March 1940: The Allies' Failed Invasion of Norway and Sweden

(This is my first post, so apologies in advance if I unwittingly violate any conventions. I'm grateful for any suggestions or advice.)

I haven't found a thread quite like this, so here goes. In 1940 Germany was extremely dependent on iron ore from Sweden, to such an extent that the Allies believed that disruption of ore supply of even a few months could virtually destroy the German war effort. During the months when the north Baltic Sea wasn't frozen, Germany could ship the ore from the Swedish port of Luleaa. However, in the winter the Germans could only get the ore by having it shipped by rail from the Swedish mines of Gaallivare and Kiruna to the northern Norway port of Narvik, after which it would be loaded on German cargo ships which closely hugged the coast of Norway to avoid being sunk by the Royal Navy in international waters.

For months after declaring war on Germany, the British and French debated whether to invade parts of Norway and Sweden, and/or to mine Norwegian territorial waters, to cut off Germany's iron ore supply. It's reasonably well known that just ONE DAY before the Germans invaded Norway, on April 8, 1940, Britain - with absolutely no inkling of Germany's invasion plans - violated Norwegian neutrality by mining Norwegian waters.

What's less known is that about a month before the German invasion of Norway, after a great deal of dithering, Britain and France had come within mere hours of invading Narvik and striking out overland into Sweden with the unstated goal of taking over the Swedish iron ore mines. The pretext for this mission was to be that the Allies were "responding" to an appeal from Finland for assistance in fighting the USSR in the Winter War, and in fact the Allies lobbied Finland to make such an appeal. But the truth, as fascinatingly laid out in Francois Kersaudy's excellent book "Norway 1940" as well as other sources, was that the British and French saw helping the Finns as merely a convenient fig leaf. The true Allied goals were to cut off the iron ore, and also to respond to powerful political pressure that the Allies "do something, anything" during the interminable Sitzkrieg.

Amazingly, the prospect of Britain and France going to war against Norway, Sweden and even the USSR came within only a few days or even hours from happening. The initial force of ships, men and materiel had already been assembled for this half-baked crusade in early March 1940 when, hours before "Operation BK" was to start on March 13, it was called off when word came that the Finns and Soviets had signed a peace agreement. With rumors of an imminent peace deal, Neville Chamberlain had already uttered his thoroughly uninspiring parting words to his commanders: "Good-bye and good luck to you - if you go."

Things could easily have been different. The negotiations between the Finns and Soviets might have taken a little longer. The incredibly amateurish discussions and war-gaming among the British and French politicians and commanders - including First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill - might have been wrapped up a few days earlier. Either way, it is entirely plausible that, with just the tiniest diversion from real history, an alternate history could have seen a joint British/French force landing at Narvik, trying to take over the town, and then marching east into Sweden and beyond.

I say "trying" because the Allies' planning efforts were utterly, amazingly inept. The story of how the German commander of the Scandinavian invasion had to buy a tourist "Baedeker" guidebook to begin his war planning is somewhat well known. But if anything, the Allies' planning was even sketchier: they could have used a Baedeker at the end of their planning, let alone the beginning. They had only the most rudimentary ideas of how to land at Narvik and take over the Swedish oil fields, let alone how to go to war with the Finns against the Soviets. They seemed to believe that both the Norwegians and the Swedes would assent to the endeavor with perhaps only a few sharply worded protests. Their orders were vague to the extreme: they were discouraged from actually firing on the defenders, but they were also told "not to be deterred by a show of resistance." Invasion would likely have led to resistance: i.e., gunfire; i.e., war. And in fact, while the Norwegian Army was abysmal, the Swedes would probably have defeated the Allies' forces and perhaps even joined with the Norwegians to send the Allies hightailing it back to their Narvik transports.

This is a very lengthy prologue, but the real intent of my discussion is to ask what would have happened if in fact the Brits and French had invaded Norway and Sweden, responding to an appeal from the Finns for help in fighting the USSR, in early March 1940 before the Finns were forced to sue for peace. Suppose Operation BK had gone off as "planned," if one can call it that: What would have been the repercussions?

First, suppose that the attack was somehow successful: that the British/French expeditionary force was able to land at Narvik, travel to the Swedish iron ore mines and secure them (against undoubted attack from the Swedes), and finally end up having a few thousand men and machines to throw into the Finnish lines against the Soviets? The result would be that in April 1940 the Allies would be at war not only with Norway, but with Sweden, and with the USSR.

And how long-lived would such a successful invasion have been? The Swedes were neutral but they were not weak-willed, nor were they militarily weak. They were not about to give in to loss of their iron mines and violation of their neutrality. They might even have invited German military support - perhaps even USSR support? - to "take back our country."

Would Germany's invasion of France and the Low Countries then have been postponed while Germany sided with Norway, Sweden and the USSR to counterattack the initially successful British and French invasion of Scandinavia? Maybe. There are so many possible changes to other parts of our timeline that I can't even begin to list them.

But second, suppose - as frankly seems far more likely - that like everything else the Brits and French were touching during this time period - the venture ignominiously failed right from the outset. The Allies would of course have been able to take over Narvik and at least start into Sweden - they were too strong to be beaten by the tiny, hopelessly outdated Norwegian "army" - but suppose that after that they were quickly defeated by the Swedes and forced to withdraw back to their Narvik ships within a few weeks, by April 1940.

A second Gallipoli!

The first Gallipoli had resulted in Winston Churchill having to give up his WWI stint as First Lord of the Admiralty; now history would repeat itself a quarter-century later, because one of the persons most strongly in favor of this rash venture was none other than Winston Churchill. In late 1939 and early 1940 he was constantly imploring Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to take action against the neutral Scandinavians: Invade their cities. Mine their territorial waters. Don't worry about violating neutrality. Churchill was a good and noble man, but in his would-be machinations against the neutral Norwegians and Swedes he almost reminds one of the Nazis scheming against Holland and Belgium.

So if Operation BK had failed, what would have been the political repercussions? I think that Chamberlain would have tried to place the blame elsewhere, and Churchill had said enough in Parliament and behind closed doors to be a very easy target. So, a mere month before the Blitzkrieg, Churchill would have been booted from the government in public derision - as would other seasoned British veterans, all reeling from the shame of the British and French combined military might being defeated by two pipsqueak Scandinavian countries.

And can one imagine Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the many other heroic efforts of Britain in the trying years to come with anyone other than Churchill at the British helm? If instead Chamberlain had tried to muddle through, or worse yet someone like Lord Halifax had taken over, where would Britain be today?

After the British-French defeat at Narvik, it hardly matters whether Germany had invaded Norway and Denmark in April 1940. Let's assume that they did. The difference from our timeline wouldn't have been that much - except that the Norwegian king and government may very well not have tried to escape Norway to Britain to seek refuge from the Nazis. They may have been much more inclined to negotiate a peaceful occupation by the Germans, having already been double-crossed by the Allies.

So: A matter of a few days in March 1940 separated our timeline from a very different one in which Churchill ceased to exist as a political and moral force, the Brits and French were at war with the USSR a good year before the Germans had even thought of doing so, and the Allies' citizens were thoroughly demoralized at the thought that their armies couldn't even defeat Norway and Sweden, let alone the most powerful army then on earth. One can easily imagine a negotiated peace in the West.

And then, Hitler would have a much freer hand with the USSR. Not only would the Allies' situation with the USSR have been extremely difficult to salvage if and when Germany itself double-crossed the Soviets and invaded, but to Americans and others the Allies - even if they hadn't already sought peace - would have ceded a massive amount of the moral high ground to the Nazis. The Allies would have been guilty of the same "trampling of neutral countries" that the Axis was, before and after Narvik. There would have been a rough moral equivalence in the eyes of the world.

The isolationists in the U.S. may also have been emboldened and empowered, perhaps to the point where they were less willing to press the issue with Japan. Could Operation BK have led to a Wendell Wilkie win in November 1940? Surely not. But in terms of affecting American strategic and political aims we're talking a matter of only a few degrees: perhaps just enough to cause Americans to care a little bit less - but enough less - about whether the Brits/French or the Germans ultimately "won" in Europe - at least until much farther down the road when Hitler's devilry was exposed in all its evil. Perhaps just enough that the Americans and Japanese would have been able to work something out in October 1941 …
 
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If the Allies manage to cock up Operation BK as you suggest then Germany probably won't even need to invade Norway, and perhaps not even Denmark. Norway may well even end up fighting alongside Germany for somewhat longer than intended.
 
Great premise! I would like to see this fleshed out into a full timeline story. My opinions?

1- ww2 becomes a 3 way war. Russia vs. axis vs. European allies.

2- I think Pearl Harbor would still occur. We were the only threat to Japan. That's why they bombed us. We would join the allies but have more enemies to face.

3- Russia would not be as powerful and would never become a world power. They would either fall to axis or would be unable to obtain ground in Europe. You would thus see more republics in places like Poland and other Warsaw Pact nations of our timeline.

Just my opinion. Like I said, great idea!
 
The Swedes were neutral but they were not weak-willed, nor were they militarily weak.

Sweden as very poorly prepared when the war broke out (even worse than the Finns). I dont know if it is correct but from talking to men that were called up in in 1939-40 I heard that training munition was given to boost morale as live rounds were scarce.
 
A British and French scuffle with the Russians, even a brief one, could be a powerful motivation for the Soviets to join the Axis. I don't think a disastrous campaign in Norway would have prevented Churchill from becoming Prime Minister. It was a disaster IOTL anyway.
 
I don't think a disastrous campaign in Norway would have prevented Churchill from becoming Prime Minister. It was a disaster IOTL anyway.

True, but IOTL they were fighting the Germans. In ATL they were thrashed by two countries they had no business losing to, if the campaign had been properly planned: Norway and Sweden.

It would be as if during the middle of WW2, instead of focusing on Germany and Japan, the U.S. had decided to invade Costa Rica - and lost.
 
The Swedes were neutral but they were not weak-willed, nor were they militarily weak.

Sweden as very poorly prepared when the war broke out (even worse than the Finns). I dont know if it is correct but from talking to men that were called up in in 1939-40 I heard that training munition was given to boost morale as live rounds were scarce.

I wonder if those may have been members of the new Home Guard units. While Sweden's military taken as a whole was no match to Britain let alone France, Sweden had several hundred military aircraft, a couple dozen tanks, and about 100,000 (!) men deployed to guard against a Soviet invasion through Finland. By contrast, the arms that the Allies actually were prepared to use in Operation BK were pitiful. They had zero anti-aircraft weapons, a couple thousand men, no tanks … They didn't want to pull resources from the troops in France awaiting a German attack.

I don't think it would necessarily have been easy, but I think a combined force of Swedes and Norwegians, especially if supported by an angry populace, could have beaten the troops that the Allies were prepared to send to Narvik in March.

But suppose you're right and the Swedes were weak. That means the invasion wouldn't have failed at the outset, but the Brits and French would have confidently marched through Sweden directly into a war with the USSR. After which Germany would have invaded Norway, threatened their rear, and cut off their supply lines.

Had the Allies carried out Operation BK, it would have been a "cluster****" regardless of whether the Allies initially succeeded.
 
True, but IOTL they were fighting the Germans. In ATL they were thrashed by two countries they had no business losing to, if the campaign had been properly planned: Norway and Sweden.

It would be as if during the middle of WW2, instead of focusing on Germany and Japan, the U.S. had decided to invade Costa Rica - and lost.

It would be embarassing if the Allies lost to Norway and Sweden, and it's plausible the Scandanavians could have thwarted Allied intentions solo, but there will be a German response that will blur the distinction. I can accept your postulation that the Norwegeans would have defended their neutrality; I believe the forts that opened fire on the ill-fated Blütcher did so without identifying the nationality of the cruiser, for example. I'm just not sure how committed the neutrals would be to the fight. If the Allies invade Norway, the Germans will too, which means Norway has to pick a side, and they might choose to join the Allies even if the Allies are the instigators.

I'm even more confident that the Swedes will look at the Allies favorably. Even if they shoot their way through Norway and are disingenuous about their intentions, the Allies are pledging aid to Finland, a friendly neighbor fending off invasion by a dangerous pariah state. The Swedes would plausibly be amendable to that. The Germans on the other hand offer no such aid to embattled buffer states, and in fact are allied to aforementioned pariah state, and are an untrustworthy pariah state themselves. If Allied troops arrive at the Swedish border by hook or by crook, I have a hard time imagining Sweden fighting a war against them. If it looks inevitable there will be Allied soldiers in Sweden, that means it's inevitable there will be German soldiers in Sweden too soon, and the Swedes will pick the Allies.

Once all of Scandanavia is dragged kicking and screaming into the war, things look less favorable for the Germans. The Norwegean campaign was difficult and a closely-contested event IOTL. In this timeline the Germans will be the ones reacting to their enemies, and they'll have the additional burden of fighting Sweden. I think that's more than enough to tip things in favor of the Allies.

Finally, there's the Finns, who this is supposedly all about (but it isn't really). I've heard conflicting thing: both that the Finns were begging for help, and that the Finns really didn't want help because that would mean turning Finland into the main battlefield in a war between four great powers. Stalin also wasn't interested in fighting the Allies, and I suspect the Finns would use the Allied intervention in Norway/Sweden as a bargaining chip and the Finns and the Soviets would hastily sign a peace treaty. I could be wrong and the Finns might be bolstered by the arrival of aid and continue the fight.
 
I wonder if those may have been members of the new Home Guard units. While Sweden's military taken as a whole was no match to Britain let alone France, Sweden had several hundred military aircraft, a couple dozen tanks, and about 100,000 (!) men deployed to guard against a Soviet invasion through Finland. By contrast, the arms that the Allies actually were prepared to use in Operation BK were pitiful. They had zero anti-aircraft weapons, a couple thousand men, no tanks … They didn't want to pull resources from the troops in France awaiting a German attack.

I don't think it would necessarily have been easy, but I think a combined force of Swedes and Norwegians, especially if supported by an angry populace, could have beaten the troops that the Allies were prepared to send to Narvik in March.

But suppose you're right and the Swedes were weak. That means the invasion wouldn't have failed at the outset, but the Brits and French would have confidently marched through Sweden directly into a war with the USSR. After which Germany would have invaded Norway, threatened their rear, and cut off their supply lines.

Had the Allies carried out Operation BK, it would have been a "cluster****" regardless of whether the Allies initially succeeded.

Well Sweden had 76 Heavy AA guns and ~160 Light AA guns, 16 Tanks & 48 Tankettes and the most interesting bit is that despite having a fairly large armaments industry had to import German 105 mm guns and Mauser rifles (to us as AT rifles(!)) in 1940-41

Now I dont say that the Allied invasion would be an success but the Swedish and Norvegian armies were far weaker than for example the Polish army in both numbers and equipment on the other hand they would be fighting in far better defensive terrain
 
Well, the issue regarding the Swedish armed forces is that they aren't invading France, they are defending against whatever France and the UK can spare to throw against them.
For instance, it doesn't matter if the Swedish planes are hopelessly outdated (I don't know if they were), because the Allies aren't bringing aircraft or AAA with them. It's a matter of applied force. And while the Allies applied force is an afterthought, Sweden can throw the best of their armed forces.

And if the nazis play it smart, they would be seen as allies of Sweden, not another set of invaders. Of course, what they do once the allies are thrown into the sea is another matter.

As for the USSR, it's possible, specially since negotiations were already under way, that the Soviets and the Finns reach a cease-fire soon after Operation BK. In that case, the USSR and the Allies aren't at war.
 
Very interesting post, and I generally agree with most comments except:

[It would be as if during the middle of WW2, instead of focusing on Germany and Japan, the U.S. had decided to invade Costa Rica - and lost./QUOTE]

The main reason for the Franco-Brit Allies to invade the region was to deny the flow of high quality Swedish iron ore to the Nazis, and therefore shorten the war. The operation had almost nothing to do with thwarting Nazi aggression in Norway or Sweden or in countering Soviet aggression in Finland.

The only way the Costa Rican postulation could be correct is if Costa Rico had a regional monopoly on uranium, cobalt, tungsten or some other rare material the U.S. needed (and didn't have) for war production.

Otherwise, Norway has strategic geographical location that makes it militarily attractive to both allies and axis forces, which Costa Rico does not.
 
The OP is interesting, but like when this same subject is discussed, I think it kind of handwaves the question about why the Finns ITTL asked the help from the Allies at this point? IOTL they knew, or at least strongly suspected, that it was already too late and that for logistic reasons only, the Allied help could not bolster the front on the Karelian isthmus to stop the Red Army's advance - the only thing that counted at this part of the war. The constantly changing and often unrealistic numbers of men the Allied representatives kept talking about didn't help their believability, either. And thus, no official plea for help to London and Paris was made to try and keep the Nordic countries, too, from getting embroiled in the war. The scenario laid out in the OP is exactly what the Finnish leadership was fearing, and not asking help but making a heavy peace with the USSR was the way to avoid it.

On the other hand, if the plea for help was in fact not made ITTL, either, then the Allies don't even have that poor figleaf for their actions, as Finland would surely make the world know that this all isn't its doing as soon as troops start landing in Norway. It might become a PR as well as military disaster - invading neutral nations for made-up reasons.


As for the USSR, it's possible, specially since negotiations were already under way, that the Soviets and the Finns reach a cease-fire soon after Operation BK. In that case, the USSR and the Allies aren't at war.

I also think this is likely. If and when the Allied troops bog down in Norway/Sweden, the Finns would finally realize that the Anglo-French help would never reach Finland in time to make a difference. In this case, making a peace would be in the interest of both Helsinki and Moscow. In no way should we underestimate Stalin's need not to fight a war against the Western Allies at this point. It was what cut short the OTL Winter War when only weeks of additional fighting could have won the war to the Soviet Union and ended in the occupation of Finland, either directly or after a "Baltic" scenario.
 
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Well Sweden had 76 Heavy AA guns and ~160 Light AA guns, 16 Tanks & 48 Tankettes and the most interesting bit is that despite having a fairly large armaments industry had to import German 105 mm guns and Mauser rifles (to us as AT rifles(!)) in 1940-41

Now I dont say that the Allied invasion would be an success but the Swedish and Norvegian armies were far weaker than for example the Polish army in both numbers and equipment on the other hand they would be fighting in far better defensive terrain

The Swedish army was larger, stronger and better equipped than its Finnish counterpart. The Finnish army was better trained, but by 1940, this had largely been remedied. Sweden had more automatic weapons, more mortars, more AT guns, more artillery and better communications equipment in one division than its Finnish counterparts.

The myth of blanks being given troops for morale is just a myth. A regular soldier was supplied with 30-60 rounds in his ammunition pockets, something which might have been reduced as the landstorm (local defence) and home guard was being organised, but Sweden had stockpile of 74 million rifle rounds in April 1940 (and this is after providing the Finns with 19,2 million rounds during the winter war). Production in April 1940 was 10 million rounds per month, which steadily increased to 20 million rounds per month towards the end of 1940. Most ammunition was simply kept at company depots as was the intention.

Sweden has 212 old and 152 modern light field cannons (75mm), 156 old field howitzers (105mm), 12 old and 48 modern heavy field cannons (105mm), 54 old and 28 modern heavy field howitzers (105mm) and 12 siege howitzers (210mm) in April 1940.

You can note that 142 German howitzers were delivered, while Bofors produced 242 equal or superior 105mm howitzers of their own design during the war.

As for armour, there were in Sweden in April 1940;

10xStrv m/21 and m/21-29 (1xMG), worn and used for training.
1xStrv fm/28 (1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
1xStrv fm/31 (1x37mm, 1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
3xStrv m/31 (1x37mm, 2xMG), worn and used for training.
1xStrv m/Carden-Lloyd (1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
48xStrv m/37 (2xMG), in service with the armoured battalions.
16xStrv m/38 (1x37mm, 2xMG), in service with the armoured battalions.

2xPbil m/25 (2xMG).
1xPbil m/26 (1x37mm, 1xMG).
31xPbil m/31 (10 with 1x37mm, 1xMG, 21 with 2xMG).
15xPbil m/39 (1x20mm, 2xMG).
5xPbil m/41 (1x20mm, 3xMG).

Under delivery was 20xStrv m/39 (as Strv m/38) and 30xPbil m/40.

So, in total 90 tanks (with a further 20 in production) and 54 armoured cars (with a further 30 in production).

However, all this is pretty much irrelevant, since the iron ore railroad is electrified - and power was supplied from the Swedish side (mainly from the hydroelectric plants in the Lule älv). All the spare steam locomotives were Swedish. So if Britain and France take Narvik and start to advance along the railroad towards Kiruna, Sweden can just cut power.

Note that there are no roads running here in 1940, the railroad is the only infrastructure in the area.
 

elkarlo

Banned
Very cool, and I am amazed at how insane the WAllies were at this time. They were almost as unreasonable as Hitler:eek:
 
Well realistically. The allies were only going to land what, a Brigade odd? I can see them landing successfully, organizing for the push towards Sweden, and then the Finns drop out. So unless they have combined this with Operation Pike, the Soviets and Swedes, will never be impacted or even know how close it came.


The big change is that the Germans are probably 'invited' into Norway, and even if they are not, they are coming anyway. And it is probably easier for them, but as soon as the Battle of France goes sideways, the allies are pulling out anyway, so the strategic situation is unchanged, and I think Chamberlain will still wear the whole thing as PM.

The big question in my mind is with a different Norway how many of the naval losses on both sides are butterflied. Bluecher? Glorious? lots of german destroyers? Or is it worse for one side or the other? Lots of weird near run things happened at sea during that campaign.
 

Driftless

Donor
At OTL Narvik, following negotiations, the German destroyers torpedoed and sank the old Norwegian Coastal Defence Cruisers before they got a shot off.

If the allies were trying to force their own landing at Narvik, they might face the same situation. Shoot first to eliminate the Norge & Eidsvold, or risk taking a 8" shell hit from the Norskies at close range?

If the allies shoot first, that would be blatant aggression(just as it was OTL by the Germans), that would be awful hard to sell to the world, let alone for their own homefronts. The loss of the Norwegian sailors on both ships was significant. I can't see the Norwegians getting past that act of war anytime soon afterwards.
 
The Norwegians were extremely chummy with the British - part of the reason they were so surprised by the Germans and offered so little resistance initially is that many of them thought it was British ships and did not want to fire on them.

If the British invade, the Norwegians will probably fold. Sweden, however, will not.
 
The Swedish army was larger, stronger and better equipped than its Finnish counterpart. The Finnish army was better trained, but by 1940, this had largely been remedied. Sweden had more automatic weapons, more mortars, more AT guns, more artillery and better communications equipment in one division than its Finnish counterparts.

The myth of blanks being given troops for morale is just a myth. A regular soldier was supplied with 30-60 rounds in his ammunition pockets, something which might have been reduced as the landstorm (local defence) and home guard was being organised, but Sweden had stockpile of 74 million rifle rounds in April 1940 (and this is after providing the Finns with 19,2 million rounds during the winter war). Production in April 1940 was 10 million rounds per month, which steadily increased to 20 million rounds per month towards the end of 1940. Most ammunition was simply kept at company depots as was the intention.

Sweden has 212 old and 152 modern light field cannons (75mm), 156 old field howitzers (105mm), 12 old and 48 modern heavy field cannons (105mm), 54 old and 28 modern heavy field howitzers (105mm) and 12 siege howitzers (210mm) in April 1940.

You can note that 142 German howitzers were delivered, while Bofors produced 242 equal or superior 105mm howitzers of their own design during the war.

As for armour, there were in Sweden in April 1940;

10xStrv m/21 and m/21-29 (1xMG), worn and used for training.
1xStrv fm/28 (1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
1xStrv fm/31 (1x37mm, 1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
3xStrv m/31 (1x37mm, 2xMG), worn and used for training.
1xStrv m/Carden-Lloyd (1xMG), worn and used for evaluation.
48xStrv m/37 (2xMG), in service with the armoured battalions.
16xStrv m/38 (1x37mm, 2xMG), in service with the armoured battalions.

2xPbil m/25 (2xMG).
1xPbil m/26 (1x37mm, 1xMG).
31xPbil m/31 (10 with 1x37mm, 1xMG, 21 with 2xMG).
15xPbil m/39 (1x20mm, 2xMG).
5xPbil m/41 (1x20mm, 3xMG).

Under delivery was 20xStrv m/39 (as Strv m/38) and 30xPbil m/40.

So, in total 90 tanks (with a further 20 in production) and 54 armoured cars (with a further 30 in production).

However, all this is pretty much irrelevant, since the iron ore railroad is electrified - and power was supplied from the Swedish side (mainly from the hydroelectric plants in the Lule älv). All the spare steam locomotives were Swedish. So if Britain and France take Narvik and start to advance along the railroad towards Kiruna, Sweden can just cut power.

Note that there are no roads running here in 1940, the railroad is the only infrastructure in the area.

How sure are you about this being the numbers for 1940?

None of the Strv m/21 or m/21-29 was in any kind of service in 1940 and one of them had already been gifted to the Germans in 1938, fm/28 and fm Carden-Lloyd transfered to the army museum in 1938. Notice also that it was planned to have an AT Company for each division (fördelning) but that wasnt accomplished until 1941 and as a stopgap Mauser 98 (Gevär m/40) was used.

Sweden also bought back 25 000 Gev m/96 and ammunition after the Winter war
 
Those are the tanks available. Yes, I missed that one Strv m/21 was given to Germany.

However, those other tanks are listed in depots or used for training.

In April 1940, each regiment has a regimental AT platoon of 4x37mm AT guns. Note that the Finnish regiment at the same time had no AT weapons at all.

2 of the divisional AT companies (6x37mm AT guns) had been organised before 1939.

Both the armoured battalions organised one motorised AT company each.

So there are at least 21 regimental AT platoons and at least 4 AT companies in March 1940.

241x37mm AT guns had been delivered to the army in March 1940 and there's at least ~120 37mm AT guns in service. The Finns returned about ~80 (along with 77 000 rifles and several hundred LMGs) in April 1940.
 

oberdada

Gone Fishin'
Go into Norway and blow up the bloody railroad. Even blowing up the electric Locomotives would have been enough, since they couldn't simply be replaced.
I think they were quiete unique and that track wasn't standard 1135 mm track.
If a couple of month delivery delay really made that much difference that should have been enough, so forget about Sweden.
I doubt that, thought...
 
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