I've been more productive lately than I've been since this story began, so here's Chapter 35 already. The Tejas Revolution continues, and escalates into something far bigger. Enjoy!
Chapter Thirty-Five: Politics by Other Means
Excerpted from The Road to War: 1830-1852 by Alexander Peterson, 1971.
Like many revolutions, the rebellion in Tejas began militarily, leaving political actors struggling to keep pace with developments. The appointment of Lorenzo de Zavala as the next Viceroy for New Spain provided an immediate pretext for resistance against the Bustamante regime. Tejas Governor José María Viesca endorsed Zavala and called on other state governments to follow suit, but he himself had been pre-empted in his declaration by Stephen Austin, the unofficial leader of the Anglo settlers in the region. Viesca wouldn’t forget this slight, but the Governor understood that his goals still coincided with Austin’s. Both men were more interested in restoring Constitutional rule to the Kingdom than in seceding to join the United States. This differentiated the two from Haden Edwards, the hot-headed empresario in charge of the lands along the Navasota. [1]
By Summer of 1832, it had become clear that Bustamante would not step down from his position as Viceroy, regardless of Madrid’s opinion of him. Austin and other empresarios began mobilising their local militias to expel Mexican army units from the state. Viesca turned a blind eye to their activities, having reached a tacit understanding with Austin that secession was not in the offing. It is important for the present-day reader to remember that the sedition in Tejas was not unusual for Mexican provinces at this point. State Governors elsewhere were just as assertive in their denunciations of the centralists in Mexico City. El Salvador, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, and Yucatan also resisted the federal government, with varying degrees of effectiveness, stretching the Mexican army considerably. [2]
Three things set the unrest in Tejas apart from that in other states. The first was the empresario system. The empresarios were men authorised by the Mexican government to recruit settlers for the lands in Tejas. Once settlement was underway, the empresarios would also be expected to keep order in the lands under their supervision with private militias. This programme had the effect of raising military formations with no loyalty to the Mexican government, which certainly had its implications when the revolt against Bustamante began. But by allowing French and American empresarios to set up shop in Tejas, the government unwittingly diluted the cultural identity of the state. Immigrants were required to learn Spanish to gain admittance, but the establishment of tight-knit immigrant communities like Bettencour and San Felipe ensured that French and English were still used in day-to-day life, driving a wedge between the settlers and native Mexicans. The introduction of slavery presented yet another bone of contention, especially once Bustamante took power and began to undermine state autonomy.
The second difference between Tejas and other rebellious states is that the former could afford to trade space for time. The Mexican army under Filisola was too large to resist in open battle, but it was also too large to support itself in the field for long. The Tejano militias under Samuel Houston exploited this weakness by fighting delaying actions while drawing Filisola ever farther into enemy territory. The first major battle took place on the 3rd of March 1833, at the Nueces river northwest of Bettencour. The Tejans gave way quickly under the weight of numbers, but the army managed to retreat in good order. Filisola left men behind to occupy Bettencour while the bulk of his force advanced further northwest and captured the fort of Béxar. [3]
The fall of Béxar left Tejas dangerously exposed to the Mexican army.
It was at this point that political considerations began to reassert themselves. The complexion of the rebellion had changed over its first six months. A sizable influx of American volunteers bolstered the ranks of Houston’s army. This caused its own problems, however, as the army’s growing size also increased the importance of requisitioning supplies from local communities.
The political character of the rebels also changed dramatically during this time. The provisional government guiding the rebels was designed to coordinate the efforts of the empresarios with that of the original state government, but the sheer demographic weight of the English-speaking community and army resulted in the slow-motion marginalisation of Governor Viesca and other Mexican federalists. A proposal from Viesca for the Tejan army to mount a counteroffensive into New Spain in support of federalist forces was promptly voted down by the provisional government – with a large Mexican army encroaching on their territory, the idea of diverting forces elsewhere was deemed too risky. [4]
The situation for Tejas deteriorated even further over the Summer of 1833. Filisola split his army again, with separate forces laying siege to Goliad on the Gulf Coast, forcing the provisional government to abandon San Felipe, and still harrying Houston’s army as it retreated towards the Neches River. Houston readied his dispirited army for a last stand on the far bank, dispatched James Bowie to deliver a message, and waited for Filisola.
The Mexican army reached the Neches on July 16th. Filisola now commanded 5,500 men after having dispersed men to occupy Tejas, as well as sending several hundred men back into New Spain proper at Bustamante’s request to help put down Yorkino activity. Houston, for his part, commanded around 2,600 men, of which 1,500 had only come to Tejas after the start of the uprising the previous year. Filisola, sensing that the end of the rebellion was at hand, pushed his fatigued army into action on the 17th, having built a pair of pontoon bridges across the river the day before. The Mexican general reasoned that the Tejans were just as winded as his own troops, and that stopping for breakfast would cost him the initiative. This proved to be the second-greatest error Filisola made that day.
The advance began at 11:30, and made poor initial progress. The Mexican army was too exhausted from its long march, and the pontoons became deadly bottlenecks for the numerically superior attackers. Still, the Tejan army was a hodgepodge of local militias and raw recruits, so a slight slackening in their fire provided a window for the Mexicans to push forward and establish a beachhead on the opposite side of the Neches. Once this was done, the weight of numbers could make itself felt. By 1:30, the Tejan center was giving way.
At 1:34, the third difference between Tejas and other states made itself known. The Neches was disputed territory between New Spain and the United States. The American government thought it a tributary of the Sabine river, which was claimed as part of the Louisiana Purchase. Houston knew this, and had baited Filisola’s army into violating the disputed soil in his eagerness to crush the rebellion. Once his scouts had spotted the Mexicans approaching his position, Houston sent Bowie to inform General Edmund Gaines, whose army detachment was stationed nearby. [5]
Tejan forces battle the Mexican army at the Neches River.
Secretary of War Lewis Cass had instructed Gaines to respond with force should Mexican forces cross the Sabine River. That Filisola approached the Neches intending to engage Houston on the west bank was pretext enough for Gaines to act pre-emptively and assist the Tejans. His army crossed the Neches north of the ongoing engagement, and fell upon the Mexican rear. Filisola’s fixation on the immediate threat left him blindsided by the arrival of a second army, and his forces splintered on opposite sides of the river. Around 2,500 Mexicans eventually managed to escape southwards, but 2,700 men, Filisola included, were hemmed in between the Tejan and American armies and forced to surrender. Upon hearing of the battle, the Pike Administration promptly accused New Spain of violating its territory, with Bustamante levelling the same charges back at Pike. On July 31st, Bustamante declared war on the United States, while the US Congress would reciprocate two days later. The Tejanos had received their miracle, or so it seemed.
[1] Edwards led an anti-Mexican revolt in the 1820s IOTL, that Austin and others helped suppress. He didn’t do that here in part because Morelos did a better job of briefing his empresarios on the specifics of their responsibilities, but also for other reasons.
[2] Oaxaca and Zacatecas were the first states to rebel against Santa Anna IOTL.
[3] The Alamo isn’t as well-remembered ITTL, in part because it falls much quicker, but also because it’s overshadowed by the battle on the Neches and its Helm’s Deep-like conclusion.
[4] There was a (very small) expedition mounted into Mexico IOTL, but the far larger invading Mexican army ITTL just can’t be ignored.
[5] Gaines was positioned in Louisiana like this IOTL, and I read speculation that he had secret orders to engage a Mexican army if they violated what was seen as US territory. I don’t know how true that is, but the Pike Administration’s Latin American ambitions make it true ITTL. Gaines was led to understand by Cass and Pike that he should creatively interpret his official instructions if the situation demanded it.