Mao dies in 1956 - PRC has better relations with *both* US and USSR in 1960s?

If Mao had died in 1956, China would have had better relations with the USSR and USA

  • Yes, because succeeding leaders would not have been as belligerent

    Votes: 7 63.6%
  • No, because domestic political factors would force any successor to be equally belligerent

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • No, because geopolitical/diplomatic factors would force any successor to be equally belligerent

    Votes: 4 36.4%

  • Total voters
    11

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
During Mao Zedong's rule he first "leaned to one side" the Soviet side, in the Cold War, while picking geopolitical fights with the USA. Then he started picking ideological fights with the post-Stalin USSR leadership in the late 50s. He also picked a fight with the Indians in the early 60s. Mao's China spent the 60s at odds with both superpowers. In the 70s Mao opened up to the US, either because the conflict with the USSR had gotten too dangerous or Mao had "proved his point" or whatever. Post Mao China continued the rapprochement with the US, but only made amends with the USSR later, during the Gorbachev years.

Given all this fight-picking that seems to have peaked in the 1960s, if Mao had died before then, in '56 for example, would China have had better relations with both the USA and USSR (and maybe also with India) under any likely successor leadership?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I'm trying to picture the consequences of a collective leadership including Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai and Deng Xiaoping in power from after 1956.

I can say more about what do *not* expect to see rather than what their affirmative program would be.

I do *not* expect to see the following OTL developments in this ATL:

1) A Taiwan Straits crisis involving deliberately ratcheted up tensions and bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu
2) Chinese Communist Party condemnation of Soviet "de-Stalinization" or Chinese Communist polemics supporting Albania as a protest against Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia.
3) Chinese Communist Party criticism of Soviet Communist ideological "revisionism" in general
4) The domestic "Great Leap Forward" Program
5) Abrupt Soviet withdrawal of technicians from China in 1960
6) A Chinese attack on India in 1962. [There is a chance that China may be backed into attacking encroaching Indian forces entering the Aksai Chin as part of Nehru's forward policy" in the 1962-1964 timeframe, but a wider war extending to northeast India is unlikely.]
7) A Chinese attack on the Soviet border in 1969.

Some knock-on consequences of omitting these OTL events are that Quemoy and Matsu do not become a cause of US nuclear alerts, nor are they mentioned in the 1960 Presidential debates. Others are that there is no Sino-Soviet split and the Chinese remain the beneficiary of Soviet technical assistance for longer. Some of this assistance will even pertain to nuclear power, if not nuclear weapons themselves. Perhaps 1965 would be a good time to wind down most aid as that's when the US wound down economic aid to Taiwan and China will be a bit more industrial than OTL by 1965 if the GLF has been avoided.
China is not distinguishing itself as the more aggressive of the two communist powers on the global stage. This lack of competition or one-upmanship may leave Khrushchev more confident in his "peaceful coexistence" policies and this may forestall the Cuban missile crisis or Berlin crises (though I don't see how the GDR goes on without putting up a wall, and this does not prevent the U2 incident from torpedoing the summit of 1960).

Domestic politics in the US, the strength of the China Lobby and memories of the Korean War will likely preclude US recognition of the PRC during the years 1956 through 1964 and will prevent any high-level leadership summits, despite the post-Mao leadership's probable reduced stridency and approach of "hiding and biding" on the global stage. However, that reduced stridency and lack of the Quemoy and Matsu shelling irritant could lead to a reduction in US restrictions on journalist and educator travel to the PRC (like the steps the US took in 1969-70) before 1964. Perhaps French recognition of the PRC might come sooner than OTL, and western grain sales may become available in emergencies.

Thoughts-?
 
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