I think the argument is that had Wavell not stopped and somehow kept going and kicked the Axis out of North Africa then Malta would be relatively safe anyway and also not as vital to the Allies as they have bases in Libya and there is no longer a pressing need to interdict supplies etc.That's what I thought from memory, in that case to me it's a relatively moot point about the "two weeks", as mentioned not going to Greece might have allowed a better fighting withdrawal and defence of Tobruk, but wouldn't have created a chance to take all of the Axis territory. Though again how Compass and it's aftermath is relative to the later war actions around Malta still puzzle me a bit?
Which is all true but the act of ‘doing’ it eludes me as the Italians still had several divisions in country sat on or near their main supply port plus whatever the Germans could have surged (which they were in the process of doing) and the relatively small British force was exhausted.
Also had the British not reinforced the Greeks, given their incorrect appreciation of the time it would take for the Germans to stand up forces in Libya and for the Italians to recover I would expect that a fair portion of the forces sent to Greece would instead go south and help beat up the Italians in East Africa which was an even greater shoestring operation as Compass had been.
The only thing that I can see changing all that is a greater and more accurate appreciation of Rommel’s intentions.
But that is a different and quite important POD in itself and beyond the scope of our discussion.