Malê Rising

Excellent thread, read the bulk of it in one day.

One thing that this brings to mind for the future are the Rifians in North Morocco. Their territory is near a very strategic bit of real estate (the south side of the Straights of Gibraltar) which is a popular site for sparking *WW I and they were quite proficient militarily as was proved when the Spanish got around to trying to conquer the interior of Spanish Morocco and were beaten quite badly (the Battle of Annual should be even more embarrassing for the Spanish than the Italians being beaten by the Ethiopians as the Spanish outnumbered the Rifians and were crushed anyway). Also if Sahelian ideas show up in Algeria as you mentioned they'd probably filter into the Rif if Algeria is similar to IOTL, as Rifians often worked as guards on plantations in French Algeria.

Too bad Abdel Krim is probably well and truly butterflied away, he'd fit into this TL very well what with setting up one of the first Islamic republics and all...
 
*snip*
Too bad Abdel Krim is probably well and truly butterflied away, he'd fit into this TL very well what with setting up one of the first Islamic republics and all...

Fascinating guy in every way. Thanks for letting me know about him.

Cheers,
Ganesha
 
One thing that this brings to mind for the future are the Rifians in North Morocco. Their territory is near a very strategic bit of real estate (the south side of the Straights of Gibraltar) which is a popular site for sparking *WW I and they were quite proficient militarily as was proved when the Spanish got around to trying to conquer the interior of Spanish Morocco and were beaten quite badly (the Battle of Annual should be even more embarrassing for the Spanish than the Italians being beaten by the Ethiopians as the Spanish outnumbered the Rifians and were crushed anyway). Also if Sahelian ideas show up in Algeria as you mentioned they'd probably filter into the Rif if Algeria is similar to IOTL, as Rifians often worked as guards on plantations in French Algeria.

Thanks for this suggestion - the Rif Wars are something I don't know nearly as much about as I should, and they make fascinating reading. From what I can gather, the Rifian governmental and administrative reforms would be very compatible with Abacarist ideas, and their style of warfare was something a Malê would recognize. Abacarism might actually find more fertile ground here than in Algeria, where it will be initially confined to the Sufi brotherhoods and will slowly make its way into the broader anti-colonial resistance.

I'll have to figure out what happens to Morocco generally. The Spanish presence in the north is pre-POD, and a France which holds Algeria and Senegal would want Morocco too, so they'll probably be the dominant colonial powers as in OTL, but the imposition of colonial rule over Morocco was very haphazard and the details could be different. Depending on the outcome of the great war of the 1890s, the borders could be different or some parts of the country might not be colonized at all - hell, if the geopolitics are right, then one of the European powers might even take the side of the Rif in one of their rebellions. I'm intrigued by the possibility of the Rif staying separate from Morocco for somewhat longer than OTL and possibly remaining outside the kingdom after independence, but I'll need to do a lot more reading before I get there. Any ideas would of course be welcome.

Too bad Abdel Krim is probably well and truly butterflied away, he'd fit into this TL very well what with setting up one of the first Islamic republics and all...

He won't exist, but someone like him might exist. There were plenty of opportunities for Rifs to have civil service or mercantile jobs which put them in contact with European revolutionary ideas, and there may be others in this timeline whose resistance takes on a republican flavor, especially if they're getting it from both European and Islamic vectors.

Fascinating guy in every way. Thanks for letting me know about him.

Definitely. One of the great things about writing this timeline is getting schooled by my readers about the parts of Africa that are outside my expertise.

Anyway, I should have my sketch maps done tomorrow and hopefully the next update by midweek. This one will be back in Brazil, and remember, what doesn't kill one makes one strong.
 
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My African expertise is very limited, pretty much all I know is the Rif :)

I'll have to figure out what happens to Morocco generally. The Spanish presence in the north is pre-POD, and a France which holds Algeria and Senegal would want Morocco too, so they'll probably be the dominant colonial powers as in OTL, but the imposition of colonial rule over Morocco was very haphazard and the details could be different. Depending on the outcome of the great war of the 1890s, the borders could be different or some parts of the country might not be colonized at all - hell, if the geopolitics are right, then one of the European powers might even take the side of the Rif in one of their rebellions. I'm intrigued by the possibility of the Rif staying separate from Morocco for somewhat longer than OTL and possibly remaining outside the kingdom after independence, but I'll need to do a lot more reading before I get there. Any ideas would of course be welcome.

I might be making a mistake here somewhere (this is all going on memories of researching my BA history thesis on Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War), but:
-The Spanish presence in the North is pre-POD, BUT pre-POD the Spanish only have a few small coastal enclaves. They didn't get (on paper at least) the whole of the north until the Treaty of Fez (1912) they took de facto control of the rest of the northern coast after that.
-The Spanish campaigned a bit in the interior fairly early on, did badly, and then later pushed into the interior in force which was a complete disaster.
-The Rifians (on paper at least, didn't mean much in practice) recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco until the 1920's and then after the French and Spanish crush them again until the present. However they were autonomous enough that they might become independent as you say. The easiest way to make that happen is to have the main colonial powers decide that none of them trust any of the others to hold strategically vital North Morocco and the Spanish aren't up to pushing their control into the Rif. In any case there's pretty much nothing worth conquering in the Rif for any reasons aside from prestige, their only real resource of value is good soldiers.
-Rif land isn't much good for agriculture so Rifians have traditionally gotten involved a lot in labor migration (working as guards in Algerian plantations pre-WW II, working in European factories post-WW II), so its easy for you to get foreign ideas into the Rif.
-Rifians tend to be very good at war of maneuver, but not so good at trench warfare or taking fortified areas (they had trouble with French border forts and got chewed to pieces in their attack on Madrid in the Spanish Civil War after kicking Republican ass all the way from the south coast to Madrid, the Nationalists would probably have lost the war without them).
-Traditionally a fairly strong strain of Sufism in the Rif as you say. I don't know anything about their stance on Islamic legal issues.

My go-to source for all things Rif was: http://www.amazon.com/Aith-Waryaghar-Moroccan-Rif-publications/dp/0816504520/ref=pd_sim_sbs_b_1 (I THINK, this one looks familiar, I don't have my research notes on hand at the moment) if it's the book that I think it is it is a stellar piece of research, very informative and readable and well worth inter-library loaning if you can get your hands on it.

As for what the Rifians will do in this timeline, it's hard to tell since you're still a few decades behind the period that I'm familiar with (the run-up to the SCW).
 
Laura Cardoso Moreira, Children of the Malê: The Revolt in Pernambuco and the Twilight of Slavery (São Paulo: Nova Fronteira, 1995)




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… Few slave revolts have caught the popular imagination as much as the Marianada of Pernambuco and northern Bahia, and it’s easy to see why: a mystic leader who’s been called Brazil’s Joan of Arc; an apocalyptic warrior cult with echoes of Arthurian legend; the saints fighting alongside the old gods. It has been immortalized in films, books and above all songs, from the clandestine chants of the last days of slavery to the pulsing novo lundu melodies of today. That so much of the rebellion is shrouded in mystery has only increased its allure.

What, then, do we really know about the Marianada? Its genesis is surely in the legend of the yamali, which arose among rural slaves in the sugar country in the 1840s. It was said that the yamali had risen against the slave-masters and been taken to heaven by their strange god, someday to return and fight for the slaves who remained. No doubt this was a memory of the great Malê rebellion of 1835-37, distorted by distance, time and what must have seemed, to the fugitive quilombo dwellers who traded with the Malê, like a sudden and mysterious disappearance. The urban slaves and freedmen knew what had really happened to the Malê, but the rural ones, isolated on their plantations, were left to imagine and to dream. These they did, and their dreams were taken up by the mães-de-santo, the priestesses of the candomble.

The mães were not the first to call for rebellion in the name of the yamali; there had been sporadic revolts in Pernambuco and Paraiba throughout the early 1850s. It was the priestesses, however, who solved the perennial problem of slave revolts: that the more people who knew of plans for an uprising, the greater the odds that someone would talk out of turn. Slaves would brag, or they would warn a kind master to stay clear, and then the revolt would have to start prematurely or not at all. The mães had seen many rebellions fail this way, so they kept their designs a close secret within their own sisterhood, and waited for their moment.

That moment came in November 1857, for reasons that will be forever unknown. Maybe the mães learned that much of the regular army had been called away to fight in the Second Platine War, and that the region was defended only by militias and a skeleton garrison. Possibly some unthinkable atrocity by master toward slave was the catalyst. Or, maybe, the priestesses simply decided they’d had enough. But while the reason may be in doubt, the outcome is not: in the space of a night, torch-bearing runners carried the word from plantation to plantation, and by morning, an entire district was aflame with revolt. Although many of the slaves were doubtless surprised by the call to rebellion, they answered it without hesitation, and they gathered themselves into an army.




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Of this army’s nominal commander, little is known. Even her name is uncertain; in some stories, she is called María, in others Mariana. What all agree on is that she was a woman, a mãe-de-santo, and an American - a slave brought to Brazil during the short-lived trans-Caribbean slave trade of the 1840s and 1850s. If so, she was nearly unique among American slaves, who kept to themselves and followed their own rituals; there are no reports of any others being taken into the candomble priesthood before the liberation. The combination of American birth and initiation as a mãe is unlikely enough that many modern historians have strained to find other origins for her, but the contemporary sources are united in their description.

How much control she really had over the rebellion is also a mystery. She was certainly the one who had first called for revolt; she was the titular leader, the one whose name the warriors called when they joined battle; the orders she gave when in holy ecstasy had the force of law; and the council of mães at the center of the slave army carried great weight. But at the day-to-day level, command was divided a bewildering number of ways: by plantation, by ethnic origin, and most of all by the religious brotherhoods that existed before the revolt or sprang up through its communal rituals. The irmandades became regiments: here, a brigade fighting under the banner of St. George; there, a company dressed in the red-and-white raiment of Xangô, orixá of war; elsewhere, a battalion of warrior women wearing horned hats in devotion to the storm-goddess Yansã.


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Possibly the brotherhood that put the most defining stamp on the revolt was the cult of the yamali, which appeared during the second week and took part in every battle thereafter. These believed that the yamali had possessed them in order to return to earth and fight against the slave-masters. They took Ulua as their god, dressed in white robes and turbans as they thought Muslims must dress, and painted their weapons - machetes, sickles, muskets when they could get them - in red to take on the power of the yamali’s flaming swords. What little they knew of the Muslim slaves’ practice, they followed, in the hope that by honoring the god of the yamali, they could worship, and thus become, the yamali themselves.

Evidently one or another of the cults’ prayers were heard, because the army of the Marianada was able to cross the magic threshold of slave revolts: by the time the district militia forces could be organized against them, they were strong enough to win. They were poorly armed and haphazardly led, but the militiamen were little better: they were landowners who served part-time rather than professional soldiers, and they were led by coronels who owed their commands to social position rather than merit. And the slaves outnumbered the militia and fought fanatically, undeterred by heavy losses. The Marianada snowballed from district to district, gathering troops from northern Bahia, Paraiba and Alagoas as well as Pernambuco, and defeated the scattered forces raised by the provincial coronels. On New Year’s Day 1858, the army of slaves marched into Recife, besieging the regular garrison in the fortress and seizing control of the port.




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During the six weeks that the Marianada held Recife, several thousand freedmen left the city on foreign ships, working their passage or paying for it with loot. Some went to England, some to Liberia, more to the French freedmen’s colony at Gabon. Others washed ashore in Ouidah or Porto Novo, joining the Afro-Brazilian diaspora already there. A few looked for the yamali; a very few found them.

Those who remained now faced the dilemma of Spartacus: should they seek refuge or victory? Some, inspired by the messianic fervor of the yamali-cult, wanted to march south through Minas Gerais and São Paulo provinces, ridding the nation of slavery as they went. Another faction argued that the army should march west to join the scattered quilombo settlements, establishing a mountain republic beyond easy reach of the Brazilian regulars. Yet a third group argued for fortifying Recife and making a stand there.

Ultimately, they chose the worst option: all of them. About a third of the ex-slaves struck out for the mountains. Another third marched south toward the regular forces that were being rushed up from Uruguay to meet them, leaving the rest behind in Recife. Mariana herself, according to most sources, spoke in favor of finding a mountain refuge, but when most of the army insisted on staying, she joined the force that was marching down through Bahia.

Incredibly, that army won its first battle against the regulars. The force that met them a hundred miles north of the Minas Gerais border was only a single brigade, and the slaves outnumbered it by more than ten to one. With Mariana herself leading, the yamali-cult charged into the teeth of the artillery, dragging cavalrymen off their horses and overwhelming the imperial brigade with sheer numbers. At the end of a bloody day of battle, the regulars were annihilated. But victory had come at the cost of almost half the freedmen’s force, and at the second battle just inside Minas Gerais - where they faced an imperial contingent 10,000 strong - it was their turn to be massacred. They sold their lives dearly, using the captured cannon against the regular cavalry and standing their ground to the last man, but in the end, all of them were either dead, prisoners or fugitives fleeing desperately for the badlands.

The end came for the ex-slaves in Recife two weeks later. Many had already deserted the cause at the news of the approaching army, going to ground on nearby plantations or seeking refuge in the mountains of Alagoas. The rest, about five thousand in all, barricaded themselves in the city, turning buildings into fortresses and forcing the regulars to clear them out one street at a time. The next six days were a nightmare of urban fighting, but at the end of it, the Brazilian flag flew again over Recife.

That was the end of the Marianada as an organized revolt, although scattered guerrilla resistance would continue for more than two years. More than forty thousand slaves had succeeded in reaching the quilombos, however, and attempts to root them out of the badlands would prove futile. Mariana was never captured, and her body was never found; her fate remains a mystery, and charismatic leaders would claim to have received her blessing, or to be her reincarnation, for generations to come…




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… The immediate reaction to the revolt was swift and brutal. The white public was panicked by the scale of the rebellion and enraged by lurid tales of murder, rape and mutilation (there actually were remarkably few revenge killings) and black magic (which, from the Church’s viewpoint, was somewhat more accurate). The candomble was banned throughout Brazil, and practice of its rituals or initiation as a mãe-de-santo were made punishable by imprisonment or death. The dwindling Muslim congregations that remained after the Malê revolt were also driven underground. Known rebels were executed, often without trial, and harsh laws were enacted to prohibit assemblies of slaves or free blacks. Brazil had always had a large class of manumitted slaves, and had been far more tolerant of freedmen than the southern United States, but that tolerance was badly eroded in the post-Marianada repression.

In the longer term, though, the Marianada accelerated the decline of slavery. Of the million and a half slaves in Brazil, more than a tenth had taken part in the revolt, and three quarters of those had either escaped or been killed. The sugar plantations suddenly found themselves without enough labor to work the land - and with the transatlantic slave trade gone, the trans-Caribbean trade declining and the rate of natural increase well into negative numbers, there were no easy ways to replace them. Some of the planters gave up and sold their slaves to Minas Gerais or the coffee country in São Paulo, where slavery was still strong and slave ownership common at all levels of society. Others, slowly at first but with increasing frequency during the 1860s, entered into agreements to free their slaves provided that they continue to work on the plantations for pay for seven to fifteen years.

The provincial governments also encouraged immigration from Italy, Spain, Greece and even the Balkans, hoping to recruit a new force of agricultural laborers to replace the slaves. Many of these, however, recoiled when they learned that they were expected to do “slave work,” and migrated to the industrial cities instead. Some of the sugar planters - once the loudest exponents of slavery - began to speak quietly about abolition, seeing it as the only way for agricultural work to lose its stigma.

These planters were still in a distinct minority. In the coffee country, and in the coastal cities, slavery remained overwhelmingly popular (except, of course, among the slaves) - so much so, in fact, that there was no organized abolitionist movement until after 1860. In the aftermath of the Marianada, however, the economic pressures against slavery became inexorable, and the cause of abolition would soon find a powerful patron in Isabel, Princess Imperial.

The patronage of the still-teenage princess would intersect with another of the Marianada’s effects: the decline of coronelismo. The great slave revolt had proven the militias woefully inadequate to defend their districts against any kind of organized rebellion, and with that proof came a decline in the coronels’ semi-feudal dominance and a demand for central administration and protection. But the local bosses wouldn’t give up their control without a fight, and as the 1860s progressed, the struggle between the coronels and the imperial government became more and more intertwined with abolition…
 
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-The Spanish presence in the North is pre-POD, BUT pre-POD the Spanish only have a few small coastal enclaves. They didn't get (on paper at least) the whole of the north until the Treaty of Fez (1912) they took de facto control of the rest of the northern coast after that.

-The Spanish campaigned a bit in the interior fairly early on, did badly, and then later pushed into the interior in force which was a complete disaster.

Got it. I expect that Spain will still try to push into the interior in this timeline, because it will want the prestige of having colonies and will also want to establish a buffer against French encroachment on its enclaves.

-The Rifians (on paper at least, didn't mean much in practice) recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco until the 1920's and then after the French and Spanish crush them again until the present. However they were autonomous enough that they might become independent as you say. The easiest way to make that happen is to have the main colonial powers decide that none of them trust any of the others to hold strategically vital North Morocco and the Spanish aren't up to pushing their control into the Rif. In any case there's pretty much nothing worth conquering in the Rif for any reasons aside from prestige, their only real resource of value is good soldiers.

There could also be a desire by one or more of the powers to keep the Rif independent as a check against France. Both the French and British will be encouraging opposition movements within the other party's empire, and although the Rif mainly fought the Spanish, an independent Rif state would also prevent France from completely controlling Morocco. Maybe in that case, the Rifians would be able to establish a de facto independent republic that would be left alone as long as it paid a nominal tribute to the sultan and provided recruits for the army, and this republic could eventually achieve de jure independence. I'm definitely planning for the Rifians to play a part in Africa's twentieth century (now that you've brought them to my attention) but there's time to decide exactly what.

-Rif land isn't much good for agriculture so Rifians have traditionally gotten involved a lot in labor migration (working as guards in Algerian plantations pre-WW II, working in European factories post-WW II), so its easy for you to get foreign ideas into the Rif.

If Abd el-Krim is any indication, some of them also went to work in the Spanish colonial administration at Melilla or even in Spain itself - the Abacarist ideas would be more likely to come through Algeria, but there would also be a current of Western republicanism coming through France and Spain.

-Traditionally a fairly strong strain of Sufism in the Rif as you say. I don't know anything about their stance on Islamic legal issues.

Abd el-Krim appears to have established a mixed secular-Islamic republic - a president with the title of emir, national assembly based on clan leaders, elected local governments, Islamic courts and collection of zakat. Of course, this doesn't say much about what doctrines they followed, and with a different leader from el-Krim, their secular law and form of government might not be the same.

I'll definitely pick up the book you recommended, as I'd like to make some plans for the Rif. BTW, while I have everyone's attention, can anyone recommend a definitive history of Liberia?
 
Love the revolt story what went down after the fall of Recife has the ring of truth to it. For the Rif the Spanish-American War was a big factor as the Spanish wanted to repair their prestige after that humiliation. For N Morocco as a buffer that makes sense. Nobody wants the Brits to have both sides of the Straights of Gibraltar and the Brits don't want anyone who can pose a threat sitting on the other side (hence Spain). How this plays out depends on the diplomatic alignment, if the Brits are friendly the Germans might try to push for the North which would piss off the French to no end.
 
I have to ask how the revolt will affect the Platine War? Even with 'only' 10,000 Brazilian troops pulled from the front lines to put down the uprising, that's still something like half of the imperial forces used in the war, and that puts the numbers decidedly in Rosas' favor. Hell, Urquiza will certainly be forced out of Entre Ríos, and Montevideo might even fall to the Argentinians.
 
Yeah, this kicks ass. Is West Africa going to open up relations with other African kingdoms? Kongo, Buganda, Matebele et al? They're in a pretty good position to trade industrial goods for gold imo.
 
Yeah, this kicks ass. Is West Africa going to open up relations with other African kingdoms? Kongo, Buganda, Matebele et al? They're in a pretty good position to trade industrial goods for gold imo.

While I suppose their could be some trade with Buganda, would'nt Matebele basically be to far away (and without a coast or access to the sea) for them to basically do anything other than maybe knowing it exists?
 
Where are you finding this art? It's fantastic.

Through Google Images searches, mostly. I've usually been able to find some art that matches the story (although the match isn't always exact -- the painting of the slaves taking oath around the tree depicts the Bois Caïman ceremony in Haiti, and the battle scene below that is American). I suspect that it will get harder as I get into the late nineteenth century and more of the available art will be photographs of recognizable people. I'll figure it out when I get there, I guess.

Great work, Mr. Edelstein!

Thanks!

Love the revolt story what went down after the fall of Recife has the ring of truth to it.

Brazil seems to have dealt with revolts by putting them down harshly and then acting pragmatically once the fighting was over - they gave amnesty to the Cabanagem fighters in OTL, and in this timeline, they set the precedent of allowing the Malê safe-conduct to Africa in order to free up troops to deal with other rebellions. Their response to the Marianada is to slaughter everyone they can catch who was directly involved and to crack down on organizations that might lead to rebellion in the future, but then to recognize that they can't kill off their agricultural labor force and they need to think about reforms.

The reluctance of southern European immigrants to do "slave work" is from OTL, and was one of the forces that led to abolition. The negative population growth rate among slaves is also from OTL -- there were about 1.5 million slaves in Brazil in 1800, and about the same number when slavery was abolished in 1888 even though 1.6 million slaves had been brought into the country in the meantime. Some of this was accounted for by escapes and manumissions, but most of it was down to a high death rate in the plantations and a preference for importing male laborers rather than families. This means that, unlike the southern United States, Brazil needed the slave trade to maintain a slave labor force, and the loss of a significant number of slaves, such as happens in this timeline with the Marianada, will represent a major labor crisis.

Abolition is still going to be a slow process, though, and ironically, the sugar provinces will be ahead of places like Rio, Minas Gerais and São Paulo where slave ownership was spread much more widely through society. The coffee provinces will be the last to go, in the 1870s, and the central government may have to fight them.

In the breakaway republics, Piratini abolished slavery in 1844, and Grão Pará hasn't done so yet (ironically, given that slaves and freedmen were an integral part of its revolution). There isn't much pressure yet to change the status quo, but things could get nasty when the rubber boom hits.

For the Rif the Spanish-American War was a big factor as the Spanish wanted to repair their prestige after that humiliation. For N Morocco as a buffer that makes sense. Nobody wants the Brits to have both sides of the Straights of Gibraltar and the Brits don't want anyone who can pose a threat sitting on the other side (hence Spain). How this plays out depends on the diplomatic alignment, if the Brits are friendly the Germans might try to push for the North which would piss off the French to no end.

There probably won't be a Spanish-American War in this timeline (at least not the one we know), but Spain will still be the natural colonial power to expand into northern Morocco due to its enclaves there. Germany is an interesting possibility, although it may have other priorities - maybe Germany and Britain would support the Rifians as a buffer between France and a weaker Spain.

I have to ask how the revolt will affect the Platine War? Even with 'only' 10,000 Brazilian troops pulled from the front lines to put down the uprising, that's still something like half of the imperial forces used in the war, and that puts the numbers decidedly in Rosas' favor. Hell, Urquiza will certainly be forced out of Entre Ríos, and Montevideo might even fall to the Argentinians.

This is the Second Platine War. The first one was more inconclusive than OTL due to Brazil being weaker; Rosas was pushed out of Uruguay but was able to repel the allied invasion of Buenos Aires, and he didn't fall from power. The Argentine Confederation didn't form, although there a looser anti-Rosas alliance coalesced in the north around Entre Rios and Corrientes.

The Second Platine War began in 1857 with another attempt by Rosas to break out of Buenos Aires. The Brazilian troop commitment is somewhat larger than the first war, with the northern Argentine provinces, Uruguay and Piratini also carrying much of the weight. The diversion of Brazilian troops from the front lines is a blow to the allies which results in military reverses and prolongs the war for a year or so, but not a decisive one given that Rosas is facing much more internal dissent by this time.

Yeah, this kicks ass. Is West Africa going to open up relations with other African kingdoms? Kongo, Buganda, Matebele et al? They're in a pretty good position to trade industrial goods for gold imo.

While I suppose their could be some trade with Buganda, would'nt Matebele basically be to far away (and without a coast or access to the sea) for them to basically do anything other than maybe knowing it exists?

The industrializing West African states are inland countries, and so is Buganda. Trade with Buganda would involve long overland journeys through difficult country, bad to nonexistent roads, and several hostile kingdoms. The Ndebele are even farther away.

At this point in the timeline, the Sokoto successor states trade with their neighbors (the Yoruba city-states, the petty kingdoms of Borgu, the Nupe and Wukari kingdoms, the Bornu empire, and the British ports at Warri and Lagos). There's some trade up and down the Niger, to the delta ports on the one hand and Umar Tall's Toucouleur empire on the other (Tall doesn't like the Malê, but he does like their products), there are overland routes through Zinder and Agadez to Tripoli, and through Bornu, Ouaddai and Darfur to Egypt. They do like gold, but they're also interested in iron and coal (both of which are mined locally or in neighboring states), machine tools and medical supplies.

They don't have ships - at least not yet - and the overseas trade is still mostly for imports. They're just starting to think about overseas markets, and at first, those will mostly be nearby ports where shipping costs are low enough to make them competitive with European industries.

Kongo, now -- that's an interesting possibility. The Kongo kingdom was a Portuguese vassal by this time and was much weaker than it had been in its heyday, but it wasn't totally subjugated in OTL until the twentieth century. If Portugal gets the Congo basin in this timeline, as we've speculated it might, then the Kongo kingdom might continue to exist as a protectorate or administrative unit with some degree of autonomy. The Kongo were thoroughly Catholic at this point, though, and they might not be friendly to the Malê. They will trade with the French freedmen's colony at Gabon, and there will be some interaction between the Afro-Brazilian community of Gabon and the Sahelian states, but once the coastal areas are split up between rival empires, this interaction may be pushed under the table.
 
Mmm. What is going to happen to Germany anyway?

I'm assuming that events up to the Franco-Prussian War will proceed more or less as in OTL, with minor variations as to names and dates. Bismarck started his political career soon after the POD, and I don't see anything in this timeline that would derail either his career or his political evolution; also, I'm not aware of anything in the decade or two after the POD that would stop the rise of German nationalism, the 1848 revolutions. So I'm going with the assumption that Prussia will defeat Austria and consolidate the smaller principalities into a more-or-less federal empire. It's after 1870 that things will seriously diverge - a less decisive Franco-Prussian war, a perceived need for Germany to ally with Britain against a stronger France, different colonies and colonial policy. Then again, I'm far from an expert on nineteenth-century Germany, so I'm willing to be proven wrong.

When's the next update btw?

You must really be enjoying this if you'd ask that question only 24 hours after the last update! :p But the next one will most likely be posted over the weekend - I'm shooting for Saturday, depending on available time. It will involve diasporas; more than that would be telling.
 
I'm assuming that events up to the Franco-Prussian War will proceed more or less as in OTL, with minor variations as to names and dates. Bismarck started his political career soon after the POD, and I don't see anything in this timeline that would derail either his career or his political evolution; also, I'm not aware of anything in the decade or two after the POD that would stop the rise of German nationalism, the 1848 revolutions. So I'm going with the assumption that Prussia will defeat Austria and consolidate the smaller principalities into a more-or-less federal empire. It's after 1870 that things will seriously diverge - a less decisive Franco-Prussian war, a perceived need for Germany to ally with Britain against a stronger France, different colonies and colonial policy. Then again, I'm far from an expert on nineteenth-century Germany, so I'm willing to be proven wrong.
If we assume that German history will be the same until 1870, then a lot depends on how the Franco-Prussian war goes. If Prussia still wins and grabs some of the German-speaking territories from France, it's likely that there will be a German Empire as we know it from OTL, with Bismarck as Chancellor and with a policy to gang up with all other European powers against possible French revanchism. If it's more of a draw with a big loss of life, Bismarck's position will be much weaker; it will also be more questionable whether the Southern states will join the Northern States in an Empire led by Prussia. If France wins, there probably won't be a German Empire. I think it's unlikely that France could win so decisively that it could destroy the Prussian hegemony in Northern Germany, but it could grab some territory left of the Rhine (e.g. the Saar area) and prevent the Southern states joining a German Empire, so we'd have not Germany, but the Northern German confederation as a player on the world scene; a state that would probably still seeing itself as having unfinished business in South Germany and with France.
 
If we assume that German history will be the same until 1870, then a lot depends on how the Franco-Prussian war goes. If Prussia still wins and grabs some of the German-speaking territories from France, it's likely that there will be a German Empire as we know it from OTL, with Bismarck as Chancellor and with a policy to gang up with all other European powers against possible French revanchism. If it's more of a draw with a big loss of life, Bismarck's position will be much weaker; it will also be more questionable whether the Southern states will join the Northern States in an Empire led by Prussia. If France wins, there probably won't be a German Empire. I think it's unlikely that France could win so decisively that it could destroy the Prussian hegemony in Northern Germany, but it could grab some territory left of the Rhine (e.g. the Saar area) and prevent the Southern states joining a German Empire, so we'd have not Germany, but the Northern German confederation as a player on the world scene; a state that would probably still seeing itself as having unfinished business in South Germany and with France.

Interesting. So a loss could derail the consolidation of the German Empire, and even a tie would delay it? At that point, the North German Confederation was already well on the way to becoming a nation-state, and would still be a significant military and political power; however, Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg would be in the Zollverein but outside the confederation. This might lead to a tug-of-war for influence between the NDB and a revanchist Austria, and could be yet another cause of a Great War in the 1890s (not to mention that a weaker German state could be another reason why France, Russia and Austria might feel comfortable taking on Britain, the NDB and the Ottomans all at once).

How important would religion be in deciding which way the southern German states jump? Baden and Bavaria were Catholic but Württemberg mostly wasn't, right? Would Bavaria renounce its alliance with Prussia and go back to the pro-Austrian stance it had prior to the 1866 war, and would the temporary failure of German consolidation revive the proposals for a third confederation in the south? Most of this will happen offstage, but it will be important in shaping the alignments for the Great War.
 
Interesting. So a loss could derail the consolidation of the German Empire, and even a tie would delay it? At that point, the North German Confederation was already well on the way to becoming a nation-state, and would still be a significant military and political power; however, Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg would be in the Zollverein but outside the confederation. This might lead to a tug-of-war for influence between the NDB and a revanchist Austria, and could be yet another cause of a Great War in the 1890s (not to mention that a weaker German state could be another reason why France, Russia and Austria might feel comfortable taking on Britain, the NDB and the Ottomans all at once).

How important would religion be in deciding which way the southern German states jump? Baden and Bavaria were Catholic but Württemberg mostly wasn't, right? Would Bavaria renounce its alliance with Prussia and go back to the pro-Austrian stance it had prior to the 1866 war, and would the temporary failure of German consolidation revive the proposals for a third confederation in the south? Most of this will happen offstage, but it will be important in shaping the alignments for the Great War.

Most likely Bavaria would align itself with France as far as I would say. While Ludwig II was afraid of Napoleon III's claims on the Palatine he thought about back-stabbing the Prussians during the Franco-Prussian War (something I found in multiple sources, but not wikipedia...). So maybe an independent Bavaria allied with France and Württemberg and Baden allied with eachother (and also remaining part of the Zollverein) could be a possibility.

And by the way: Excellent timeline, a fascinating read! Subscribed and lurked for a while now and I haven't been dissappointed.
 
What can I say, Jonathan? Excellently written, engaging, interesting; I just can't wait to nominate this timeline for a Turtledove. Great update!

This massive slave rebellion will also probably have consequences in the United States. As news trickles into the Southern states, slaves will become antsy and slaveholders will become ever more paranoid. Throw a few crazy Northern abolitionists like John Brown into the mix, and you've got yourself a civil war a few years early, precipitated by a slave rebellion.

The hills of South Carolina and the rice country there are a good candidate for such a rebellion to start; rebelling slaves could fall back to the Appalachians if defeated, and historically, African-Americans in that region outnumbered whites by almost 3-1.

Of course, you might have entirely different plans! Whatever they are, I'll be eager to read them.

Cheers,
Ganesha
 
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