Malê Rising

On the topic of Hyderabad, I would assume the Nizam would go with King/Malik for the same reason many post colonial monarchies went with it: under the colonial system, the Sultan was under the King-Emperor. And any attempt to go with Padishah would be met with a little ridicule; plus taking the title Shah would mean linguistic subservience to Persia; unacceptable!:p
 
Noodle stalls, yeah - they're not just for Nonyas anymore. There will probably also be a lot more bleed-over between Malayan and Javanese cuisine.

Speaking of which, I wonder if there will be a food rivalry between the East Indies cities just like OTL. Penang and Singapore are quite known for their Chinese and Nyonya fusion cuisine while Sumatra and the northeastern Malay states are somewhat famous for their traditional dishes. The food blogs and newspaper columns would be quite a sight ITTL.

BTW, am I correct in understanding from a few minutes of googling that the Negeri Sembilan dialect is Minangkabau?

Yep. Negeri Sembilan's history is a bit intertwined with that of the Minangkabau as the ruling nobility there have intermarried with Minangkabau princes and princesses from Sumatra over the centuries, bringing along peasant immigration among the latter as well (inclusing my mother's ancestors). This has resulted in some parts of the state having different dialects, architecture, and customary laws from the rest of the Malay Peninsula such as property and bloodlines passing down through the daughters, not the sons.

ITTL, the deeper connection of the East Indies might pull more Minangkabau to settle in Malaya, bringing along their culture and customary laws to a new generation. I could see more public and government buildings in Negeri Sembilan adopting Minangkabau styles of architecture, maybe even up to emulating something like the Pagaruyung Palace.

I asked an Indonesian (the Persatuan Ejaan idea was his - my initial thought was "Bahasa Kesatuan"), but the mistakes in word order were my own. Thanks for the correction.

Anyime. :)
 
Wow, a good ol' Siam-Burma switcheroo! Really though, reading about Siam's government, the Ne Win/SLORC/USDP vibes were so strong, they couldn't be missed.

Having worked in the Shan highlands (near Kokang/Muse/Nam Kham/Lashio), and having visited the Karen highlands last new year, I'd be really curious to see where the "borders" lie, and how chaotic it must be for the Consistory to manage (to use a term) Zomia.

If I ever had time, I could think of a potentially interesting narrative in the region...

One other thing that hasn't happened and won't happen ITTL is the view of Bangkok as a Southeast Asian sin city - under the socialists and then the military, it was fairly strait-laced, and has stayed so under the right-authoritarians. I'm not sure if any city in that region will have the place in popular imagination that Bangkok did IOTL: the Muslim cities and Manila are culturally wrong for it, Singapore and Saigon are all business (and also culturally wrong), and Chiang Mai and Vientiane are more hippie than decadent. Maybe Rangoon or... Mandalay? Or maybe not.

I would wonder why this trend would emerge at all. Unless the Consistory has the same record as the UN for promoting cultures of prostitution, etc (a la Cambodia), Southeast Asia ITTL hasn't seen the same trends as OTL that turned Bangkok into such a city (i.e. no American GIs headed to Bangkok for R&R during the Vietnam War)...
 
Interlude: Memories of a poet

Shatby, Alexandria
January 1990

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Sugar Mary sang at the Metropolitan on Thursday nights. The club was near the corniche and it drew tourists from the hotels and ships; they were the ones who filled the tables in front, listening under the bright lights to songs most of them didn’t understand. The other tables – the ones where the light was dimmer and the shadows were a veil – were where the city people sat. They were Arab, Greek, Armenian, Italian, all of Alexandria’s nations, and they all had different reasons for coming, but they all came because it was Mary’s night.

Costas sat near the wall, by the door that led downstairs to the kitchen, and nursed a bottle of ouzo while he listened. At the tables to either side, there was smoke and conversation, and the air was heavy with tobacco and kif; he was alone and said nothing. He had ears only for the song, and eyes only for the singer.

The set started with the Cairene and Stambouli ballads that were standard Alexandrine nightclub fare, mixed in with Roman love songs. Mary sang them well: her voice was deep and smoky as the air, the kind of voice that carried emotion as easily as a professor’s might carry erudition or an army officer’s might carry command. Some of the tourists sang with her, the ones who knew; others clapped their hands. Those at the back tables waited.

After thirty minutes, she dismissed her accompanists, and two men came on stage to replace them, one skilled on the oud and the other with a duduk. The music took on a new tone, a melancholy one, and Mary beat slowly on the hand-drums and sang in Armenian and Turkish. Now the conversation ceased in the dim corners of the club, stilled by laments that even the tourists could tell were ancient. Costas understood only a few of the words, but he didn’t need them to conjure scenes of doomed love and long-ago wars. Every nation had those stories.

Last of all, at the changing of the hour, Mary sang in Greek. For this, she had no accompanists at all, but if the tourists were expecting traditional songs, they were disappointed. Some of them were slow and others brisk and modern, but none had their origin in the tavernas of Athens or among the peasants of Arcadia. They were poetry, and they came from these very streets.

“This is called ‘1901,’” Mary said, and Costas put his drink down and leaned forward through the light of flickering candles. She sang slowly and sadly, and it was a song of a man’s love for another man and longing for his lover’s embrace. To sing of such things at all was daring in Alexandria, where everyone knew about them but kept them hidden, and for a woman to sing of them seemed more daring still. It was almost, Costas thought, that there was a different character to her voice now – or maybe it was just that he knew whose lyrics those were.

The song ended – everything must end – and its spell hung over the silence. Mary made her way offstage and out of the harsh light. She was overweight, Costas noticed for the first time, and she was somewhere on the far side of fifty. There was an empty table in the shadows and she retreated to it, disappearing as the patrons called for more drinks and the next singer came on.

Costas got up, leaving behind his half-finished bottle, and walked over to where she was. She was surrounded by admirers and well-wishers, but they dissipated after a time, and at last he stood alone with the palms of his hands on the tabletop.

“Ustaza Mariam?” he asked. “I hoped to meet you.”

She didn’t know him, but she thought that he was another admirer, and her smile was welcoming. “And you are?”

“Costas,” he said. “Costas… Kavafis.”

The smile vanished; the eyes grew stony. Mary rose from her chair, and she too left behind a half-empty bottle. “You’ve met me,” she said. “Now you can go to hell.”
_______​

Costas didn’t dare approach her the next Thursday, although he came to listen, and on the one after, he walked halfway but his courage failed him. It was the Thursday after that – the last one in January, with leaden skies and a cold drizzle such as only happened in Alexandria in the winter – that he made it all the way.

Mary recognized him this time, and she signaled for the bouncer. “Wait,” he cried out. “I’m not the one who threw your mother out of the family. I wanted to meet you. Just that.”

She looked at his face closely, and her hand stopped in mid-movement. “You’re a child. Maybe you mean it,” she said. “Then sit.” She poured a glass of carob juice, pushed it in his direction, and gestured at a bottle. “That’s ‘Athyub vodka. To improve the kharoob.”

He poured some in, raised the glass timidly and drank, the earthiness of the Ethiopian spirit contrasting with that of the carob. Across the table, Mary put her own cup down and regarded him evenly.

“So tell me,” she said. “What does the family say about my mother now? What do they say about me?”

He looked embarrassed. “They don’t say anything. They don’t mention your name. I didn’t know who you were until I heard the lyrics to your songs.”

Mary laughed out loud, and there were ripples in the smoky haze. “So Constantine’s verses brought you to me? I weave them in with a few of my own… I’m only a poet in Greek, you know. When I try to write in Arabic or Armenian, I never can – I guess I’m part of the family at the end of the day, whatever they don’t say about me.” She took a deep drink from the vodka bottle, not bothering to mix it with kharoob this time. “So tell me, what do they say about him?”

“That he was a great poet. Isn’t that what everyone says?”

“That’s not what family should remember. But that’s what’s safe for them to say, I suppose. My mother only married an Armenian – they must have thought he was much worse.”

“I don’t know.” Costas listened for a moment to the singer on stage – an Italian, he had never liked Italian music – and searched his memory. “His mother and brothers loved him, they say, and he never caused a scandal, so no one else had to notice. But no one talks much about that. He’s a god in the family, and no one likes to think of gods as doing human things.” A question suddenly flashed through his mind. “Did your mother know him?”

Mary put the bottle down abruptly, and for a moment, Costas thought he’d angered her again. But when she stood over him, there was no menace. “Are you hungry?” she asked.

Hunger was the farthest thing from his mind. “I can’t say…”

“I am. You can follow me or not.”

He stood before he could make a conscious decision, and the two of them left the Metropolitan behind. The exit brought them to Shari al-Naby Daniel, in the Jewish quarter up the street from the synagogue: the drizzle had turned into rain, and Jews huddled under raincoats and hurried up the street to their homes. Costas shrank into his coat as well, envying Mary as she strode along oblivious of the weather.

Across Riyad Pasha and Ramzi Elmasry streets, the neighborhood turned Greek. The buildings were older away from the corniche, many of them a hundred years old, with carved stonework and balconies. A few newer ones marked where bombs had fallen during the Nile war, but there weren’t many of those: Alexandria had only been within the Ethiopian bombers’ range at the end of the war, and it hadn’t been a major target. At turns, the jumble opened to admit a small park or a domed church; all around were importers’ shops with Greek signs and the smell of cooking from tavernas.

It was one of those that Mary entered, finding a table by the window as she shook off the rain. A waiter brought them bread and a plate of lamb and dolma, speaking in Arabic when he first saw Mary’s face and switching to Greek after she spoke it to him. Costas ordered ouzo and Mary raki; there was silence for a few minutes as the older woman ate and drank, and then she picked up the conversation as if it had never been interrupted.

“My mother did know Constantine. He was in Cairo most of the time she was growing up, but his heart was here, and he came back whenever he could. He wasn’t a god yet, as you put it, but he wasn’t very close to her: he was the uncle she saw at Christmas and family gatherings. That changed when she married my father. She was nineteen, and he was the only one who’d still talk to her… but he died three years later, and then there was no one at all.”

“That was before you were born?” Costas guessed.

“Yes, I was born during the war. My father was at the front already. He came home to see me a few months later, but of course I don’t remember that, and then he was killed at Malakal on the White Nile. Constantine was dead before the war began, but he did write a poem for me.”

“For you?”

“For my mother’s first child. It was called ‘The Theater of Artaxata.’” She looked toward the rain streaking the window and recited from memory. “Tell them there are Greeks even in Ararat…”

He had read every poem the great Kavafis had written, but those words were unfamiliar to him. “He never published it?”

“Of course not. He wrote it in a letter to my mother, and knowing him, I doubt he even kept a copy…” She trailed off as she saw the light in his eyes. “You want to see it, don’t you? It’s Constantine in me that fascinates you.” She waved away his denial. “I’ve been sought for worse reasons. Meet me at the lake in the Shallalat Gardens tomorrow at noon.”

Costas finished his lamb. Mary was already talking of other things, but he knew he would be there. She hadn’t given him a choice when she’d asked if he were hungry, and he didn’t have one now.
_______​

The artificial lake was the Shallalat Gardens’ glory, with islands of palms and a sculpted shoreline that took in part of the ancient wall. It was Friday, and though the Muslims were at prayer, the park was full of Christians and Jews. Minutes passed before Costas, anxious all the while that he might not find Mary, made his way along the shore to where she was.

In daylight, she looked more Armenian, although maybe that was the way she dressed: her hat was red, and the raised panels on her jacket showed Armenian crosses and Persianate knots. The clothing should have looked ridiculous on a woman of her size, but it didn’t: even a near-stranger could see that her personality was strong enough to carry it off.

He thought that she might show him the letter right away, but she didn’t. They walked out of the gardens and onto the Shari al-Horreya, which in daylight was filled with election posters and exhortations to work and study for the advancement of the nation. They passed the museums and posh stores until they were almost back at al-Naby Daniel, but before they got there, Mary turned abruptly north.

Two blocks up a narrow street led them to another sawdust taverna, which seemed little different from the one where they’d eaten the night before until Costas realized that Mary was the only woman inside. He himself preferred women – a drunken night at the university had taught him that he had no inclinations in the other direction – but he needed no explanation of what this place was: the symbols that many of the patrons wore on necklaces, and the way they looked at and touched each other, left no room for doubt.

“Men have met here for a hundred and fifty years,” Mary said, and Costas realized how old the furnishings were. She looked as if she had something more to say, but maintained the mysterious silence to which, Costas’ mother had told him, women were entitled.

“Constantine?” he guessed.

She nodded. “The song I sang the night I told you to go to hell – 1901 – was about this place. It’s the one place of his that nobody made into a museum.”

In spite of himself, Costas laughed, and when he looked down, he saw that Mary had slid an envelope across the table.

He opened it as his companion ordered zibib – strong, illegally distilled arak – for both of them. The wrapper was brittle and yellowed with age; it bore a stamp with Riyad Pasha’s face and an address in Greek. In those days, the letter-carriers at the Shatby post office would have known how to read it. They probably still could: even today, some people lived their whole lives in Shatby and never learned any other language.

Inside was a letter in the hand that Costas had come to recognize as the poet Kavafis’, and without conscious thought, he began reading out loud:

At Artashat the statues are of strange gods
But sculpted in the Greek style, and athletes
Run naked and bronzed under the mountains, a proud people
Who have learned much from their teachers…

All at once he imagined himself in Constantine’s place, and lost the thread of his reading as he tried to pick up that of the poet’s life. He imagined the elder Kavafis in this taverna on his day off from his government job, or on a visit from Cairo later when his fascination had extended to things Egyptian as well as Greek. In this place he was surrounded by invitations to pleasure but knew he must keep them secret. Here was a sanctuary, but outside, he could only return to silent longing…

When Costas looked up, he saw Mary nodding her head slowly. “He was lonely much of his life,” she said. “That’s what drew him to me, more than anything. They ask me why I’d sing about a man who loves another man, but when I first sang about Constantine’s love affairs, I was singing about my own loneliness. Later, the first time I was married, I put it aside for a while, but his poetry was too deep in my soul by then.”

Costas folded the letter without finishing its contents, and handed it back to her. “Maybe it’s better if this stays unpublished,” he said. “It was private, and it should be private.” There was a silence, and suddenly, with diffident voice, he said, “I’d like to bring more of the family to meet you. Greeks marry Armenians all the time now – even Muslims and Jews. After all this time, you should come back to us…” He stopped short, frightened of his own daring.

Mary, amused, noticed the caution in his voice. “Did you think I’d tell you to go to hell again?” she said. “Maybe yesterday I would have. Now… if they come, I’ll meet them, although meeting here might be a bad idea.”

He laughed, as much at the release from tension as at the joke. “No, the Arsinoe, by the western harbor.”

“At noon,” she said, and rose from her chair. Costas watched until the closing door obscured all trace of her.
_______​

Saturday was sunny and unseasonably warm, and Mary took her time walking from her home to the harbor. It was a quarter past noon by the time she got to the Arsinoe. But late as she was, there were only three people waiting for her. Costas was one; beside him was a woman with Jewish features and a swastika charm she’d brought back from India; on the other side was a young man with the face of a hundred generations of fellahin. Neither of them looked like family.

“No one came,” she said.

“They send their regrets, but they all have other appointments,” Costas answered. He believed that no more than she did.

“I could have told you. They might forgive marrying an Armenian, but not an insult to the family. That’s what my mother’s marriage was, and when they tried to forbid her, she made that very plain. They’ll never come.”

“But Naomi and Adly are here,” Costas said quickly. Then, slower, “Naomi and I… are going to marry.”

The trace of a smile crossed Mary’s face. “I hope it won’t cost either of you your family.”

“No, this is another day.” All the same, the silence lengthened.

“I’ve played at the Metropolitan too,” Naomi broke in.

“You have?”

“I play the flute. I backed Yasser Eid there a few times. These days I’m with the city orchestra – the one the Hellenic community started.”

“I’m a medical intern,” said Adly, “at the Greek hospital.”

Now Mary’s smile was more than a trace. “There are Greeks in stranger places than Ararat, are there?”

“Or stranger people have invaded Greece.” Adly waved to a table. “Is it time to eat?”

“No. I don’t think I’m hungry. Let’s go out to the harbor. It’s not the Metropolitan, but I can still sing.”

She gave them no time to demur, but swept out onto the Shari al-Bahariya toward the waterfront and the palace at Ras el-Tin. There was a raised platform near a jetty that had once held a statue, and Mary climbed onto it and stood facing the water. “I am Kavafis’ child,” she said, “and we will all meet again.”

She signaled to Naomi to accompany her, and joined in at the second measure. It took Costas only a second to recognize the words: they were Constantine’s, of course, and they were from a poem called “The Sixth or Seventh Century.”

She will be lost from Hellenism inexorably,
But still holds as much as she can.
Is it any wonder that we,
Who brought back the Greek language to this land
Look on that age with such longing?
 
So basically, a Greek family went through a hell of drama because one of them married an Armenian and another, a famous poet, secretly liked men. Fast-foward a generation later, and their (separate) descendants are trying to make sense of it all.

Well, drama shall be drama.
 
Speaking of which, I wonder if there will be a food rivalry between the East Indies cities just like OTL. Penang and Singapore are quite known for their Chinese and Nyonya fusion cuisine while Sumatra and the northeastern Malay states are somewhat famous for their traditional dishes.

And then there would be Batavia with its Javanese and Dutch influences, and Manila borrowing from just about everywhere. Favorite regional cuisines will definitely be a thing.

Yep. Negeri Sembilan's history is a bit intertwined with that of the Minangkabau as the ruling nobility there have intermarried with Minangkabau princes and princesses from Sumatra over the centuries... ITTL, the deeper connection of the East Indies might pull more Minangkabau to settle in Malaya, bringing along their culture and customary laws to a new generation. I could see more public and government buildings in Negeri Sembilan adopting Minangkabau styles of architecture, maybe even up to emulating something like the Pagaruyung Palace.

I mentioned at one point that many of them migrated to the Javanese cities for work and education, but if there's a historic connection to Negeri Sembilan, the migration routes would lead there as well. And that kind of architecture has to spread - it would be an alternative to both British colonial architecture and the Chinese/East Asian aesthetic of buildings such as OTL's Negeri Sembilan palace.

Having worked in the Shan highlands (near Kokang/Muse/Nam Kham/Lashio), and having visited the Karen highlands last new year, I'd be really curious to see where the "borders" lie, and how chaotic it must be for the Consistory to manage (to use a term) Zomia.

If I ever had time, I could think of a potentially interesting narrative in the region...

Demarcating those borders would be a hell of a chore - it may still be in progress, with a lot of negotiation over customary usage and rights of passage. The border with Burma might not be such a big deal - the Burmese government is eager to win back influence among the hill tribes, and thus willing to make concessions - but the Siamese side could be very tricky.

I'd love to see your narrative - if you ever have the time and want to run some ideas by me, please do.

I would wonder why this trend would emerge at all. Unless the Consistory has the same record as the UN for promoting cultures of prostitution, etc (a la Cambodia), Southeast Asia ITTL hasn't seen the same trends as OTL that turned Bangkok into such a city (i.e. no American GIs headed to Bangkok for R&R during the Vietnam War)...

Other wars, other tourists - but I think you're right, and this kind of environment wouldn't arise in any southeast Asian city. Macao, on the other hand...

So basically, a Greek family went through a hell of drama because one of them married an Armenian and another, a famous poet, secretly liked men. Fast-foward a generation later, and their (separate) descendants are trying to make sense of it all.

It's this man's family, or more accurately, his ATL-brother's family. As I mentioned earlier, his life wasn't quite the same and his historical interests developed differently, but his basic personality is much the same, including both his sexual preferences and his conflicted attitude about them. I borrowed from his OTL work for "The Sixth or Seventh Century," and the song "1901" is loosely based on an OTL poem, but "The Theater of Artaxata" exists only ITTL.

Without an equivalent to Nasser, Alexandria ITTL is still a polyglot city, with OTL's large Greek, Italian and Armenian communities and probably some Russians, Ethiopians and Nilotic peoples to boot.

Alexander's legacy, the positive side of it at least, lives on.

Kavafis/Cavafy was very much concerned with that, IOTL and ITTL.
 
The set started with the Cairene and Stambouli ballads that were standard Alexandrine nightclub fare, mixed in with Roman love songs.

So, ATL Rome is the peninsula's main exporter of melodramatic love songs, instead of Naples? :p

Well, I hope ATL Rome hasn't developed a local equivalent to narcocorrido and a musical scene propped up by organized crime, like OTL Naples (and its musica neomelodica) has. :eek:
 
Persia and the Caucasus since 1955


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Shirin Fashami, The Revolution and After: A Persian Story (Tehran: Azadi, 2014)

… The repression that followed the False Dawn [1] continued throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. The slightest breath of discontent, if overheard by the wrong person, was ground for imprisonment or execution, and the royal personality cult, which had been downplayed during the 1940s, was again all-pervasive in education and public life. The less committed opponents of the regime disbanded and went on with their lives; the more committed ones went into exile or underground.

Despite the brutality of the monarchy – which became even more so after an abortive revolt by the urban clergy in 1963 – the opposition maintained a certain strength. The False Dawn had allowed both the urban left and the religious opposition to organize and build alliances; in the cities, those organizations became the nucleus of underground cells, and in the countryside, they formed self-contained communities. Villages grew up, inspired by narodnik and Belloist traditions as well as the Honduran cofradias, which were intensely religious, governed by consensus, and which did not so much oppose the regime as ignore it.

Given what happened later – and given that parallel institutions had already proven dangerous to established governments – many historians have described the rural opposition as Mohammed Ahmad Shah’s blind spot, and have asked why he didn’t suppress it more ruthlessly. In fact, he did sometimes move against the religious communes, especially if they harbored fugitives or tried to establish themselves in working-class urban neighborhoods. But he was a centralist at heart and believed that control of the capital and the army were the only things that really mattered, so his attention was focused far more on the left and the urban religious hierarchy than on hardscrabble communes in the countryside. Also, the communes existed disproportionately in areas populated by the Shi’ite minorities such as the Lurs and Azeris, and even in the Sunni marches, and the Shah, Persian chauvinist that he was, considered these peoples relatively unimportant. The result was that the communes flourished and built increasing ties to the urban left.

These connections between opposition factions would prove crucial. The left and religious opposition had worked together before, but these alliances had been shaky and had fallen apart over cultural issues: during the False Dawn, religious, leftists and liberal local councilmen had quarreled with each other almost as much as with the royalists. But in the new era of repression, particularly after the 1963 revolt when the urban hierarchy was decimated and the left became the communes’ only conduit to the cities, the opposition felt that it had no choice but to forge a lasting coalition. This took place primarily in Shirvan and Turkestan, where groups of exiles, joined sporadically by representatives from the homeland, hammered out a policy document which called for joint action against the Shah and the establishment of a devolved federal state with broad local autonomy.

The symbiosis between the religious opposition and the left grew throughout the 1960s. At first it could do little against the Shah other than organize and disseminate information, but by the end of the decade, the aging monarch was starting to show signs of weakness. These signs became more acute in the 1970s, as the recession led to declining oil prices. Persia had suffered a bad case of Dutch disease throughout the twentieth century, with the combined effect of oil wealth and corruption choking off the development of other industries, and lower oil prices thus meant a drastic decline in government revenue and a major threat to the Shah’s program of modernization. All this made the public more restive: corruption and the royal family’s conspicuous consumption were less tolerable in a recession than during a period of rising living standards, and poor economic management made matters even worse.

During 1973 and 1974, criticism of the monarchy became increasingly bold, and the Shah’s ability to hold power by force declined as disaffection spread to the police and the conscript soldiers. By 1975, opposition literature circulated freely in the barracks, and when a regiment of the Tehran garrison mutinied in April, it spiraled into several days of confused fighting between rebel and loyalist units. By the time the government could bring more loyalist troops in from the hinterland, both the countryside and cities had erupted in revolt, with the urban left seizing police stations and government buildings and the religious communes acting as strongholds to control key roads and impede troop movements. By May, the Shah’s march on Tehran had collapsed amid armed resistance, mutiny, and desertion, and Mohammed Ahmed himself, the last monarch to rule Persia, fled the country.

The erstwhile opposition now faced the daunting task of building a state. The provisional government was a grand coalition of the left, the Shi’ite religious hierarchy, representatives of the army, and scattered liberals and local notables. Their economic and political policies were broadly compatible – all of them favored participatory government, diversification of the economy, and nationalization of the oil industry – but social issues were a point of contention across the political spectrum, and disagreement on how to manage them meant that the first elected parliament was unable to vote out a constitution. In its place, the cities, wards and rural councils passed their own laws on social and cultural matters and on local development, and their jurisdictional clashes with the central government, refereed by a supreme court that (like Ilorin’s) had both civil and religious judges, solidified into customary law. When a constitution was finally agreed in 1982, it largely incorporated this custom, and the local governments were able to keep the roles they had carved out for themselves.

The resulting state was somewhat like Honduras or the Toucouleur Empire: a de facto division of the country between the left and the religious populists in the cities and the religious conservatives in the countryside. And, again as in those countries, such an arrangement was metastable over the short term but not the long term. Post-revolutionary Persia might be a state in which most matters were decided locally, but people still moved freely between town and country, and the concentration of educational institutions and professional jobs in the cities meant that there was a steady migration there and to the oil wells that were still an economic mainstay. Ideas traveled in both directions, and by the 1990s, there were the beginnings of a genuine religious-leftist synthesis which one the one hand accepted religious law as an economic and moral foundation and on the other had come to terms with feminism and modern forms of dress and cultural expression.

The more conservative religious authorities responded to this in the same way they had to the latter-day Shah: by forming alternative institutions. In 1986, a group of local councils, mostly rural but some in working-class wards on the outskirts of cities, formed an open university with scattered campuses that gave many classes at a distance. The curriculum was more conservative than in the urban universities, and the rules for those who lived on campus more restrictive.

But rather than stopping social change, this university only made it happen a different way. Its existence made more rural families comfortable with sending their daughters to college, knowing that they could take many classes from home or a local meeting-hall and that they would be supervised if they lived away. By 1996, a decade after the university opened, more than half its student body was female, and the women who graduated from it gained economic independence and became the backbone of many local schools and clinics. Their feminism was softer than that of the cities, and for the most part they made no direct challenge to custom, but their very presence led to changes in family life and the open university’s reliance on new media broadened their horizons. Over time, rural society has come to accept them – among other things, an educated wife and daughters are now considered a mark of distinction, and it is accepted for women to work outside the home and even hold political office as long as they are traditional in dress and manner – and, try as the true reactionaries may, rural Persia is coming to its own synthesis of customary and modern.

In the center cities, of course, there is no such need for compromise. They are secular or else religious left, and since the end of the Shah’s censorship, their literature, public art and sculpture have become quite avant-garde. The cities are the center of the information and service industries that have been at the heart of the Persian Federal Republic’s program of economic diversification. Tehran in particular is a polyglot city of the world, and the feel of its downtown streets and public squares, outside Shi’ite public holidays, is much like that of Stamboul or Alexandria.

From bitter experience and struggle, the two Persias have learned to live with each other, but there are still two Persias, each sure that it is the authentic soul of the country. Whether the two will remain separate or merge, or whether one will prevail, is still to be seen…

*******

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Tamar Sharadze, The Modern Caucasus (Tbilisi: King David, 2013)


… It has been the Caucasus’ immemorial fate, with few respites, to be fought over by the surrounding powers, and for generations prior to 1950, these were Russia, Persia and the Ottoman Empire. The Porte had contended with Russia over this region in the War of the Balkan Alliance and the Great War, and with Persia over Shirvan during the 1920s and 30s, and as late as 1936, war with Russia had seemed imminent. In this world, the peoples of the Caucasus had little choice but to do as they had always done: choose their patrons wisely and accept that their internal struggles and revolutions would become their neighbors’ business.

In the world that emerged after 1950, another option was possible. With sovereignty becoming more porous – a development that Armenia and Georgia, among others, had pioneered after the War of the Balkan Alliance – and with spheres of influence no longer seen as exclusive, the Caucasian nations could maintain connections to all the regional powers and even those farther afield. The transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Ottoman Union, and the transformation of Russia from unitary state to treaty union after the 1966 revolution, made it possible to become part of both without being swallowed by them. The Persian revolution of 1975, and the subsequent renunciation of the Qajar Shahs’ territorial ambitions, allowed similar relationships to develop in that direction: although Persia was not a treaty union and had no formal outer tiers of association, it was willing to form such relationships with individual countries.

Between 1955 and 1980, the four Caucasian states entered associations with each of their neighbors, even those that they would have viewed as antagonists a century before. Armenia and Georgia had traditionally looked to Russia as their protector, but both had coethnic populations in Persia and Anatolia and many had been educated there. For Armenia, especially, outer-tier Ottoman Union membership enabled it to build ties with the Armenian vilayet that had coalesced within the Union’s borders. Conversely, the Shirvan Republic and the Khanate of the North Caucasus had once viewed Russia as an oppressor, but like Turkestan, they had been profoundly influenced by it, and most of their constituent peoples had a presence in Russia proper. The North Caucasus’ accession to the Russian fundamental treaties was, predictably, the last regional relationship to be formalized, being ratified in 1979 and taking effect on 1 January 1980, but with it, the overlapping spheres of influence in the Caucasian region were complete.

For all this, there was little movement toward unity among the Caucasian states themselves. Their languages, cultural outlooks and priorities were different: Armenians and Georgians considered themselves European peoples, and both countries joined the outermost tier of the European Union during the 1990s, while Shirvan and the North Caucasus were more inclined to look south or across the Caspian. Regional cooperation was most often effected through the Russian, Ottoman or Persian framework, or through unofficial institutions that extended into the Armenian vilayet and to Persia’s Azarbaijan and Ardabil provinces. The Greek and Jewish minorities who existed throughout the region, and who had been prominent in many of the revolutions of the Great War period and the twentieth century, were often key to knitting these institutions together.

Ethnic issues have also hampered unity, both between and within the Caucasian nations. Prejudice against transnational minorities – including the aforementioned Greeks and Jews – still exists throughout the region, as does religious prejudice, although both have declined somewhat with the rise of liberal government and the end of great-power competition. More troubling is the problem of territorial minorities. In the North Caucasus – the twenty-first-century’s only remaining khanate – no single ethnic group is in the majority and government is largely traditional and decentralized, but each of the other countries has undergone centralizing and assimilationist tendencies since gaining independence. Armenians in Shirvan and Azeris in Armenia have both faced pressure to assimilate and have, in turn, demanded autonomy and sought support through the informal regional institutions. And in Georgia, the Abkhazians, Ajarians and Ossetians, each of which are territorially coherent, have run up against Tbilisi’s strongly centralized government and its insistence that devolution would allow feudal landlords to return to power.

Some have argued that, with the Caucasus having nearly as many cross-border peoples and regional minorities as Europe, these problems could best be solved through a regional union. This movement – which is especially strong in the cosmopolitan capital cities – has led to a renewed push for regionalism, and to the ratification of a Caucasian customs union and four-freedoms treaty in 2006. At the same time, the last three decades have seen a drastic increase in separatism, which has sometimes manifested in riots, attacks on government officials, and de facto withdrawal from the state. Sukhumi, for instance, is a polyglot city of 120,000 with close ties to Greece and Stamboul, while not ten kilometers away are hill clans that recognize no government other than their own. These tensions threaten to disrupt regional wine production and the growing trade in historical tourism and religious pilgrimage, and if it is not resolved, the Caucasus could become one of the twenty-first century’s conflict regions…
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[1] See post 5352.
 
A POD in the first half of the 19th century can't change the ethnic and religious makeup of the Caucasus enough to prevent constant sectarian strife from happening, after all...

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...and this is after Russia was ruled for nearly a century by a regime hell-bent on cultural genocide inside its borders. ATL's ethnic map of the Caucasus must be even more of a cartographer's nightmare. On the other hand, Persia seems to be doing quite well. Did the Shah's cult of personality involve the foundation of a new Persepolis, anyway? :D
 
Sadly, it seems like the Caucasus just can't avoid ethnic conflict. Let's just hope it can be solved peacefully ITTL.
 
So, ATL Rome is the peninsula's main exporter of melodramatic love songs, instead of Naples? :p

Let's just say there's a friendly rivalry. :p

Well, I hope ATL Rome hasn't developed a local equivalent to narcocorrido and a musical scene propped up by organized crime, like OTL Naples (and its musica neomelodica) has. :eek:

I suspect that would be more of a southern Italian thing ITTL as IOTL - the dubious role of organized crime during the land reform struggle would hopefully reduce the amount of romanticism that exists around it, but there will always be a sector of society that sees local outlaw groups that way, whether it's the Camorra or Jesse James' gang.

(I hadn't known about the narcocorrido, BTW - the Mexican counterculture, with its religious and mythic trappings, is endlessly fascinating.)

Good to see Persian have a good time. Shame about the Cacacuses though.

Sadly, it seems like the Caucasus just can't avoid ethnic conflict. Let's just hope it can be solved peacefully ITTL.

A POD in the first half of the 19th century can't change the ethnic and religious makeup of the Caucasus enough to prevent constant sectarian strife from happening... ATL's ethnic map of the Caucasus must be even more of a cartographer's nightmare.

Pretty much this. The Caucasus ITTL is similar to nineteenth-century Europe in that political boundaries bear only a passing resemblance to cultural boundaries, there is a rising sense of nationalism among minorities, and governments that fear both the nationalism and the ideologies behind it. It certainly won't be impossible for the Caucasian states to work through these issues - after all, Europe and India did - but it will be a long slog.

On the other hand, the Caucasus ITTL has the benefit of strong collective security institutions, proven ways to integrate cross-border minorities, and neighbors who aren't actively fomenting trouble. This means no Russian-inspired secessions and no ethnic cleansing or outright civil war. Some regions of the Caucasus aren't doing badly, and the safe parts of the region are becoming a major tourist draw.

On the other hand, Persia seems to be doing quite well. Did the Shah's cult of personality involve the foundation of a new Persepolis, anyway? :D

Persia faced many of the same problems as the Caucasus, but had advantages in dealing with them: it had a long history of nationhood, oil wealth had left it prosperous and well developed, and its largest minorities, especially the Azeris and Lurs, were well integrated and invested in the success of the state. It also helped that the opposition groups had reached a modus vivendi and that none had the strength to overcome the others as the Khomeinists did to the left IOTL. Add widespread education and women with higher status than most of the surrounding societies (the bit about women becoming a majority of university students after the revolution is from OTL) and Persia is in good shape.

And I'd thought about having a Persepolis-like affair be part of what brought the monarchy down, but I decided that would be entirely too convergent.

Anyway, as can be seen, I made the Persia-Ottoman update into a two-parter. The rest of it, showing the Ottoman Union, the Trucial States and the Maghreb, will be up in a week.
 
I always feel a little sad when the Persian monarchy has to go, because it's so gosh-darn old as an institution, but, well, sometimes you just have to throw the bums out...

Too bad that, ITTL as IOTL, the Shahs didn't recognize that the world was changing and change with it.
 
I always feel a little sad when the Persian monarchy has to go, because it's so gosh-darn old as an institution, but, well, sometimes you just have to throw the bums out...

Too bad that, ITTL as IOTL, the Shahs didn't recognize that the world was changing and change with it.

To be fair, the modern incarnation of the Persian monarchy only goes back the early Sixteenth century.
It referred to older traditions, of course, ultimately harking back to Cyrus (who himself built upon the Median monarchy and the old and glorious Elamite one). But we are talking about broken, reinterpreted and reenacted traditions. There's little institutional continuity from the Achaemenids to the Parthians, to the Sasanids, and even less when the Buyids or the Seljuks are involved. The institution in itself was younger than, say, some European monarchies.
The Safavids revived Shah titles, but they were actually closer to Turkic-Mongol Khans with a strong religious bent in the earlier period (being ethnically Azeri to boot, although that did not matter much in the context).
I'd say there's not much more continuity than what Austria-Hungary could have claimed from the Roman Empire.
 
Too bad that, ITTL as IOTL, the Shahs didn't recognize that the world was changing and change with it.

Also, IOTL the last Shah was indeed quite the modernizer. He could, and should, be blamed for a lot of nasty things, but it is unfair to say that he did not understand change or progress.
 
I'd say there's not much more continuity than what Austria-Hungary could have claimed from the Roman Empire.
Territorially, they have much more in common with the majority of Iranian empires than the Austrians had with Rome. Pragmatically, there had been many empires on Iranian territory that claimed to be Iranian empires, creating a tradition of that sort of thing, rather like the Chinese monarchy.

As an institution I only meant the establishment of a monarchy including and focused on the Iranian plateau itself, not any of the other details. Regardless of their structure, the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids, Safavids, and later dynasties have that in common.

Also, IOTL the last Shah was indeed quite the modernizer. He could, and should, be blamed for a lot of nasty things, but it is unfair to say that he did not understand change or progress.
What I meant was that untrammeled absolute monarchy was no longer a successful method of running a country (at least in the long term), not anything about other fields. Sure, killing people with reckless abandon will keep you in power for a while, but it always ends up failing in the end.
 
To be fair, the modern incarnation of the Persian monarchy only goes back the early Sixteenth century.

Territorially, they have much more in common with the majority of Iranian empires than the Austrians had with Rome. Pragmatically, there had been many empires on Iranian territory that claimed to be Iranian empires, creating a tradition of that sort of thing, rather like the Chinese monarchy.

Also, like China, Iran tended to Persianize its conquerors, including, to a surprising extent, the Abbasids.

Also, IOTL the last Shah was indeed quite the modernizer. He could, and should, be blamed for a lot of nasty things, but it is unfair to say that he did not understand change or progress.

What I meant was that untrammeled absolute monarchy was no longer a successful method of running a country (at least in the long term), not anything about other fields.

The TTL monarchy was even worse than OTL in that regard - the twentieth-century Shahs were Qajars rather than Pahlavis, they had a very strong sense of divine right, and their experiments with political and social modernization tended to be short-lived. They did succeed to a greater extent in modernizing the economy, but even during the periods when they professed liberalism, they weren't really able to get non-absolutist politics. If you think of the last Shah ITTL as being similar to Nicholas II, you won't be far wrong.
 
Well, at least ITTL Persia won't be known for it's extreme religious views, though I suspect there will be some fringe groups that will squak on about the Shias and their political/religous beliefs (looking at you, PAS party).
 
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