Mark Antony as a Military Commander
I was reading the Mark Antony killed at Mutina thread and it had me thinking about Mark Antony as a military commander. From what i've read he seems to be underrated.
Antony during his early years performed well in the East, Gaul and during Caesar's Civil War. After Caesar assassination, he fought Octavian's forces a Forum Gallorum and Muntia both battles he was horribly outnumbered, managed to inflict heavier casualties then sustained and killed both enemy consuls. Later at Phillipi he pretty much won the battle himself due to Octavian's illness.
Now later in his career he starts to slip a little bit. The Parthian war certainly did not go as planned, he took heavy losses and archived little outside of subduing Armenia. Antony did he managed to keep his army intact something Crassus failed to do at Carrhae. He managed to keep discipline in his army utilizing his light skirmisher forces well and kept his cavalry from overextending themselves, like at Carrhae, and limited them to short successful charges. Over his 27 day retreat he fought a through 18 engagements and survived, despite being attacked by a far more mobile force of 40,000 cataphracts-horse archers.
Now finally we have Actium. Antony's plan for the campaign and his positioning southern Greece seems like a good choice. I'll quote Anthony Everitt "Antony's plan can only have been to tempt, or at least allow, Octavian to transport his army into Greece. The fleet at Actium could then move north and mount a general blockade, preventing provisions and reinforcements from coming to Octavian's assistance. Once the trap was closed, the Roman empire's leading commander would delay offering a set-piece battle. With his safe supply route to Egypt, Antony would have all the time in the world, whereas Octavian, whom he knew already short of money, would soon also be short of food. Bottled up and desperate for an encounter Octavian and his army would be easily finessed into a weak defensive position and routed." We can also blame Quintus Dellius betraying all of his plans to Octavian which I'm sure didn't help. I do however think it was a mistake for Antony to put so much focus on the naval aspect and not his land army. Canidius Crassus wanted Antony to play for a land battle and I think had it been fought he probably would have won.
Hope the above analysis was good.
Where do you think he ranks as a ancient military? Were any of his post Caesar contemporaries better then him such as Agrippa, Sextus Pompey, Cassius, Lepidus, Ventidius, ect...?
@James XI posted this in the Mutina thread, I very much agree:
I was reading the Mark Antony killed at Mutina thread and it had me thinking about Mark Antony as a military commander. From what i've read he seems to be underrated.
Antony during his early years performed well in the East, Gaul and during Caesar's Civil War. After Caesar assassination, he fought Octavian's forces a Forum Gallorum and Muntia both battles he was horribly outnumbered, managed to inflict heavier casualties then sustained and killed both enemy consuls. Later at Phillipi he pretty much won the battle himself due to Octavian's illness.
Now later in his career he starts to slip a little bit. The Parthian war certainly did not go as planned, he took heavy losses and archived little outside of subduing Armenia. Antony did he managed to keep his army intact something Crassus failed to do at Carrhae. He managed to keep discipline in his army utilizing his light skirmisher forces well and kept his cavalry from overextending themselves, like at Carrhae, and limited them to short successful charges. Over his 27 day retreat he fought a through 18 engagements and survived, despite being attacked by a far more mobile force of 40,000 cataphracts-horse archers.
Now finally we have Actium. Antony's plan for the campaign and his positioning southern Greece seems like a good choice. I'll quote Anthony Everitt "Antony's plan can only have been to tempt, or at least allow, Octavian to transport his army into Greece. The fleet at Actium could then move north and mount a general blockade, preventing provisions and reinforcements from coming to Octavian's assistance. Once the trap was closed, the Roman empire's leading commander would delay offering a set-piece battle. With his safe supply route to Egypt, Antony would have all the time in the world, whereas Octavian, whom he knew already short of money, would soon also be short of food. Bottled up and desperate for an encounter Octavian and his army would be easily finessed into a weak defensive position and routed." We can also blame Quintus Dellius betraying all of his plans to Octavian which I'm sure didn't help. I do however think it was a mistake for Antony to put so much focus on the naval aspect and not his land army. Canidius Crassus wanted Antony to play for a land battle and I think had it been fought he probably would have won.
Hope the above analysis was good.
@James XI posted this in the Mutina thread, I very much agree:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/wi-mark-antony-killed-at-mutina.399898/This period was Antony at his absolute best as a commander, even though it's often portrayed as a lull for him because it coincided with Octavian's rise to legitimacy. At Forum Gallorum he adopted a Napoleonic strategy that almost worked, taking on 8 legions with his 2, wiping out more than 5 legions and withdrawing in reasonably good order, though still heavily outnumbered. At Mutina he's facing greater than 2:1 odds and comes within a hair's breath of winning, killed both enemy consuls and retreated in good order. At Phillipi he alone defeated both Liberator wings, saving Octavian's life/legions and destroying the enemy army.
Because his enemies wrote his history he's often marginalized, but there's a lot of evidence that suggests he was a brilliant commander and pretty shrewd politician. His principle weakness seems to be that the above describe him in moments of crisis/action...when things subside to the day to day he grows restless, indolent and luxuriant.
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