, rather than strategic level. In fact, a lot of his strategy was extraordinarily risky - e.g. the Peninsular Campaign. E.g., leaving Porter's Corps out to be potentially destroyed in detail. At the same time, in the Antietam campaign, he sat on his hands for a few precious days rather than act immediately. It's essentially the opposite of e.g. Phillip Kearny's "I can make men follow me to hell" style of generalship. It's been suggested that he was too concerned for the wellbeing of his men to order them to death.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
McClellan was someone who demonstrates the Peter Principle

Agreed, but as I pointed out, McClellan simply did not possess the requisite initiative and capacity for aggression for such a strategy to have a chance at success. What this indicates is either that he woefully misestimated his own capabilities (failing to acknowledge that he did not have the military personality for such a strategy), or simply was a lousy strategist who made a plan to divide his force in the face of a superior foe, and then just... sit there.

McClellan was a cautious general, but the nature of that cautiousness is sufficiently haphazard that it's hard to assess. It seems to have manifested itself predominately as caution on a tactical, rather than strategic level. In fact, a lot of his strategy was extraordinarily risky - e.g. the Peninsular Campaign. E.g., leaving Porter's Corps out to be potentially destroyed in detail. At the same time, in the Antietam campaign, he sat on his hands for a few precious days rather than act immediately. It's essentially the opposite of e.g. Phillip Kearny's "I can make men follow me to hell" style of generalship. It's been suggested that he was too concerned for the wellbeing of his men to order them to death.

McClellan was someone who demonstrates the Peter Principle to the nth degree...

He's not Elphinstone, obviously, but he is also not Wellington (or Scott, or Grant, or Sherman, etc.). He would make a useful division/corps commander; army/departmental level was beyond him, and general-in-chief was another planet.

Best,
 
Agreed, but as I pointed out, McClellan simply did not possess the requisite initiative and capacity for aggression for such a strategy to have a chance at success. What this indicates is either that he woefully misestimated his own capabilities (failing to acknowledge that he did not have the military personality for such a strategy), or simply was a lousy strategist who made a plan to divide his force in the face of a superior foe, and then just... sit there.

McClellan was a cautious general, but the nature of that cautiousness is sufficiently haphazard that it's hard to assess. It seems to have manifested itself predominately as caution on a tactical, rather than strategic level. In fact, a lot of his strategy was extraordinarily risky - e.g. the Peninsular Campaign. E.g., leaving Porter's Corps out to be potentially destroyed in detail. At the same time, in the Antietam campaign, he sat on his hands for a few precious days rather than act immediately. It's essentially the opposite of e.g. Phillip Kearny's "I can make men follow me to hell" style of generalship. It's been suggested that he was too concerned for the well being of his men to order them to death.

On this I do believe we agree. He definitely had an inflated opinion of himself (certainly not helped by the hero-worship in some circles and undying respect of his men) which at times made him good at his job (organizing and planning) but which somehow managed to make him timid and cautious.

I agree it's very difficult to assess (which makes the lack of his own memoirs, which although they would have been self-aggrandizing to the extreme, maddening! They would have at least offered more insight on the man) since we don't know just why he continuously hesitated, even when he had what was basically a slam dunk at Antietam. I do lend credence to the political side of argument (avoid major defeats and thereby set him up for the presidency) but also that he may have been very protective of his men to the point that he didn't want them to die needlessly.

Which while that is a good trait, it really isn't one which allows for excellence in carrying out risky maneuvers or grand strategy. People dying is something of a given in war after all.
 
If he's elected in 1864 and (near certainly) manages to reunite the Union during his term; people will probably be willing to excuse his 1861-1862 failings.
 
If he's elected in 1864 and (near certainly) manages to reunite the Union during his term; people will probably be willing to excuse his 1861-1862 failings.

That is assuming that the south still wants to reunite with the union in a confederate victory. Given that they were hoping for a MCClellan victory so they could make peace on their own terms, which included secessions, it may be a bit doubtful.
 
That is assuming that the south still wants to reunite with the union in a confederate victory. Given that they were hoping for a MCClellan victory so they could make peace on their own terms, which included secessions, it may be a bit doubtful.

Say what you will about McClellan...he wasn't about to let the Confederacy leave. And even if he was, Lincoln would have done everything in his power to win the war before March 4, 1865. No, the Confederacy would have to bank on a peace Democrat taking the nomination in 1864 which would do nothing to boost McClellan's reputation.
 
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