Marianne Wept: An Interwar Timeline

The Northern Expedition

"Western journalists, in their hubris and naivety, have drastically misunderstood Chinese politics. [...] Just last week, the New York Times called Zhou Enlai the 'Most Dangerous Man in China'. This could not be further from the truth. In actuality, Zhou Enlai is, by far, the most dangerous creature on the face of the Earth".
-Chiang Kai Shek

Wang Jingwei had his work cut out for him. The Zhili had achieved control over the northern part of the country, having decisively crushed every army that stood against them. At the same time, the right-wing faction of the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was power-hungry and anxious to replace Wang. Nevertheless, the Republic had a much better trained, equipped, and organized army than the Zhili, who had still not recovered from their various wars against rival factions in the North. The Beiyang government also had concerns about the dubious loyalty of the warlords further South, fearing that they may abandon Wu Peifu should the winds change.

The Republic's invasion plan consisted of two different armies that would advance into Zhili territory. The first, under the command of Li Zongren, contained about 110,000 troops and would race up the coast towards Shanghai. Meanwhile, a western army of around 120,000 would advance on Wuhan in the Western theater of the war, before turning northeast and attacking Nanjing, where they would be joined by Li Zongren. Once their objectives were secured, the forces would go north in pursuit of the ultimate prize, Beijing itself.

The early days of the invasion went well for the Republic. Zhili concerns about treacherous warlords in the border region were realized, and many of them defected to Wang's government after brief struggles. Li moved rapidly up the coast, running into little resistance until he reached Taizhou, about 120 miles south of Shanghai. An army of 50,000 soldiers had been deployed south of the city, cutting off the Republican's advance. Due to their numerical superiority, Li chose to attack first. The Zhili army was quickly pushed back into the city, where they regrouped north of the Jiaojiang River. At this point, it became clear to Li that this had been their plan from the beginning, and that the Zhili were trying to lure them into attempting a crossing. Instead, he decided to circumvent the river, by taking 90,000 of his soldiers several miles west to circle around and attack from the North. After spending several days navigating the highlands west of the city, Li returned to Taizhou, only to find that 40,000 of the soldiers had been moved north, out of the city. Exasperated and eager to pull the Zhili into a direct confrontation, Li continued towards Shanghai.

En route to Shanghai, the army was continuously harassed by small militias loyal to Wu Peifu, who raided camps, gathered intelligence, and cut supply lines. The Zhili, being the most liberal of the three Beiyang factions, had some support from the local populations. Many local peasants were Republican sympathizers, but did not contribute intelligence and resistance like Wang had hoped. Villages did not take strong steps to prevent anti-Republic sabotage by Zhili agents, and made only half-hearted attempts to bring them to justice after the fact. This greatly frustrated Li, who would arrive in Shanghai nearly two weeks later than expected at the beginning of the campaign. These two weeks proved vital to the Zhili defense of Shanghai, who had been deliberately obstructing the Republican's march north in order to buy time. Walls, trenches, and armaments had been constructed running from Taihu Lake to Hangzhou Bay, promising a bloody struggle to advance into the city proper. Li's intelligence informed him that the plains west of the Taihu and south of the Yangtze had been heavily mined. 70,000 soldiers defended the city from within, with mountains of supplies, weapons, and ammunition.

Zhou Enlai, a native of the region and lieutenant under Li, had been educated in Europe and was familiar with trench warfare. Lacking the tanks that would be necessary to break the stalemate in that matter, Zhou devised an infiltration strategy to breach the southern defenses. Once this was accomplished, the KMT would use their superior numbers to corner the Zhili in the city, killing or capturing the majority of the army. In the beginning, the Battle of Shanghai went as planned for the KMT. The Zhili seemed unprepared for their deft implementation of anti-trench tactics and ruthless exploitation of gaps in the 47 mile defensive perimeter. Even still, Li was unable to beat the defences and enter the city before the beginning of October. Shanghai had a mild climate, so the winter was not of real concern to attackers, but the failure to score a single decisive victory over the Zhili for the entire Summer was demoralizing.

The Western front of the war saw the quick conquest of Wuhan after a minor struggle with local warlord Jin Yaojing. The army advanced towards Nanjing, and was confronted by an army of nearly 200,000 hastily assembled troops to stop them. Their commander, Sun Chuangfang, was Wu Peifu's protege, and had experience in the earlier years of the Warlord Period. Despite their numerical advantage, the Zhili army was under equipped, and many had completed only minimal training. The battle was fought in the shadow of Tianzhu Shan, the tallest mountain in the Dabie Range. Sun Chuangfang and his troops fought valiantly, but they couldn't resist being overwhelmed by the superior by the clearly superior Southern forces. Still, it was hardly an easy victory for the Republicans, who lost 30,000 troops and found themselves stranded in the mountains with no easy routes for supplies. Hopes of quickly capturing Nanjing and then proceding to assist Li's army in Shanghai were extingushed. The Western Army regrouped in the Anhui province, then continued towards Nanjing slowly and cautiously.

Despite their overwhelming numerical advantage, the Zhili had been reluctant to commit too many troops to halting the invasion, instead using resources defending against Ma, Anhui, or Fengtian invasions. After the defeat of the Fengtian, the Zhili had also become concerned that Japan might intervene directly. A foreign invasion during the war with the KMT would be a nightmare scenario for Wu, and he left a sizeable army on the Korean border in preparation for such a contingency. Another fear Wu had was that the KMT might make a drive directly for Beijing, disregarding major cities in the South. Control of Beijing was important to the Zhili for several reasons. For one, it legitimized them in the eyes of the lower classes, and meant they were perceived as the legitimate government rather than a rebel uprising like the KMT. This was also of vital importance of securing the alliegance of smaller warlords in the peripheral regions. Further, the Beijing government was the sole recognized government of China to foreign states, which meant that the Zhili could take out loans from other states and received some weapons and funding from Western states. Losing this legitimacy could be catastrophic to the Zhili war effort.

Fortunately for the Zhili, by the end of 1926 the KMT had shown its hand. A rapid victory was no longer possible, and the Zhili held the advantage in the event of a protracted war. There was still a possibility, believed Wang, that the KMT could break through Shanghai's defenses and route the Zhili while avoiding a war of attrition. The internal conflicts of the KMT were not making this easy, however. Wang lived in fear of a right-wing coup orchestrated by Chiang Kai Shek. In order to prevent this, he had marginalized right-wing politicans and military commanders within the army and government by relegating them to positions where they could not harm his control. By November of 1926, he began to question Li Zongren's commitment to the revolutionary cause, and began circumventing his authority in favor Zhou Enlai, who was decidedly left-wing. This did not go unnoticed Li, who became disillusioned and resentful. His actions were taken as further evidence of disloyalty, as was the fact that Shanghai was still out of the Republic's hands. Zhou, for his part, smelled opportunity, and fanned the flames of conflict between the two men. On January of 1927, Li was removed from the command of his 110,000 man army, and instead placed in control of a smaller auxillary force sent to secure Nanchang, a city of little strategic importance.

Zhou, now less than 30 and one of the most powerful men on the continent, led a KMT victory outside Shanghai within two weeks of his promotion. They entered the city and soon discovered the harsh new realities of urban warfare. Advances in urban tactics had been made by the Germans during their own civil war, but even those battles had occurred mostly in the countryside and in less densely populated areas. A brick and mortar jungle spanning 20 miles in every direction and including almost 5 million civilians now swallowed the full might of the KMT. The two armies, of about equal size and shape, squared off in this setting, the first of its kind in modern warfare. Fighting took place in the streets, in classrooms, in hallways, in staircases, in abandoned homes. Mines and traps littered the city, picking off soldiers left and right.

Shanghai proved to be a deathtrap for the soldiers of both armies. Escape across the minefields in the north was dangerous. Passing south would take them through miles of scared battlefield ravaged by months of conflict. Thousands drowned trying to flee across the Yangtze river or Lake Taihu. The army that emerged victorious, or at least the one the least beaten, was the KMT. By April 1927, the KMT had captured Wuhan, Nanjing, and Shanghai, but at a great cost. The war had been more costly than expected, and there were calls from within the south to negotiate a peace with the Zhili. Wang was having none of it, and ordered a full on assault on Beijing. Wu Peifu, who had become frustrated with his general's inability to defeat the KMT, took matters into his own hands and took personal command over a Zhili army of 250,000 to stop the advance. The forces on the Korean and Ma borders were removed, and the troops that had been left behind a Beijing were brought along as well. Several miles from Xuzhou, the Zhili's southern advance reached the KMT. The largest battle of the Warlord Period began on June 12th, 1927. The winner, it was feared, would be able to push swiftly into their opponents territory and win the war, unifying China.

The division of China would prove more resiliant than early estimates had expected. Wu beat the KMT at Xuzhou, but his counterattack was extremely cautious, and he did not even reach Shanghai by the time the KMT had moved south and regrouped. The war ground to a stalemate at around the 35th parallel north by the end of the summer, and both sides were under increasing pressure to cut their losses and make peace. Each passing day, Wu grew more paranoid of a Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Spies in Korea warned him of a buildup of troops there and a possible attack. The Japanese had no such plans, but Wu was terrified of an attack and wanted to deal with the KMT as swiftly as possible. Wang, who had begun the war with such vigor, now faced pressure to end it. The KMT had been successful in expanding North, and Beijing now seemed beyond reach. Thus, the Northern Expedition ended in a victory for the Republic of China in what is generally considered the end of the Warlord Period. The ROC, or South China, gained international recognition at the conclusion of the war, though both the North and the South considered themselves the to be the "true" China. The empire, long united, had divided.
 
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China, 1928

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Doomsday

"The end of the world began on a glistering Tuesday in late August"
-John Steinbeck
On Tuesday, October 7, 1929, the stock market crashed. On Wednesday, October 8, every that had been built since the end of the war came tumbling down. In the United States, the Coolidge's popularity, once historically high, cratered overnight. Poverty and deflation gripped the nation, devastating rural farmers and urban workers alike. All income levels took massive hits, and industry and international trade declined substantially. Coolidge's desperate attempts to rescue the economy followed the then-orthodox economic policies of cutting spending and raising taxes, in order to keep the government budget balanced. In spite of these policies, the Depression continued to worsen throughout Coolidge's second term, as he fell from one of the most popular presidents ever to the single most hated man in the country.

Europe, too, was gripped by by economic crisis. Industrial output and prices fell drastically in the UK, France, and Germany. Unemployment spiraled out of control, leading many to revisit radical ideologies previously cast aside, including socialism, syndicalism, and fascism. The Conservative government in the UK was upended in the crash, and lost nearly all of their seats in the 1930 election. At the same time, the British left grew more radical, with significant support growing for nationalization and a powerful welfare state. Opposition to capitalism itself also became far more mainstream in the aftermath of the crash, though the Labour Party never supported this view.

In France, the crash brought about the fall of the Cartel de Gauches and Édouard Herriot's left-wing government. Among all the left-wing parties running in the 1932 election, the Communists were the only ones to gain seats. The French Section of the Workers International was devastated, as was the French Radical Party, losing 120 seats between them. Having finally shaken the damage of the Thursday Riots, the fascist Patriot League secured their first seats in the election, winning 7. The center-right coalition managed to take enough seats to form a government without the left or the fascists, so both groups were marginalized under Louis Marin's Premiership. This only served to enrage them further, however, as the Conservatives failed to quickly resuscitate the economy.

Meanwhile, the German establishment was barely fending off the Volki Party under Hitler's leadership. The VSDAP's meteoric rise to the second largest party in the Reichstag had occurred mostly at the expense of the other Conservative parties, meaning that the SPD's Otto Wels was one of the only leaders in the West who was not immediately voted out of power after during the Depression. This was due to fear of the Volkis from all over the political spectrum. In the hopes of re-establishing order and keeping the fascists under control, the SPD, the Centre, and the DDP revived the Brandenburg Coalition from the Civil War years. For now, this was enough to keep both the Communists and the Fascists out of power, though with the worsening Depression there was no guarantee that anything would last for long.

Polish industry that had been built up in the 1920s ground to a halt. Gdansk, once a bustling center of Baltic trade, was now struggling to survive. Piłsudski, who had been criticized for what was percieved as authoritarianism even before the Depression, was now viewed negatively by most Poles, to say nothing of the Ukrainians and Belorussians who lived in states under Poland's thumb. Worker's unrest, strikes, and general discontent in the Northwestern areas near the corridor began in earnest in early 1930, growing out of control and spreading to other areas of the country as Piłsudski cracked down on them and the Depression deepened. Sensing weakness, Ukrainian Nationalist military commander Symon Petlura staged a coup against the Polish-backed government and declared Ukraine and independent state. Poland promised to reclaim Ukraine, but for the time being was pre-occupied by what had the potential to become a civil war. Knocked from its pedestal, Poland desperately struggled to regain the position of power that it held in the 20's.

Russia's agrarian economy and decentralization had mostly insulated it from the crash, and continued as it had before. This led to many in the west coming to view Socialism more positively as their own economies floundered. Despite these rosy views of life in Russia, the reality was that conditions in the Eastern European state were still harsh, and even at the depth of the depression North America and Western Europe had higher standards of living than the typical Russian peasant.

Excerpts from various sources
"Thus the new Russian Government, which proclaims itself to be a Socialist Worker's state, has, in fact, bent at the knee before the capitalists. In its intermediary and regulating function, its concern to maintain social ranks, and its refusal to liquidate the petit bourgeois, the UWP reveals itself to be a capitalist state masquerading as a revolutionary organization acting in the interests of the peasant class.

...A program of "disarmament," while imperialist antagonisms survive, is the most pernicious of fictions. Even if it were realized by way of general agreement - an obviously fantastic assumption!- that would by no means prevent a new war. The imperialists do not make war because there are armaments; on the contrary, they forge arms when they need to fight.

...Many years ago, my dear friend Leon Trotsky wrote to me that Antonov's government was doomed; that if he failed to halt the Green forces and drive them from Moscow it would mean Russia had been irretrievably lost to the counter-revolutionaries. In the intervening years I have become convinced that his assessment was correct. Antonov's preservation of the social castes of the Russian Empire have made him indistinguishable from the Tsar. His refusal to accept the inevitable historical trends of industrialization has sentenced him to the dustbin of history. His betrayal of the working class to the foreign capitalist will allow imperialist domination of by the bourgeois class at the expense of the Russian worker. Progress in Russia cannot be made until another Revolution occurs to remove the UWP from power and replace it with a true proletarian rule."

Josef Stalin, "Trotsky's Ghost"
"Fear that penetrates the soul, engulfing the subject in its power. The man is rolled about in the dust until it becomes one with him, and all that his him blown away in the wind. This is a different kind of fear, unknown to the civilized man, but all too familiar to the modern nomad."
John Steinbeck, "Sin in the New West"

"It is difficult to overstate the national hatred that took hold towards President Cooldige. The slums the homeless built were nicknamed 'Coolidgevilles'. The rabbits they ate to survive 'Coolige hogs', shot with their 'Coolidge guns'."

Joseph R. Williams, "Calvin Coolige: A Life"

"So now the Jewish bankers in the west have chosen to wage economic war against our nation. Know that if you have lost your home, or your job, or your savings, they have stolen from you, personally. Those who denounce our movement as 'radical' do so because they want the perpetrators of this crime to escape any punishment. Is justice for your wrongs too much to ask? We think not. There is no price too great to bring these criminals to pay for their theft."

Adolf Hitler
"You see now, the hubris of the capitalists who believed they could continue forever in their old ways. The plight of the American workingman is regrettable, to be sure, but is a necessary step towards the abolition of capitalism throughout the world. We only hope that the workers take action soon, so that their pain may be mitigated and the progress towards the inevitable reality of socialism may be accelerated."
Alexander Antonov, "The Depression"
 
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Just caught up and things are looking GRIM of the world. Lots of resentment and plans to pay back opponents and foes left over from the Wars. Just who may hold on, which will fall, and where will they leap for in the coming years?

As for the quotes, I enjoyed them, but maybe split them up or add a bit more background.

Update when you can. Thanks.
 
The Wasteland

Hope of a quick recovery from the Depression soon evaporated. As 1930 and 1931 ground on, anti-Coolidge sentiment continued to grow. Socialist activities in New York were quelled, and racial conflicts in the South remained unresolved. The Klan, now receding from power, dropped all pretense of being a political party upholding order and became an explicit domestic terror group that attacked political opponents and "undesirables". This explicit endorsement of violence did not help their declining popularity, but some governor's lackluster response allowed Klan insurgency to continue to exist in many areas. In response, a number of anti-Klan militias sprung up to combat the reign of terror. Taking cues from European anti-fascist groups, many of these militias were made up mostly of blacks, Catholics, and Socialists. They responded to the Klan's violence with violence of their own, no methods too extreme. The Nat Turner Group, in particular, was notoriously brutal in its handling of the Klan. They gained national attention in 1931 when they kidnapped, beat, and lynched five KKK members in Southern Georgia. Know as the Jekyll Island Incident, the event turned many liberals off of the militant anti-Klan movement in the North, while also coming to be seen as a symbol of the struggle against the Klan among many anti-Klan Southerners. Jekyll Island was just the first in a long string of confrontations in the South. The Great Migration, the mass exodus of blacks from the South, accelerated during this period of conflict.

There were, however, places in the Deep South not embroiled in racial violence. Huey Long's Louisiana was more than willing to use force to suppress insurgency in the countryside. Coming to power by exploiting the internal conflicts in the Democratic Party Machine of the late 20's, Huey Long had been elected governor by assembling a coalition of organized labor, racial and religious minorities, and the rural poor. Long, in addition to taking on the Klan, was responsible for a number of public works programs in his state, including roads, schools, hospitals, and bridges. He was popular with the lower classes, but faced considerable opposition from the Louisiana Democratic establishment, even being threatened with impeachment for executive overreach.

The rest of the country was more peaceful than the South, which wasn't saying much. New York, Detroit, and Chicago all had active Socialist movements. Slums in major cities were breeding grounds of disease and radicalism. It was in this political climate that the 1932 Presidential election occurred. Coolidge had chosen not to seek a third term, and in all likelihood couldn't have gotten one even if he had tried. The 1932 RNC, the first Republican convention without an incumbent seeking re-election since 1920, was held in Chicago. Herbert Hoover, Coolidge's Vice President, was the early frontrunner for the nomination. His opposition included Governor John J. Blaine of Wisconsin and Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas. Many were concerned that any Republican, especially Hoover, would be tarred by Coolidge's unpopularity. However, the Progressive faction of the GOP had mostly abandoned the Party by this point, and was not able to mount a challenge to the three "Coolige Republicans". Curtis secured the nomination on the fourth ballot after Blaine dropped out, without much fanfare. The victory was bittersweet for Curtis, however, because the GOP had little hope of holding the White House.

At the Progressive National Convention, the excitement was palpable. The effect of the Depression on American politics was apparent even then, and it was believed that the nominee would be able to easily defeat the regional Democrats and the despised Republicans. The PNC was not without tension, though. The "true-progressives", who had joined the party earlier and subscribed to the beliefs of LaFollette and Johnson, felt resentful that the former Democrats had drawn the party towards the center and effectively co-opted the the Progressive movement. Nowhere was this more apparent than in New York, where Fiorello LaGuardia, a left-wing progressive, fought his bitter rival Al Smith in the 1930 gubernatorial election during the Progressive primary. Smith, a Tammany Hall backed conservative Progressive, had emerged victorious in both the primary and the general that year, winning a fifth term as Governor. Smith and LaGuardia both sought the Progressive nomination for President, as did George White of Ohio and Floyd Olsen of Minnesota. Olsen, who was a member of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party rather than the Progressive party, was instrumental in the increasing cooperation between the Progressive and Farmer-Labor parties, and had successfully convinced them not to run Progressive challengers in his state. Still, he was seen by some members of the party as an imposter. Regardless of Olsen's legitimacy in the party, both he and his like-minded Progressives were defeated by Smith, who clinched the Progressive nomination. Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Kansas became the Vice Presidential nominee of the Progressive Party shortly after.

Like the Progressives, the Democrats believed they had a chance to retake the Presidency for the first time since Wilson. Their chances were not as positive as many believed though, as this was no longer Wilson's party. Racial resentment and blind anti-Coolidgeism were the themes of the 1932 DNC, held in Atlanta, Georgia. Huey Long's progressive faction and Carter Glass's moderates were both drowned beneath a tide of Conservativism, led by Pat Harrison of Mississippi, Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi, and George Q. Bachmann of Tennessee. Bilbo's nomination by the Democratic Party was yet another defeat for the moderate Democrats, who were now nearly purged from the party altogether. Long, realizing there was no room for his ilk within the Party, returned to Louisiana and began exploring routes forward without relying on the DNC.

The Election of 1932


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At last, Alfred E. Smith was elected President of the United States, the first Catholic to do so. Ironically, Smith did not win a single state that he had won in his 1924 run. Crushing both the Democrats and Republicans in overwhelming fashion, the Progressive Party was now the strongest of the three political parties in the United States. Even in 1932, the American economy was continuing to hemorrhage jobs and wealth. Smith's campaign promised to stop the bleeding and turn the conditions around, emphasizing new leadership and a return to the Wilsonian policies that they claimed had produced the prosperity of the 1920's. The Klan was even more infuriated now than they had been in 1928, something which had seemed impossible at the time. A Catholic, anti-Prohibition President was the KKK's worst nightmare. Racial conflict in the South only got worse after 1932, despite Smith's best efforts to restore order.

Congressional races were equally lopsided towards the Progressives. In the Senate, they held 47 seats to the Democrats' 22, the Republican's 25, and Farmer-Labor's 2. In the House, the Progressives gained an outright majority with 220 seats, next to 6 Farmer-Labor, 100 Republican, and 109 Democrats. Though they now controlled both chambers of Congress and the Presidency, the Progressive Party was not able to enact the full scope of its agenda in 1933 due to interference from the Smith-wing and obstruction from the Democrats and Republicans. Even with these issues, the Progressives succeeded in passing the Emergency Banking Act and important regulatory measures like the Glass-Wallace Act. The FDIC and SEC were both established in Smith's first year in office. Massive expansion of government programs advocated by the likes of LaGuardia, Olsen, and Long were stymied in order to prevent a crippling deficit. In Smith's absence, LaGuardia finally won the New York gubernatorial election, beginning his term as one of the most left-wing governors in the country. The seismic shift in politics brought on by the Depression proved to be the most significant event in American politics since the Civil War.​
 
A Pale Horse

"The anti-Fascist Pact was criticized, both at the time and ever since, for being Faustian in nature. While not entirely incorrect, this was beside the point. We knew very well what we were getting into. The fact is that in 1932 we were willing to make a pact with any devil, real or imagined, except the one named Adolf Hitler."​

-Former Chancellor Otto Wels in a 1949 interview with the Milwaukee Sentinel​

German democracy had survived the beginning of the Depression, much to the dismay of the Völkisch Socialists. The Brandenburg Coalition, headed by the SDP, did everything they could to lock the VSDAP out of Government. The disarray in the Reichstag, combined with the massive number of parties, made it extremely difficult for the Legislature to function properly, forcing President Wilhelm Marx to govern almost entirely through the emergency decrees established by Article 48 of the German Constitution. This was needed simply to keep government functioning as normal, let alone to enact the reforms desperately needed to combat the Depression. It didn't help that nearly half of the seats in the Reichstag were held by either Communists or Volkis, meaning that even a few dissenters from within the Pro-Democracy alliance on any specific topic would immediately kill the issue.

Outside of the Reichstag, the situation remained dire. The SA and the Communist Rotfront engaged in frequent street fights, and casualties continued to mount on both sides. When the SA was banned in 1931, in quickly reorganized into the Stahlfront, an organization virtually identical to the old SA. When this, too, was banned, it was replaced by a loose alliance of paramilitary groups vaguely answerable to Ernst Röhm, in a fashion reminiscent of the Freikorps from a decade earlier. This structure, known as the National Underground, or NUGB, proved difficult to combat. Government agents cracked down against Fascist violence, but it seemed the harder they pushed the stronger they became. The Rotfront, too, saw massive increases in membership and public support during the depths of the Depression. A number of poor and working class individuals were drawn to the Communist Party, who they felt better represented their interests than the Social Democrats. Unfortunately for the Communists, these new recruits lacked the military experience and resources that many of the fascists had. Like lambs to the slaughter, hundreds of Communists were massacred by VSDAP supporters over the course of the early 1930s. The largest confrontation between the two groups occurred on May 1st, 1932. The Communist Party staged May Day demonstrations throughout Germany, which were swiftly attacked by NUGB members. The nationwide violence and destruction that ensued left 152 dead and hundreds injured. It was at this point it became abundantly clear that the Brandenburg Coalition would not be able to restore order until something changed.

Eventually, the rifts in the Reichstag became too much for the SDP to bare, and the legislature was dissolved as a result in May 1932. The SDP was unpopular with the masses, but many supporters of democracy saw no choice but to throw their support behind them in the hopes of holding off the radicals. The VSDAP grew in popularity after the crash, and now their paramilitary agents, called "Brownshirts" after their uniforms, policed polling stations and harassed Communists, much as similar movements had done in Italy, France, and the US. The Rotfront and other anti-Fascist groups countered with their own schemes. The end results of the election would paralyze the nation in terror.

German Federal Election, May 1932

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For the first time in the history of the Republic, the SDP, DDP, and Centre did not make up a majority of the seats. Wels and Marx managed to pull the more Conservative DVP into the coalition, and numerous members of smaller parties and BVP members agreed to cooperate. Still, this only gave them 268 seats, far short of the 305 needed to form a majority. This left them with three additional parties, all sworn enemies of each other, who would refuse to form an alliance. The ultra-conservative, Monarchist DNVP entertained cooperating with the fascists in order to defeat their primary opponents, the Social Democrats. Many of the DNVP members saw the fascists as useful idiots, lower class workers who would deliver the upper class back to the power they had enjoyed under the empire. The VSDAP, meanwhile, believed the DNVP as obsolete fools who stood no chance against the larger parties. They continued to negotiate, each believing themselves to be playing the other. These two parties together held 249 seats, a force to be reckoned with, but even smaller than the Brandenburg Coalition. They hoped they could swing the DVP and BVP into their coalition, but these groups were both extremely wary of the Volkis.

The Communists, at first, refused to speak to the SDP about forming a united front against the Right. However, acting under orders from Moscow, Ernst Thälmann eventually came around to cooperation. In order to even consider such an alliance, the Communists had a number of harsh demands for the Coalition. First, they would allow the Rotfront to pursue the Volkis violently without interfering. Germany would recognize the UWP and deny asylum to any former White Movement members fleeing Russia. The German government would pass a number of laws protecting the power of workers. There was some talk of devolving power to local worker's councils, but this flatly refused by every party in the Coalition. Despite the controversy that was destined to result, the Communist Party agreed to enter a Grand Coalition against the VSDAP.

The announcement of the anti-Fascist Pact shocked the world. Many powerful politicians in Britain lamented their failure to finish off the Communists during the Civil War. Communists within the party felt betrayed by Thälmann for bending to the will of the Capitalists. The American Progressive Party severed all ties to the Labor and Socialist International, to which the SDP belonged. All Western countries condemned the cooperation with the UWP, which they had all refused to recognize. Conservatives in France and Poland doubled down on their anti-Communist sentiment as a consequence. Hitler siezed on this as proof that the SDP had been controlled by the Jewish Communists all along. Regardless, it was a functional Coalition, which something Germany had lacked for 4 years. They proceeded to force through a series of extremely left-wing reforms that dissatisfied both the Conservative Democrats and the Communists. Thälmann justified this legislation by saying that it would ease the pain of the German worker, and that the party had not abandoned its commitment to the Revolutionary cause. This assuaged the fears of some Communists, but only enraged the Conservatives more. The fight continued, beginning with the Presidential election that followed only a few weeks after the federal election.

In the first round, the Grand Coalition threw its support behind Wilhelm Marx. His main competitor for the Presidency was Hitler. Communist Heinz Neumann, who had refused to accept the Centrist-Communist alliance, ran as an Independent Communist. His campaign was undermined by the Communist Party at every turn, and the Coalition made sure to prevent him from spoiling the election in favor of Hitler. Also contesting the Presidency was Alfred Hugenberg of the DNVP. Marx won 42% of the vote, while Hitler took 37%. The remaining 21% was split between Hugenberg, Neumann, and various other minor politicians. The runoff election was held a two weeks later, this time with mass mobilization on the part of the fascists.

Known throughout the English-speaking world as the "Night of Red Pavement", June 13th, or "Rote Nacht", the VSDAP staged its most direct assault on the Communists yet. In a massive, coordinated operation, the National Underground attacked over thirty prominent Communist and Socialist politicians and labor leaders throughout the country. Occurring on the eve of the runoff election, the move was a blatant attempt to wipe out opposition and scare socialists into avoiding the election altogether. Hitler denied ordering the attack, and claimed that the VSDAP had no connection to the National Underground. To this day, it is debated among historian whether Hitler ordered the operation or if it was carried out by Ernst Röhm. Either way, the new Coalition was now in a state of all out war with the fascists. Despite the Volki's best efforts, Marx won re-election by the skin of his teeth, carrying 50.2% of the vote. Still, to many foreign observers, Germany was beginning to look like a failed state. The Grand Coalition resolved to preserve the Republic and hold the Volkis at bay, through any means necessary.
 
Just caught up and at the moment of greatest suspense too!

I find it odd that Thällman would be taking orders "from Moscow;" sure Antonov claimed the mantle of the Communist movement--but as the guy responsible for killing Lenin that mantle can't count for much; Communism, like Socialism, is whatever you make of it I'd think. There's no reason for Communists outside of Russia to pay any attention to those in Russia really. Certainly the UWP seems to pose no military threat to anyone.

Perhaps Moscow has acquired new authority because the isolated and agrarian economy of Rump Red Russia did not particularly notice the global Crash? But this too can only be a pale echo of the attraction of Stalinist Russia at this juncture, where OTL massive building projects were being undertaken.

Here I have to wonder if maybe you underemphasize what someone like Antonov might accomplish in Russia after all. Lacking the doctrinaire "we know what Communism is and how to get there" mentality of Lenin's close followers, could it be that by muddling along with the wrecked remnants of pre-war Russia, by compromising with entrepreneurial types balanced by agrarian Utopians, that the UWP stumbles into a scheme whereby economic growth more or less effectively centrally planned is hit upon and although lacking the vast geographic sweep of the OTL USSR nor the vast reserves of resources hidden in its reaches, the core of Russia is by the 1930s starting to get serious traction with a new but workable system?

Some time ago I read a book I have but have stored away, title and author forgotten, that seemed to be suggesting that OTL during the NEP period, an alternative to both a return to capitalism and the military style command Plan economy had emerged, whereby several bodies that were not private NEP ventures, being linked to the Bolsheviks they were committed to, would serve as syndicates that coordinated the actions of the factories. A syndicate representative at a factory would advise the factory management on products to build and offer, and guide the products to users who needed them, and either could pay or the syndicate, in a more complicated roundabout fashion would balance the inputs and outputs somehow. Thus factories were on paper autonomous, each a creation of the Party legally and de facto under self-management, but the syndicates, with no commanding power but offering solutions to the problem of finding buyers for factory products and finance for the factories, would create networks to coordinate them. The syndicates I stress were not private concerns, they were creations of the Bolshevik Party and were responsive to directives from it.

Now suppose something like this evolved in Russia, and instead of viewing it sourly as some kind of creeping profiteering, as the OTL Bolsheviks did, the ragtag coalition Antonov so loosely presides over welcomes the evolution and the harder-left elements attempt to use the syndical soft power of the service of coordination to prod the economy in an industrializing direction. They cannot, as Stalin did, simply decree massive taxes on the workers, massive drafts of workers urged or ordered to join vast hero projects, supplemented by convict-workers. All they can do to attempt to work toward Communism by industrializing is divert as much surplus the syndical networked factory/farm system can spare toward more extensive and elaborate industrialization. They can only do this to the extent the comfortable established interests, especially the agrarian SR faction, allows them to, which I suppose puts a stringent limit on how much sacrifice they are willing to bear.

However, even the peasant faction has got some interest in industrialization. After all, in the beginning it is mere reconstruction back to pre-war levels, badly damaged by the Civil War. The agrarians want industrial products too, and the OTL option championed by Bukharin of the State purchasing the agricultural product, feeding the workers with part and selling the rest on the global market so the state could then purchase the industrial products the countryside wanted and sell them back to the farmers is simply not an option here, aside from its standing as a properly Communist sort of plan to have. The world has nothing to do with Russia, would have preferred to see Antonov and his diverse backers overthrown completely. Stalin OTL controlled a vast Soviet Union including Ukraine and controlled it tightly; Antonov's Russia is tiny compared to that and weakly ruled. The Russian farmers have little leverage on the global market anyway so the fact they are barred from it makes little practical difference. If Russian farmers are to have anything that they cannot craft for themselves, be it farming equipment or consumer goods, they must support the Russian industrial system one way or another.

Hey, this is a pretty neat way to turn around the "scissors" of OTL I must say!

Of course there is no guarantee of a progressive outcome; the "solution" may be stagnation and eventually Antonov's feeble-minded little muddled Utopia gets gobbled up by the Ukrainians or Poles or some White adventurer.

But if we assume that the Communists loosely under his aegis in Moscow have half a moment to set aside petty bickering and come together on some common ground of wanting more for Russia than this, and that if it is physically possible that Russia has the means of self-advancement, then perhaps despite its apparently ramshackle and loose organization, the Antonovite "Aprilsts" (should we call them that?) have in fact been slowly recovering from the Civil War for some time now, and that the syndicates that answer to the Party and guide the relations of factories and farms are getting good at mapping out a Plan for progress that builds on what they have?

Supposing this is the case, it could be that by say 1940, if they are given that long, their net gains might be comparable to those achieved by Stalin! Perhaps that is too much, but then again consider how very wasteful Stalin's methods were. If the Aprilist Syndicals are fairly efficient, and neither workers nor plant managers have incentive to steal or skim or misrepresent, and farmers trade grain for good, sound products that they need, then on what might not be much of a market base at all, perhaps even getting away from money exchanges, Russia might be gradually, slowly, behind everyone's back and without fanfare, quite a solid power industrially.

It would be very different than the USSR of OTL of course One huge difference is lacking the vast strategic depths Stalin's regime enjoyed when struck with powerful blows. In defiance of all economic logic but with good strategic logic, Stalin ordered many vital factories built beyond the Urals; Antonov doesn't even reach there. Everything the Russians build ITTL is in reach of a determined, large military push by some eastern European power.

Obviously also, they would not have much access to the vast resources the USSR had--on paper! OTL those were largely matters of potential by the time of the Great Patriotic War.

I do wonder if, over time, the disdain all the splinter states of the former Russian Empire have for the pretensions of Lenin's Bolsheviks to rule all of that old Empire has dissipated somewhat among those states, especially since Antonov has after all been the one to bump off Lenin. The distant Great Power states all refuse recognition to his Russia, but perhaps the many states of the former Empire, isolated from global market routes, underdeveloped, and with threats from other powers on their borders, might come to look to a growing and fairly happy central Russian state as an ally. Ukraine probably not--though we don't know the political tendency of the breakaway regime. But might not Moscow be able to quilt together some sort of alliance, and shift the domestic economic policy of these toward cooperative soft central guidance with a socialistic service ethic overriding the currently collapsed market paradigm?

In Germany I wondered too at Thällmann being named the Red leader. OTL he was a thug acceptable to Stalin and elevated past others Stalin had drummed out or bumped off. Here there is no such central power in Moscow; any word from that city can only be advice, not commands. Is this guy the same one as OTL? If so why did the German Communists go so authoritarian? I suppose it makes sense knowing they were underground and defeated, perhaps. But I'd think in a world without Stalin's Communist International, the big cheeses of the German Communists would be different people, with lots of street red.

In the USA--was there a Red Scare in the late Wilson years? I would think so, and Harding and Coolidge would continue it. But with the outcome of the Civil War being so different I'd think that Russia would have more friends than OTL in the USA, and the Progressive Party will have some pressure, despite its infusion of conservatives in its high ranks, to recognize the Russian state. Why blame them for something happening in Germany?

The idea that the Russians are making some kind of plodding progress toward higher industrialization, on a democratic socialist basis, is entirely my own and might not be your intention at all. To lock them in an uninspiring agrarian stagnation all that is needed is less optimism about the possibility of intelligent deployments of modest surpluses accumulating. A little pilfering here, a little laziness there, and they are stuck as a bunch of agrarian peasants armed with little more than hammers and sickles, and liable to be eaten like a grape by any half-competent imperial power that can muscle into their region; the only thing helping them thus far is these powers are Pilsudski's federation, Romania (which may have joined that federation?) and now a loose Ukraine which insulates Red Russia from Turkey, as the federation did before. To the east are no large threats, yet. The British might try to extend their power past Afghanistan while locking up Persia as an effective protectorate, but will the Central Asians allow it?

By the way--you've given us maps of many situations, often the same territory twice in one post. But we've never seen a map of the former Tsarist Empire as it stood once the last White army was defeated attacking Antonov's zone! Can we have one? I find it hard to guess just where the boundaries would be and who the splinter states are.

Anyway the less effectively progressive the Russians are, the less interesting, but also the less scary. The Red Scare should now be suffering a backlash it did not OTL; all kinds of persecuted Leftists ought to be in vogue in the USA, to some extent precisely because of their martyrdom. (It would not be too amazing if Stalin could move to the USA and become some sort of pundit!)

If the Russians are in fact making some progress along the lines I indicated, or in some socialist fashion anyway as opposed to mere capitalism, then their example ought to be of great interest to millions of Americans. OTL it was despite being entangled with a ruthless, violent police state liable to turn an eye of extra suspicion on professed foreign friends. Here if little or none of that is happening, Russia should be quite a fascinating subject indeed. I suppose that conservatives, denied the terrible truths of OTL to denounce, will simply make up some just as lurid, and indeed the assumption they could and would is what lay behind much left-wing denials of the true state of things in the USSR. ITTL, the difficulties of getting into the USSR, seeing what there is to see there, and getting out safely without having agreed to shill for the regime unconditionally of OTL are replaced by the fact that Russia is isolated and surrounded by enemies. So it may remain a mystery wrapped in an enigma.
 
I find it odd that Thällman would be taking orders "from Moscow;" sure Antonov claimed the mantle of the Communist movement--but as the guy responsible for killing Lenin that mantle can't count for much; Communism, like Socialism, is whatever you make of it I'd think. There's no reason for Communists outside of Russia to pay any attention to those in Russia really. Certainly the UWP seems to pose no military threat to anyone.

Yes, but the UWP is the only Socialist country in the world at this time. The German Communinst Party is extremely strongly influenced by Luxemburg, who was very critical of Lenin, so having killed him isn't viewed extremely harshly. Antonov holds much less sway with European Communist Parties than Lenin did IOTL, but the UWP does actively support leftists outside Russia. Since the UWP is weaker than the USSR was, it looks for any support it can get, and is much more willing to work with other leftists that may not agree on everything. "Acting on orders from Moscow" is probably less accurate than "Under some encouragement from Moscow". This isn't to say that the UWP controls all the international Communist parties. In Poland, for example, Leninism is the main ideology of the Communist rebels that emerged during the Depression.

In the USA--was there a Red Scare in the late Wilson years? I would think so, and Harding and Coolidge would continue it. But with the outcome of the Civil War being so different I'd think that Russia would have more friends than OTL in the USA, and the Progressive Party will have some pressure, despite its infusion of conservatives in its high ranks, to recognize the Russian state. Why blame them for something happening in Germany?

There was a Red Scare in the US in the early 20's, and the Harding and Coolidge administrations remained hostile towards the UWP. People like Al Smith maintain these policies, but many on the more extreme ends of the Progressive Party are more supportive of the UWP than they were of the USSR. Thanks to the lack of a sustained backlash against leftism, anti-Capitialism will have much more support in the US than IOTL.

If the Russians are in fact making some progress along the lines I indicated, or in some socialist fashion anyway as opposed to mere capitalism, then their example ought to be of great interest to millions of Americans. OTL it was despite being entangled with a ruthless, violent police state liable to turn an eye of extra suspicion on professed foreign friends. Here if little or none of that is happening, Russia should be quite a fascinating subject indeed.

The UWP, while certainly less authoritarian than the USSR, isn't without problems, which I'll elaborate on later. Russia will end up very different than IOTL, but not all of it will necessarily be better. In general, Russia is less powerful than the USSR, and Western nations aren't as threatened. Even still, Germany's decision to recognize the UWP is controversial.

It would not be too amazing if Stalin could move to the USA and become some sort of pundit!

You haven't seen the last of Josef Stalin.

By the way--you've given us maps of many situations, often the same territory twice in one post. But we've never seen a map of the former Tsarist Empire as it stood once the last White army was defeated attacking Antonov's zone! Can we have one? I find it hard to guess just where the boundaries would be and who the splinter states are.

I'm not sure if you can tell by the quality of the maps I've posted, but I'm not the greatest cartographer out there. I'll try to post one soon, but know that it necessarily be 100% accurate and I'd be open to suggestions if anything looks too unrealistic.

the only thing helping them thus far is these powers are Pilsudski's federation, Romania (which may have joined that federation?) and now a loose Ukraine which insulates Red Russia from Turkey, as the federation did before. To the east are no large threats, yet. The British might try to extend their power past Afghanistan while locking up Persia as an effective protectorate, but will the Central Asians allow it?

Romania is a member of the Warsaw Pact, but not Międzymorze. Międzymorze is essentially Poland and assorted client states, while the Warsaw Pact began as a Franco-Polish alliance against Germany and grew to include Romania and Czechoslovakia as a check against Hungarian revanchism, similar to the Little Entente IOTL. As for Central Asia, the power vacuum left by Russia will become enticing for the British, but for now the Empire is still traumatized by the war and the Depression. With Tibet independent, and China in fragments, Britain will also push in that direction as well eventually.
 
As requested: The Last Days of the Bolsheviks, Early May 1921

Russia1922.jpg


(Ignore China and Mongolia). This map is a little anachronistic, as the Siberian Republics didn't breakaway from the White Movement until after the Greens had won. Gray countries were either never involved or had left the war by the April Revolution. Black is the remaining territory held by the Mahknovists, and Green is obviously the Green army. The Kuban and Don Republics were White-aligned but made peace with the Greens shortly after the April Revolution. The Siberian Republics sprung up during the Civil War, but don't expect them to last too long, as North China, Japan, and the UWP are all looking to expand into that area. These countries are Chukhotka in the far Northeast, Kamchatka just south of that, Transbaikal on the Eastern shore of Lake Baikal, with Yakutia to its west. Green Ukraine is the smaller republic bordering China, and the Amur Republic is the larger one bordering that. These all existed as de jure entities, but as of the Kolchak's defeat they were all essentially under the control of the White Movement. You can also see Crimea and the Mountain Republic near the Black Sea. The Greater Finland concept has been much more successful ITTL thanks to a weaker Russia. North Ingria and Karelia are both Finnish now. In Central Asia, Bukhara, Khiva, Kazahkstan, and Turkestan are all independent.
 
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