While heavier and super heavy tanks may make some kind of tactical sence the evidence suggests they were a poor choice from an strategic POV.
The surviival rates from year to year for the German tanks were
Panzer IV
40% in 1943 & 29% in 1944. This means that of all the tanks built rebuilt and added to the inventory, the above figures are whats left each year. So in 1943 40% of the Panzer IV in the inventory plus those built and rebuilt during that calender year was about 40% of this total.
The figures for Panther were 50% in 1943 and 45% in 1944.
The figures for Tiger I were 55% in 1943 and 25% in 1944.
The figures for Tiger II only cover mid 1944 to early 1945 and show about 50% survival rate.
So the heavier the tank the less survivable it was operationally. The obvious suggestion is that they had to be abandoned in all the retreats of 1943 and 44, which was their main critisim. Do the math on how many more tanks they might have had if they had diverted the resources from these superheavies into some basic tank like the Panzer IV.
What most people fail to grasp is that the superiority of German tanks in the early years of the war was mostly due to superior doctrine and training constrasted against the inferiority and incompetance of their opponents during these years. By the end of the war this situation has reversed. Allied doctrine and training had caught up to early war german levels , while Hitler cripled the German doctrine and the Eastern front bleed them of their best trained units , while allied bombing of the fuel industry linmited all machine training , be it AFV fighter or warship.