Marshal Zhukov, General Secretary of the USSR

Ming777

Monthly Donor
What if the very decorated Marshal Zhukov somehow became leader of the Soviet Union after Stalin? How migh t the cold war have turned out?
 
That's actually really interesting. In terms of foreign policy, President Eisenhower and Premier Zhukov would have a great personal relationship with each other, but neither men would be slow to take aggressive action. So who knows how that could work out. There's an opportunity there, both for disaster and Detente. Berlin Summit might be successful and come to some kind of consensus on Germany (or U-2 might screw it up). Zhukov's might travel abroad less than Khrushchev, so Nixon's political profile might drop without the Kitchen Debate.

Internally I can't see him having much success. Certainly less reform minded than Khrushchev, and less likely to agree to the post-WW2 budget cuts. Secret speech is probably butterflied away.
 
Certainly less reform minded than Khrushchev

Which is why in Joanna Granville's accounts of the Presidium meetings Zhukov was more strident against intervention into Hungary than Khrushchev? Because, you know, mentioning the real extent of casualties expected from the operation as an excuse to not crush workers councils outside of the party is obviously less reform minded.

yours,
Sam R.
 
Which is why in Joanna Granville's accounts of the Presidium meetings Zhukov was more strident against intervention into Hungary than Khrushchev? Because, you know, mentioning the real extent of casualties expected from the operation as an excuse to not crush workers councils outside of the party is obviously less reform minded.

yours,
Sam R.
Hungary was an external operation, when I think of internal reform matters I don't really link the connection of the intervention of Hungary to growing corn in Central Asia for example.
 
Hungary was an external operation, when I think of internal reform matters I don't really link the connection of the intervention of Hungary to growing corn in Central Asia for example.

If you're unable to see how supporting the development of workers councils outside of party control in an aligned state relates to internal reform of the soviet union, then I don't think your opinion on reform in the soviet union is of any value.

yours,
Sam R.
 
If you're unable to see how supporting the development of workers councils outside of party control in an aligned state relates to internal reform of the soviet union, then I don't think your opinion on reform in the soviet union is of any value.

yours,
Sam R.
That certainly seems uncalled for in a discussion that's supposed to be give and take. Perhaps instead of just trying to be witty, you could contribute to the discussion instead if you believe you have something of more value to say besides belittling other posters?

I'll say there's also a line between being cautious about foreign intervention for military and diplomatic reasons, and believing that it would be the best course of action for the USSR to follow as well.
 
First of all, this is very unlikely, given the CPSU leadership's fear of "Bonapartism." Zhukov was not even a full member of the Presidium (as the Politburo was then called) until July 1957, and he remained one only for a few months. He had helped to defeat the Anti-Party Group, but that very fact convinced Khrushchev that he was getting too powerful.

Second, on Hungary: my reading is that he (like Khrushchev and the majority of the Presidium) was conciliatory through October 30, wanting to give Imre Nagy a chance. But when Khrushchev changed his mind on the 31st, Zhukov went along with him, as did the rest of the Presidium except Mikoyan. By November 1, Zhukov was adamant that the military intervention must go ahead: "Remove all the rotten elements. Disarm the counter-revolution. Everything must be brought to order." https://books.google.com/books?id=OOxRrfalHJcC&pg=PT269
 
What if the very decorated Marshal Zhukov somehow became leader of the Soviet Union after Stalin? How migh t the cold war have turned out?

First of all, this is very unlikely, given the CPSU leadership's fear of "Bonapartism." Zhukov was not even a full member of the Presidium (as the Politburo was then called) until July 1957, and he remained one only for a few months. He had helped to defeat the Anti-Party Group, but that very fact convinced Khrushchev that he was getting too powerful.

"General Secretary" is the leader of the Communist Party, not of the Soviet Union. Yes, yes, they're often the same, but IF Zhukov managed to be leader of the Soviet Union, it would surely not be through the ranks of the Communist Party.

So. "President" might work. "Great Leader" or some other invented title might.

The most obvious route would be a coup or semi-coup in the last days of WWII, when some really stupid political decision is handed out that would be militarily disastrous and the Army refuses.

Another possibility would be the Party has massive infighting with several factions allying with various power blocs in the country, and the faction supported by the Red Army wins. Unlikely, but possible.
 
"General Secretary" is the leader of the Communist Party, not of the Soviet Union. Yes, yes, they're often the same, but IF Zhukov managed to be leader of the Soviet Union, it would surely not be through the ranks of the Communist Party.

So. "President" might work. "Great Leader" or some other invented title might.

The most obvious route would be a coup or semi-coup in the last days of WWII, when some really stupid political decision is handed out that would be militarily disastrous and the Army refuses.

Another possibility would be the Party has massive infighting with several factions allying with various power blocs in the country, and the faction supported by the Red Army wins. Unlikely, but possible.

The Party was quite adept at playing the KGB against the Military and vice versa. Hence why the Party stood above each. Zhukov would have had to distance himself from the army as Andropov did in 1983 when he followed Brezhnev with his best bet probably being in 1953 following Stalin. I dont know enough about the situation at this time to plot out a scenario or assess its plausibility.
 
None of those threads got off the first page, though; the question remains, essentially, unanswered.

So, what and where are biographies, opinions, views on Zhukov? Most recent biography is Andrew Roberts' Stalin's General, which, um, the title gives quite a lot away.

Last part of the last chapter before the conclusion, according to Roberts, Zhukov towards the end of his life filled out one of those celebrity questionnaire things, and his daughter Maria preserved the answers(I think we can assume there was some cherry picking as to what made it into the book);


Q. What is the most important thing in a person's life?
Z: A sense of duty fulfilled.

Q. What quality in people do you value above all?
Z: Integrity.

Q. On the part of men?
Z: Courage and audacity.

Q. On the part of women?
Z: Faithfulness and tenderness.

Q. Your favourite colour?
Z: Sky-blue.

Q. Favourite writers?
Z; Lev Tolstoy, Mikhail Sholokov, Alexander Tvardovsky.

Q. Most talented Russian commanders?
Z: Suvorov and Kutuzov. It is impossible to separate them.

Q. Favourite composer?
Z: Tchaikovsky.

Q. What won't you forgive?
Z: Betrayal!

Q. Are you envious of any of your friends?
Z: Yes! I've always envied Budenny. He is a virtuoso on the accordion.


Judge the man from that if you like, but it seems obvious to me that he would not have made a good civil or peacetime leader. He held himself to very high standards, expected the same from his staff, and was very abrupt with them when they failed to meet his standards. He could be brutally demanding, and difficult to serve.

On the other hand he did owe loyalty upwards, and he was a convinced and committed Communist by choice, a true believer. It's not really credible that he could or would have led a coup; if the job somehow came to him, he would do it, but he was not a great intriguer, too abrupt, too much Red Army in him.

And in the last analysis...accordions. Yeurgh. That alone should have been enough to disqualify a man from any position above street sweeper.
 
And the question, again, remains unanswered? If anything we really should try to answer the what if, for the minimum reason of stopping the question coming up again and again.

Why would he end up with a job he didn't want, showed no signs of wanting and would probably have been terrible at?

An assassination at Yalta seems the most likely thing- during the war, somehow, Stalin and most of his aides are killed, the war is still going on, the party fall out among themselves, after much Zhukovian yelling at people to organise the attack on Berlin it emerges that he is the dominant personality of what is left of the Russian high command.

He would have done the job set before him, but figuring out what to do next... he was an operator, not a statesman.

If anything he might have maintained Stalin's forced- draft policies, using the army to pull society forwards, intolerant of slacking and failure as he was I can't help thinking cracks would have started to show, and if anything he was possibly a bit too communist.
 
On the issue of a Zhukov "coup": he was implicitly and sometimes even explicitly accused of planning one when he was removed in October 1957. But the accusation seems quite clearly false. Brian D. Taylor in *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000* writes (pp. 186-188):

"There were a host of accusations against Zhukov, including weakening Communist Party control over the military, creating a Zhukov 'cult of personality' in the army, and most seriously, trying to acquire unlimited political power and of 'Bonapartism.' Khrushchev told the October CC Plenum, 'in Zhukov's understanding, there is no place for the party...he was counting on the power of the army..This is nothing other than a military dictatorship, a military junta.' Khrushchev was even more direct in his memoirs, stating that 'Zhukov was striving to seize control...we were heading for a coup d'etat...We couldn't let Zhukov stage a South American military-style takeover in our country.'

"Other speakers echoed Khrushchev's claim about the political danger Zhukov represented. Presidium member Mikhail Suslov noted the impermissibiity in a socialist country of a 'general on a white horse 'saving' the country.' General M. V. Zakharov accused Zhukov of 'Napoleonic aspirations' and 'Bonapartism.'

"Khrushchev also claims that Moskalenko accused Zhukov of trying to seize power. According to Khrushchev, Zhukov replied, 'How can you accuse me? You yourself told me many times, 'Take power in your own hands. Just take it! Take power!' Khrushchev states that he believed Zhukov that Moskalenko had said this. He contends that no action was taken against Moskalenko because of his assistance in the arrest of Beria in 1953. Sergey Khrushchev and Viktor Grishin also believe this story. Sergey Khrushchev maintains that no action was taken against Moskalenko because he was known as a sycophant, who was quite capable of trying to suck up to Zhukov by telling him to take power and then turning around and accusing Zhukov of planning a coup to please Khrushchev.

"Still, it is hard to believe that Moskalenko would be allowed to remain the commander of the crucial Moscow Military District until 1960 if he had stated praetorian tendencies. He was later appointed head of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Moroever, as the Russian military historian V. A. Anfilov points out, Zhukov had nothing bad to say about Moskalenko in his memoirs; in fact, he had good things to say about Moskalenko. Zhukov presumably would have been more critical of Moskalenko if Moskalenko had accused him of planning a military coup in October 1957. Regardless, there is no evidence that, if Moskalenko did make such a statement to Zhukov, that Zhukov took the suggestion seriously.

"No evidence that Zhukov had any intention of trying to seize power was presented at the October Plenum. The best piece of evidence that Khrushchev could produce for the alleged plot was that Zhukov had taken steps to set up a central school for special forces (Spetsnaz) and had informed only two other officers, without acquiring CC approval. Khrushchev said accusingly, 'Beria also had his group of commandos.' In fact, every Military District had established Spetsnaz companies. Zhukov argued he simply was trying to create a better training method for the special forces, maintaining that he did not consider this a new question that needed party approval. Moreover, it is untrue that only Zhukov and two other officers knew of the existence of the school; plans for establishing the school were conducted through regular Ministry of Defense channels.

"The fact that Zhukov was not trying to seize power also is evident from ow he was treated at the time. Zhukov was not arrested, reduced in rank, or dismissed from the party. After Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964 the accusations of 'Bonapartism' against Zhukov were dropped. Recent archival revelations show that Zhukov remained distressed for years about this accusation. In private conversations with his wife, reported to Khrushchev by the KGB, Zhukov said he 'couldn't make peace' with the allegation. 'What facts are there? None,' Zhukov complained. 'If I had been trying to seize power, he noted, 'why wasn't I arrested?'..." https://books.google.com/books?id=oanB4q0o2vsC&pg=PA186
 
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And the question, again, remains unanswered? If anything we really should try to answer the what if, for the minimum reason of stopping the question coming up again and again.

It's not unanswered. It's a moot point.

It's like asking "How would Germans treat UK population after successful invasion in 1940?" And the answer is "Gemrans can't invade so any occuaption plans are moot".

Since Zhukov can't become GenSec then it's irrelevant what kind of leader he might be
 
On the issue of a Zhukov "coup": he was implicitly and sometimes even explicitly accused of planning one when he was removed in October 1957. But the accusation seems quite clearly false.

My question is then: why was Zhukov removed? Soviet bureaucracy worked through indirection, particularly with accusations against central party figures. Much like Bukharin's "parallelogram of forces" for terrorism, wrecking, espionage, and a right-Trotsky centre for counter revolution were not the cause of his persecution. Moreover the indirection is used to mask a real phenomena. In the case of Bukharin, a real and unorganised tendency within the party that didn't believe the economic line to be correct. Similarly, in this document Mikoyan's report appears to actually be an attack on Rakosi, Gero and the 1949 party purge ("that it is an intolerable violation of internal party discipline when officials of the CC apparatus do not carry out the decisions of the elected party organs, the collective leadership, and conduct their own policy directed against the CC"), rather than an attack on Nagy or the Petofi club. (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc3.pdf)

Given that formal and substantive are separated in Soviet bureaucratic practice, even within the central organs, why remove Zhukov?

It couldn't be Zhukov's incompetence at playing the nasty and deceptive games of a central committee member. Nor could it be his inability to form an independent series of links with powerful more junior nomenklatura, particularly outside of the military. The PC could carry dead weight fine.

I'd propose it was as a sop to the anti-party group tendency.

When central policy formation involves such high levels of indirection, particularly on matters such as whether the communist party should be the leading social tendency by force or by quality of persuasion. When policy issues such as a heavy industry or light industry line are masked behind the competence of Bierut or Nagy. In these circumstances removing Zhukov is probably removing a potential (but not actual) line or tendency. It wouldn't be Mikoyan (too competent and useful).

yours,
Sam R.
 
My question is then: why was Zhukov removed? Soviet bureaucracy worked through indirection, particularly with accusations against central party figures. Much like Bukharin's "parallelogram of forces" for terrorism, wrecking, espionage, and a right-Trotsky centre for counter revolution were not the cause of his persecution. Moreover the indirection is used to mask a real phenomena. In the case of Bukharin, a real and unorganised tendency within the party that didn't believe the economic line to be correct. Similarly, in this document Mikoyan's report appears to actually be an attack on Rakosi, Gero and the 1949 party purge ("that it is an intolerable violation of internal party discipline when officials of the CC apparatus do not carry out the decisions of the elected party organs, the collective leadership, and conduct their own policy directed against the CC"), rather than an attack on Nagy or the Petofi club. (http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc3.pdf)

Given that formal and substantive are separated in Soviet bureaucratic practice, even within the central organs, why remove Zhukov?

It couldn't be Zhukov's incompetence at playing the nasty and deceptive games of a central committee member. Nor could it be his inability to form an independent series of links with powerful more junior nomenklatura, particularly outside of the military. The PC could carry dead weight fine.

I'd propose it was as a sop to the anti-party group tendency.

When central policy formation involves such high levels of indirection, particularly on matters such as whether the communist party should be the leading social tendency by force or by quality of persuasion. When policy issues such as a heavy industry or light industry line are masked behind the competence of Bierut or Nagy. In these circumstances removing Zhukov is probably removing a potential (but not actual) line or tendency. It wouldn't be Mikoyan (too competent and useful).

yours,
Sam R.

Well, first of all, the fact that Zhukov was not planning a coup doesn't mean that there wasn't a fear that he might do so in the future. One really couldn't advance to the Politburo/Presidium *without* a dose of paranoia--or what might seem like paranoia to people who had never experienced what CPSU leaders had. Incidentally, Shepilov and others have claimed that at first Zhukov himself had favored the ouster of Khrushchev--which if true would only increase Khrushchev's distrust.

Second, it is true that Zhukov took a harder line against the Anti-Party Group than Khrushchev himself (let alone other members of the Presidium--some of whom had at first sided with the Group) essentially urging that they be tried for complicity in the 1937-38 repressions. It is true that he said that Khrushchev was in a different category because he had led the fight against the Stalin cult in 1956. But as William Taubman remarks this "backfired badly. It was one thing to indict the likes of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, but another to imply that Khrushchev himself had been Stalin's accomplice and then, as if Zhukov himself were the conscience of the revolution, to forgive him." https://books.google.com/books?id=8n7zYmshBNgC&pg=PA363

Third--and most important--why *not* oust Zhukov? There was no real risk involved, given that Zhukov was unpopular with many of his colleagues in the Army. So why not oust someone who was seen as too powerful and not entirely reliable by either Khrushchev or the other members of the Presidium?
 
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