Mass armies and crowded battlefields.

The Union Armies carried a lot more "camping and comfort" equipment than a Napoleonic era army.

Ingalls kept about half the wagons loaded with animal feed. Organised as a large flying column this allowed the AoP 10 days operations away from a supply base, although this was feeding the animals at 14lbs/day, causing much wastage (Sherman advocated 20lb/day)*.

If they'd manage to forage to the same level as Napoleon, which is prettymuch an impossibility (the richest farmlands of the west would only support a static force of 20,000), this could be brought down to about 25 wagons/ 1,000 men

Sherman's Atlanta campaign was slightly different. He had 2,500 wagons (ca 25 wagons/1,000 men), and they carried their own forage, and their own load. He formed special foraging parties (of his best troops) to scour the countryside for forage etc. acting much like one of Napoleons campaigns. This was possible due to comparitively rapid movement, and the time of year (and the fact that Georgia was unscathed).

* See Chapter 25 of Sherman's Memoirs at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4361/4361-h/p4.htm#ch25

The numbers don't always reflect the dynamic element of warfare. For example Sherman may have had 2500 wagons on the roster, but they never moved off at the same time. I'd suggest the high point of supply would be soon after the opening of the campaign, but every day, emptied wagons would be turning back to be reloaded. At some point, defined by distance from depots, one third of the wagons would be loaded and available to the troops, one third empty and returning, and one third at the depots either disabled or reloading.

With reference to foraging, how much time is lost by a combat formation if they must collect their own supplies from the land? Since wagons move much slower than troops, either marching or mounted, there must have been a trade-off between waiting for wagon supplies to arrive vs commandeering on the march. Perhaps less critical for infantry formations except when forced marching.

How much supply, especially forage, did ACW cavalry carry when moving quickly? There must be a comparison somewhere between the time taken to allow animals to graze (lost time from the march) and feeding them as much grain as their digestions could handle, and losing less marching time.

Kester
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The numbers don't always reflect the dynamic element of warfare. For example Sherman may have had 2500 wagons on the roster, but they never moved off at the same time. I'd suggest the high point of supply would be soon after the opening of the campaign, but every day, emptied wagons would be turning back to be reloaded. At some point, defined by distance from depots, one third of the wagons would be loaded and available to the troops, one third empty and returning, and one third at the depots either disabled or reloading.

With reference to foraging, how much time is lost by a combat formation if they must collect their own supplies from the land? Since wagons move much slower than troops, either marching or mounted, there must have been a trade-off between waiting for wagon supplies to arrive vs commandeering on the march. Perhaps less critical for infantry formations except when forced marching.

How much supply, especially forage, did ACW cavalry carry when moving quickly? There must be a comparison somewhere between the time taken to allow animals to graze (lost time from the march) and feeding them as much grain as their digestions could handle, and losing less marching time.

Kester

Yes they did. There are two possible methods of supply, either a round robin, with a "racetrack" of wagons behind the army, or organising as a flying column, which means taking all the wagons with you, and moving from supply base to supply base. The latter is more efficient and is the method adopted by both sides (also, it means you don't need to secure a long and tenuous supply line).

Sherman had supply bases on various rivers, with paddle transports protected by gunboats essentially moving up as makeshift depots. He was launching his army from river to river, with hopefully enough supplies to make it too the next (prearranged) supply base. A serious reverse in a few of those movements could have destroyed his army.

March discipline was terrible, and would be until Grant finally started mass hangings in 1864. One of the reasons commanders were reluctant to allow troops to forage (and even Sherman restricted foraging to within sight of camp except for picked men) is that it gave them another opportunity to desert. This is less of a factor if you're a French soldier in Germany for example....

Oh, and Cavalry don't move faster than Infantry. Both are limited to the speed of their wagons and guns, and horses require so much fodder that you essentially can't cut free from them. Cavalry can simply cover a wider area along their line of march, rather than have a longer line of march.
 
The differences between the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and WW1 of 1914 are good indicators of the changes you are talking about. Once the French were smashed at in the frontier battle at Sedan in 1870 the way was open to Paris. But in WW1 radio, telegraph and railways meant that troops could be quickly shuttled to the interior after a defeat on the frontier to form a new defensive line and fight successive battles. Earlier than I think that communication placed a limit of something like 70-80,000 as the most that one general could command at a single battle. Any more than that and he couldn't get is messages and intention out to his subordinates quicly enough. The lack of good portable comunications persisted well into WW1, the loss of comms once troops got into the opposing trenches was a major reason the success couldn't be reinforced and exploited where it was achieved.
 

MrP

Banned
The differences between the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and WW1 of 1914 are good indicators of the changes you are talking about. Once the French were smashed at in the frontier battle at Sedan in 1870 the way was open to Paris. But in WW1 radio, telegraph and railways meant that troops could be quickly shuttled to the interior after a defeat on the frontier to form a new defensive line and fight successive battles. Earlier than I think that communication placed a limit of something like 70-80,000 as the most that one general could command at a single battle. Any more than that and he couldn't get is messages and intention out to his subordinates quicly enough. The lack of good portable comunications persisted well into WW1, the loss of comms once troops got into the opposing trenches was a major reason the success couldn't be reinforced and exploited where it was achieved.

I half recall reading somewhere - maybe it was Martin Samuels? - that this was why the Prussians instituted the General Staff - to make everyone so well-trained they thought pretty much the same thing, and thus allow instantaneous communications (as it were) in an age when they couldn't be achieved.
 
There is also the question of Costs,
Not only did Military and Industrial Technology, get more advanced, but so did the Economic Sector, and Banking Sector.
The Prussia that had trouble paying 60,000 soldiers in the 1770's, could Pay 600,000 Soldiers in 1870.
 
How about density? Earlier armies had to mass their forces in a way made impossible by modern artillery and air power. Even if the armies where smaller, they where hold together more.
 
There is also the question of Costs,
Not only did Military and Industrial Technology, get more advanced, but so did the Economic Sector, and Banking Sector.
The Prussia that had trouble paying 60,000 soldiers in the 1770's, could Pay 600,000 Soldiers in 1870.
One of the advantages the British had over the French in the eighteenth century was well run finances. Because they were reliable at paying back their war loans they could borrow at a cheaper rates, which of course made it easier to pay the money.

Looking at another era, the early Imperial Romans had paid armies because they had a good cash flow. By the time the Dark Ages was finished cash flow in Europe was so poor that feudalism was invented partly to support the raising of an army. When money picked up again in the Middles Ages, the richer kings and princes switched from feudal rabbles to mercenary reavers.
 
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