Did Max Hastings express a view on operation Compass? The book under discussion is about Operation Pedestal.
I may have missed something.
Max Hastings: Operation Pedestal
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I may have missed something.
trinity
Banned
The book that I quoted above wasn't written by Max Hastings, but Jon Latimer and Jim Laurier.
Osprey Campaign Operation Compass 1940: Wavell's whirlwind offensive
trinity
Banned
IIRC, wasn't the entire Italian armoured force consigned to near non-existence by the end of Operation Compass? They alone certainly wouldn't have been enough.
Riain
Banned
No idea, but Pedestal was mounted in August 1942, by which time there was no question as to an alteration of Allied strategy. The 8th Army and Desert Air Force were already huge and about to make an unbeatable advance and the US was about to enter the fray with Operation Torch. The time to abandon Malta to the Axis had long since passed, the Allies were in the ascendancy and it was only a matter of time until they overwhelmed the Axis. In that scenario the choice is to fight through the Pedestal convy to retain Malta or let is surrender and take is back in the next 3-6 months.
With what?
Compass (which was never intended to capture Cyrenaica and started life as a 5 day raid ending up as a 2 month rout of the Italian 10th Army) had exhausted the forces in North Africa and as Rain has pointed out the Axis won the reinforcement race by a country mile.
Wavell later lamented that Opsec derived intel and other sources of Rommel claiming he did not have enough stuff convinced Wavell that the Axis were not going to attack before he had a chance to refit his forces in North Africa and the curb stomping of the Italians during Compass had made him too blasé regarding the Italian capability to recover as well as they did.
He understood that he had time.
Rommel was not sending this information to his superiors to catch the British out but to con his superiors into sending him more stuff
If Wavell believe that at the time - would not London think the same?
What Wavell did not have was the forces or the Logistics to advance into Western Libya even had the forces sent to Greece not been sent.
I agree and 'wish' that the Greek 'adventure' had not happened as the extra forces remaining in North Africa might very likely have prevented Sonnenblume from being as big a success as it was and result in a much lower 'high tide mark'.
However I understand why 'Churchill' (and by that I mean HMG - Winston was not a dictator) made the decision to reinforce the Greeks and involve the Yugoslavians (who were probably next after the Greeks anyway).
trinity
Banned
The DAK hadn't even been properly equipped or manned yet before the critical fornight-long imposed delay, whilst the Italian defensive capacities were practically non-existent at this point without extensive German assistance.
The Home Government decision making process was essentially controlled by Churchill at this point, so the two terms are completely interchangeable with each other.
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Riain
Banned
Sure, but it's about 800km from Marsa Al Brega to Tripoli and there are still thousands and even tens of thousands of military personnel such as garrison forces, supply troops and whatever extant field forces still remained intact along this route. It's not as simple as putting 50 men on a bus and driving to Tripoli to accept the surrender, it would have to be a military operation mounted in sufficient force to avoid a disaster and overpower the worst case scenario resistance and deal with any counterattack the Germans might rush in.
The Germans had been investigating sending forces to Libya since October 1940, Hitler issued a directive in November 1940 which he later rescinded and then began ordering German troops to Libya in stages on Jan 11 and Feb 3. The first German troops were in Libya on 14 Feb and the first tanks on 20 Feb, the DAK was formed on 19 Feb.
Riain
Banned
This is about the best that can be hoped for I think. However with the huge non-combat tank losses the British suffered it's just as likely that they lose 200 tanks rather than just 100. That said if all efforts were in Libya and the deployment was sensible I doubt the 2nd AD would have quite as many problems as OTL and at the very least would wear down Rommel a bit more if they were defeated.
trinity
Banned
According to Latimer and Laurier, the already fragile Italian Army morale was nearing total collapse by the end of Operation Compass, so the perceived British strength against the Italians would have been a matter of morale and exaggeration/bluffing rather than their true condition, which wasn't so good either although still much better than that of the Italians.
The true question lies in whether Hitler himself would have fell in for the bluff and ordered the DAK to withdraw to French North Africa, or called Wavell's bluff, and ordered an immediate counterattack against the severely overextended British.
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Riain
Banned
Bluffing requires the player to have cards in his hand, the British had no cards left, they'd shredded and lost the deck in the process of winning the pot.
It was formed enough for German troops to reach Sirte on the 15th Feb and for Op Sonnenblume to have started effectively on the 24th Feb with the Capture of El Agheila.
Note that the last operation of Compass officially finished on the 9th Feb (with some other operations deep in the desert carried out into March)
This supposed 2 week period where Wavell could have routed the Axis in North Africa is fanciful and never existed.
trinity
Banned
German military intelligence capabilities were not up to date even in 1940/1941 when they were fighting a war. With the Abwehr's overestimation of total Allied armoured strength in the Dunkirk pocket during the France 1940 campaign being a crucial factor in the formulation of the Halt Order in the first place, it is not unreasonable to assume that the DAK will repeat the same error that they had made before by overestimating the remaining British AFV strength and so abandon Tripoli to the advancing 8th Army.
Riain
Banned
What does all of this mean in practical terms, as in troops undertaking tasks? Talk of morale collapse and poor intel is all well and good, but exactly what do the British do to take advantage?
For example the poor morale might mean that if a battalion with an artillery battery and a few armoured cars and light tanks shows up at a garrison or camp the Italians surrender. But how far away is this camp or garrison and how do the British get this small force there, and what if there is a desultory fight before surrender, and how do the British deal with the prisoners and occupy the position? What about the fuel, food and ammo to make the next move for this 1000 men and 100 vehicles?
It's on these points of detail that sweeping claims fall over.
trinity
Banned
Not all of the German troops in Sirte on the 15th Feb were necessarily ready for combat: the 2 week period between 9th Feb and the 24th Feb is the one that should be counted.
After Compass, did the British even have the supply capacity to push further forward, let alone the physical equipment? Also again how is this relevant to the question of the importance of Malta? If in this suggested POD the British manage to overrun the Italians then Maltas situation is totally different anyway.
Riain
Banned
No, the British didn't get Benghazi port running until just before Rommel arrived and Tobruk was way too far back to make up for it. As a result they faced the same problems that the Axis did, a lack of strategic transport over the huge distances in Africa itself.
That's what I thought from memory, in that case to me it's a relatively moot point about the "two weeks", as mentioned not going to Greece might have allowed a better fighting withdrawal and defence of Tobruk, but wouldn't have created a chance to take all of the Axis territory. Though again how Compass and it's aftermath is relative to the later war actions around Malta still puzzle me a bit?