Could you develop this process description a bit? I'm far from being familiar with.
In a nutshell, although China developed a process of bureaucratic selection as early as the Western Han in 100BC, the bureaucracy largely continued to be the exclusive preserve of landed clans, who formed a 'feudal class' that reached its apogee in the Jin and Southern Dynasties (c.300-600AD). These clans were a major constraint on imperial power, even into the Tang (c.600-900 AD). Contrary to the idea of Imperial China as meritocracy, epitaph research shows that lineage (mercantile and landowning as well as royal descent) remained a powerful determinant of social class throughout this period.
The warlordism of the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms (10th Century) utterly decimated these traditional clans, and starting from the Song meritocratic selection of the bureaucracy, exemplified in the famous examinations system, became the main determinant of class. Thus came the scholar-bureaucrat class, which admitted members on adherence to state-sanctioned Neo-Confucianism, and whose loyalty was only to the state.
Further central control over the selection of bureaucrats was enhanced during the Ming and Qing with examination standards (the so-called 'eight-legged essay), and the power of local gentry (even Ming princes) quickly reached its nadir - at least, until the decline of Qing government starting in the mid-1800s.
The emergence of the scholar-bureaucrat class also had great ramifications for the future development of China, not least in terms of the rigid Neo-Confucianism that became a requirement for social advancement, and its enablement of centralization and, later, absolutism as emperors defended their powers against the bureaucrats.
What do you mean regarding this (except low taxation, that is more or less self-explaining)?
As I posited, Li Zicheng would probably have a similar outlook as Zhu Yuanzhang, founder of the Ming, due to their similar circumstances. The late Ming peasant rebellions were fuelled primarily by a couple of factors: 1) bad harvests, 2) overtaxation, 3) accumulation of land by rich landowners who would then reduce peasants to increasingly serf-like conditions, 4) land speculation by merchants. The same things largely happened during the Yuan.
So I don't think it's unreasonable to expect Li Zicheng to, in Chinese-history speak, "look down with pity on the peasants" and to take action against their so-called tormentors, as well as tilting state economic policy in their favour. Zhu Yuanzhang certainly did that.
Was it really different from Qing administration on this regard?
Ming and Qing perceived different primary domestic threats. I think it's fair to say that for the Ming, the security apparatus was aimed at the
bureaucratic class; for the Qing, the apparatus was aimed at the
Han people. As such, Ming's security apparatus were actually agencies - the Eastern Depot, the Western Depot, the Inner Depot, and so on.
Qing's security apparatus, on the other hand, was essentially the Manchu people - Manchu quarters existed in every major Chinese city, and Manchus received much better training in arms than Han (during the Opium Wars, the British commented that they could have been good Sepoys). All government agencies had Manchu officials to look over their Han underlings, and you also had the collective-informing-and-punishment system of the
baojia. Manchus were largely controlled through a web of inter-marriage and 'sharing the spoils'.
As such, Qing's agencies weren't anywhere as powerful as their Ming counterparts, which also meant that Qing eunuchs were not as powerful as their Ming counterparts. Qing was also... less sadistic (for the most part) towards its officials due to this, though it took perceived threats to its regime (the so-called Literary Inquisition) from the common folk extremely seriously.
Both dynasties did centralize intensively, however.