Manzikert: Fluke or Fate?

From what I understand Anatolia may not have yeilded the produce, manufactures and tax revenue of more populous Western Anatolia and Thrace but it did yeild some pretty good cavalry forces. Mongolia is a shit-hole of a place too, but those steppe nomads make pretty good cavalry armies.
 
Tarchaneiotes' army disappeared, though, probably defeated. In any case, you don't have to kill every man in an army to cause it to cease to exist. The Tagmata were never reconstituted - that in itself is an indication of the destruction of the Byzantine army as it was. From then on it wasn't really much of a force.

I don't see how the loss of the Anatolian plain should have been what caused it to cease to be a major force, since most of the population was in Western Anatolia and Thrace.

What I am arguing for here is that the main damage done was not military, but political. If the political damage was never done, the military damage could have been repaired. Consider that the Empire had far worse defeats in its history, militarily speaking... what really did it in was the time between Manzikert and the ascention of Alexius I.

Granted, Romanus IV was probably doomed regardless of how the events turned out. However, let's presume that someone slightly more sensible than Michael VII comes on the throne, decides to make the best of the bad situation, and agrees to honor an agreement with Arp Arslan. There is still likely to be a lot of Seljuk migration to Anatolia, but FAR less than OTL, and that gives Byzantium enough breathing time to rebuild its military, which can be done, given that the losses at Manzikert were not, in the long run, irreplaceable, and that the treaty between Romanus and Arp Arslan was quite lenient on the Byzantines in the short run.

In other words, it would give the Empire at least 10-20 years in which to rebuild - the problem was that Michael VII basically threw all of that away by refusing to honor the treaty, and by making a mess out of what was a bad, but repairable situation in the first place.
 

Nikephoros

Banned
Don't know how this will affect the debate; but I remember reading that once the Rum Seljuk state was established, Byzantium taught them how to run a govt. and a country
 
I'm not sure I agree that there wasn't permanent military damage done, but on the other front it was Alp Arslan who wouldn't honor the treaty because he made it with Diogenes, who he considered a friend, and Michael (or anyone else) an usurper and traitor.

It doesn't really matter anyway since Arp Alp Arslan was dead a year later and his successor was more hostile to the Byzantines.

The person who really deserves the blame is Constantine IX, who dismantled the eastern defenses and left the empire exposed to the Seljuks in the first place. Or you could extend the blame back to Basil for not producing an heir resulting in a long string of bad leaders.

What I am arguing for here is that the main damage done was not military, but political. If the political damage was never done, the military damage could have been repaired. Consider that the Empire had far worse defeats in its history, militarily speaking... what really did it in was the time between Manzikert and the ascention of Alexius I.

Granted, Romanus IV was probably doomed regardless of how the events turned out. However, let's presume that someone slightly more sensible than Michael VII comes on the throne, decides to make the best of the bad situation, and agrees to honor an agreement with Arp Arslan. There is still likely to be a lot of Seljuk migration to Anatolia, but FAR less than OTL, and that gives Byzantium enough breathing time to rebuild its military, which can be done, given that the losses at Manzikert were not, in the long run, irreplaceable, and that the treaty between Romanus and Arp Arslan was quite lenient on the Byzantines in the short run.

In other words, it would give the Empire at least 10-20 years in which to rebuild - the problem was that Michael VII basically threw all of that away by refusing to honor the treaty, and by making a mess out of what was a bad, but repairable situation in the first place.
 
I'm not sure I agree that there wasn't permanent military damage done, but on the other front it was Alp Arslan who wouldn't honor the treaty because he made it with Diogenes, who he considered a friend, and Michael (or anyone else) an usurper and traitor.

It doesn't really matter anyway since Arp Alp Arslan was dead a year later and his successor was more hostile to the Byzantines.

The person who really deserves the blame is Constantine IX, who dismantled the eastern defenses and left the empire exposed to the Seljuks in the first place. Or you could extend the blame back to Basil for not producing an heir resulting in a long string of bad leaders.

Still, presuming that someone more politically adept than Michael VII ends up on the throne, I am sure he can at least play enough of carrot and stick with Arp Arslan to get at least something similar to status quo. After all, this is what Byzantine diplomacy was famous for. Such leadership could also result in more of mending fences with Arp's successor, who would have less of a quasi-legitimate reason to invade. In other words - yes, the Byzantines were not that well off before Manzikert, and Constantine IX deserves much of the blame (and so does Constantine X), but the situation was not irrepairable even AFTER Manzikert. It was simply a matter of bad leadership, combined with disastrous diplomacy (or lack thereof), and blatant disregard of Constantinople for the real problem - they did not seem to realize the magnitude of the Seljuk problem until after it became too big for them to handle.
 
What I have read, although not for a couple of years now, seemed to suggest that the battle itself was not fatal. I.e. that it was the civil war that killed off the rest of the army and made a quick recovery impossible. Alexius himself was the leading general of a contender he later overthrew himself and had a rather lucky victory over another, talented rival in a bloody battle that if it had been avoided could have altered things drastically. Think the same book pointed out that despite the upland areas of Anatolia being occupied by the Seljuk’s almost immediately after the battle the region around Antioch stayed under imperial control for several more years. Despite being richer, more open to the Turkish nomads and the way they wanted to go, i.e. towards the Fatimid’s. Simply because there were still coherent imperial forces to defend the region.

The social/political changes with the empire increasingly reliant on mercenaries and local lords were important but only became difficult to reverse after the bulk of the old imperial army was destroyed by the civil war.

Steve
 
What I have read, although not for a couple of years now, seemed to suggest that the battle itself was not fatal. I.e. that it was the civil war that killed off the rest of the army and made a quick recovery impossible. Alexius himself was the leading general of a contender he later overthrew himself and had a rather lucky victory over another, talented rival in a bloody battle that if it had been avoided could have altered things drastically. Think the same book pointed out that despite the upland areas of Anatolia being occupied by the Seljuk’s almost immediately after the battle the region around Antioch stayed under imperial control for several more years. Despite being richer, more open to the Turkish nomads and the way they wanted to go, i.e. towards the Fatimid’s. Simply because there were still coherent imperial forces to defend the region.

The social/political changes with the empire increasingly reliant on mercenaries and local lords were important but only became difficult to reverse after the bulk of the old imperial army was destroyed by the civil war.

Steve

Okay. So this is, I think, the general decision of the group, that it was the civil war post-Manzikert, not Manzikert itself, that caused the loss of Anatolia. If the civil war had been quickly resolved, much of the long-term damage done to the Empire could have been avoided. That long-term damage consisted primarily of the loss of the professional army, forcing the Empire to rely on local lords and mercenaries, and this reliance contributed to increasingly political instability. This political instability was kept under control by the Komnei (sp?) but bubbled up once there was a regency (after Manuel's death).

If Manzikert is avoided altogether, then the Seljuk Turks focus south against the Fatimids. It would appear that Egypt was their real goal, and Anatolia was taken simply as a target of convienence.

If Manzikert happens, but the civil war is much shorter and the army remains more or less intact, will the Seljuks head south against Egypt, or will they stay put where they are? I'm not familiar with the Turkish settlement of Anatolia, but it appears to me that a lot of the intial Turkish population increase was Turks moving into Anatolia, rather than natural increase. If this is true, then those Turks want to move, and where probably doesn't matter. So are they going to be able to take Egypt?
 
How about this angle:

Manzikert, the civil wars that followed and all the other "bad" stuff that happened to the Byzantine Empire at that time, could have been avoided if Eudokia Makrembolitissa did NOT marry Romanus.

No Romanus as emperor -- no feud with the Doukas family.

No feud -- no civil war (possibly).

No civil war -- more attention to governing the empire properly (hopefully), most possibly by a Doukas emperor (although good governance and Doukas don't normally exist in the same sentence)

I know that it sounds too simple, but after all, Romanus was a very central and pivotal character during this period in Byzantine history. His absence could butterfly a LOT of thing that happened in OTL.

Just my thoughts on the matter :)
 
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