Mantaining the Anglo-Japanase alliance.

Could there be a way for Japan and Britain to mantain their alliance into the 1930s? what would be the consequences ofthis partnership beign mantained?
 
Churchill wrote in his History of the Second World War, that there was an opinion in some circles of the British Establishment in the 30s (Can't recall if it was Conservative Party specific) that Britain should have maintained the Alliance.

Perhaps if Japan sent a division or two to the western front it might strengthen the bond. Maybe even a small squadron of ships to assist the Royal Navy as well. When you have Japanese soldiers dying for the Entente on the other side of the world it would certainly be a lot harder for Britain to divorce themselves from the alliance after the war, even with American pressure. After all it would essentially be selling out one ally who had sent troops perhaps as early as 1915 to an ally which only started sending troops in late 1917. This would be all the more reinforced when the American Senate doesn't back President Wilson's plans and looks like retreating further into isolationism.

I'm very interested in whether the maintaining of the Alliance is enough to preserve Japanese Democracy though - otherwise the Alliance will come to a natural end by way of Japanese Aggression.
 
Real politik

Maybe even a small squadron of ships to assist the Royal Navy as well. When you have Japanese soldiers dying for the Entente on the other side of the world it would certainly be a lot harder for Britain to divorce themselves from the alliance after the war, even with American pressure.

According to this account there were Japanese sailors who fought and died on British Warships in the Battle of Jutland which one would think would be of some significance. The problem is no matter how much the Japanese contributed the British Empire maintaining good relations with the US is far important due to sharing physical borders, same can be said for China concerning Burma.

The end of the Taisho democracy had more to do with the Great Depression who's affects plagued every nation so I doubt Britain could afford to lend aid. Perhaps in light of maintaining such an alliance the Japanese battle plan could look quite a bit different if not perhaps less ambitious then OTL.
 
Ending the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was understandable at the time but in the end was a serious foreign policy blunder for Britain.

It was an attempt to keep the USA happy at the time of the Washington Conference. Unfortunately Britain gained nothing by trying to please the USA since their foreign policy was isolationist anyway.

The Japanese wanted it to continue and in the end Britain gained a potential enemy without gaining a friend.

The problems come in the 1930's when the Japanese become more aggressive in China. With the Treaty being a defensive one the British don't have to do anything (they didn't anyway) when the Japanese invade China. The Americans may become unfriendly but they wouldn't actually do anything either except say that they were annoyed.

Relations between the US and Britain were cool in the 1930's anyway and didn't become friendly until Hitler became a real danger and after Churchill became PM.

Japan would probably not deal with Hitler if they had a British Alliance but I would expect a natural cooling as the 30's progressed.

When WW2 breaks out I would expect Japan to stick to the letter of the Treaty and say that since Britain declared war on Germany and not the other way around Japan was under no obligation to join. When France falls I can see the Japanese occupy French Indo China as a 'favour' to their British Allies even if no one else sees it that way.

After that I think things are too unpredictable.
 

NothingNow

Banned
Churchill wrote in his History of the Second World War, that there was an opinion in some circles of the British Establishment in the 30s (Can't recall if it was Conservative Party specific) that Britain should have maintained the Alliance.
It was, but it was mostly an issue of short-sightedness on the part of both parties to the treaty, and the IJN breaking ranks over the Washington Naval Treaty, at the same time as Wilson's behavior at the Paris Peace conference was perceived as a slap in the face back home.

Canceling the Anglo-Japanese alliance occurred at the worst possible time politically for the IJN, and was due to the idea that the alliance wasn't necessary when the Americans were friendly and the French and Germans maimed and unable to wage a serious war for the next generation or so.

Sending more than a destroyer fleet to the med, along with some Cruisers for ASW ops, (as occurred IOTL with Adm. Satō Kōzō's 2nd Special Task Fleet) is honestly going to be very hard, and probably wouldn't have that great a political pay off for the Japanese, or the UK.

Maybe you could deploy the Katoris or Satsumas with their escorts to augment the obsolete 3rd Battle Squadron, but that'd pretty much be it. The Destroyers would be the valuable part there, but they're also needed back in the pacific.

Deploying even more capital ships to Grand Fleet wouldn't be that effective to begin with, even if somehow all four Kongo-class BCs were deployed with Fuso (this of course assumes that the RN even wants them, which given the political wrangling needed by the Americans to get Battleship Division 9 accepted into the Grand Fleet, is unlikely.) Any IJN vessels sent there would be at the end of a ten thousand mile supply chain unless some machine shop in Britain starts cranking out spares for them, and in 1915 the IJN had half a dozen Dreadnoughts and Battle Cruisers, assuming they speed up work on Yamashiro. The crews would be exhausted by the trip, and realistically only capable of performing at the same abominable level as the RN (where as the IJN under normal circumstances was the most professional and effective navy man for man in the period,) until they'd rested for a few weeks and effected repairs.
That said, having a few officers there on an exchange would be a good idea. Especially with Prince Hiroyasu along as a Naval attaché (it might be enough to shift him decisively from the fleet faction to the treaty faction later on.)

And before you even bring it up, the IJA was not going to send troops to fight on the Western Front. The leadership of the IJA might be insane, but they weren't so stupid as to throw away perfectly good troops in a rat and typhus-infested trench when they didn't have a dog in the fight. Maybe you could get them to relieve Australia and New Zealand of some occupation duties in the pacific, or send some cavalry units to the middle east, but by and large the IJA's war ended at Tsingtao.

The problem is no matter how much the Japanese contributed the British Empire maintaining good relations with the US is far important due to sharing physical borders, same can be said for China concerning Burma.
It depends on the wider geopolitical context. If the US is seen as something of a threat, the Japanese do become essential to securing british possessions in the Pacific. Especially after 1914-1915, when they're physically separating the two thanks to occupied Micronesia and Polynesia, with Guam and the Philippines being the only gap.

That said, maintaining the Alliance would stress US/UK relations enough that keeping it would be important, especially if British investors get bullish on East Asia, Australia and Continental Europe, so there isn't that much of a vested intrest in being very close to the Americans.

After all, with the IJN and Royal Navy hanging around, should things go south, the only real threats are to Canada (which after becoming an independent signatory of the league of nations charter, the treaty of versailles, and the Halibut Treaty could quite reasonably claim neutrality in an Anglo-Japanese/American war) and the Caribbean Colonies.

I'm very interested in whether the maintaining of the Alliance is enough to preserve Japanese Democracy though - otherwise the Alliance will come to a natural end by way of Japanese Aggression.
By itself it isn't. What it will do is allow civillian government to continue playing the IJA and IJN off against each other.
Ideally what you'd need to do is kill Wilson fairly early on, along with Prince Kotohito, while somehow avoiding some of the more spectacular Taisho-era scandals.
 
The problems come in the 1930's when the Japanese become more aggressive in China. With the Treaty being a defensive one the British don't have to do anything (they didn't anyway) when the Japanese invade China. The Americans may become unfriendly but they wouldn't actually do anything either except say that they were annoyed.

Relations between the US and Britain were cool in the 1930's anyway and didn't become friendly until Hitler became a real danger and after Churchill became PM.

Japan would probably not deal with Hitler if they had a British Alliance but I would expect a natural cooling as the 30's progressed.

When WW2 breaks out I would expect Japan to stick to the letter of the Treaty and say that since Britain declared war on Germany and not the other way around Japan was under no obligation to join. When France falls I can see the Japanese occupy French Indo China as a 'favour' to their British Allies even if no one else sees it that way.

After that I think things are too unpredictable.


This is fairly accurate in my opinion. But it doesn't well answer the question of getting the alliance to survive in the first place.


Part of the trouble is in the fallout of the Great War British Commonwealth countries held various differing views on Japan, at a time when the Commonwealth was trying to define for itself a single foriegn policy matter.

Initially the omens were good for a renewal, with great support except for Canada, but as the conferences continued, the notion that Japan and America might go to war, hence drawing the Commonwealth into fighting the US was broached.

The US whipping up public opinion that Japan would no doubt in time attack Commonwealth holdings and asia and grow to close off markets from America. On a part, given the American aid during the Great War, eventually it was decided to keep US good will.


In essence, we have to tune down American Imperialism in this era to remove their lobbying for spheres of influence, or bolster Britain and the Commonwealths strength.



The latter is fairly more easy to do, since it at heart only means for Britain to favour her colonies in the pacific more than the Americans, since at this time there is very little really Japan could do to threaten the Americans. At worst, and assurance could likely be able to be got from the Imperial Diet at the time to sign a non-aggression pact over the Philippines and other US pacific dominions.

Had the Japanese when they entered the conference deemed to suggest this under the notion; "It's ludicrous we would want to attack the US", then the Americans and Canadians would have lost complete face in their enlargement, and it would have become more clear that they were more trying to secure spheres of influence in the pacific.

Greatly cooling relations between the Commonwealth and Britain.



On the other hand, Britain was not very happy with Japanese conduct during the Great War era, not only had Imperial Japan entered the war for their own reasons and secured much territory from having done so, as well as making demands on China and furthermore for demanding racial equality with White European states.

In these senses, Britain was being incredibly prejudiced and hypocritical to Imperial Japan, which rankled them.

Had, the 21 Demands, been the 13 Demands initially, and Japan waited for British acknowledgement for joining the conflict, then Britain would have a much better opinion of Imperial Japanese foreign policy. In this context is is likely that the racial equality act may be signed, or at least a special case made for Japan, and as recompense, the British may ask for their own international concessions upon renewal of the Alliance.

i.e. If Japan gets what they want, Britain now wants what she wants, a foreign colonial power that she can 'control' in the Pacific, and won't harm the Empire.

-------------------------------------

As things evolve...


Well, a renewal of the Treaty likely prevents Imperial Japan from ending up on its milliteristic path. During hte 1920s there was something of a decrease in Japanese milliterism, which was only reignited with the economic downturns of the late 1920s and early 1930s, which pushed aggressive foreign policy to the front.

Yet, if Japan has a British 'ally' trade between Japan and the Commonwealth may weather the storm much better, with less militaristic factions being able to claim strength.

This may push back the Mukden Affair(s) a couple of years, and when they are conducted the Japanese Diet is quick to reign in the military due to pressure from Britain.


When Britain declares war on Germany, Imperial Japan would in all likelihood stand by the notion of the defensive treaty, it has nothing to gain in its sphere of influence. The British would likely respect this, because it is the word of the treaty, but may also lobby Imperial Japan to join, or provide aid.

Imperial Japan on the other-hand is going to see Britain pre-occupied.

This may be enough for Japan to go milliterist, once Germany declares war on the Soviet Union, then Japan would more likely than not decide to align with the allies to also attack the soviets. They may do this by escalating matters to get Stalin to declare war, and there by the allies to declare war on the soviets to. Churchill never was a fan of Stalin, and while it might be one of those 'spy thriller type events' of history, it could be within the realms of possibility for a false flag precedent here.

The Japanese get rather owned in the process, but we might see a much stranger outcome to WWII than we might imagine.
 
euromellows said:
there was an opinion in some circles of the British Establishment in the 30s ...that Britain should have maintained the Alliance.
I tend to agree. Had it been maintained, IMO, there would have been no Pacific War, nor any alliance with Germany. Possibly a negotiated settlement with China.
euromellows said:
Perhaps if Japan sent a division or two to the western front ...Maybe even a small squadron of ships to assist the Royal Navy as well.
Not really in Japan's hands, AIUI: it was under pressure from the U.S., or from Oz & Canada (depending on which story you believe:rolleyes:). There was also hope on the British side the U.S. would cancel Britain's war debt in exchange. (Needless to say, not...:rolleyes:)
euromellows said:
whether the maintaining of the Alliance is enough to preserve Japanese Democracy though
It couldn't hurt, since it gave IJN more clout. It also meant more exposure to British & American officers, & to the issues of blue water fighting. This could only help show Japan's senior military leaders (who were a rank collection of dimwits, IMO:rolleyes:) just how bad an idea war with Britain, or the U.S., would be.
Devolved said:
With the Treaty being a defensive one the British don't have to do anything ...
When WW2 breaks out I would expect Japan to stick to the letter of the Treaty and say that since Britain declared war on Germany and not the other way around Japan was under no obligation to join.
Actually, when Italy joins in, Japan is obliged...& that creates all sorts of potential headaches. Like, does Japan still keep the peace with the Sovs? Does it make Britain a co-belligerent against ROC?
Devolved said:
When France falls I can see the Japanese occupy French Indo China as a 'favour' to their British Allies even if no one else sees it that way.
Possible, but less likely IMO, given the above conditions. In fact, with Japan offering (some) aid, it's conceivable France's will to fight is a trifle stiffer...

The obvious big change is no Pacific War.:eek::eek: (What happens to Lend Lease to ROC is a rat's nest of problems.:eek:) Good chance the U.S. is drawn into the war against Germany in '42.

In any event, this has quite enormous postwar butterflies: no Vietnam War.:eek: No Korean War.:eek: No "M*A*S*H".:eek: No Oliver Stone.:cool: No "Magnum, P.I.":eek: (Tom Selleck is Indy:eek:)
NothingNow said:
That said, maintaining the Alliance would stress US/UK relations enough that keeping it would be important, especially if British investors get bullish on East Asia, Australia and Continental Europe, so there isn't that much of a vested intrest in being very close to the Americans.
I agree with the rest of what you say above that. This, however, makes me wonder: do you get Britain being less inclined to give away tech like radar when war breaks out? Do you, in fact, get a U.S. less inclined to provide Lend-Lease? Or old DDs?:eek: (I can't imagine actively hostile, let alone belligerent, but more strongly isolationist? Yes--& that's not good for Britain.:eek:)
 
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Perhaps if it became clearer earlier on in the peace that the US Senate, and the American public at large, was firmly opposed to America becoming involved closely with Britain it might lead to Britain deciding to keep the Alliance - or at least extend it only a few years to await political developments in America. Obviously when it becomes clear America is retreating into isolationism Britain would breathe a nice sigh of relief they still keep a powerful ally in the Far East, particularly in light of the Russian Civil War resulting in a Communist victory.
 

NothingNow

Banned
I agree with the rest of what you say above that. This, however, makes me wonder: do you get Britain being less inclined to give away tech like radar when war breaks out? Do you, in fact, get a U.S. less inclined to provide Lend-Lease? Or old DDs?:eek: (I can't imagine actively hostile, let alone belligerent, but more strongly isolationist? Yes--& that's not good for Britain.:eek:)
Who says anything like WW2 would even happen. We're talking about a pre-Versailles POD after all.
Besides, with the IJN capable of securing pretty much everything east of Singapore, the RN would have the Destroyers and Sloops needed for adequate ASW coverage of any convoys.
 
NothingNow said:
Who says anything like WW2 would even happen. We're talking about a pre-Versailles POD after all.
Fair point. I do think the butterflies won't start to be felt til after the war, at best. How much does this change Germany's politics before 1914? Or Japan's desire for German territory? Or dominance over China & Korea? Not much IMO.
NothingNow said:
Besides, with the IJN capable of securing pretty much everything east of Singapore, the RN would have the Destroyers and Sloops needed for adequate ASW coverage of any convoys.
I'm not seeing the connection, here. The U-boat threat in the Indian Ocean was always pretty small, & raiders were pursued by cruisers anyhow, while IJN didn't do commerce raiding on an appreciable (or noticeable:rolleyes:) scale.
 
You know it struck me that if Germany had a more imposing presence in the Far East in WW1, Japan would quickly prove its worth to the Alliance. Maybe a German Phillipines instead of a US Phillipines. Clearly this sets the POD just slightly before 1900, but it's certainly not unreasonable.

If we assume this as a POD, it would also mean that not only would Japan be a very significant ally in the Pacific against a significant German possession, but the absence of an American Phillipines also means US interests aren't so potently threatened by a powerful Japan.
 
Could there be a way for Japan and Britain to mantain their alliance into the 1930s? what would be the consequences ofthis partnership beign mantained?

Increased friction between the US and Britain, increased likelyhood of the Soviet Union and Germany forming a more dangerous partnership, and an indirect British participation in the Japanese conquest of China.
 
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