Honestly where Napoleon I failed in my opinion with the Continental system was not really doing much work to bind the economies of his allies and client states to the French economy. This would have built an economic bloc that would have been able to challenge the dominance of the UK.woul
Is that realistic given that the expanded European colonial system produced goods in high demand in Europe that the Coalition (read here, mostly British RN) could blockade and could not be produced in Europe?
To be sure, around 1800, no colonial goods that come readily to mind were actually essential in any industrial sense--they way they would be come 1900 (rubber, rising importance of petroleum, obscure metals for alloying, etc). At this time, colonial goods were mostly luxury goods, albeit much desired, hence the profitability. Cotton is not important yet. Sugar is the main thing that goes into the "necessity" column, and behold, sugar beets are a thing and can be grown in Europe. A total blockade of the Continental system by the Coalition won't starve anyone nor impair the Continental system's ability to produce war materials--except maybe nitrates? Does Europe have ample sources to make all the gunpowder they'd need, bearing in mind how lavishly Napoleonic armies consume it? I would guess there are plenty of mines, accessible enough, to supply top notch forges with whatever alloys are known to make state of the art artillery and guns with?
Naval stores are another colonial good of sorts. That is, the materials that ships of the era needed traditionally could be acquired in Europe, but the great forests with suitably large trees for good timber were largely depleted in the center (good forest management might scrounge quite a lot out of Germany I suppose) and it was such peripheral powers as Denmark, Sweden and Russia supplying them--here Napoleon's policies have handed Finland over to Russia, so it comes down to Denmark holding Norway, and shipping timber in North sea waters the RN can be quite strong in to the Continent. Other naval stores the north American British colonies produced such as turpentine might require more temperate or even semi-tropical cultivation; those were southern Atlantic colony sourced in the pre-ARW British system I believe.
But if the continental imperial system does not strive for naval equality against the RN I suppose naval stores are optional and can be scrounged well enough for limited purposes from Continental sources?
It is tricky for me at any rate to remember that actually the CS was Napoleon's idea, an attempt to starve the British of European markets and goods, and that actually at this early date even good relations between Britain and the USA, plus British North American production such as it was, could not reliably fill all the consumer and industrial demands of the UK itself. Shipping, in an age when hulls were wooden and propelled solely by sail, would not be adequate in volume I suppose for transAtlantic supply even if American production is more than up to it and the RN can pretty well secure it from losses to commerce raiding. Meanwhile relations with the USA are fluctuating, Federalist administrations leaning toward a pro-British policy, Democratic-Republican Jefferson preferring France, serious conflicts regarding both US and British failures to comply with the Treaty of Paris in various matters (notably Yankees not much honoring the obligation to treat British and Loyalists fairly in lawsuits, I believe the pattern was the Federal courts, few as they were and in their rare handling of cases were compliant but state courts generally weren't); trouble on the frontier due to British trading arms to Native persons whether that was an imperial containment/resistance policy or just the private interests of the traders involved not actually mattering, either way Americans settling the frontier area faced well-armed Native hostility blamed on British policy, and of course the whole impressment issue all irritated and alarmed both sides. The author here has indeed noted how the Continental System did in fact create serious problems in Britain.
I would think there must be sources of nitrates suitable for keeping Continental gunpowder stocks adequate, though perhaps it might require organized production from human and animal urine, always a possible but burdensome and either limited or costly approach (depending on the scale needed).
Certainly the French Imperial system providing some kind of strong guidance and organization of System economies and industry would strengthen that System materially and often find substitutes to ease dependency on global sourced imports. But such top-down direction will be resented in client states unless very diplomatically imposed and shown quickly to be locally profitable. Even if plainly beneficial, there will be inherent resentment at following what appear to be orders from Paris.
I actually think it would be a good thing to favor a pan-Imperial political identity over linguistic-nationalist notions. But isn't it rather inevitable that on both sides, the imperial system will be seen as French supremacy? French chauvinists will have nothing stopping them from seeing it that way, and irritating all non-French persons however interested otherwise in supporting the pan-European system; non-French persons will tend to resent French dominance and reflect on how glorious a unified German or Italian state might become on the French model?
---------
Anyway all talk of the Continental System or Coalition counter-blockades is water under the bridge, it is decades later by now, and Europe has been largely at peace since, with most violence being of the nature of internal coups and civil wars. In settling peace with Britain as major driver of the Coalitions, continental trade with Britain largely resumes, subject to tariffs and other forms of preference (Corn Laws, etc). The difference from OTL is that Napoleon remains the kingpin on the Continent whereas OTL Britain reverted to shifting alliances and preferences with the aim of preventing any such hegemony from arising. This might have a heavy bearing on how world commerce develops, because OTL Britain tended to shift toward free trade in the abstract anyway, meaning that little powers such as the German port cities could aspire to developing civil merchant marines in competition with British flagged shipping. Thus Norway for instance was quite a major shipping nation in 1940. Here Norway is a department of the Danish kingdom in alliance with Napoleon's system. Bremen and Hamburg I suppose are Napoleonic satellites too. Belgium is never created and is split between an integrally French Wallonia (whose people, I suppose, both working class and bourgeois-elite and nobles if any under the Napoleonic system will all come to think of themselves as integrally French) and a Flanders annexed to the Netherlands, under French hegemony too. Spain is a French client.
The author's attention to Latin America also has bearing on differential developments of global commerce and industry. OTL Britain managed to strongarm Spain into agreeing to allow British merchants trading privileges in the Spanish empire. Here, the Spanish Empire is somewhat eroded but largely intact, on paper, though loosely held--but insofar as it is "Spanish," Spain is under French guidance. Perhaps the weakness of Spain's grip and inability or disinclination of the Napoleonic patron to reinforce Spanish control means that the old agreements with Britain are de facto still operating, or I seem to recall that the USA swooped into the vacuum to some extent and ATL Yankee operations are at least somewhat, perhaps entirely, displacing British interest in nominally Spanish flagged American ports.
If so--OTL the British took advantage of the disintegration of Spanish control and formed informal relations with strong men in nominally independent Latin American republics, to promote their interests and under that cover of "whoever claims supreme power in the capital, they will respect our interests or else" made investments. Here on the one hand Britain is economically weaker, with fewer surplus funds to invest. And if it is mainly Yankees (and as discussed, French) investors who find the door more or less open, do they have the investment funds to match or exceed OTL investment? I suspect the answer for Americans is no, they don't; they mainly profit from trade pure and simple, and what Yankee investment capital there is will tend to stay in the USA where ample opportunities exist. French investors on the other hand enjoy a certain degree of protection, but rather rickety---it comes from Paris, as far as the Emperor is interested in pulling their private chestnuts out of the fire, leaning on Madrid, which has weak control over what actually happens in America. I would think the Latin American splinter states around OTL Argentina/Chile and Peru would tend to fall into the British sphere by default, and perhaps the concentration of reduced British venture capital into fewer channels makes British investment in both more intense than OTL. Certainly Britain is in a good position to back up Peru and Chile, and to a degree where greater proximity is offset by greater proximity of European (read, French-system) rivals in Rio del Plata, navally despite ATL setbacks--the RN is still a globally focused entity.
Overall then Britain is somewhat restricted in power and influence versus OTL, depending on what degree the Napoleonic-backed Spanish let them operate in nominally Spanish holdings, and the degree British investors feel any security in doing so. USA is possibly enjoying a windfall in merchant trade versus OTL but this largely siphons off trade profits north mainly to New England and New York city (probably also Baltimore and Charleston, in some proportion, maybe New Orleans and other Gulf ports like Pensacola benefit too).
Can and will the British attempt to recoup some of their setback versus OTL by attempting more aggressively to monopolize world trade? OTL most nations maintained a rather nominal and desultory competition and on terms of RN power plus general market strength, British trade came to dominate on economic competitiveness grounds. If the British lean too much on hostile force they will spur resentment and governmental investment in counter sea power; a soft approach is probably most rational still and could give the British flagged merchants world dominance yet. But might they make that aggressive mistake? And would it be a mistake actually?
In the Indian Ocean region unless I am forgetting some major British concession in India to France, the British seem well poised to dominate among European powers. The Dutch I imagine retain a grip on Indonesia, so Dutch merchant marine and navy are a sort of proxy of French policy in the region; I presume any French naval vessels can anyway rely on DEI ports--if the dearth of them between Europe and there don't effectively limit Continental projection that far. The Dutch navy is going to be pretty much at RN mercy, though no doubt able to make the British pay a hefty price for wiping them out. If France were going to challenge British sea power, they'd best do it by building up a French navy they can rely on for sure, with sidekick powers trailing in their wake. Then they'd need bases in Africa and south Asia--I presume anything Spanish flagged is available to them so no need for the moment to scheme for something in America, and IIRC French Guiana is a thing here as is French holdings of some Caribbean islands. Or Haiti might be under French quasi-protection. So the Americas would not be their focus, and if they cared a lot their easiest course of action is to reinforce Spanish power there. (How much potential there is in a Franco-American alliance is another interesting question, it seems to me though that American interests are already converging with British largely).
Are the British still free as OTL to "open up" China with opium as the pry-bar?
Returning then to the core of world capitalism, Britain as a major driver of 19th century industrialism is somewhat on the back foot, between hangovers of losing the Coalition War and subsequent authoritarianism in the UK itself, the Canal bubble collapsing, and somewhat impeded world trade (and colonial investment) opportunities hand in hand with reduced capital. USA is about as OTL or more so factoring in avoiding the War of 1812 and possible Spanish Empire and rebel republic trading profits, but versus OTL by this late date weaker in not having secured northwest Mexico from New Mexico on west to California. We know from hindsight this Mexican territory, therefore still under the Spanish crown at least on paper, has gold and silver in rich deposits, and if the USA does not have some pretext or opportunity to grab California or Nevada, that mineral wealth is going to benefit someone else. Who? If Spain could keep control after a gold rush gets under way, with a lot of gold rushers being either Yankees or British subjects unless someone foots the bill in a timely manner to get strong Spanish force in control of San Francisco bay, then ultimately California-Nevada mining could be a big help toward stabilizing the whole Spanish system. If Yankees do not grab it, preemptively before discovering this as OTL or after the rush is on, possibly separatist Mexicans can split it off along with much of the New Spain north--but then they'd be a weak brand new untried republic or kingdom caught between a no doubt annoyed Spain with or without French backing, and a greedy USA. Again Britain might be key here despite being weakened versus OTL, especially if RN strength is built up and modernized and based both in British Columbia (not yet legally a thing, this is a geographic expression) and Peruvian ports; in enough force that might be enough to buy an independent California centered or anyway holding Mexican splinter state. This might have to come at the cost of alienating the Spanish and if there is Caribbean/Mexican/Central American and Spanish Main trade to be lost, a greater cost than it is worth to Britain to secure CA, at least in the short run--longer run we know it is worthwhile but this might not be obvious at the time.
If the USA does not grab northern Mexico, we won't be as fiscally strong as OTL, but basically the dollar will still be pretty sound, being more fundamentally based on the credit of the USA as a whole, and surely even without extra infusions of capital from Latin American trade US industry will develop. Perhaps a bit more slowly than OTL due to Britain's retarded development providing a slower trickle of innovation to emulate and a weaker spur of competition, not to mention possible reduction in British capital investment. For a long time to come the major line of US development will be agricultural, as "frontier free land" comes under cultivation. But even if European import markets are weaker, most US development is internal and can be expected to continue on OTL tracks.
Regarding defense of north Mexico from further US incursions, I think there might be some hope if the politics pulls together and some visionary patriotic person high in Spanish/Mexican service realizes that there is potential in the Native American tribal peoples. Spain/Mexico not having any immediate designs on exploiting the vast sweep (beyond what is happening in California already under the mission system and moderate influx of Mexican settlement there, and the string of missions in Arizona plus the eastern anchor of the Santa Fe centered Nuevo Mexico administration, which is largely a tribal confederation regarding the Spanish as the devil they know), can they strengthen and extend the weak hegemony in Nuevo Mexico to reach north along the more or less conceded frontier with the Louisiana Territory that has been the US/Spanish border since the Louisiana Purchase? These tribal peoples, the most formidable but also most threatened, such as the Comanche, Kiowa and Lakota, are actually in occupation of conceded US territory and US policy is under the ATL version of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Spain (assuming this is how it sorts out, instead of Mexican independence) cannot do anything to help or protect these peoples on US soil without very likely starting another war with the USA. But could there be potential to negotiate with them to withdraw out of US claims (remaining only in a manner Spain can plausibly disavow) and take up service in defending Spanish claims against Yankee intrusion?
OTL, the nominally Mexican regime in Nuevo Mexico was de facto compliant with Comanche interests--on paper the Comanche were enemies of Mexico and freely raided south of Nuevo Mexican domains and to some extent within, but at Santa Fe the Comanche enjoyed a truce and SF based Mexican "force," weak as it was, made no moves against them. Going north from western Tejas and into the old (and I suspect, vague) treaty boundary of Louisiana, there is Rocky Mountain front range territory at least arguably on the Spanish side, where these tribes might find some room for partial settlement, and which Spain might send light forces to reinforce them. The aggressive tribes are already remarkably effective light cavalry; supply them, reinforce with some infantry and artillery and heavy cavalry (the Spanish can provide training and advisors to enable selected Native volunteers to largely fill these roles too) under consensual Spanish coordinating command, and while if the USA does mobilize its full potential they can be swept aside, the Spanish might make it somewhat costly and delayed to try it. The Native peoples would be crowded on not very productive land and many would not want to settle down to intensive agriculture anyway--but if it is possible to develop regional resources enough to keep them fed, the offer of a standing role as the standing auxiliary army defending Spain's northeast and northern border might gratify them. Possibly over time Native people in the interior who might not immediately see the point when they are protected with other people's efforts, might have enough political savvy to observe the Yankee threat and recognize some benefit in participating in a manpower tribute system of sorts whereby they either comply with intensifying their agriculture and hunting to help supply the front line tribes, or rotate in as volunteer recruits to reinforce the lines that way.
I wonder as to the potential of the Great Salt Lake region to be developed as an agricultural base to assist in keeping the front line tribes fed and supplied. OTL by this date the Mormons had moved in to annex it, prior to formal US conquest of it. But in this ATL, how likely is it that we have Smith and LDS in recognizable form, or that they or some other US sect resolve on such an exodus? Not too unlikely, the USA has the potential just as OTL clearly to produce such a group--if not LDS as we know it, perhaps some Utopian cult, even an atheistic one or anyway clearly non-Christian.
But with no such thing happening at all, can a Spanish agency recognize the potential of the region and rush up some forces and settlers to develop the zone as a bastion of Spanish control?
I suspect if this concept of a Grande Nuevo Mexico strategy of Native alliance has any potential in terms of logistics and manpower, it is going to be nixed by the apparent flow of events as the latest posts have foreshadowed. The USA has at any rate seized Tejas, not as much as the OTL Texas Republic claimed to be sure, and has force in being in the form of Anglo (and French) settlers and a clear legal claim on the upper western reaches of Mississippi system watersheds, so there is not much time to try to put up this screen. Logistics might make the whole notion impossible, with poor trails and low wealth pretty much requiring every tribe be autonomous and thus in conflict with each other. Meanwhile the likelihood of some Spanish officer hitting on this as a plan and having support and a strongly unified, loyal regime backing it seems pretty far fetched. The geopolitics of another Spanish-American war, bearing in mind no one was able to stop the Yankees from taking Tejas, don't seem to promise strong deterrents to the USA to forbear from poaching on the northern lands either.
But it would be cool I think, and possibly a basis for ongoing Spanish control of the whole sweep of "New Spain" all the way to Oregon and the Rockies allowing for a later stronger California and Great Basin region in ongoing union with Spain, or Mexico.
Circling back to the heartland of Napoleonic continental system again, I expect as long as imperial hegemony is maintained, its pragmatic/technocratic Napoleonic regime will muster at least as much investment capital as the combined territories generated OTL--probably more so early on due to shorter wars and less devastation early in the century, and I would guess overall even weak centralization would help overall, more than hurt.
But what geographic and demographic pattern will the Napoleonic coalition members follow? OTL capitalist development spread not only in France (largely in the north) but also the Rurh, parts of the Rhineland as well as Saxony and the Berlin area, and Belgium along with the Netherlands was another major industrial site.
Here as noted Belgium is not a thing, and north French Walloonia might well be as developed or nearly so--indeed with this far north portion of France being regarded as core French, it might develop more strongly and OTL northern France a bit less so. But will centralizing French dominance tend to concentrate industrial development there and in north France of OTL, and scant it in the German territories and Italy? To a degree power is devolved to the client states and allied realms, so if pro-industrial influences are strong in the client courts, we can see investment spread out. But would Saxony for instance have the same access to investment capital? Will the Ruhr?
The overall scale of total development within the entire imperial system I expect will match and quite possibly surpass than of OTL. But will it mostly be a matter of hothouse super-development of French industry, or will it spread out more like OTL? Might not the German and Italian stretches be overall less developed than OTL? (In Italy, I think south Italy will clearly have an edge versus OTL, but this might happen to some extent at the north's expense and if the north develops slowly enough overall Italy comes out behind despite a much better developed south).
Part of the pattern of industrial development is political after all. OTL numerous rival states existing in the wake of Napoleon's defeat each had their own interest in particular development. On the other hand, such development is disruptive socially! Under Code Napoleon, there are some restrictions on the total overbearing rule of factory masters versus their workforce which might cushion the blow a bit, if not voided by later Imperial alignment with the capitalist interest. But there is the general phenomenon of developing nationalism I alluded to at the start of the post.
Depending on how much political liberalism the Empire promotes--so far it seems, it does so quite little--if the upshot is the Imperial hegemony of central French empire and client and allied states remains dictatorial and anti-democratic, large alliances of the disgruntled with forces we'd label politically radical, even Communistic, being merely extreme wings of a unified liberal-revolutionary opposition to ruling class authority can form. Success, even partial success, of these movements can split these alliances, but if most subjects are in effect less than citizens, subject to paying heavy taxes, being drafted into armies, and daily subordinate to small classes of high finance and landlords, all discontent might feed into a mass liberal-radical illegal revolutionary alliance, which probably takes on strong nationalist-populism as well versus the cosmopolitan imperial ideal. British sem-democracy, oligarchic as it is, is one example for more moderate revolutionaries to look to; radical American mass democracy is another more sweeping (but ideologically consistent) example, and one resonating with the old spirt of 1789.
In the ATL, Napoleonic authority is successful, while the Revolution is understood by all to have devolved into infighting and lost control to military central power. This is no doubt a caution to many a would-be rebel. So I am not stating as an absolute that the masses must prevail.
But I am saying, it behooves Napoleonic bureaucrats and technocrats to be somewhat astute, to minimize grievances, to soften nationalistic reactions by being cosmopolitan and soft-pedaling French chauvinism, to be seen as usefully balancing regional conflicts in pursuit of harmony and shared progress for all. Insofar as any dominant hierarchy is doomed to achieve these standards of good government only partially, the potential for explosive mass revolution is simmering on the back burner ready to boil over, and decisions made to mollify potential revolutionaries might result in inhibiting capitalist growth.
The way you solved it reminds me of an earlier post of yours about the need to allow for miscalculations, blunders and general incertitude when writing credible AH - previously you inserted it in in a voluntary manner but now it seems like it is providing a straighforward answer to in-universe problems. For now Madrid is seeking an equilibrium between the influence its military strenght can grant it and the various centrifugal forces in the New World, but if I may ask, is this calculation not bound to be undermined by another one - the heavy costs of New World involvement vs the mostly symbolic benefits of it?