By 2032, it was becoming clear that something about Saudi Arabia had to change. Specifically, it was the “Saudi” part of it. The House of Saud had become a symbol of everything that had been wrong and archaic about the country: the despotic absolutism no longer tolerable, the religious fanaticism too oppressive, the petroeconomics no longer feasible and the use and disposal of migrant workers like a sanitary mask no longer maintaining the wheels running on the decaying State.
Now, that is not to say that reform had not been attempted; to say so would be a disservice to King Mohammad who, since his days as Crown Prince, had spearheaded valiant efforts to reform and modernise the country, most importantly through his Saudi Vision 2030 program, meant to diversify the economy, develop public services and promote a better image of the kingdom. The problem was that 2030 had come and gone and the end result of Saudi Vision was… well, not a complete failure, but not particularly impressive either, with the country still lagging behind in modernisation.
So, as if a portent from God Himself, it was when King Mohammad died in Riyadh, leaving his son to succeed him as Salman II, a reign that lasted for five days before falling victim to a palace coup to impose his brother Abdulaziz on the throne, kickstarting the Saudi succession crisis, a brief yet bloody affair that ended with an octogenarian cousin to be made King, in the merit of not arising great passions out of anyone as king.
That proved to be a fatal mistake. The monarchy, already shaken in its popular support, just lost it all as King Mohammad died, his eldest son was couped for another to be used as a puppet, only to then have both of them replaced by a man whose only merit was having no base of support whatsoever. King Mohammad had had, for all his faults, a wide base of support he had built around himself, but by the end, the Saudi monarchy was for them no longer the institution of King Mohammad, but the institution that had probably killed him and then usurped his heir. The façade of legitimacy had fallen.
The first to rise up were, as usual, the Shias, once again contesting the discrimination they still faced in their own country, in the Eastern Province and in the southern regions. The women followed, using International Woman’s Day as a reason to push to the streets themselves and demand full rights once and for all. Soon enough, members of the middle and upper classes were calling for liberal reforms, for elections, for a constitution. Even in the Armed Forces there were talks of mutiny and coup.
The House of Saud and its regime might have survived all of that, and the Revolution might have been quelled yet, if the expatriate workers, the immense masses of migrant peoples, coming from all over Asia and Africa, being worked in exploitation by the Saudi upper class, making by themselves the bulk of the actual working class in the country, had not risen up for their own demands, putting the Saudi economy on a standstill and nailing the coffin of the monarchy, once and for all.
The coup was quick and painless, with most of the royal house having been able to read the writing on the wall and fled to their properties overseas, ready to spend life living off the offshore wealth their dynasty had accumulated. The old king was kept in comfortable home arrest, until dying peacefully in his sleep. A military junta reigned in his place, promising reforms and elections, but first demanding for order to be restored. This was easier said than done, as many of the peoples who had risen up were not ready to lay down their arms so easy. And so, after some shuffling around of some more conservative elements within the junta, concessions were indeed made, including
- Abolition of the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice and end of persecution on the basis of religious practice
- Lifting many of the restrictions on women’s rights and promising full suffrage for women in the upcoming elections
- Lifting freedom of speech and assembly restrictions, allowing for the publishing of books, pamphlets and newspapers without restriction
- Allowing for the free formation of political parties
- Immediate release of all political prisoners
And most controversially of all,
Giving citizenship rights to all immigrants working in Arabia during the Revolution, including giving them full voting rights
The last point shocked the world but, after weeks of strikes spearheaded by migrant workers who, having suffered the most during the revolutionary upheaval, were now being threatened to return to the precarious oppression of before, it had become a necessity to ensure the restoration of a semblance of order. Of course, the new regime still had to deal with daily sectarian attacks and the occasional mutiny, and as mass political parties came into being, partisan attacks as well, but at least they survived, surprising most of the world, including themselves, by managing to avoid a full-blown civil war to fall upon the country.
Much of this was due to, above all, a remarkable display of tact on their part. The military presented themselves as a caretaker force to hold the country together until proper elections could be held, and one that avoided to make any more political decisions than those already won by the people in the streets. The Hejazi flag of the Arab Revolt, from the 1910s, was dusted off and made to replace the Saudi flag, by then deemed the essence of despotism. As for the name of the country, obviously “Kingdom” and “Saudi” had to go. But what would take their place? Would they be a “Republic”? An “Arab Republic”? An “Islamic Republic”? A “People’s Republic”? A “Democratic Republic”? A “Democratic People’s Republic”? A “People’s Islamic Republic”? The options were endless and the opinions ran high. To avoid offending anyone, a clever mind within the junta came up with the solution of being “Arabia” only, for the time being, and let the elected delegates deal with the formalities.
When political parties started forming, the Junta ensured cooperation with them, holding regular meetings with prominent leaders to discuss policy decisions and have some consensus during the most difficult of times. The parties gradually emerging from the dust of Riyadh were,
- Al-Sahwa Al-Islamiyya, most commonly known as Sahwa, the inheritor of an old reformist tendency in Arabia, originating in the 1950s and 60s from Muslim Brotherhood exiles fleeing Egypt. They had flourished until the 1990s, when opposition to American presence in “holy land” had led to their curbing by the Saudi regime. Nevertheless, their movement had kept its influence over an educated, Islamic-minded youth, with great presence in social media. The movement would with time lean towards Sururism, the trend of combining “the organisational methods and political worldview of the Muslim Brotherhood with the theological puritanism of Wahhabism”. The members of Sahwa participated in the Revolution, welcoming the political reforms that came with the fall of the House of Saud, but nevertheless are sternly opposed to the more secularising measures they fear might take place, and the lifting of modesty laws on women
- National Assembly, the true inheritor of the liberal tendency under the Saudi regime, was built over several generations of urbanite, intellectual families of the Arab bourgeoisie, who had long clamoured for liberalisation and democratisation of their society, and pushed for peaceful reform to this effect, serving the role of a perennial loyal opposition. Ultimately, the Revolution had to take care of what reform couldn’t, and the liberals mostly served as cheerleaders for the Revolution, calling for a peaceful solution and for the regime to stand down. With the military takeover, the liberals quickly began working to form a political party and pushing the junta to ensure democratic rights. National Assembly runs on a message of constitutionally enshrining the conquests of the Revolution, to modernise the country and establish a healthy liberal democracy in lines similar to Europe, hoping that such a program would serve to restore peace to the country and finally bring freedom and prosperity to Arabia
- Future Alliance, a more loosely-knit coalition than most, that serves to represent the leadership of the military junta as they attempt to continue to have a role in politics after democratic handover. The Alliance runs on a platform of law and order, promising a new republican system capable of bringing prosperity to Arabia and ridding it of the sectarian tensions that have been plaguing it. Its leaders and candidates (many of them running as independents) enjoy a good deal of support for their role in overthrowing the Saudi regime, despite suffering from being an army of generals without soldiers, with each candidate having his own program, often incoherent with that of the Alliance, that of other candidates and even incoherent within itself. Generally, the party is also favourable to having closer relationships with fellow Arabic states, in particular Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, in some cases going so far as to be accused of Nasserism or Baathism
- Party of Hope, formed by the cleric leadership of the Shia community, who had been the first to take to the streets in what would become the Revolution once the rest of the country joined them there. Having always been great opponents of the Saudi regime, which had treated its Shia subjects as second-class citizens, they had already risen during the First Arab Spring, only to be crushed, and now rose again, to be successful in their cause. The Party of Hope was built following the ideals of Nimr al-Nimr, an advocate for Shia interests, for Islamic democracy and for non-violence. He had been very popular among the youth and his ideals survived him to be enshrined in the Party of Hope. You’ll hear its opponents claiming it is a puppet of Iran, but that could not be farthest from the truth: in fact, the Party of Hope is quite possibly one of the most unabashedly pro-American parties running in the election, claiming kinship in the American ideals of liberty and justice
- Hizbollah Al-Hijaz, or just Hizbollah, being precisely everything its Sunni detractors accuse the Party of Hope of being, is a sister-organization of the similar groups, present in Lebanon and other countries, violently seeking Shia supremacy in the country and being backed by Iran’s own regime. A militant group active since the 1980s, the group had been accused of carrying out several terrorist attacks and had been responsible for much of the Saudi-Iran tension. With the fall of the regime, the group had become active once again, using the newfound freedoms of the country to legalize itself, much to the dismay of the liberal groups who had wanted to prevent extremist organizations from arising. The group competes with the Party of Hope for support among the Shia youth, recruiting them not just as voters, but as militants for an organization that, despite competing in democratic elections, is prepared to act by force when the time comes to reclaim their power
- Women’s Coalition, the inheritor of the feminist movement that existed during the Saudi regime and that successfully, and with great effort, carried out several movements for their rights, such as the women to drive movement and the anti male-guardianship campaign. “The most organised and articulate civil society” under the Saudi regime, feminists took an important role in the Revolution, such as the 8 March demonstrations that spread the protests from the Eastern Province to throughout the country. The Coalition was built by the various feminist groups formed before or during the Revolution, to coordinate their efforts nationally and to campaign for women’s presence in the new democracy. It suffers somewhat from being a one-issue party that struggles to agree on a common program on other points, and even within women’s issues faces internal divisions
- Najran Front, representing the Ismaili community present in the Najran region, a community with its special interests and that the Saudi regime had long mistreated. There were attempts by the Party of Hope to insert the Ismaili Shia in their party, but ultimately the community decided to stand on its own, creating the Najran Front to organise themselves and represent them in the democratic institutions of the country
- Believing Youth, often called Houthis, although they detest the use of that name, represent the Zaydis in southern Arabia, who, after being harshly persecuted and having their brethren across the border in Yemen victimised in a Saudi-led coalition war, stood once again during the Revolution to reclaim the rights that had been taken from them. Still upholding many of the values of the original Houthis, the Believing Youth has nonetheless worked towards creating a truly anti-sectarian movement working towards building a country where Sunni and Shia can live together. At least some of its members have, others have taken up arms again, ready to strike when needed
- Liberation Movement, a political association meant to represent the Sufi practitioners in the country against the violence posed by other groups. Sufism had long been persecuted by the Saudi regime, leading its followers to welcome the Revolution as freeing them from their oppression. The Movement leans somewhat to the left, encouraging social activism from its members and for State support for the impoverished in Arabia, although there are also more conservative Sufis whose views are accepted for the sake of unity
- Caliphate Party, the legalised branch of the Hizb ut-Tahrir transnational movement, yet another party whose legalisation befuddled the liberal centre. Openly dedicated to the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate and the worldwide application of Islamic law, the fact that it was decided open elections would be a feasible and coherent way of achieving this has perplexed many, including its own members, although the party does also run the typical militia operations as far as the military allows them
- Lions of Arabia, formed by the Afro-Arab community of the country, the descendants of the slaves carried from East Africa to serve Arab masters and that, centuries later, remain discriminated against in almost all spheres of life. The community’s leadership centred on imams, the highest post one could hope to achieve when born with black skin, but nevertheless, the social challenges faced by their community has shaped the party into being pretty left-leaning on social matters, essentially embodying an Islamic socialist doctrine. That, combined with some pan-African tendencies from its members, as led to, of all books, Gaddafi’s Green Book to be a popular reading and symbol among party militants of the most radical kind, leading to rather interesting conversations within party circles
- Toilers’ Party, the heir of the militant organisations of migrant workers that were formed during the Revolution and that were able to spark their members into massive strikes that paralysed the country and forced the Saudi regime to surrender at last. Long treated as little more than slaves, as disposable machines to be used, abused and shipped back home, the workers of a plethora of nations have now fought for and won the freedom of the Arabian people. Coming from all over South Asia and Africa, in particular India, Bangladesh and the Philippines, and made up of Muslims, Hindus and Christians, the party represents these New Men, who demand full rights, better working conditions and a sharing of the country’s natural wealth that benefits them too. Certainly, having the most left-wing program and the most agitated base, the party leadership is nevertheless rather moderate and willing to collaborate with liberal secular parties to make positive change possible. Nevertheless, the old chauvinism of Arab society has been proving too stubborn to allow the party to go beyond expatriates to build a truly universal workers’ party in Arabia, and it seems likely this will also make collaboration in governments with other, Arab-led parties, difficult, even among the liberal ones, that try to keep their distance from the Toilers’ Party
Of course, there are also parties catering for those that do not support the Revolution but that won’t allow principle to keep them from voting to protect the interests, namely,
- Vision¸ the party that essentially serves to represent those for whom the late Saudi regime, in particular the reign of King Mohammad and the attempts from Vision 2030… were actually good for. The program might have failed in its generality, but that doesn’t mean that it didn’t have its successes, and that those successes did not inspire loyalty. The militants of Vision are the generation of Arabians who were liberals when they were students, only to abandon liberalism and become supporters of King Mohammed when he was Crown Prince and started implementing reforms. Ostensibly monarchist, the party has been losing that particular character and has become accepting of the liberalisation efforts, and focuses instead on ensuring these don’t mean reforms straying too much from the economic order set by King Mohammad and Vision 2030. They went economic reform, but in a way that implies infrastructure modernisation and diversification, not really one that implies more equality and higher taxes
- Arabia First, also composed of King Mohammad fans, but these were never liberal to begin with, nor did they care so much about his economic reforms as much as his sponsoring of a Saudi nationalist identity that strayed away from classical Islamist thought or from pan-Arab nationalism. They are fierce supporters of Saudi restoration, as they identify themselves as Saudi, subjects of that house, and fear the Revolution will dilute that, a fear that the massive granting of citizenship to expatriate workers has only fuelled. They are the most aggressively anti-expatriate party, with its militants often conducting attacks against prominent leaders of the Toilers’ Party and other expatriate organisations
As these parties formed, dates were set for the election, in the anniversary of the overthrow of the Saudi regime. Immediately, the parties turned to campaigning with an astounding ferocity, launching campaign on all media formats, from holding huge rallies that often turned violent, to plastering the walls with posters, to becoming really irritating in social media. It seemed the country was taking to democracy with unexpected fervour, and polls varied wildly as it was everyone’s guess as to what parties would be getting greater support come election day.
After meeting with the various political parties and scoping their opinions and negotiating for a common ground, or at least something as common as possible (forbidding every non-Sunni citizen from voting as the Caliphate Party wanted would by necessity be incompatible with the Hizbollah’s demand to forbid every non-Shia citizen from voting, for example), it was decided that 360 delegates would be elected from the people, 180 of them from party lists elected on a province level, and 180 others on candidatures (by list or independently, if they so preferred) based on the governorates. The point was to allow as much geographic diversity as possible, although some were quick to point out the imbalances this system created.
Ultimately, the results of the election were that of a nation still looking for its new identity. Besides the Toilers’ Party, that could count with the support of the large expatriate community (but with very little support from Arabs), no party went beyond the 15% mark for voting. The results also differed greatly from the two electoral methods: Toilers got 73, or around 40%, of the province-level delegates, but only 39, around 22%, of governorate-level delegates, as both the overrepresentation of smaller, more Arab towns, and the strategic voting of Arabs to prevent the victory of a Toilers’ plurality, contributed to their lower numbers.
No clear majority emerged from the election, even if ultimately, a minority coalition of liberal secular and moderate religious parties managed to create an unstable government, that nevertheless needed occasional Toilers support to see its programs pass. Democracy in Arabia was flourishing for sure, but it was nevertheless as fragile as a flower