March 1918. Germans just defend.

[Blackfox5]

The German plan comes close to terms the Allies can accept. However, Wilson's 14 Points are the minimum terms the Allies can accept, and the German terms fall short of that.

Point 6 requires withdrawl of all German troops for Russia, and thus end of German domination of its intended eastern European empire. Independent Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic states, and Finland are great; but not with German troops propping up puppet governments or with a German monarchy.

Point 10 implies a dismemberment of the Habsburg empire.

Point 11 requires Germany giving up their gains in Romania, Serbia, and Monenegro.

Point 13 requires an independent Poland with access to the sea, most likely Danzig although a Lithuanian point is possible.

Most likely response is that Wilson says he is encouraged by the German offer, but that it falls short of a system that would ensure permanent peace and justice in Europe. The other Allies also reject the proposal, knowing that status quo in the West but German domination in the East bodes ill for the long term balance of power and their security.

Without a German offensive in the West, the Americans are able to build up their forces without incident, slowly and deliberately. Allied blockade still starves the Germans and German morale begins to collapse.

The Hundred Days offensives probably begins around the same time IOTL meaning a great Allied push in late summer. While some of the success of the Hundred Days was due to exhaustion of the German Army after being on the offensive, alot had to do with the effects of the blockade and improved Allied tactics, weapons, and combined arms. I think the final results will be very close to the front lines at OTL.

 

[Glenn239]

If you mean the first battle of PIave, it was in late november 1917, just after Caporetto, with the army still in disarray and Cadorna still as commander or just dismissed...and Italy loss between casualities, prisoner and dead 43.000, if you mean the Battaglia del solstizio aka the last offensive of the A-H army, well it was the austrian version of the Michael offensive, an attempt to knock out Italy launching against her everything and the kitchen sink and failed with 90.000 (the 50.000 figure include the MIA and many of them come back to the italian line...or their corpse were discovered in later years) loss for Italy and 150.000 for A-H btw, the motivation of the wait was more regarding the full replenishment and retraining of the army than any question regarding the solidity of the Hasburg Empire

I mean the June 1918 Austrian offensive. Granted, the counterattack divisions functioned well, but 50,000 POW's taken in a difficult river assault is indicative of problems in the Italian army, IMO. Had the battle not the obsticle of the Piave, the Austrians may have ripped the front wide open.

Maybe, but so what? Italy will not cave and the loss will be still high for the German, plus well now the French front is basically ready for the rest of the Entente to go and grab.

If the Americans have to bail out the Italians, then the Americans have leverage over the Italians to drop some of their war aims that can cause complications.

 

[Glenn239]

The Hundred Days offensives probably begins around the same time IOTL meaning a great Allied push in late summer. While some of the success of the Hundred Days was due to exhaustion of the German Army after being on the offensive, alot had to do with the effects of the blockade and improved Allied tactics, weapons, and combined arms. I think the final results will be very close to the front lines at OTL.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cambrai_(1917)

This battle says the that once the Allies advance beyond their fortified network, the German army can crush the advance in a devastating counterattack. No German offensives = large counterattack reserves.

 

[pdf27]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cambrai_(1917)

This battle says the that once the Allies advance beyond their fortified network, the German army can crush the advance in a devastating counterattack. No German offensives = large counterattack reserves

Don't assume that because they did it once, they'd manage to do so again - the British usually learned pretty quickly when they'd got something wrong, and by Amiens even had the Germans had the troops available to counterattack the chances are any counterattack would have been crushed.

 

[lukedalton]

I mean the June 1918 Austrian offensive. Granted, the counterattack divisions functioned well, but 50,000 POW's taken in a difficult river assault is indicative of problems in the Italian army, IMO. Had the battle not the obsticle of the Piave, the Austrians may have ripped the front wide open.

Have you read the part were i said that the 50.000 PoW figure include the MIA...and of that many returned on their unit later as they were lost during the battle and many others were dead who were found, well honestly we still found bodies.

If the Americans have to bail out the Italians, then the Americans have leverage over the Italians to drop some of their war aims that can cause complications.

First: How this help Germany?
Second: sorry but Italy being treated worse than OTL by the americans (and the rest of the Entente) is difficult to image
Third: Till the A-H surrender the italian front is secondary, so they will go were the real action is aka France.

 

[Glenn239]

Don't assume that because they did it once, they'd manage to do so again - the British usually learned pretty quickly when they'd got something wrong, and by Amiens even had the Germans had the troops available to counterattack the chances are any counterattack would have been crushed.

I'm thinking precisely the opposite - that the Allies simply would not be prepared to absorb a counterattack in the open on the intensity of Blucher or Michael, and that whatever gains were made could be rapidly lost.

IMO, the 100 Days couldn't happen until the counterattack capacity of the German army was broken.

 

[Glenn239]

Have you read the part were i said that the 50.000 PoW figure include the MIA...and of that many returned on their unit later as they were lost during the battle and many others were dead who were found, well honestly we still found bodies.

Yes, I saw that. But the Piave attack was a difficult river assualt and the Italians looked shakey and might have suffered a debacle had the Piave not burst its banks on the Austrians, and better coordination had been maintained between the two Austrian fronts. The Italians gave up a large number of prisoners, then waited until the dissolution of the Austrian Empire before attacking the completely disorganised Austrian army. This all suggests to me (1) that the Italians had not recovered fully from 1917 and (2) that a German attack may have been beyond the capacity of the Italian army to resist.

Second: sorry but Italy being treated worse than OTL by the americans (and the rest of the Entente) is difficult to imagine.

Precisely. By driving a wedge between the Americans and the Italians by way of crushing the Italian army, the Germans weaken the Allied coalition and cause disunity within it. This may be exacerbated by Wilson's incompetent demands (14 Points) of Albania for Serbia, and national self-determination, which will cut across Italian imperial ambitions.

Till the A-H surrender the italian front is secondary, so they will go were the real action is aka France.

The Central Powers require a large victory in 1918 in order to hold public morale together. Italy easier than Britain or France. So, far from being secondary, I see the potential for a decisive victory in the direction of Venice as nearly a prerequisite to the Central Powers withstanding the negotiations with Wilson into 1919.

(Posters are assuming the British and French armies are the danger to Germany, but I don't think they are the most important factor. The danger is entering into public negotiations that can cause friction within the alliance and confusion and demoralization in the publics of Austria and Germany.)

 

[AdA]

The Germans might have to offer something that gives Britain and France a sense of victory. The High seas fleet and the colonies would be the most resonable sacrifices to make. The large surface units could be offered as reparations, leaving only a reasonably seized fleet (Two Badens, Four Konigs and no BC?) and they could renounce submarine warfare and accept a limit on its submarine fleet.
But this would be an extremly difficult sale on Germany, even with propects of territorial gains in the east.
Britain would also have to consider the possibility of a stronger (on land) Germany coming back for round two in a few years time and gain total continental dominance.

By 1918 both sides were looking for long term safety. They didn't get OTL, but thought they had. Any ending that forces all nations to prepare for the possibility of another major war within a decade wouldn't be acepted by anyone. Both sides wanted a peace that would leave the loosers defenseless.

 

[lukedalton]

Yes, I saw that. But the Piave attack was a difficult river assualt and the Italians looked shakey and might have suffered a debacle had the Piave not burst its banks on the Austrians, and better coordination had been maintained between the two Austrian fronts. The Italians gave up a large number of prisoners, then waited until the dissolution of the Austrian Empire before attacking the completely disorganised Austrian army. This all suggests to me (1) that the Italians had not recovered fully from 1917 and (2) that a German attack may have been beyond the capacity of the Italian army to resist.

For the usefullness of the Germans attackin Italy at this stage see the end. Sure Italy line was shacken...the the Anglo-French during the spring offensive, the Hasburg offensive was their last desperate ditch effort to knock out Italy using everything that can spare...it failed miserably and basically gutted their army.
The Italian command waited the best moment as the June austrian offensive was a very strong one and need sometime to replenish

Precisely. By driving a wedge between the Americans and the Italians by way of crushing the Italian army, the Germans weaken the Allied coalition and cause disunity within it. This may be exacerbated by Wilson's incompetent demands (14 Points) of Albania for Serbia, and national self-determination, which will cut across Italian imperial ambitions.

And what are italian options? Accept the white peace German offered at the time for leave the war? If they don't have accepted after Caporetto...this is not the time.
The only way they can separate Italy from the Entente by now, is sacrificing the A-H and give to the italians what the Entente promised, othewise nothing will happen.

The Central Powers require a large victory in 1918 in order to hold public morale together. Italy easier than Britain or France. So, far from being secondary, I see the potential for a decisive victory in the direction of Venice as nearly a prerequisite to the Central Powers withstanding the negotiations with Wilson into 1919.

Sure, it will be a very morale boost...for just the five minutes necessary for the troops on the French front to attack as now the German lines are severely depleted of men and material who were transferred on the italian front.
Germany had finite resources

 

[Glenn239]

For the usefullness of the Germans attackin Italy at this stage see the end. Sure Italy line was shacken...the the Anglo-French during the spring offensive, the Hasburg offensive was their last desperate ditch effort to knock out Italy using everything that can spare...it failed miserably and basically gutted their army.
The Italian command waited the best moment as the June austrian offensive was a very strong one and need sometime to replenish

Comparing the Austrian Piave offensive to Michael, IMO isn't realistic. The German attack was much, much stronger.

And what are italian options? Accept the white peace German offered at the time for leave the war? If they don't have accepted after Caporetto...this is not the time.

Italian options, if they had lost their capacity for offensive warfare due to some giant CP offensive, presumably is to beseech their allies for consideration of their territorial objectives, that are no longer in Italian reach.

Sure, it will be a very morale boost...for just the five minutes necessary for the troops on the French front to attack as now the German lines are severely depleted of men and material who were transferred on the italian front.
Germany had finite resources

Perhaps, and perhaps not. In either case, now the Italians are asking the French to retrieve their chestnuts for them.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

I am surprised that some people keep talking about grand Central Powers offensives (e.g. in Italy) when the reason why it cannot happen has already been sensibly explained by several people on this thread.

Put simply: the German economy was near collapse in 1918. The British and French economies had been in this situation, but were not any more, thanks to the United States' financial support. In addition, anti-war agitation was growing; let us not forget that the Kaiserliche Marine revolted against the Kaiserreich regime at roughly this time IOTL. The fact of the matter is that Germany can win victory after victory, but as long as the British blockade keeps going (which it will) and the war remains at the same intensity of fighting (which it will), the German economy will be unable to sustain the war any further.

To AdA: good points, but well countered by yourself. Germany can't accept limitations on its navy when, in its own opinion, it hasn't lost. Britain and especially France can't accept Germany surviving as a major threat, not after the Franco-Prussian War and this extended mega-WW1 and all the damage that those wars have done to France. And your last point is probably the most important one made on this thread so far, as it accurately explains why WW1 could not have ended with a reasonable negotiated peace:

"Both sides wanted a peace that would leave the losers defenseless."

 

[lukedalton]

Comparing the Austrian Piave offensive to Michael, IMO isn't realistic. The German attack was much, much stronger.

The German attack was stronger but faced a much stronger defense is just a mode to compare thing, as Micheal the Austrian one was the last ditch offensive to settle thing and so they throw it everything they had.
But

Italian options, if they had lost their capacity for offensive warfare due to some giant CP offensive, presumably is to beseech their allies for consideration of their territorial objectives, that are no longer in Italian reach.

And we go for the nth time...the giant CP offensive will need men and material, not things that the CP had to spare so they need to weaken others place aka the France front open the door for the rest of entente.
Basically Italy just need to wait for his allies to win, and by treaty (even if in the end were not respected) they don't need to phisically conquer the place to get it.

Perhaps, and perhaps not. In either case, now the Italians are asking the French to retrieve their chestnuts for them.

And the French will be happy to do it as now have the perfect opportunity to win the war.
Sorry but if you desire a CP victory, even negotiated, by this time it will happen only with the help of some powerfull ASB by now is too late.

 

[Perkeo]

I wonder if it is set in stone that Germany has to be defeated by an America-backed Entente. Let Germany somehow survive the year 1918 without any foreighn troops on its soil - not easy at all, but possible. American public opinion will start to doubt the necessity of a prolonged war of attrition against an enemy who's well willing to compromise.

Status-quo-ante-bellum in the West, German-Austria allowed to join, Brest-Litowsk not revised - that IS a German Victory, and a not impossible (albeit unlikely) outcome of a defensive strategy.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

The net effect of the Spring battles was -12 -16 german divisions out of the west front reserve. Any redeployment to crush Italy IN ONE MIGHTY BLOW mwuuahahhahha, like that has not been tried for a few years now. is going to take out a significant portion of any reserve. And without the german offensive the allies are in a net much better manpower position.

The proposition is really use the Last Reserve to achieve a partial victory in a peripheral sector. Not going pass the General Staff exam by proposing obvious stupidity. Or keeping it intact and allowing the Entente to attack at a time and a place of their own choosing, basically grind out the german reserve with no real hope of victory.

With no German offensive the spring will be taken up by some Entente offensive action. OTL any planning by Foch is forestalled by the Spring Offensives and setting up the war council and whatever the UK government thinks, les Bosches sont a Noyon and Foch 'My center is giving way, my right is in retreat; situation excellent. I shall attack.' answers to Clemenceau 'My home policy: I wage war; my foreign policy: I wage war. All the time I wage war.'

Worth bearing in mind that both armies will be losing 200k men a month even without an offensive by either, Germans probably slightly more.

Looking at the details of the Allied ( especially British ) attacks all of them are very rapid broad and deep penetrations of positions achieved generally in the first few hours of the attack, i.e. prior to any reserves other than very local being able to intervene.

The Hindenburg positions fall comparatively easily.

TTL there will be more local german reserves and in a better position. However the method the entente was adopting to attack german defensive systems would ( it did ) break into the main position giving the germans a choice of attempting to counterattack, probably would, but having their reserve chewed up on the approach march with no great prospect for success once you get there.

Roughly speaking on a major offensive (by the allies) the Germans can expect to lose a regiment a day minimum on ration parties and similar.

OTL the germans were in full and increasingly disorganised retreat from Mid October. Once the Bruges - Metz rail line is brought under fire the Germans have to retreat further. Its the lateral logs line that means the Western front can stay intact. Without it anything north of the line is dependent on east west lines and are increasingly divided and unable to reinforce each other. The next position where they can achieve that is in Germany itself.

 

[Mikestone8]

The proposition is really use the Last Reserve to achieve a partial victory in a peripheral sector. Not going pass the General Staff exam by proposing obvious stupidity.

Though some of Ludendorff's actions came pretty close.

Only two days into Michael, he wasted most of an army against a near-impregnable position at Arras, rather than reinforce to sectors where things were going well. Wonder what the instructors at Potsdam would have said about that.

 

[Glenn239]

I am surprised that some people keep talking about grand Central Powers offensives (e.g. in Italy) when the reason why it cannot happen has already been sensibly explained by several people on this thread.

Put simply: the German economy was near collapse in 1918. ."

To argue that the German army was not capable of making large scale attacks in 1918 is to argue against basic facts.

 

[Glenn239]

The German attack was stronger but faced a much stronger defense is just a mode to compare thing, as Micheal the Austrian one was the last ditch offensive to settle thing and so they throw it everything they had.
But

We agree that Michael was much stronger and the Italian defences much weaker.

And we go for the nth time...the giant CP offensive will need men and material, not things that the CP had to spare so they need to weaken others place aka the France front open the door for the rest of entente.
Basically Italy just need to wait for his allies to win, and by treaty (even if in the end were not respected) they don't need to phisically conquer the place to get it.

There is no opportunity for the French or British armies, even if either had any intention of launching offensives in spring 1918 (neither did). The reinforcements for Italy would all come from the east, leaving the Western Front as intact as in 1917, when Allied offensives had failed.

 

[lukedalton]

To argue that the German army was not capable of making large scale attacks in 1918 is to argue against basic facts.

No it was capable of one and only one large scale attack hoping to bring the Entente to the negotiation table not even win and for Michael they had used everything they had...and they failed

 

[Glenn239]

The proposition is really use the Last Reserve to achieve a partial victory in a peripheral sector. Not going pass the General Staff exam by proposing obvious stupidity.

Whether you do or do not understand why eliminating secondary theatres strengthens the Central Powers in negotiations with the US is of no interest. The fact of the matter was that the German army was no longer capable of winning the war militarily, and therefore had to revert to a strategy which combined military and diplomatic initiatives to present the CP as strongly as possible.

The Central Powers strategy since 1914 had been to attempt to isolate and destroy the Entente armies in isolation, picking off secondary powers one at a time and thereby weakening the enemy coalition. The mistake in 1918 was abandoning that strategy for the impossibility of defeating the British in France. Ludendorff was attempting a military solution when none existed, and by wrecking the German army on the attack before the government finally answered the 14 points, he threw away its capacity to influence diplomacy.

Far better for the Germans to have answered the 14 points favorably in February 1918, then recieved Wilson's reply (which will have been unacceptable, of course), then the German army smashes the Italian army and Berlin replies to Wilson again - more favorably.

 

[Glenn239]

No it was capable of one and only one large scale attack....

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_Offensive


Contrary to the assertions made by other posters, it was casualties, not economic factors, that caused the German army to fail on the offensive in 1918.
The difference on the Italian front being that, from Caporetto, if the Italian army collapsed, losses would not be nearly as severe for the Germans as in Michael, Georgette, and Blucher-Yorck.