Marshall getting his invasion of France in 1942

Could Roosevelt and Marshal have forced it in 1942? they did their best, though.

What would it have taken to bully Churchill?
 
Could Roosevelt and Marshal have forced it in 1942? they did their best, though.

What would it have taken to bully Churchill?

Very simple. 'We go to France or no more Lend lease.' or even just 'We go to France or the USSR gets first priority on Lend Lease.' FDR had the same leverage as anyone who is paying the bills. If he REALLY wanted something from the British he was in a position to get it.
 
FDR had the same leverage as anyone who is paying the bills. If he REALLY wanted something from the British he was in a position to get it.

He was also terrified of scaring the UK into the Soviet camp, which this revelation of insanity would do.
 
He was also terrified of scaring the UK into the Soviet camp, which this revelation of insanity would do.

Churchill though understood that the British were the junior partner and he had been desperate to 'drag the US in.' It really all depends how much Roosevelt wants this to go through. If he forces the issue Churchill really has no choice but to agree. The British need the US more than the other way around.
 
Churchill though understood that the British were the junior partner and he had been desperate to 'drag the US in.'

It's going to be hard to see how he's the junior partner when the invasion will consist of majority British/Commonwealth forces.
 
When Marshall pressed for Sledgehammer he didn't actually have the forces he was promising to provide.

According to Andrew Roberts in Masters and Commanders, Operation Sledgehammer called for a landing by an Allied Force of 9 divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsular which could capture Cherbourg and its ports and be gradually strenghtened to ensure the Allied presence on the continent and draw the Germans into Normandy.

The process for a cross channel invasion called for the build up of 500,000 US troops to be in the UK - Operation Bolero - followed either by Operation Sledgehammer - as describe above - or Operation Roundup - a 48 division landing between Bolounge and Le Harve pushing up into Belguim.

When Marshall presented these plans to Brooke and the British Chiefs of Staff he could only offer 2 and a half divisions and 700 planes, and by the time Marshall wanted Sledgehammer put in operation - September 1942 - there were only 15 and a half US divisions earmarked for European service in existance and they were in the States. And at that period of time the US could provide no significant airforces for the operation, nor shipping, and the British themselves could not provide extra airforces or shipping due to commitments to the Middle-East, North Africa, India and Burma.

In short, Sledgehammer was impracticable to all involved, and Marshall knew that when he presented it. He didn't actually expect an agreement to get it put into effect, he expected an agreement in principal for a cross-channel invasion by 1943 at the latest.

The British were not prepared to outrightly refuse the American's plans for fear that they would take their ball and go home, that is head to the Pacific and abandon the "Germany First" agreement if the British didn't agree to do what the US wanted, and though Brooke, Churchill, Portal and Pound agreed with Bolero wholeheartedly and agreed in principal to a return to the continent by 1943 they did not agree with either Sledgehammer or Roundup - yet Marshall took Churchill pomposity and bluster as full support for both operations even though Brooke and the Chiefs of Staff had presented major misgivings over them.

When the British Chiefs of Staff flew to America later that year, Churchill met Roosevelt without them in New York while Brooke, Portal and Pound met with the Marshall and the American Chiefs of Staff. At this time Brooke and Marshall both agreed to support Bolero and a cross channel invasion in 1943 while Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to support Operation Gymnast - the invasion of North Africa which became Torch - mainly because Roosevelt wanted Americans in action against the Germans before the next election, and so for political reasons Bolero was to be delayed and the cross channel invasion put back a further year. Marshall did not accept this and continued to argue against it.

Later Marsall would fly back to the UK with King and Hopkins to get a definite decision of where the American troops would be used. Roosevelt told him that if he couldn't get the British to agree to Sledgehammer then he would have to find some alternative operation - by that time there was no doubt that Roosevelt was favouring North Africa.

Marshall was prepared, at that time, to use the threat of transfering the bulk of American manpower and material to the Pacific to deal with Japan if the British didn't agree to cross the channel and he and King had written up an ultimatum about this which they presented to Roosevelt to confirm. Roosevelt rejected it however saying that he did not like the "Japan First" memorandum because struck him like "taking up your dishes and going away" - a childish and petulant response for not getting their own way - nevertheless it did show that Marshall was prepared to use the Pacific as a threat to made the British fall in line.
 
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All resources towards it. Malta falls in December 1941 as it is not re-supplied. Parachute jumps and LW - Crete in 1941.

60% of Rommels supplies got sunk at the heights of the Malta campaign, so it is fair to assume that with an additional 60% for Rommel, the drive for the Canal is indeed possible.

I've heard (Van Creveld?) that the value of Malta at this stage has been overstated, with the real problems being the lack of port capacity at Tripoli etc, and the vast distances from the ports to the front in Egypt. So neutralising Malta just means fuller warehouses, which doesn't help Rommel break the Alamein line, but it would help him make a stand at somewhere like Agheila.

Of course, if 8th Army reinforcements like those Shermans and 6-pounders get diverted to France, then there's a good chance that both sides are unable to break Alamein.
 
I've heard (Van Creveld?) that the value of Malta at this stage has been overstated, with the real problems being the lack of port capacity at Tripoli etc, and the vast distances from the ports to the front in Egypt. So neutralising Malta just means fuller warehouses, which doesn't help Rommel break the Alamein line, but it would help him make a stand at somewhere like Agheila.

Of course, if 8th Army reinforcements like those Shermans and 6-pounders get diverted to France, then there's a good chance that both sides are unable to break Alamein.

This is true and not true... undoubtedly Tripoli and Bengahzi were working to full capacity and eliminating Malta to secure those routes doesn't chance that material effect

however, eliminating Malta DOES free up very considerable air forces from suppression and escort duties to either directly support the panzer army africa or to bomb the RN's station ports

Malta also provides a very useful stop for refueling for covering fighters and or a place to put in for damaged ships etc etc
 
When Marshall pressed for Sledgehammer he didn't actually have the forces he was promising to provide.

Later Marsall would fly back to the UK with King and Hopkins to get a definite decision of where the American troops would be used. Roosevelt told him that if he couldn't get the British to agree to Sledgehammer then he would have to find some alternative operation - by that time there was no doubt that Roosevelt was favouring North Africa.

Marshall was prepared, at that time, to use the threat of transfering the bulk of American manpower and material to the Pacific to deal with Japan if the British didn't agree to cross the channel and he and King had written up an ultimatum about this which they presented to Roosevelt to confirm. Roosevelt rejected it however saying that he did not like the "Japan First" memorandum because struck him like "taking up your dishes and going away" - a childish and petulant response for not getting their own way - nevertheless it did show that Marshall was prepared to use the Pacific as a threat to made the British fall in line.

Even if FDR felt this way and was committed to a Germany First strategy it still would have taken no m ore than a single letter or phone call to Churchill threatening the possibility to force him to agree. The British needed US weapons and material as much as they needed soldiers. The fact that the US could divert resources to other theaters would be enough to force the British to agree. All that was lacking was FDR's willingness to force the issue.
 
too soon

1942 was just to soon. The earliest I would consider defending as a possible D Day would be after Torch and instead of Sicily.
And that got me into my biggest multiple boogey dogfight since I've stumbled upon this site...
 
Of course 1942 was too soon. But Marshall was also under pressure from King.

One thing that Brooke had difficulties with was that landing craft was pulled out of the Med for Overlord and, I believe, for Pacific.

As Brooke saw it, it was the threat in the Med which would keep Germany occupied, not an actual invasion of Italy.

If Grmany would have to guard the entire coast, they would be a bit busy. But an Anzio would immediately relieve the pressure (if could be contained).

So, US had a tendency to bully poor UK.

Brooke also asked Marshall: Now, if you get ashore, then waht? do you go North? South, East? West maybe? what? Marshall did not have any view of it, except to just get ashore.

Now, maybe if they had employed some from the Pacific with a bit of experience in beach landings?

Ivan
 
Nothing can force Churchill into launching an invasion for which he lacks the troops, weaponry or landing craft and the US in 1942 can not provide the amount needed in any category so the idea fails.

Or we could have FDR and his top advisors go insane, force Churchill into madness and after the invasion fails...along with the British government...
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Even if FDR felt this way and was committed to a Germany First strategy it still would have taken no m ore than a single letter or phone call to Churchill threatening the possibility to force him to agree. The British needed US weapons and material as much as they needed soldiers. The fact that the US could divert resources to other theaters would be enough to force the British to agree. All that was lacking was FDR's willingness to force the issue.

All that was lacking was FDR being insane.

Fixed your quote for you. FDR order sledgehammer in 1942 or 1943 means he is making serious military mistakes, like Hilter was prone to do at the end. In 1942 or 1943, the USA lack air control or enough land forces. We did have control of the sea, but 1 out of 3 does not work in amphibious operations.
 
All that was lacking was FDR being insane.

Fixed your quote for you. FDR order sledgehammer in 1942 or 1943 means he is making serious military mistakes, like Hilter was prone to do at the end. In 1942 or 1943, the USA lack air control or enough land forces. We did have control of the sea, but 1 out of 3 does not work in amphibious operations.

Every major political leader in World War Two made serious military mistakes either for political reasons or because they failed to really understand the situation.

Hitler - His halt order allowed the BEF just enough leeway to escape to Dunkirk. His insistence on launching Barbarossa. His declaration of war on the United States. His constant orders that troops not be allowed to retreat, particularly at Stalingrad.

Mussolini - His decision to enter the war. His decision to attack the British in order to capture Egypt. His decision to invade Greece.

Churchill - His decision to divert troops to Greece rather than allow O'Connor to finish off the Italians. The dispatch of Force Z. Placing Percival in command of the defense of Malaysia.

Roosevelt taking the advice of his most trusted military adviser would hardly make him insane. I agree it would be a major mistake, but it's hardly as if all his decisions were perfect. It's not out of the realm of possibility to think Marshall and the Joint Chiefs could point to British results after two years of war and argue they weren't the best teachers. Norway, Belgium, France, Greece, Crete, Cyrencia; they had lost a lot more battles than they had won.

If Marshal really believed they could carve out a permanent foothold out of occupied France the US moving forward with a less than eager British governemtn in tow doesn't seem at all impossible.

Is it smart? No.

Is it possible? Yes.
 
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Even if FDR felt this way and was committed to a Germany First strategy it still would have taken no m ore than a single letter or phone call to Churchill threatening the possibility to force him to agree. The British needed US weapons and material as much as they needed soldiers. The fact that the US could divert resources to other theaters would be enough to force the British to agree. All that was lacking was FDR's willingness to force the issue.

The Americans had committed themselves to a Germany First stance the moment they entered the war. Roosevelt was not about to go back on his word, nor was he about to let Marshall talk him out of it - however much he respected Marshall's military knowledge.

The British did need US Weapons and Material but the US needed Britain's Ports and Airfields. Without access to Britain's facilities the US had no springboard to launch an invasion of mainland Europe and no secure base to operate from. As is usual in the give and take world of international politics especially in wartime with Allies each sided needed the other for different things and couldn't just demand the other fell in line.

And, additionally, Admiral King, industriously, syphoned off troops, shipping and landing craft earmarked for Europe and sent it to MacArthur and Guadalacanal while Marshall, Roosevelt, Churchill and Brooke were debating strategy for the Germans. So not only could the US divert their forces to the Pacific, they did.
 
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What I see happening, if Americans do try, is invasion of Bretagne or Cotentine peninsula. Those areas could be easily defendable and naval support would be available round the clock. As to how to make this posible? Say, Germans decide to cut their losses in North Africa and send planes and troops to USSR instead in Tunisia if for example Soviets are more succesful/early.

Allies than capture Africa without trouble, but decide to invade France in 1943 instead of Italy. Problem is, while they could pull this off, it would be a dead end. Nothing would happen there until 1944 anyway, when suficient reinforcements could be brought from USA. Trouble with any scenario for 1943 invasion runs into problem to explain away why Allies would not pick on Italy, which offered the best oportunity to score diplomatic points and knock an oponent out of fight.
 
I'm sure Roosevelt could have pressed harder for a second front in Europe but I'm equally sure that Churchill and the British Generals would go along and do everything in their power to put the brakes on, probably with some of their US counterparts in support once it becomes clear how impossibly it is in the timeframe.
Yes all the war leaders made mistakes but those mistakes reflected their character and history; I simply don't buy Roosevelt turning into a reckless gambler.
 
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