Marche Consulaire: A Napoleonic Timeline

From a straight reading of it it seems more like they are worried about being on the receiving end of a Russian peace deal not worry about abstract balance of power concepts.

I thought it was obvious that any peace that's not a French surrender is going to be moving the balance of power towards the French
 
Chapter Fifteen: The Eagle's Repose, Continued
What was originally going to be a short, quickie update became a normal length one after I decided to attach some information about French policing that I'd planned to expound on later. So enjoy Part 2 of my exploration of post-war France, now with extra heavy-handed foreshadowing.

Also, I've been trying to include more pictures in the last few chapters to hopefully make the updates more engaging than a straight wall of text, so let me know how that's been going. Eventually, I'll start including pics that aren't just portraits of important people, but we'll cross that bridge when we come to it.
Chapter Fifteen: The Eagle’s Repose, Continued.
Excerpted from Patterns in French Migration from 1820 to 1950 by Alessio Vernengo, 1988.​

The first thing that stands out about the French diaspora is its size. Compared to the large outflows from England, Ireland, Italy, Germany, and other parts of Europe, France experienced much lower population losses to emigration during the 19th Century. Between slower population growth and the relative security enjoyed by small farmers in France relative to other countries, there was less pressure, and less of an impetus for families to move abroad.

Despite this, there were two periods during this time in which French emigration spiked. The larger and more famous of these episodes came in the 1870’s, as many thousands of French fled the country to escape the excesses of the Second Terror. The other incident came several years after the end of the Revolutionary Wars, with the agricultural slump that stretched roughly from 1818 to 1823. This displacement resulted in approximately 90,000 citizens leaving France over the course of the 1820’s. [1] Approximately two-thirds of these emigrants set off for the New World, primarily the United States.

Despite its smaller size, the contingent that went to Mexico also had profound implications in later decades. The newly minted Kingdom of New Spain offered several advantages that America lacked. The first and most obvious factor was a lack of anti-Catholicism; despite a popular sense of anti-clericalism from the recent rebellion, few Mexicans would discriminate against French immigrants on religious grounds. Another reason was a relative lack of government oversight. Viceroy Morelos was preoccupied with a series of ambitious social reforms, including an effort to gradually abolish slavery. Because of this, sparsely populated regions in Veracruz and Tejas became popular destinations for French settlers.

Historically, Tejas had resisted Mexican settlement, as conflicts with Apache and later Comanche Indians were a perennial obstacle. As a result, the region boasted little more than 3,000 settlers in 1820, a population outnumbered by the indigenous tribes. Morelos tried to rectify this through generous land grants, on the condition that new residents learned Spanish and practiced Catholicism.

These stipulations didn’t prevent Anglo settlement, but French émigrés were more welcomed, and in 1823, a community of 600 was founded at the mouth of the Nueces on the Gulf Coast. [2] In addition to some small farming, the town of Bettencour also sustained itself through trade with Mexican soldiers stationed in the area to stave off the Comanches. This symbiosis eased what might otherwise have been a contentious relationship between the new immigrants and the Mexican army, and formed the foundation for the French Mexican community to grow over the subsequent decades.


1873 Sketch of Bettencour, Tejas.
Excerpted from Angels and Demons: The Shadow War for the Soul of France by Mathias Gaspard, 2004.​

Any observer tracing the historical development of industrialism and other radical ideologies first needs to appreciate their births in the proper historical context. And to do this, one needs to understand the nature of the French security state as it evolved over time. After all, it was under the shadow of Napoleonic surveillance and censorship that the Blanquists and other social movements took shape. The need to evade government scrutiny while still building popular support is reflected in the tactics favored by these groups – in many respects, it even pervades the ideologies themselves. [3] Therefore, a thorough review of the security state itself is in order.

As a part of his broader effort to centralize the French state, Napoleon I laid down the foundations for modern French law enforcement. The fruit of this labor, La Sûreté Nationale, was refined further by Napoleon II, taking on a sophisticated counterintelligence role, before finally being unleashed on the French people in all its fury by Napoleon III. Despite the reputation it would later acquire, the French police, much like the Emperor himself, had humbler origins.

Napoleon’s overhaul of French administration and law enforcement was a gradual process, starting during his time as First Consul and continuing until his death. The Emperor had several interests to balance: on the one hand, he wanted to concentrate administrative power in Paris, to restore a sense of stability in the wake of the Revolution. He also wanted a security apparatus that could supplement his military intelligence gathering. On the other hand, Napoleon’s years of campaigning meant that he also needed the police to function without his direct supervision. Threading this needle would require a spymaster blessed with both skill and the nerve to operate independently.

Both of these needs were met by Joseph Fouché, Napoleon’s Minister of Police. Appropriately, Fouché was mistrusted by the Emperor personally, but retained his position through a skill and efficiency that commanded universal respect. As Napoleon put it, “He is the police incarnate. He would teach it to God the Father, and the Devil would have nothing to teach him.” [4]

Fouché’s police force maintained peace in Paris, kept the Emperor appraised of domestic threats to his rule, primarily from royalists, and provided critical intelligence during Napoleon’s campaigns. After the Treaty of Madrid, the Minister’s focus shifted towards monitoring the French countryside, making sure that the disruption of French agriculture in the post-war years didn’t boil over into violence.

Following Fouché’s death in 1819, the Emperor appointed an even more controversial figure as his replacement. Eugène Francois Vidocq, a thief and forger, had joined the state’s payroll as an informer ten years earlier, and spent the intervening years ascending the ranks of the police. La Sûreté was, in fact, Vidocq’s brainchild. Initially an informal outfit of plainclothes detectives, the organization was quickly rolled into the Minister of Police’s purview. By infiltrating the criminal underworld, Vidocq’s detectives could identify and track threats to public order, allowing for more proactive security policy. The Emperor’s promotion of Vidocq in spite of his criminal past was a strong signal of Napoleon’s desire for investigation and detective work to take center stage. Some degree of crime would be tolerated, so long as it could also be controlled.

Achille_Dev%C3%A9ria_-_Vidocq.jpg

Eugène Francois Vidocq, Father of La Sûreté

One of Vidocq’s first acts as Minister began the transition of the Sûreté from an investigative branch of the Paris police towards its later role as the command and control of domestic intelligence gathering. [5] This shift was encouraged by Napoleon, but was pursued even more vigorously by his son, who saw the benefits to infiltrating and monitoring any potential subversive movements in the Empire. This awareness would enable the state to deal with threats as delicately or forcefully as the situation demanded, even influencing the country’s political culture through selective enforcement. This posture was also well in keeping with the political changes of the Constitution of the Year XL, and its empowerment of professionals over lawmakers.

What the Emperor did not realize, however, was that this environment would have other, less readily foreseeable implications for his country’s political culture. Blanqui and others were well-aware of the danger of state infiltration of their movements, and tailored their structure and tactics to exploit gaps in the state’s abilities. Not only could this awareness let radical groups evade detection, but it also guided them towards avenues in which they could build their own power base, with Imperial officials none the wiser. This, too, would have profound effects on the crisis of the 1870’s.

[1] This is a huge boost from OTL’s 1820’s, but that’s cancelled out by a tapering off in the next few decades where there was a more of a steady increase over time IOTL. Of course, sending out more migrants earlier on will have a compounding effect in the future of this timeline.

[2] OTL Corpus Christi. There were a couple unsuccessful colonization attempts in the 18th Century IOTL before the successes of the 1830’s and 40’s.

[3] Considering OTL Blanquism is basically all tactics and no ideals, this says a lot.

[4] OTL quote from Nappy. He didn’t like or trust Fouché, but he certainly seemed to respect the guy’s acumen. Also worth noting that the Walcheren Expedition didn't happen ITTL, and neither did the Perceval Ministry, removing the two most immediate reasons Fouché got fired IOTL.

[5] This happened much later IOTL. Here the shift means that la Sûreté retains its detective branch even as it starts managing the rest of the constabulary.
 
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The 'Second Terror' unleashed by Napoleon III... that sounds ominous.

That's the idea. This timeline has mostly been populated by rational actors so far, with the most glaring exception probably being King Ferdinand, whose doctrinaire absolutism has gotten him exiled. Most of this chapter was setting up later events, and for me, a part of that involves assuring everyone that things will, in fact, get crazier at certain points in the future.
 
Chapter Sixteen: State of Emergency
Now that I'm back in the swing of writing for this, I'm going to try and see if I can maintain an update a week, or every two weeks at most. So now we've got a British politics update, and the next one will bring us back to South America to wrap up unfinished business down there. Enjoy.

Chapter Sixteen: State of Emergency

Excerpted from The Age of Revolutions by A.F. Stoddard, 2006.​

In the wake of its defeat against Napoleon, the British Empire entered a strange torpor politically, and nothing exemplified this better than the occupant of Number Ten. Simply put, George Canning was not supposed to be Prime Minister. He was too much a Tory for the Whigs, too Whiggish for many Tories, and was personally mistrusted by the King. Worse, Canning also suffered from being hemmed in by the legacies of previous governments, further stymieing his ambitions for social reform. Nevertheless, due to the listlessness pervading both parties, he found himself at the forefront, as the only reasonably acceptable choice to maintain a majority government.

One of Canning’s passions was free trade – as an early disciple of Ricardo, he believed that a world shorn of trade barriers would accentuate the superiority of British industry. Unfortunately, the last measure taken by the outgoing Liverpool Ministry was an agricultural tariff, the first of the Corn Laws. [1] The tariff kept bread prices high in England even as they began sinking on the Continent after 1818, benefiting landholders at the expense of urban laborers. Despite his opposition to the tariff, Canning knew better than to challenge the Corn Law. Farmers on the Continent and even across the Atlantic were put out of business as food prices declined. For the landholders and their advocates in the House of Lords, Britain’s insulation from this trend was a sign that the Law was working exactly as intended, and was therefore grounds not to challenge it.

Canning’s other unwelcome bequest from previous governments was a historic level of war debt. The Napoleonic Wars had raged for nearly a quarter of a century, and outfitting its own armies as well as those of its continental allies had left the British government with 850 million Pounds in debt - an unprecedented burden. [2] Canning described the dilemma before his government succinctly, noting that “Should we keep taxes as they are, the country’s pensioners and creditors will rise against us. Should we raise taxes to retire the debt more quickly, the rest of the country will riot. We face popular opprobrium regardless of our choice.”

In the end, raising taxes was deemed the lesser evil. The House of Commons refused to retain an income tax in peacetime, forcing the government to increase the excise on liquor, tobacco, and several other goods. This did little to ease the nation’s spirits, but it did allow Canning to make steady progress towards lowering the public debt burden. From 1816 onward, the ratio of debt to output was on the decline. [3]

In the meantime, Canning decided to tackle another of his domestic ambitions – Catholic emancipation. Ever since the Act of Union in 1800, the question of anti-Catholic discrimination had been a thorny issue. At the time, Pitt had promised an end to the Test Acts and other legislation that pressured British Catholics to effectively renounce their religion to hold public office. Opposition from George III had been the main stumbling block at the time, and Pitt’s government fell once it became clear he couldn’t keep his word.

The King’s death in 1819 provided an opening to tackle the Catholic Question again. George IV was no friendlier to the Catholic cause than his father, but Canning’s Cabinet of pro-Emancipation Tories and Whigs was prepared to go to the mat on the issue. On January 29th, 1820, Canning and Home Secretary Lord Wellesley met with the King. An Emancipation Bill had been drafted by William Plunkett, and the two men flatly informed George IV that should he withhold his consent from the legislation, then the entire Cabinet would resign. Reluctantly, the King acceded to Canning’s ultimatum. National unrest seemed to be approaching a boiling point, and George feared the instability that could result from a fallen government at this juncture. His obligation to uphold the monarchy outweighed his loyalty to the Church of England.

The King was right to worry – the Revolutions in France and Spain were vivid demonstrations of what could happen when a monarch refused to bend to the will of the people. Modern historians tend to cite greater prosperity and stronger and more responsive institutions as reasons why Britain avoided a similar upheaval as its continental neighbors. These points have merit, but the fact remains that British radicals existed, were a potent force, and despite reform efforts by Canning and others, it was often violent repression that kept these radicals from power.

In Britain, there were two primary movements that pushed for revolutionary change in the country’s political and economic governance. Of these two, the more famous were the Luddites, whose cause became so well-known that their name remains in use today to denote opposition to new technology. Spurred by harsh working conditions during the Napoleonic Wars, this movement took aim at new advances in automated textile making, which deprived skilled craftsmen of their livelihoods, only for these tradesmen to be replaced by less skilled, less well-compensated workers.

FrameBreaking-1812.jpg

A sketch of machine breaking.

The Luddite response was a program of economic sabotage, with affiliated workers destroying mechanical equipment throughout the country, but particularly in industrial centers in Nottinghamshire, Yorkshire, and Lancashire. This movement is traced back to 1811, but picked up further steam following the Panic of 1813, as well as in the wake of the Treaty of Madrid in 1815. What began as an apolitical protest movement gained further adherents who brought with them the sense that British government had failed its people, and that the only recourse for the downtrodden was to damage the livelihoods of the elite, and make them feel the same hardship that afflicted those beneath them. [4]

Ultimately, the British Army was forced to take action against the Luddites. Indeed, as Lord Byron sardonically observed, there were more British troops taking action against public unrest in Northern England in 1814 than had fought the French during the Fourth Coalition. “Because when confronted with our age’s Caesar on the Continent, and a few broken looms at home, certainly the latter is the more pressing danger,” he deadpanned. [5]

Regardless of urgency, the government responded with mass show trials, one in 1813 and another in 1816. In both cases, around half of the defendants were acquitted, but the other half faced execution or transportation. This harsh response eventually halted the growth of the movement, but its heavy-handedness may well have radicalized the more stalwart agitators, which led to the growth of this period’s other significant movement.

Despite achieving less initial notoriety, the second radical group, the Spenceans, may well have been the more influential, if only for their one chance success in 1820. The Spenceans were disciples of Thomas Spence, an 18th Century radical who advocated an end to aristocratic landholding in favor of collective ownership. Unlike the Luddites, this movement was non-violent at first, seeking redress for the country’s poor. Although the British economy rebounded from the Panic of 1813, the firm floor on cost of living imposed by the Corn Laws, paired with Canning’s tax increases, collectively excluded the country's poor from the recovery. Output plateaued in 1818 and stagnated, never quite returning to its pre-Canal Mania heights.

As with the Luddites, the government responded with a show of force, trying Spencean leader Arthur Thistlewood and several others with high treason for their part in inciting unrest. The men were acquitted, but the display of governmental contempt hardened their resolve in the righteousness of their cause. As will become clear, our primary source on the Spencean leader’s thoughts is emphatically not an unbiased observer, but according to him, the 1817 Islington Affair was the moment when Arthur Thistlewood lost any remaining faith in British government. For him, the only way forward was to bring the entire edifice crashing down.

The following year, Thistlewood and his followers began plotting a violent overthrow of the British government. With the death of George III and the subsequent furor over Catholic emancipation, it seemed as if their time had come. The Spencean Philanthropists, as they were known, would attack Canning’s Cabinet at a ceremonial dinner, decapitating the government in one fell swoop. To facilitate the plan, the group rented a house on Cato Street and awaited their chance.

That chance was ultimately an illusion. Ever since their previous brush with the law, the Spenceans had been monitored and infiltrated by British authorities. Thistlewood’s second, George Edwards, was secretly a police informant, and he had concocted the story of the Cabinet dinner to ensnare the others. On February 1st, 1820, the night before the conspirators intended to move, the London police struck first. The operation hit an early snag when the Coldstream Guards, whose support had been requested, failed to materialize, forcing the police to belatedly make the arrest alone. Despite this setback, most of the ten men enlisted in the conspiracy were captured. The sole exception was Thistlewood, who escaped through a window. To evade pursuit, the Spencean sought refuge in the home of a sympathetic cobbler while he devised a new plan. [6]

Cato.jpg

The February 1st Raid on the Cato Conspiracy was not the success the government had hoped for.

It is unclear whether Thistlewood realized at this point that his group had been betrayed, but he knew that he couldn’t count on additional help, and that his own arrest was imminent. With these grim realities apparent, he set his mind on one last roll of the dice. And so it was that on February 3rd, a mere two days after his fellows were captured, Arthur Thistlewood walked into Number 10, disguised as a member of the cleaning staff. As outlandish a plan as this may have seemed, it worked. The men on duty, not recognizing the wanted criminal in his stolen clothing, allowed him inside without incident. Once there, he found his way towards the Prime Minister’s office, where Canning was discussing strategy with Lord Wellesley. [7]

Thistlewood attacked the two, shooting the Prime Minister and stabbing the Home Secretary. Both men would perish within the day. News of the assassination shook the country, and not simply because of the violent act itself. The fact that a man with an extensive criminal record, whose activities had been closely monitored by authorities, and who had been the target of a city-wide investigation, could not only slip through the law’s fingers but, in so doing, bluff his way to the doorstep of the Prime Minster, was a harrowing turn of events.

It was also one that found Canning’s conservative rivals quick to take advantage. Chief among them was Henry Addington, the Viscount Sidmouth. As Home Secretary, he had overseen the initial government response to the Luddites, with an emphasis on maintaining public order at all costs. Sidmouth subsequently left government in protest of Catholic emancipation, which he strongly opposed. With Canning’s assassination, the former Secretary now saw an opportunity to retake the Tory Party from the late Minister’s reformists.

He couldn’t do this alone, however. Sidmouth had served as Prime Minster before, signing the Treaty of Amiens, but that tenure had been cut short by a Parliamentary revolt against his weak leadership. He knew the moment was ripe for a strong appeal to public order, but he also knew that his oratorical skills were ill-suited for the task. To remedy this, Sidmouth forged a partnership with Lord Eldon, the longtime Lord Chancellor, who could provide the strong rhetoric and charisma demanded by the situation. Together with Sidmouth’s old ally Spencer Perceval, the three resolved to steer their party and their country back on course.

On the 9th, less than a week after Canning’s demise, the surviving Cabinet secretaries met with King George. The current Cabinet, divided as it was between Whigs, Canningite Tories, and more traditionalist conservatives left over from Liverpool, was unable to decide on a successor. [8] There was no choice but to call a new election, less than a year after the one that followed the death of George III. And as the country prepared to visit the polls again, Sidmouth and his allies had a secret weapon in their corner: George Edwards.

As the government’s mole inside the Cato Street Conspiracy, Edwards remains our primary source of information on Arthur Thistlewood and the slow descent of the Spencean into an anarchist assassin. Throughout the months of February and March, Edwards offered his (stringently coached) account of the Conspiracy and its infamous leader to The Times. This process is considered by journalists as the precursor to modern interviewing, as well as a cautionary tale into the pitfalls of overreliance on official sources.

For weeks, readers were treated to an exhaustive account of Thistlewood’s activities and the precautions taken by government to mitigate potential damage. This tale culminated in the fateful raid on the 1st, where Edwards spared no criticism for the police force’s failure to apprehend the ringleader, and the subsequent lack of vigilance that had cost the Prime Minister his life.

The Tory Party traditionally enjoyed a majority during the elections of this time, thanks to the inclusion of seats from rotten boroughs. The 1820 election was more than simply an assertion of majority party dominance, however. In fact, while the Whigs lost dozens of seats, the true losers were the Canningite Tories, who were charged by the press and by more hardline conservatives with vacillation and incompetence, with letting public order in England fall by the wayside in their zeal to appease the Irish. In accordance with Sidmouth’s plans, Lord Eldon emerged as the new leader of the party. With the High Tory faction triumphant, Eldon formed a new Cabinet from veterans of the Liverpool and Portland Ministries.

The new government operated on the basis of five fundamental points of agreement:

1. No Catholic Emancipation.
2. The Corn Law was not to be contested.
3. The breakdown in order exemplified by the Luddites and Spenceans was to be met with all means at the government’s disposal.
4. Electoral reform was to be tabled. The cause had some adherents among doctrinaire Anglicans, but was still too contentious for the government to support.
5. The unrest in Spain must be dealt with, even if doing so required an alliance with Napoleon. Otherwise, intercession on the Continent was to be minimized. [9]

With these imperatives in mind, and with Sidmouth reinstated as Home Secretary, the new High Tory government set out to meet the challenges of the 1820’s, preserving social order by any means necessary.

[1] This is my attempt to resolve what might have otherwise been a continuity snafu from two chapters ago. I mentioned Canning and Corn Laws, but given his opposition to them, I decided it could be something he was saddled with by Liverpool, who also wasn’t a fan, but got pushed into it IOTL anyways.

[2] Less than OTL in other words – no Peninsular War, more colonial action, more subsidies for allies in 1809-1810, but few/none afterwards. Still well over 100 percent of GDP, though, so a major long-term problem, and difficult to service with no peacetime income tax.

[3] This is a swifter response than Liverpool did, though, so the country will find itself on the mend sooner rather than later.

[4] This is a divergence from OTL’s Luddites. Basically, the discontent from those two shock events that didn’t happen IOTL cause the movement to take a more politicized bent and last a few years longer before petering out.

[5] This, however, is basically OTL. There were a lot of British troops up north during the war, and Byron was sympathetic to their cause.

[6] Most of this is OTL, until the raid. There, several people escaped along with Thistlewood in real life, but were all caught here. Ironically, this makes things easier for him, as he simply needs to go to ground by himself instead of with a group.

[7] And this is basically an acknowledgement of the whole social engineering literature on infiltration. It offends our sense of logic, but insultingly simple deceptions like this really do work more often than they should.

[8] A task made harder by Sidmouth, Spencer and Eldon advising the conservatives to gum up the works as much as they can, to force a new election.

[9] Canning was actually not so sentimental about the differences between republic and monarchy. Sidmouth and friends care about the distinction a lot more, however.
 
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Come on, British Revolution! Or at least Irish Revolution, that'll be acceptable too.

Well, Ireland will certainly be fuming after seeing emancipation get so close, only to get snatched away at the last minute. Still, it's important to remember that Lord Sidmouth actually succeeded in neutralizing most of the unrest that was going on at this time IOTL. And most of what's happened in this last update is only a little worse than real life - even in victory, this wasn't the happiest time for Britain. Throw in the one big divergence that happened here, and the High Tories now have a potent new weapon to hurl at the agitators. Hell, they don't even need to speak ill of the dead; instead, they can argue that Canning and Richard Wellesley extended a hand in friendship to the Catholics and other malcontents, only for it to get bitten off.

So in this environment, especially in the absence of an expanded franchise, Lord Eldon can stay PM for as long as he wants, barring a real catastrophe. And IOTL, he lived until 1838. Things will better eventually, but "eventually" may prove to be a long ways off.
 
Perhaps you'll cover this as part of the rumored "Second Terror", I'm curious to see how FRENCH society reacts the rise of the Luddites. No doubt if her level of industrialization is similar to the British, they'll soon be facing a similar resistance, especially since the Revolutionary ideals give a strong moral-political precedent for unemployed/displaced workers to resist violently. ("The Factory Foreman is nothing more than a later-day member of the ancien regeime, only now displacing us from our long-cherished and honorable trade with the loom which spins the wool rather than the sheep who wears it")
 
Perhaps you'll cover this as part of the rumored "Second Terror", I'm curious to see how FRENCH society reacts the rise of the Luddites. No doubt if her level of industrialization is similar to the British, they'll soon be facing a similar resistance, especially since the Revolutionary ideals give a strong moral-political precedent for unemployed/displaced workers to resist violently. ("The Factory Foreman is nothing more than a later-day member of the ancien regeime, only now displacing us from our long-cherished and honorable trade with the loom which spins the wool rather than the sheep who wears it")

I want to keep my cards close to the chest on this, but you're right in that there will be similar movements responding to industrialization in France in this story. And yes, it will play into the Second Terror eventually. Of course, there'll be other cultural influences more unique to France that will also play into it - some of them encouraged by Napoleon himself, in fact! So yes, this is another thing to look forward to in the coming decades.
 
Chapter Seventeen: The Enemy of My Enemy
Phew, just barely managed to avoid breaking my one update a week promise - the week after I made it! But here I am, wrapping up the war in South America. Next, we're going back to Spain to see how its Revolution is coming. Enjoy!
Chapter Seventeen: The Enemy of My Enemy

Excerpted from The First Wave: Independence Movements of the Napoleonic Era by Juanita Perez, 1984​

The Ordinance of 1819 marked the beginning of the end of fighting in Spanish America. In most Spanish colonies, Royalist forces held the upper hand, however hard-fought or tenuous, and war-weary locals were willing to give the new Regencia Liberal a chance to address their problems peaceably. The exceptions to this were the two colonies who rejected the Regency on principle.

Despite this commonality, the two most persistent trouble spots shared little else politically. The Viceroyalty of Peru refused to accept the Palafox Regency as a legitimate continuation of the Bourbon monarchy, effectively joining the ranks of rebellious Spanish colonies, even as most others laid down their arms. The other outlier was the first and bitterest of the uprisings, in Rio de la Plata. Here, the Buenos Aires Junta was confident of ultimate victory, an optimism further reinforced by their successful manipulation of the competing factions in Chile.

From 1816 to 1819, the Spanish army had clashed with the La Platans on the border between Upper Peru and Chile. The Royalists were better-trained and had superior numbers, but their long and easily raided supply lines proved a liability. In both 1817 and 1818, the Royalists had gained the advantage in Upper Peru during the summer, only to retreat back into Chile in the Fall, to avoid getting cut off once snow blocked the mountain passes they depended on for resupply. By appealing to José Miguel Carrera’s ego, Buenos Aires’ allies in the Lodge of Rational Knights were able to secure a ceasefire on this front, with their subsequent coup putting the revolutionaries in charge of all Spanish territories south of Peru.

And Peru, in spite of its royalist sentiments, appeared doomed to share the same fate. With Santiago secured, the Castelli Junta turned its attention towards Lima. In light of the colony’s monarchist resistance against the regency in Madrid, Peru now seemed like an easy target. In July 1820, La Platan forces under José de San Martín landed on the coast of Peru with roughly 20,000 troops. Deprived of protection from the Spanish army, the Peruvians could muster forces only a third of this size. [1] For Viceroy José de la Serna, it was clear that Lima could not be defended against such overwhelming numbers. This did not make Serna willing to give up, however.

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The Chilean Navy, Supporting San Martin's 1820 Invasion of Peru.

Instead, the Viceroy resorted to irregular warfare, dispersing his forces across the colony to harry San Martin’s columns and impede their progress. La Guerilla, as it was called, severely tested an already war-weary force. This alone wouldn't be enough, however. With a clarity often absent in other royalist administrators, Serna realized that only a broad-based resistance movement could compel the La Platans to abandon their newest conquest. And in Peru, this meant inclusion of the natives. The Spanish subjugation of the Incas had never been a truly settled matter, with revolts flaring up periodically from the 16th Century onward. Fourteen such uprisings had occurred during the 18th Century alone. With the disorder unleashed by La Guerilla, the Indios rose once more, conducting hit and run attacks on royalists and La Platans alike.

Even before 1820, a certain modus vivendi between Spanish authorities and native leaders had been necessary for Peru to function smoothly. To sway the Indios towards the royalist cause and against the La Platans would take far more than mere accommodation, however. As a result, Serna’s championing of the royalist cause in the absence of any real oversight from the Spanish monarchy was an unqualified boon under these circumstances. On Christmas eve, the Viceroy met with a group of Quechua and Aymara chiefs, along with the Mestizo militia leader Mateo Pumacahua. Together in the mountains north of Cusco, this group hammered out a consensus that would dramatically alter the political character of Peru.

The Charter of Cusco was, ironically enough, a mirror image of sorts to Palafox’s Ordinance of 1819, overhauling the Bourbon architecture of the previous century to better suit current conditions. [2] Where Palafox and Calo attempted to sway the rebellious Spanish American colonists with promises of greater representation, so too did Serna entice Quechua and Aymara notables. Specifically, the Charter promised to grant both tribal groups representation in Peru’s Real Audiencia, the colony’s judicial-legislative apparatus. Through that body, the natives would have a direct avenue for redressing grievances, as well as direct access to the Viceroy himself as he made decisions. Coupled with other local concessions, Serna successfully persuaded native leaders to form a unified front against the La Platan occupation force. La Guerilla would continue to be a thorn in Buenos Aires’ side until their eventual withdrawal in early 1822.

More than Peruvian insurgents, however, what really put a stop to the Argentinian war machine was a threat much closer to home. Portugal had long contested the Rio de la Plata region with Spain. Control of the river basin offered immense influence over events in the interior of the continent, and the basin itself provided rich farmland. In light of the Palafox Regency’s tacit consent, King John VI finally decided to act. On March 12th, 1821, Portuguese forces advanced into the Banda Oriental region, claiming the land north and east of the Rio de la Plata as a part of Brazil.

The Buenos Aires clique was not terribly surprised by this development, as the Portuguese had mulled intervention for years before finally acting. And after years of fighting Spanish and British armies and holding their own, the La Platans were confident they could best a third European power just as easily. Santiago de Liniers led 30,000 men against a comparably sized Portuguese force near the town of Bagé. To their shock, the La Platans found themselves roundly defeated.

What Liniers and his compatriots hadn’t accounted for was that in their earlier encounters with European armies, logistical constraints had precluded significant use of artillery. The Portuguese, with the luxury of months and years to prepare their attack, were not so limited, and their canister shot devastated tightly packed La Platan formations. [3] Liniers tried to form a new defensive line anchored by the river Negro, but with the ground between the river and the coast open, and the Portuguese navy free to supply assaults on his flank and rear, this was a futile effort. Only the well-prepared earthworks of Montevideo managed to put a brake on the Portuguese advance.

By now, the La Platan war engine was truly running out of steam. The ruling Junta had relied on extensive conscription to fill out its ranks, with nearly 80,000 men serving in the republic’s military over the course of nearly a decade. [4] Roughly a quarter of these men were dead or wounded by the end of 1821, with a quarter of that number perishing in the campaign against Brazil alone. The psychological toll of these losses was tremendous. Riots broke out frequently in Buenos Aires and Santiago, and it was only fear of the Portuguese that kept Montevideo quiet.

After nine years of fighting, Juan José Castelli and his comrades were finally ready to cut their losses. San Martin was recalled from Peru, and peace feelers were sent out to representatives from Portugal, Spain, and Peru for a comprehensive South American peace treaty. In the Treaty of Montevideo, a slice of the Banda Oriental was ceded to Portugal, while Chile retained nominal independence despite its pro-Buenos Aires government. Paraguay and Upper Peru would be annexed by the newly recognized Argentine Republic. With that, the fighting in Spanish America finally reached its end.

[1] This is actually a dramatic reversal of the OTL manpower dynamics. But given the intense over-mobilization that Buenos Aires has undergone ITTL, coupled with Peru’s isolation from Spain, the numbers make more sense.

[2] I had planned this twist for a while, but only noticed this irony as I was writing it. Part of my idea was to create a situation where, as monarchists and liberals fight, it’s the monarchists who are more willing to be pluralistic and reach out to Native Americans. Only because it better suits their interests, of course, but it’s a reminder that “more liberal” =/= better, sometimes.

[3] It may seem like I’d wanked the Argentineans so far, but this really is a big part of their success in previous engagements. They’d either fought landing parties, or smaller forces without significant artillery, or fought overstretched armies in mountainous terrain. Facing a pitched battle against a well-supplied European army exposes their delusions of grandeur.

[4] The Viceroyalty’s 1800 population was around 2 million, for comparison. The mobilization isn’t WWI Bulgaria or anything, but it’s a big, big strain for a population of this size, and will have severe social implications down the line.
 
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Man, that Peru is awesome! How is it doing, after the war? Are the Indios better treated, or are things returning the to the status quo ante bellum now that the Platan threat is gone?
 
Man, that Peru is awesome! How is it doing, after the war? Are the Indios better treated, or are things returning the to the status quo ante bellum now that the Platan threat is gone?

Well, Peru didn't face as much fighting as Chile or Upper Peru or La Plata, so in that sense, they're better off than most of their neighbors. The loss of Potosi may hurt more in the long run, but Lima was losing its grip on the silver trade even before then. So economically, they'll be able to hang on.

As for the Indios, I'm going to have to conduct some more in-depth research to see how they fared under the OTL republic first, to get a better gauge on the country's internal politics. One thing I did find out in my early research was that Peru remains plurality native to the present day, and as that turbulent 18th Century showed, this population really wanted a bigger say in Lima. I'd say that Serna, at least, is inclined to follow through on his promises. He's smart enough to recognize the danger of going back on his word, and the Indios responding by never trusting Lima's word ever again. That could lead to the territory splintering apart. So for the time being, Peru will be moving in a more pluralistic direction, while still retaining conservative politics on most other issues.
 
Chapter Eighteen: The Regency
Update time, and thankfully this time I didn't have to rush to get this out. Enjoy the wrap-up of the Spanish Revolution, and stay tuned for next chapter, when we return to the United States for the 1824 election, with a side helping of Constitutional crisis. Hooray!
Chapter Eighteen: The Regency
Excerpted from The Age of Revolutions by A.F. Stoddard, 2006.​

Thomas Huxley famously observed that the Regency period in Spain was the principal reason the Spanish Empire avoided suffering the same fate as the Qing Dynasty in China. Where the latter’s stabs at modernization and liberalization were ultimately too little, too late, the former did more than simply catch up to its European and American peers in political and social change. With many of the more conservative supporters of the Bourbons having boycotted the new government, debate was dominated by more liberal voices. As a result, the Constitution put together by the Cortes General in the Autumn of 1820 was the most progressive document of its kind in the world.

Most notable among the 1820 Constitution’s provisions was its guarantee of universal male suffrage. Twelve years before the United States and nearly a century before Great Britain, the Spanish established a broad-based franchise, an essential building bloc for the sort of mass democracy that swept the world in the 20th Century. As we will see in due course, this guarantee still had its own limitations, but the general principle remained. [1]

Alegoria_constitucion_1812-1-.jpg

Francisco de Goya's Allegory of the Constitution.

For as commendable as the new franchise was, the Spanish Constitution still contained several key shortcomings, as various factions tried to preserve their privileged positions within the political scene. Chief among these factions was the Regent himself - General Palafox pushed to preserve a strong role for the monarch in government, especially in foreign policy. The implementation of the Ordinance of 1820 already established a precedent for the newly empowered colonial Viceroys to be unilaterally appointed by the King (or Regent), and this power was explicitly upheld in the new Constitution. In addition, the monarch was given wide latitude to conduct diplomacy and negotiate treaties with the Cortes serving in an advisory capacity. Only the King and Cortes together could declare war, however.

Another outstanding concern was the status of citizens in the colonies. Should the franchise expand to include every man in the American colonies, then their combined weight would give the colonists a majority in the Cortes. Ironically enough, this prospect was unwelcome both to Spanish representatives and to many of the representatives representing the colonies, where the Creole elites were loathe to dilute their own influence. As a compromise, voting rights were limited to those with ancestry in Spain or its imperial possessions. This meant that although free blacks and mulattos were granted civil liberties, they could not vote.

One final irony of the new Constitution was its approach regarding federalism. Although its endorsement of the Ordinance of 1820 guaranteed autonomy overseas, the new government moved in the opposite direction at home. Spain was reorganized into provinces, as part of a campaign to roll back regional autonomy. Palafox’s personal popularity ensured that his home region of Aragon would acquiesce to the new measures, with some reluctance, but other areas, the Basque country and Catalonia in particular, proved more intractable.

This was the point at which it became clear that the Regency had overplayed its hand. Conservative elements of Spanish society, previously passive and divided in the absence of the king, now rose up to defend regional autonomy and the Church. Through much of 1821 and 1822, low-level revolts and insurgency took root in more rural and conservative areas of the country, and Palafox, who had thought himself a peacemaker, was now forced to deploy the army against these internal threats. [2]

This didn’t help his political standing in Madrid, where Palafox’s primary base of support came not from the most liberal members of the new Cortes, but the more moderate delegates, people who supported a Constitutional order, but one tempered by the monarchy. The liberals, for their part, were highly concerned by the role the Regent was taking in the new government. These dissenters labeled General Palafox a Bonapartist who fought for royal prerogatives out of personal self-interest, rather than ideological conviction or an interest in the common good.

This was the weakness at the heart of the Spanish Revolution. The current government had seized power through a military coup and the flight of the royal family, rather than through popular mobilization or proper and legal channels or reform. As a result, the warring political factions in the Cortes only had a limited respect for due process and peaceful resolution of disputes. The Regent had achieved his position by means of conspiracy, and so conspiracy was the order of the day. Both liberals yearning for a republic and conservatives fighting to restore the monarchy began plotting against the sitting leadership. [3]

And this, at least, was something Napoleon could understand and exploit. The French Emperor had been a passive observer of the Spanish Revolution in its early days, harboring the exiled Bourbons but otherwise making no moves against the Regencia Liberal. Behind the scenes, he was more active, attempting to persuade King Ferdinand and his brother Charles to abdicate the throne in exchange for French aid to their youngest brother Francisco. These efforts had stalled out in the face of the Bourbon family’s refusal to accept French terms, but with the rising counterrevolutionary turmoil in Spain, Napoleon saw an opportunity to break the deadlock.

King Ferdinand had been given free rein to write and receive letters during his exile, and naturally, some of these had been to and from his conservative supporters in Spain. Spanish authorities had allowed this, but Police Minister Vidocq strongly suspected that Ferdinand’s mail was inspected by the Spanish before it reached its intended destination. And so Napoleon devised a plan to turn this precaution to his advantage. During December of 1822, his agents dispatched a number of forged letters, bearing Ferdinand’s official seal, and addressing Spanish conservatives with vague intimations of a right-wing coup to overthrow the Regency and make way for the return of the Bourbons. For added effect, these letters spoke obliquely of “others” to approach for support when the time was right.

The Restorationist Letters, as they became known, were a carefully considered ploy on the part of the French. If their suspicions were wrong, and the letters reached their destinations unopened, then they could well become a self-fulfilling prophecy, bringing about the very counterrevolutionary action they alluded to. And if the letters were intercepted by the Regent, then his reaction would give Napoleon the necessary impetus to bring Ferdinand to heel. [4] As it turned out, the Emperor did not have long to wait to learn the truth of the matter.

On New Years’ Day 1823, the Regent announced his discovery of a plot against the Kingdom and the Constitution, and, with the permission of the moderates and liberals in the Cortes, began to take drastic action against those he suspected of being party to the conspiracy. Clerical groups were especially hard-hit, with the Jesuits banned from the Kingdom, and many members arrested. This state repression exacerbated existing tensions, which led to even more civil disorder. Spain seemed to be headed for civil war.

This crackdown was exactly what Napoleon had been waiting for. He called for a conference between the great powers of Europe to address the latest developments in Spain. On the 21st, he met with representatives from Britain, Austria and Russia in Caen to reiterate his proposal for an intervention. Tsar Alexander had been amenable to Napoleon’s suggestion to install Prince Francisco from the beginning, and Francis of Austria, previously ambivalent, was swayed by descriptions from Spain of “atrocities” against the Catholic clergy. Even Lord Eldon, who had previously supported either Ferdinand or Prince Charles for the throne, was now ready to approve Napoleon’s plan. [5]

This left Ferdinand and Charles as the sole remaining dissenters to the plan. But with violence in Spain seeming to worsen by the day, and the last of their foreign supporters abandoning them, the brothers finally folded, abdicating the Spanish throne to Prince Francisco.

220px-Don_Francisco_de_Paula_of_Bourbon%2C_Infante_of_Spain_%281794-1865%29_by_Vicente_Lopez_y_Porta%C3%B1a.jpg

Francisco I legitimized Spain as a constitutional monarchy.

With this concession in hand, Napoleon mobilized his army along the Pyrenees, proclaiming his intent to restore the rightful King of Spain to his throne. In addition, the Emperor reminded the Regent of his promise to step aside for a monarch who would respect the new Cortes and its Constitution. Under other circumstances, General Palafox would likely have found some pretext to object, and try hanging on to the Regency. As it was, however, a decade a peace had further inflated the Emperor’s already formidable reputation as an invincible opponent. And with one third of the country branding Palafox a Jacobin and another third the Spanish Bonaparte, the Regent saw little reason to postpone the inevitable any longer.

On April 14th, in exchange for a promise of clemency from the new king, General Palafox abandoned the regency, and retired to his hometown of Zaragoza. He would remain there until his eventual death in 1843. Prince Francisco took his place on the throne, with a mandate to retain the Cortes and the new civil institutions of the 1820 Constitution, while reining in more intrusive liberal excesses. And with that, the Regency period of Spanish history came to a close, although the influences of those four years would be felt for a long time to come.

[1] This stuff is largely based off of the OTL Cadiz Constitution from 1812. There are some differences, the big one being Palafox’s going to bat for royal prerogatives, but that was what I decided to use for a baseline document ITTL, warts and all.

[2] And considering Palafox first took power to try and stop the endless police actions in South America, it’s really embarrassing for him to be forced to bring the policing home like this.

[3] Conspiracy from the right and left was rife during OTL’s Trienio Liberal, from what I can tell. A Constitution imposed by way of a military coup is naturally going to be rather tenuous.

[4] And if Ferdinand complains that the letters are fake, well, that’s exactly what he’d say if they were real, too, since the “plot” is clearly bearing no fruit.

[5] Not to mention that suspicion of Ferdinand’s involvement in the Restorationist Letters makes him look even worse in the eyes of the great powers. At best, it paints him as a stubborn idiot scorning foreign aid out of hubris.
 
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Chapter Nineteen: Divisa in Partes Tres - The Election of 1824
This took longer than I expected, but here we have the super-complicated Election of 1824. I hadn't really thought about what should come immediately after this update, so I think I'll put together something on Russia and Turkey next. In the meantime, enjoy!

Chapter 19: Divisa in Partes Tres – The Election of 1824
Excerpted from The First American Party System by Charles Francis Adams, 1871.​

As the second term of his presidency wound down in 1823, William Crawford had cause for satisfaction and anxiety in equal measure. His Administration had navigated diplomatic disputes with its neighbors advantageously, weathered post-war economic turmoil, and laid the foundation for further territorial and economic expansion. And yet these same accomplishments further accentuated sectional differences, and so bore the seeds of dissolution for Crawford’s party. In 1824, these seeds would finally bear fruit. [1]

Indeed, many of Crawford’s greatest feats can only be fully understood in the context of the festering North-South fracture, which either forced responses from the Administration or else was further exacerbated by its actions. In the realm of foreign policy, Crawford contributed to a thaw in Anglo-American relations after their Napoleonic nadir. The London Convention contributed to the gradual demilitarization of the US-Canadian border, now fixed along the 49th parallel. [2]

As welcome as this amity may have been, it can be attributed in no small part to the aftereffects of the Compromise of 1820. The confrontation over Arkansaw and Missouri awakened Southern lawmakers to the political danger of war with Britain – with the prospect of incorporating Canada as free soil territory, success became more daunting than failure in their minds. This realization led many Congressmen who had been war hawks less than a decade previous to change their disposition towards our northern neighbor. These Southerners endorsed Zebulon Pike’s seizure of Florida for the same reasons, seeing the peninsula as a new frontier for slavery once the native Indians were dealt with.

The Crawford Administration’s push for internal improvements also proved a locus of sectional tension. As the push for roads and canals continued, Southern states became more suspicious of such enterprises, seeing them as programs to benefit the North at the South’s expense. In this regard, no project showed the intractability of this sectional question as much as the National Road. A brainchild of Albert Gallatin, Jefferson’s Treasury Secretary, the Road had been envisioned as an endeavor that would bring the states together. Traditionally, settlers moving west tended to veer to the north or south to cross the Appalachians, with northerners skirting the edge of Lake Erie, while Southerners traversed the south end of the Cumberland Plateau, through northern Alabama. By building a road straight through the mountains of western Virginia towards the Ohio river, Gallatin hoped to allow both Northerners and Southerners to follow the same path westwards, bound more tightly together by the shared journey.

Gallatin's lofty ideals were ultimately thwarted by geographic reality. The original proposed route for the Road passed through the highest mountains in the Appalachian chain, and before long the builders were forced to alter its course, building through central Ohio and Indiana rather than on their southern borders. The Road was able to be finished in this fashion, and starting in 1821, the federal government began charging tolls along the route. But Southern public opinion, previously the bedrock of support for the project under Jefferson, was now firmly opposed. Senators from South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia denounced the Road as an affront to the rights of their states, and as another indulgence for the benefit of the North. [3]

National_road_map.png

The amended route for the National Road.

Consideration of this sectional context is necessary to understand the events of 1824, but it is not sufficient. Individual ambition and rivalry had parts to play as well, not least on the part of the sitting President. Crawford was quite conscious of the turmoil at work in the country, but clung tightly to hope for the Democratic-Republicans to endure. As such, he favored a successor who could be trusted to carry on his work. These factors taken together meant that when Crawford endorsed Vice President DeWitt Clinton, the choice faced near-immediate dissent from all corners.

For Southerners like John Calhoun, Crawford’s support of Clinton, who had challenged James Madison as a Federalist twelve years earlier, served as validation for the growing suspicion that Northern Democrats and Federalists were separated by labels alone. For other allies of the Administration such as Henry Clay and my father, the choice of Clinton was a personal slight. And for populists and opportunists like Andrew Jackson, the fiat of the Administration and its Congressional allies was an opaque and undemocratic process for choosing the next president. Each of these aggrieved parties demanded satisfaction, and would no longer be denied.

800px-1824_Caucus_curs_by_JamesAkin_LC_00005v.jpg

A Pro-Jackson Cartoon Mocking "King Caucus."

Calhoun was among the first to act, along with James Monroe. Both men secured the approval of their respective state legislatures to run for President as Democratic-Republicans in opposition to Clinton, the Congressionally-endorsed nominee. They were soon joined by Clay and my father, as well as Generals Andrew Jackson and Zebulon Pike. With the Federalist Party no longer fielding presidential contenders, 1824 would instead by contested by seven men, all of the same party.

The means of selection for the dueling candidates may not have worsened sectional divisions by itself, but it certainly symbolized the fractures at work. These men were chosen by the states rather than by a national party, and through the summer and fall of 1824, their campaign tactics only drew more attention to this fact. Calhoun and Jackson were the most aggressive, lambasting Clinton as a closet Federalist, intent on draining Southern coffers to enrich the Northeast. Clinton was uniquely vulnerable to these charges not only because of his own record, but also on account of his running mate, none other than Albert Gallatin. [4]

Personal attacks were also commonplace on the campaign trail, with Clinton counterstriking at Calhoun as a separatist, and at Jackson and Pike as Bonapartists. The New York Evening Post memorably branded the latter two as “Cromwell and Caesar”, an epithet that would persist for years to come. All told, the campaign produced more rancor than any contest since 1800.

With such an immense selection of candidates, there was no question of any one man securing a majority in the Electoral College. Instead, the winner would be determined in the House of Representatives. This procedure had its own weakness, however, as the Constitution requires that the House choose only from the three contenders with the most Electors behind them. In this case, Vice President Clinton narrowly bested General Pike, with Speaker Clay coming in a distant third. [5]

With these choices, the contingent election in the House resolved itself relatively easily, but in a way that was calculated to reinforce, rather than quell, the contentiousness of the campaign. As Speaker, Henry Clay managed to persuade his own colleagues to select him rather than Pike or Clinton, focusing in particular on swaying Southern delegations hostile to Clinton and Northeastern representatives suspicious of Pike. On February 9th, 1825, Clay was elected President of the United States.

800px-Henry_Clay.JPG

Henry Clay, Sixth President of the United States.

This victory was a Pyrrhic one, however. Clay had secured a mere 42 electors during the election, and his share of the popular vote was only a fraction of what Clinton, Jackson, or my father had received. Denunciation erupted over the arcane vagaries of the contingent election and the Corrupt Bargain that had enabled the Speaker to defeat more popular opponents with the help of his fellow Congressmen. Worse, Crawford’s Democratic-Republicans had finally ruptured, with many Senators and Representatives expressing more loyalty to Calhoun, Jackson, or Pike rather than the sitting President. In winning the Presidency, Clay had lost the Congressional majorities necessary to advance his preferred agenda. This truth would haunt the President-elect for the next four years.

[1] More than the other “books” I’ve been using so far, Adams is driving at a very specific point about the gradual disintegration of the Democratic-Republicans. As a result, he’s very methodical in trying to explain all the causes and variables that resulted in this mess of an election. All of the US updates have been leading up to this, basically.

[2] From what I read on the subject, the 49th was used as a general rule of thumb by border arbitrators as early as 1807. Even in the absence of a War of 1812, it seems likely that that would remain the benchmark.

[3] I did a research paper on the National Road back in college. The terrain problems with the road were OTL, and I do think they made the original vision impractical. Maybe if they’d had northern and southern branches that met along the Ohio after crossing the Appalachians, that could have worked better, but the OTL plan was a no-go.

[4] This is OTL, too, funnily enough. Crawford, the real-life “nominee” in 1824, got saddled with Gallatin as his first running mate. For Clinton, it’s an even worse lodestone under the circumstances.

[5] Andrew Jackson didn’t fight at New Orleans ITTL, and Pike seized Florida instead of him. He’s nowhere near the giant of OTL as a result. Doesn’t mean we’ve heard the last of him, of course.
 
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Chapter Twenty: December Days
I've been a little stricken with writer's block lately, and need more time to figure out material concerning the Ottomans. As such, we're getting a shorter update today that's just about Russia. The Turks and the Greeks will show up next time.
Chapter Twenty: December Days
Excerpted from The Age of Revolutions by A.F. Stoddard, 2006.​

The course of the Napoleonic Wars turned on the Emperor’s ability to frustrate the repeated efforts of France’s rivals to organize coalitions against it. And the lynchpin for this strategy was the Franco-Russian relationship: the rapprochement between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander removed one potential threat to the French Empire, weakened another rival in Prussia, and diverted British attention to Scandinavia and the Balkans, exacerbating the strategic indecisiveness of post-Pitt Britain. For his part, Alexander benefited from a freer hand strategically. Freed of obligations to participate in the main theaters of the war with France, the Tsar was able to expand his rule in both Europe and Asia and to consolidate power through internal reforms.

Alexander is remembered as a cipher among more transparent kin. The impetuous fighter so easily lured into disaster at Austerlitz developed into a far cannier statesman in the wake of Tilsit. The romantic who bound Poland and Finland together with Russia through personal unions grew colder and more rigidly authoritarian in his later years. Despite these changes to his demeanor, the Tsar retained some degree of idealism, which manifested in fits and spurts for the rest of his reign.

This ideological inconsistency was on full display in Alexander’s stabs at governmental reform. Russia has always struggled to keep pace with the industry and institutions of Western Europe, and the decade following Madrid was no exception. The Reformist minister Mikhail Speransky led the charge for a Constitutional order, balancing the monarch’s power against a series of local Dumas, with the State Council acting as an intermediary body. These suggestions were calculated to shift Russia away from absolute monarchy towards a more pluralistic and federalist society. [1]

This vision was unlikely to have ever seen fruition under Alexander; even during the time when Speransky enjoyed the Tsar’s favor, his ideals drew ire from more conservative elements in the Russian aristocracy. As it was, however, Alexander opted for a scaled-back variation on his minster’s proposal, modified to suit his own needs. The Dumas were eschewed, and the Council, while initially dominated by Speransky and his allies, came to include more members from the nobility, diluting the influence of reformist voices.

These new additions expanded the Council’s total membership, which reached 60 seats in 1825. This would remain the general size of the State Council for the remainder of the 19th Century, with slight fluctuations. The Tsar retained the right to appoint or dismiss members, but as the years went by, the body managed to erode this ostensible check on their power. Alexander’s successors gave progressively greater deference to the Council’s word on many topics, and eventually, this came to include the selection of replacement members or the early dismissal of those who had alienated enough of their colleagues. Political parties remained officially verboten under the Tsarist regime, but an informal smattering of factions nevertheless emerged in the Council, with reformers, conservatives and moderates competing for the monarch’s ear. As a result, the political development of Russia from the time of Peter the Great began changing course in the 19th Century. [2]

Marie_palace.jpg

The State Council's Iconic Meeting Place in St. Isaac's Square.

This was the backdrop against which the Empire faced its first true test since the Treaty of Tilsit. On December 16th, 1824, the Tsar succumbed to typhus at the age of 46. The crown passed to his younger brother Konstantin, a more personable figure than the increasingly mercurial Alexander, but also one without his brother’s decisiveness and resolve. [3]

As critical as this difference in personality was, one other difference stood out between the new Tsar and his brother. Unlike Alexander, Konstantin never lost his youthful admiration of Napoleon Bonaparte, whom he had fought at Austerlitz and treated with at Tilsit. As a result, when Speransky approached the new emperor to discuss secret negotiations with the French concerning Christian uprisings against the Ottomans in the Balkans, Konstantin was quick to accede to the French proposal.

[1] IOTL Speransky took the blame for the Franco-Russian alliance falling through. ITTL, Alexander has taken to relying on modified versions of his ideas to help govern. For him, the State Council is a tool to institutionalize that process with the help of competing voices.

[2] I thought liberalism and republicanism might have had too much success so far, so to keep things interesting, we have Russia’s first stab at a Constitutional system devolve into a self-dealing parody of an actual Parliament.

[3] Because of butterflies, Konstantin didn’t go to Poland, and remains amenable, albeit less than enthused, about succeeding his brother.
 
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This is for real my favorite Napoleonic victory timeline. I really like the focus on economics and how the Spanish Empire is attempting survival.
 
This is for real my favorite Napoleonic victory timeline. I really like the focus on economics and how the Spanish Empire is attempting survival.

Loving every bit of this TL.

Somehow discovered this timeline only now, and I love it!

Thanks a lot for the support, guys! I think I've decided to bring this arc of the story to a close relatively soon, which for me is exciting, because I plan to open up and diverge more aggressively starting in the 1830's or so. So for economic and cultural stuff especially, I'll be emphasizing this timeline's changes to the world even more at that point. Cheers!
 
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